Right plane, wrong process
We have long supported the acquisition of F-35 stealth fighter jets for the Royal Canadian Air Force — for good reasons. The CF-18 fighters currently fielded by the Air Force are 30 years old, and will be close to 40 by the time they are expected to be retired in 2020. Since the Canadian military likely will use the next plane it buys for nearly as long, it makes sense for us to buy the most advanced plane possible. Furthermore, the F-35 has been designed in consultation with our closest allies, and will likely be used by many of their forces in coming decades. It is efficient, both economically and operationally, to use equipment shared with allies.
But no weapon system can be supported at any price. As important as it is to have a wellequipped military, it is equally important to ensure that every public dollar is spent wisely. Money invested in F-35s is money that isn’t available to address our military’s other pressing needs (of which there are many), or for other worthy goals — including the elimination of the federal deficit.
For months now, opposition politicians have accused the government of neglecting cost oversight during the F-35 procurement process. And thanks to a report released on Monday by Michael Ferguson, the federal Auditor-general, those claims can no longer be dismissed as partisan point-scoring.
The A-G’S F-35 report tells the tale of a program run by the generals, not by elected officials
The A-G has concluded that in 2006, when Canada first announced its intention to buy 65 of the advanced, American-built aircraft, proper procedures were not followed.
The Ministry of Public Works was obligated to analyze documentation provided by National Defence establishing that no other aircraft met the Air Force’s needs. But when Defence failed to provide such documentation, Public Works signed off on the controversial sole-sourced decision based entirely on a letter sent by Defence to Public Works, declaring the F-35 the only plane that would do. Based on this, Canada committed itself to the largest military procurement program in its history.
There are problems beyond that: The Auditor-general found that Defence was ill-inclined to keep relevant government officials aware of cost increases in the F-35 program, including those caused by development delays and challenges experienced by the U.S. manufacturer, Lockheed Martin. Nor were government ministers given all the information that Defence had available — just the best-case scenarios that cast the F-35 in the best possible light.
Defence also underestimated, says the Auditor-general, how much the F-35 would cost to sustain in service. This means the military or the government would need to contribute additional future funds to cover shortfalls caused by maintenance and the probable need to procure replacement aircraft, given that the government only intends to purchase 65 (the absolute bare minimum necessary to meet all of the Air Force’s obligations).
The Auditor-general’s report on the F-35, in short, is the tale of a military program being directed by the generals, not the elected officials (and their appointees) tasked with minding the public purse. The military wants the F-35, and is doing its best to make sure that’s what they get.
Assuming that the original government costing is not massively off base, the F-35 is the right plane for Canada. And we would continue to support its purchase, so as to ensure that our Air Force remains competitive with any potential future threat. (Contrary to those who question why Canada needs advanced jets at all, we appreciate that military threats can develop suddenly — few would have foreseen, even months in advance, that Canada would go to war in Afghanistan or Libya).
But the military has bitten the hand that fed it by failing to observe the proper protocols for the acquisition of new military hardware: The government, which has typically been proud to tout its military expenditures as evidence of its support for the troops, is expected to announce Tuesday that management of the program will be transferred entirely to Public Works, and that other aircraft will be considered in place of the F-35 while the entire program is reviewed.
We welcome the review, as it will provide an opportunity for voters to learn truly how much it will cost to replace the CF-18S. In the end, the cost of the F35s may prove prohibitive. But in any event, there are lessons here, both for the government and the military: Major spending purchases must be decided upon by the proper officials. It’s the job of the armed forces to explain their needs and let the government do its work. Meddling in the process, even with good intentions, is clearly not something that works out well for anyone.