Deploy NATO forces in Ukraine

Crimea has a broad and complex history which is subject to varying interpretations. But it’s clear that post-war relations between Russia and the West has not exactly been ambivalent. Whether Russian president Vladimir Putin is concerned with protecting Russian-speaking minorities in Eastern Europe, or is anxious about a West-leaning Ukraine as a destabilizing force is somewhat unimportant. What is important is that we recognize that Mr. Putin understands and respects strength, and will capitalize on weakness. That in mind, diplomatic and economic sanctions are appropriate but insufficient in terms of dealing with Russia. None of NATO’s new eastern members is safe from Russian armed expansion unless NATO takes a clear and deployed stand.

The new Ukrainian government should formally request NATO support, as should Ukraine’s NATO neighbours via a stabilizing multidimensional deployment. The issue is no longer Crimea. The issue is the rest of eastern Ukraine and neighbouring countries.

Thousands of NATO troops moving toward eastern borders where they would deploy appropriate naval, air and special force support is the best platform for constructive negotiations with Russia. Ruling out military options is exactly what Mr. Putin wants to hear from Western leaders, and it encourages the more aggressive and expansionist forces in the Kremlin and Russian military.

While economic sanction should still be pursued, failure to facilitate a defensive and prophylactic military stance undermines the prospects for diplomatic solutions. There are alert levels and readiness enhancement initiatives within the purview of NATO. There are naval and other deployments that the Russians would take seriously. Being taken seriously is the first essential platform upon which a new framework with Russia can be built. Dependable weakness, as was shown in Georgia by the West and in Syria more recently, sends a message to Russian leadership that negotiating is neither necessary or helpful.

Russia may well want a new “near abroad” framework for Eastern Europe, just as NATO will want democracy and selfdetermination guarantees. Not having the discussion is a mistake. But not deploying NATO forces to ensure the freedom of Eastern Europe would be the biggest mistake of all. While negotiating is better than combat, getting to negotiation sometimes requires being seen as able and willing to deploy.

In the end, the responsibility to protect — whether as a UN doctrine or NATO obligation — is meaningless without the capacity and will to deploy. Those of us who border the Arctic with Russia are well advised to watch this Ukrainian-Russian dynamic with great seriousness. A failure of will in Eastern Europe will have a contagion effect.