In Saturday Observer:
In an age of ballooning deficits, some argue that the Canadian military’s special forces, including 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron at CFB Petawawa and Joint Task Force 2 at Dwyer Hill, are expenses this country can ill afford. The specialized un
A look at the Canadian military’s special forces. Some say our country can’t afford these units; others say they are crucial to fighting insurgencies,
T he Griffon helicopter skims several hundred metres above the ground as soldiers inside the aircraft prepare to slide down ropes onto the roof of a training centre.
A member of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment signals his comrades as they approach target.
Everything relies on precision as the pilots of 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron enter the Griffon into a hover. One wrong move and any of the men — weighed down with weapons and ammunition — could plummet 15 metres to the roof.
Orders crackle over radio headsets: “Insert. Insert. Insert.” The men, now balancing on the helicopter skids, grab for the thick rope and then slide down it like a fireman’s pole. Fast-roping, as it is known, is employed by special forces soldiers to swoop down on insurgent strongholds or to quickly access building tops or ship decks. In fewer than 15 seconds, the soldiers are on the roof, with their weapons at the ready. The helicopter peels away. Elsewhere at CFB Petawawa, candidates for the special operations regiment are attacking a simulated insurgent compound using live ammunition.
The training and recruiting is part of an expansion of the country’s special forces, a process driven in part by the Afghan war and the campaign against terrorism. But in an era of $ 50-billion deficits, some question whether the Canadian Forces needs or can afford a specialized capability — especially given government plans to trim or delay some military spending and pull out of Afghanistan.
An upcoming review of the military’s structure is expected to examine the size and structure of the special forces.
Some politicians and former military officers believe it would save money and improve oversight if the conventional army were to absorb CANSOFCOM, the special forces command that was created in 2006. They suggest the Canadian Special Operations Regiment in Petawawa could be part of the conventional force. The reorganization would allow the regiment, now at about 450 personnel, to be more available to the army for regular duties.
“Special forces is a very expensive component of the military and no one has made the case as far as I can see that they are the only ones who can do the jobs they do,” says Liberal senator Colin Kenny, the former chairman of the Senate Defence committee. “Do we really get back value for what we put into it, or would this training be better applied generally across the Canadian Forces?”
A January 2007 study conducted by two retired generals and an admiral for the Defence Department recommended reviewing the future of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, CSOR as it is known. That study, obtained by the Citizen, noted the review should begin after the 2010 Olympics. The study recommended an examination of the command structures put in place in 2006 by then Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier in a process he dubbed “ Canadian Forces transformation.”
CANSOFCOM’s budget is considered secret. Its size is also classified, although estimates put it at around 1,400 personnel, almost all in the Ottawa area. The command is the umbrella organization for Joint Task Force 2, the country’s main counterterrorism and special operations unit located at Dwyer Hill; the 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron at Petawawa; the Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit, which deals with weapons of mass destruction and is now at CFB Trenton; and CSOR.
Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk praises the work of the country’s special operations forces — SOF, as they are known in military parlance — and says they’ve proven their worth during the past 17 years in warzones from Bosnia to Afghanistan.
The units will remain essential in the future, he argues. “We see that irregular warfare, the coun- terinsurgency we are seeing in Afghanistan, is occurring and could occur in other parts of the world. The one strong aspect of special forces is that it is very surgical in nature. They need a high level of … competence.”
At the same time, Natynczyk says no organization in the mili- tary will be exempt from belttightening that will result from a strategic review now being conducted within the Defence Department. “We are looking at efficiencies in the overall organization, whether it be air, land, sea or SOF.”
The Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. spurred the expansion of Joint Task Force 2. Hillier, who became defence chief in 2005, added more forces. He created a new special forces command, known as CANSOFCOM, and brought in the various units under its umbrella. He also championed the establishment of CSOR.
Almost immediately there was resistance. Some officers questioned the added bureaucracy. Others complained that with JTF2 already claiming some of their best personnel, the addition of CSOR would only make the problem worse.