Why Germany needs the Eu more than Greece
The European project has become part of the country’s identity
As Greeks vote in a referendum that could see it drop the common currency of Europe, an ancient European nation that is famed for its cultural and intellectual heritage stands on the brink of an existential crisis. That nation is Germany. Greece may be voting on its own perilous future this weekend, choosing between bitter austerity and leaving the eurozone, in which it is a basket-case junior partner.
But a Grexit, as Greek’s return to the drachma is known, may pose an even greater threat to Germany, the economic top dog of Europe, which has led negotiations to prevent it.
“Just on a purely practical or strategic level, Angela Merkel doesn’t want to be the chancellor to start breaking down the European Union,” said Phil Triadafilopoulos, an associate professor of political science at the University of Toronto who specializes in Germany and Greece.
As an idea, Europe is a strategy to ensure peace through cooperation after centuries of nearconstant war, especially the century just passed. Germans, whose modern forebears lived under dictatorship and occupation in a single generation, understand this better and more deeply than most, and the fear that the Greek crisis could cause a wider splintering of the eurozone — and even threaten the European Union — hits them especially hard.
“The common currency was in some parts designed to keep Germany in Europe,” Triadafilopoulos said. “The reason for being of the European project, and the European Union, is to avoid the nationalist and destructive tendencies of the past, of which Germany was a lead player obviously, but blame can be roundly shared. The aim, principally, was to preserve peace in Europe after the Second World War.”
Today, it is no longer Germany but the Russian Federation that glowers at the Western world, using its economic influence to conjure a vision of imperial destiny.
Germany tried that and failed apocalyptically, and so now it sees the European project as key to its identity, even more so than many of its partners. Both Britain and France, for example, which have comparably strong economies, have major anti-Europe political movements.
There is no equivalent movement in Germany, though.
“And it’s not without reason,” Triadafilopoulos said. “Germans are very well aware of their past, and recent generations of Germans are especially wary and aware of their past. So the European project for most Germans, elite and non-elite alike, is about more than a currency union, or a trade union, or even a union that allows for the free movement of people. It’s an idea, it’s part of the German identity.”
Economic might does not sit lightly on German shoulders, and this has influenced the way Germany leads, which is to say reluc- tantly, cautiously, and with a fixation on following the rules.
“Germany, first and foremost, wants to be the country that makes sure that everybody plays by the rules, and the same rules apply to everybody,” said Christian Leuprecht, a political scientist at Royal Military College of Canada and Queen’s University in Kingston, Ont.
The totalitarianism of the past looms in Germany’s political consciousness, and it has tried to learn its own lessons, Leuprecht said. “But those lessons are not the lessons the world would necessarily want Germany to draw.”
The American stereotype is of meddling uninvited in global affairs, but in recent decades Germany has been seen as the opposite, a country that “writes the cheques but stays in the background,” Leuprecht said.
“People get very nervous when Germany thrusts itself on the global stage. We spent the first 50 years of the 20th century trying to push the Germans back into their borders, we spent the next 50 years trying to keep them there, and now we’re all surprised when they’re kind of reluctant to go anywhere. This is also how the Germans look at their economic might.”
They are simply reluctant to use it. Triadafilopoulos calls Germany the “reluctant hegemon” of Europe.
The Grexit crisis has illustrated this. Merkel’s strategy, executed mainly by her finance minister, seems to have been to articulate the ground rules, then just let the chips fall where they may. As a result, in the end, it is Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, a politically inexperienced left-wing ideologue, who has been huffing and puffing on Twitter: “Voting NO on a solution that isn’t viable doesn’t mean saying NO to Europe. It means demanding a solution that’s realistic.”
Merkel, for her part, has cut off negotiations until the referendum results are known. Her hope, which appears to be backed by market reactions, is that Greeks will vote to accept a deal, Tsipras will pay the price of his office, and a deal will be reached to keep Greece in the eurozone.
Merkel’s mentor, Helmut Kohl, who played a role in building monetary union, inspired a political term of art for this leadership style, “aussitzen,” meaning “taking a pass” or delaying a decision in the hope all will work out fine.
Germany had many opportunities over the last five years to draw this episode to a close by giving in to Greek demands for what Leuprecht described as “protection money on Europe.” Merkel’s decision to call Tsipras’ bluff has made her the very model of the modern German chancellor, but it comes at great national risk.
“Greeks and Germans share this deep, existential attachment to the European project, and that may be what carries [the referendum] through,” said Triadafilopoulos.
If not, the Grexit is likely to be seen as a German failure.
Common currency was in some parts designed to keep Germany in Europe