Why Canada has been slow to bring out the big guns
On any given day, I’m open to the idea that I’m wrong on any given subject. But not on Canada’s over-cautious response to Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.
Being sanctioned by Vladimir Putin’s bandit regime confirmed my conviction that far too often, sober second thought in official Ottawa has been used as an excuse for delay and inaction.
The bureaucrats and generals at National Defence have blocked attempts to send anything bigger than Cold-war-era anti-tank weapons, claiming that the army would be bereft without any of its current kit.
Public servants at Global Affairs recoil at the sordid thought of sending weapons anywhere at all — as if the dark skies over Donbas can be lightened by their diplomatic efforts.
“The machinery of government, particularly Global Affairs, is uncomfortable with the idea of lethal aid in general,” said Mark Norman, a former vice-chief of the defence staff. “I find the distinction between ‘lethal’ and ‘non-lethal’ politically-motivated and unhelpful. We should focus on the best type of assistance provided to Ukraine and stop arguing over semantics.”
Meanwhile, the Trudeau government has been calcified by fears that it might really upset the Russians if it sends weapons that might tip the balance on the battlefield.
That is what made the prime minister’s announcement last week, that Canada will send heavy artillery to Ukraine, all the more surprising. Late Friday, the government confirmed that a number of M777 howitzers and ammunition have been delivered to Ukraine, “in conjunction with our American allies.”
So what happened? The explanation is that the Americans provided Justin Trudeau cover to beef up a military aid program that was starting to look like it was all hat and no cattle.
The prime minister’s pledge came just days after President Joe Biden said the U.S. would send US$800 million of heavy weaponry, including howitzers. Canada has 37 of the same big guns, according to Wikipedia’s Canadian military inventory and CBC reported that Canada has committed to send four from its stocks, to be back-filled at a later date.
The government release also said it is in the process of finalizing contracts for a number of “commercial pattern armoured vehicles” which will be sent to Ukraine as soon as possible. National Post reported last week that the Liberals are in discussions with Roshel Smart Armoured Vehicles of Mississauga, Ont.
It is also possible that the government will also free up some of its 600 or so light armoured vehicles for use in Ukraine.
But why has it taken two months of a conflict to restore justice in Ukraine for Canada’s contribution to come close to matching the rhetoric of its ministers?
The answer is that the government’s position has evolved at a slower pace than public opinion or the situation on the ground.
Discussions on how Canada might respond to an invasion began in January. There was a strong aversion to sending weapons around the cabinet table and in the upper reaches of the diplomatic corps. But the reality of the invasion became grim enough that the decision was finally made to send modest amounts of lethal aid.
Three days after the Russians invaded, the government announced it would send a package of aid, including 100 Carl Gustaf anti-armour weapons. The Rubicon had been crossed but with no great enthusiasm by a cabinet that was happier in mid-stream.
The lack of zeal was reflected in the military and the bureaucracy at National Defence, where the default position is to play down Canada’s ability to contribute.
While it’s true that the Canadian Forces are not bristling with surplus firepower, it is also true that they wouldn’t voluntarily give up the parsley off their fish.
The bureaucracy at National Defence ignored proposals to send Harpoon anti-ship missiles, telling political staff the Americans had blocked the idea, something the State Department later denied.
A proposal to send hundreds of LAV3S was also spurned on the basis that the Ukrainians don’t have the parts or the training to operate them.
Norman scoffed at that idea. “Send them the owners’ manual. They’ll figure it out,” he said. “The bureaucracy grabs on to this kind of thing if it is predisposed to not do something.”
The inaction suited a cabinet that was concerned about escalation by the Russians, if Canada contributed weapons that actually made a difference on the ground.
However, the success of the Ukrainian defence, and clear concerns that the $500 million in military aid in the budget might turn up too late, prompted a rethink.
As the Americans recognized the need to equip the Ukrainians with heavy weapons in the second phase of the war, Canada decided to move in lockstep.
The Biden Administration has committed an additional US$1.6 billion in heavy weapons in the past two weeks — a level of capability that was viewed as too provocative a month ago.
While the U.S. has still not sent fighter aircraft, it managed to scrounge enough parts to add 20 new operational planes to a fleet that now has more aircraft than it did three weeks ago.
“We’re in a critical window of time,” the president said, adding the U.S. and its allies are “moving as fast as possible” to provide weapons for Ukraine.
That sense of urgency, allied to Biden’s announcement on the howitzers, gave Trudeau the confidence to make his own vague promise on artillery, a commitment that appears to explode the idea that the political deal with the NDP is driving the Ukraine policy. Following in Biden’s slipstream will make things easier from a political and logistical point of view.
The fact that Biden and Trudeau feel the need to send in the big guns speaks to the precarious nature of Ukraine’s situation.
This is not a story where a happy ending is pre-ordained.
But Canada’s decision to dip into its modest stocks and send M777s, as well as the prospect of armoured vehicles, means it has done more than most of its critics expected.
SEND THEM THE OWNERS’ MANUAL. THEY’LL FIGURE IT OUT.