Iraqi PM helped to sow the seeds of chaos
ISIL audacity could be its undoing, writes Ronald Crelinsten.
Last Sunday, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) announced that it had restored the caliphate, with its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the new caliph, to whom all Muslims must pay allegiance. On Tuesday, al-Baghdadi invited Muslims from all over the world to come to the new Islamic state, “where Arab and non-Arab, white man and black man, easterner and westerner are all brothers.”
With this move, the Sunni jihadist group has attempted what radical Islamists throughout the Muslim world have long been striving for — the creation of an Islamic state that transcends national boundaries and serves as a territorial base for continuing jihad.
As the most effective rebel force in the festering Syrian conflict, the group has already become a magnet for foreign fighters from Europe and North America, including young men from Calgary and elsewhere in Canada. With this new development, the attraction for some will only increase. Already, some jihadi groups in North Africa are expressing sympathy for ISIL and, in Jordan, radical Islamists have been inspired by ISIL’s rapid advance through northern Iraq and up to the Jordanian border. ISIL has already announced the appointment of an emir in Lebanon, Abdul Salam al- Ordoni, and has tweeted a map of their Islamic state that includes Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Kuwait.
In response to events on the ground, Kurdish fighters have seized Kirkuk, a crucial oil hub that has been the object of a continuing dispute between the Kurds and Baghdad. Now Israel has called for the establishment of a separate Kurdish state following the Islamist successes.
There are widespread concerns that we are witnessing the beginnings of the breakup of the Iraqi state.
How did we get here? Many blame Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for marginalizing the Sunni minority, thus stoking resentment and rekindling tensions between Sunnis and Shia. This is why U.S. President Barack Obama insists on al-Maliki creating a more inclusive government rather than providing any significant military support. Few feel that al-Maliki can — or is willing — to deliver.
The sectarianism that al-Maliki has been accused of fomenting certainly runs deep in the region. The prime minister purged his cabinet of Sunnis and refused to integrate Sunni militias into Iraq’s security forces after the Sunni insurgency ended in 2008. Before that, ISIL’s predecessor, al- Qaida in Iraq (AQI), headed by the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was equally vicious, targeting mostly Shia in their attempt to inflame sectarian tensions. Like its successor, AQI was condemned by al- Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri for being too extreme.
It is clear, however, that the whole chain of events was set off by the 2003 invasion of Iraq and, in particular, the controversial decision by Paul Bremer, then head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, to disband the Iraqi army and ban former Baath party members from holding public office, which resulted in the firing of thousands of government employees and school teachers. This de-Baathification policy severely weakened state capacity, creating a power vacuum that ultimately led to disorder, chaos and widespread sectarian violence several years later.
The success of ISIL today is due in part to that group’s military prowess and adept use of social media to inspire, recruit and raise funds. However, it is also due to the support of alienated, frustrated, and disenfranchised Sunnis — ex-Baathists and various tribal groups and sects — who see no alternative but to join forces in an alliance of convenience.
One ray of hope is that, with its audacious restoration of the caliphate, ISIL will alienate those current allies who do not share its extremist views and radical Islamist vision.