Knowing when to hold ‘em, and when to fold ‘em
Iwanted to discuss the letter written by the 19 geriatric Canadian worthies who encouraged the prime minister to trade Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, in Canadian custody fighting extradition to the U. S., for the “two ( Canadian) Michaels” detained on ill- defined espionage charges in China. Colleague Chris Selley has gone over the ground, but that’s showbiz for you. Selley concluded his overview by pointing out that the letter argues perversely for “surrender, then victory.” With the Meng- Michaels standoff out of the way, the various ex- diplomats and superannuated politicians argued, Canada could use the opportunity for a fresh foreign-policy start, deciding what “tough steps” ought to be taken against China. If any.
The letter, part of a campaign on the two Michaels’ behalf led by ex- Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour and ex- justice minister Allan Rock, is self- refuting in parts. Yielding “to bullying or blackmail” is “repugnant,” the authors admit, while advising just that. But “resisting China’s pressure is no guarantee that it will never be applied again in the future ... China might well decide that next time it will need to escalate by detaining more than two Canadians.”
The implication, if this argument is to have any force, is that actively rewarding China’s abduction of our citizens is a jim- dandy way of making sure it never happens again. The problem with this reasoning is obvious, but the authors are also careful not to define victory too precisely. They say that letting Meng go and getting Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor back would permit Canada to “declare its position on Huawei’s involvement in the deployment of 5G technology in Canada,” a decision “that has been postponed time and again.”
Sooo ... the authors think we should slam the door on Huawei, whose CEO is Meng’s father? They don’t say so! They only say that settling this quarrel would make it easier for us to decide. And they are only slightly clearer on issues of human rights in China and Hong Kong, which our current government and foreign service are allegedly being shy about “so as not to make the situation worse for the Canadian prisoners.”
If we can just get Kovrig and Spavor back before China lets them die of neglect or abuse in custody, maybe the pair will rediscover their fondness for home and stay out of the reach of the Chinese government. This would leave only every other Canadian citizen in China ( and perhaps Hong Kong) as potential hostages. But it would somehow give us the courage to resume fighting for Uyghurs and Hong Kongers using the weapons that the old diplomatic warhorses who signed the letter spent their careers deploying: sternly worded missives.
The promise doesn’ t amount to much. There is general agreement that Canada was placed in a position to be treated in a humiliating, contemptuous way by China. ( Though surely not by any of the letter’s elite signatories — back when they were running the country, or going on in the press about “soft power.”) A week ago our former ambassador to China observed that the Chinese would never dare treat Americans as they have treated Kovrig and Spavor. “We don’t,” Guy St.- Jacques told CNN, “have much the Chinese really want.”
Clearly we have one thing they really want, i. e., Lady Huawei. Last week a bureau chief for the Party- owned China Daily newspaper tweeted angrily that “Meng is worth 10 Kovrig & Spavor, if not more.” That sounds rather as though we have the better hand in the poker game. The Chinese have been tying themselves in knots trying to convey that Meng is important to them. Meanwhile, Eighties Canada is on the beige dial phone telling us that we should let her go, with all possible speed, and depend on China to honour its side of the deal, even though it is behaving uncomfortably like North Korea. Was realpolitik ever less realistik?
The prime minister is resisting the appeal in the letter, and deserves credit for this. ( Even if you intend to surrender you ought to put up some show of resistance.) The 19 signatories argue that the rule of law is not at stake in the Meng case, that it is a political matter, and in this they are not altogether wrong. Meng is in custody for, at root, violating U. S. sanctions against Iran. The legal pretext for the extradition is that she defrauded banks by lying about the ultimate purpose of some transactions, exposing them to reputational risk.
Her offence, in other words, has a strong colouration of high policy as opposed to garden- variety criminality. Leaving us with the question “So what?” If you put the whole question exclusively on the level of politics, the logic of the letter doesn’t get stronger.
If you believe my old pals at Maclean’s, which put four of the country’s best reporters on this story, the letter’s publication was never intended and is slightly embarrassing. But we can be agnostic about that. If the 19 authors never imagined the letter could come out, they are just Canada’s ordained quota of village idiots. If they knew it might be published, their next question ought to have been “Will this letter help make it easier for Trudeau to do what we want, or make it more costly?” Since its appearance instantly led Trudeau to commit to following through on the extradition, it doesn’t look like they got that one right.
WE HAVE ONE THING THEY REALLY WANT, I.E., LADY HUAWEI.