Lessons not learned from Somalia inquiry
Exactly 25 years ago, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were in the midst of a profound crisis with troubling news emerging daily from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Originally convened to investigate the brutal murder of Shidane Arone in Canadian custody during operations in Somalia three years earlier, it quickly uncovered evidence of mass hazing of soldiers and other troubling incidents, as well as a brazen coverup by senior officials at National Defence Headquarters. It ultimately resulted in the chief of the defence staff resigning after being implicated in manipulating documents for public release two years earlier, and a sweeping set of reforms to the military.
As the government announces a second independent review of sexual misconduct in the Forces, the Somalia commission and its outcome provides some useful lessons for this new review’s ultimate success or failure. The Somalia commission’s immediate challenge was to reform the culture of the CAF. It was effective at weeding out the immediate problems localized within the airborne regiment and significantly raised the military’s overall professionalization. However, the military is now facing a second, larger and far more diffuse crisis with deeply ingrained cultural roots. It points to broader systemic issues around leadership and accountability within the Forces that the Somalia inquiry tried, and failed, to address.
The Somalia affair was, in reality, two separate scandals — first, the immediate atrocities committed by the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia and its toxic culture, and second, the broader coverup that occurred afterwards.
At every step of the way, senior officials sought to diminish the problem and obscure its reach, until it became impossible to do so. Overall, it highlighted a leadership failure within the CAF that pervades the forces to this day.
Part of this is rooted in the reality that the military presides over a unique culture that must prepare soldiers to operate in a combat environment. However, it also can be attributed to decisions made in the 1970s that increased National Defence’s ability to administer itself with minimal political intervention. Instead of actually dealing with problems, the military often minimized or outright suppressed them from public view, reflecting the old adage, “no news is good news.”
The Somalia commission sought to change that and suggested several reforms to clarify responsibilities and increase accountability within the department. At first, this had valuable benefits; it improved the openness of the CAF as well as its ability to manage existing problems. Unfortunately, many of the commission’s recommendations were not followed. For example, it called for the creation of an Office of the Inspector General — an independent review and investigation body with a mandate to deal with systemic issues within the CAF and the legal authority to implement changes. Had it existed, an Inspector General might have helped address the various issues surrounding sexual misconduct that emerged over the past two decades.
Other recommendations made by the commission were reversed in the next decade, crushed during the broader organizational changes that emerged as a result of operations in Afghanistan. DND’S message control tightened significantly, ostensibly to ensure “strategic communications” with the Canadian public. The approach was effective at highlighting the professionalism of the CAF in the post-somalia reforms in the theatre, but it also revived the relentless effort to control the narrative to ensure public support. That line can be drawn to the present crisis over sexual misconduct.
Ironically, DND no longer has to manipulate documents, which was what resulted in the chief of the defence staff’s resignation during the Somalia inquiry. Instead, the government’s Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) system is now so utterly broken that it’s not unheard of for information requests to take two or more years to be answered. In the aftermath of the Somalia inquiry, outside interaction with the department has become anodyne, with little actual information forthcoming.
This has certainly suited successive governments, which have abetted and even accentuated these instincts. One only has to look at the “gag order” placed on individuals working on the CF-18 replacement program, which was ordered to avoid further embarrassing leaks on a poorly thoughtout government policy.
Any reforms require a full and transparent accounting of the problems in the Forces — the first instinct must not be to diminish, obfuscate or hide issues. This has already damaged the relationship between the enlisted and junior officer ranks and senior leadership, as well as between the CAF with the general public. While the new inquiry may resolve issues surrounding sexual misconduct, if the government does not address the broader issues of accountability and leadership it may find itself facing yet another serious issue in the not-too-distant future.
THE MILITARY IS NOW FACING A SECOND, LARGER AND MORE DIFFUSE CRISIS.