U.S., U.K. in pact to shield Ukraine
Russia objects to NATO expansion on its borders. Hence its characterization as Western “aggression” any NATO expansion that may include Ukraine. If Ukraine is threatened today because it might join NATO in the future, it follows that NATO itself is engaged in this dispute.
Yet NATO is not the only relevant treaty. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 is critical. Indeed, the agreement in Budapest obliges the United States (and the United Kingdom) much more than NATO obligations do.
It’s not well known, but the “Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine” was one of the most important steps in creating a post-cold War, postu.s.s.r., security structure for Europe and the world.
After the Soviet Union was thrown on the ash heap of history in December 1991, the question of its nuclear arsenal needed to be resolved. Its nuclear weapons were held at various sites now located in independent countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Ukraine inherited the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, including some 1,900 strategic nuclear weapons designed to strike the United States.
Immense diplomatic activity was devoted by the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration to persuade the three former Soviet republics to give up their nuclear weapons. They agreed, with their arsenals being transferred to Russia for decommissioning. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also joined the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
It was considered a major diplomatic triumph and a key piece of the post-soviet security order.
The former Soviet republics were understandably wary of making themselves vulnerable to the historically hungry Russian bear. The Budapest Memorandum was the response to the Ukrainian security situation.
The United States and Russia, joined by Britain, thus signed security assurances in December 1994. The Budapest Memorandum committed Washington, Moscow and London “to respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine” and to “refrain from the threat or use of force” against that country. Given that the likelihood of Britain invading Ukraine was minimal, the intent of the memorandum was clear. Russia promised to respect Ukraine’s borders and to renounce its claims to Ukrainian territory. The U.S. and U.K. acted as guarantors.
Later the other two official nuclear powers, France and China, also gave their assent to the Budapest Memorandum, though with weaker commitments.
It was analogous to the agreements made after the Second World War, pledging recognition of the new borders as permanent, which involved considerable shifts in territory for Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Russia.
In 2014, Russia massively violated the Budapest Memorandum by invading, occupying and annexing Crimea, as well as fomenting armed conflict in Ukraine’s eastern territories.
The Budapest Memorandum obliged the U.S. and the U.K. to come to Ukraine’s support morally, and gave a legal basis for doing so. That remains the case today.
In 2014, Russia’s claim was that Crimea was historically part of Russia and was only assigned by the Soviet Union to Ukraine in 1954. Hence, Crimea was being “restored” to Russia. Putin even staged a “referendum” after occupation that, unsurprisingly, went in his favour.
The history of Crimea is complicated and there are competing claims, though one notes that when the eastern Slavs were baptized at Kyiv in 988, Moscow was still a wilderness.
Nevertheless, in 2014 the U.S. and the U.K. were not keen to take a stand over Crimea.
Now that Ukraine proper is on the table — chopping block? — the obligations of the Budapest Memorandum are certainly relevant. Canada is not a signatory, nor is Germany or Poland. But the U.S. and U.K. have committed themselves to Ukrainian support. What that means must be worked out, but it is clear that significant and effective support is required. This is not a matter of NATO’S future, but of promises to be honoured now by the U.S. and U.K.
Putin has been long seeking to reverse what he regards as the “catastrophe” of the dissolution of the Soviet Union 30 years ago. Given that the Budapest Memorandum was an essential protocol in codifying that dissolution, it follows that he would consider it a constraint to be disregarded. But Putin’s failure to keep Russia’s promises does not exempt Washington or London from keeping theirs.
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