ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI
Jihadist leader seen in public
When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi emerged from the shadows to lead Friday prayers, the world caught its first glimpse of the reclusive jihadi leader since his forces overran much of north and west Iraq.
His message was clear. As selfdeclared caliph, he called on the world’s Muslims to join his jihad.
Although his words may have been part of his struggle for supremacy over al- Qaida and its branches, his rare appearance was a reminder of the way another secretive Islamist leader had declared his arrival two decades earlier.
In 1996, Mullah Omar took to the roof of a mosque in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and wrapped himself in a cloak reputed to have once been worn by the Prophet Moham- med. Six months later his Taliban troops conquered Kabul.
The question analysts and military commanders must now ponder is whether al-Baghdadi’s Islamic State can follow suit and sweep to power.
At the very least, his appearance demonstrates his confidence, according to Charles Lister, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Centre.
“Put simply, one of the most wanted men on Earth was able to travel into central Mosul and give a 30-minute sermon in the most venerated mosque in the largest city under control of the most notorious jihadist group of our time,” he said.
At first glance, both this Islamic State and the Taliban have comparable strengths and weaknesses. Both have used similar rapid offensives to win swaths of territory.
In a recent essay, Ahmed Rashid, who has written extensively about Afghanistan and the Taliban, said their primitive, extreme versions of Islam were no substitute for coherent, long-term political programs. “Both groups’ extreme Islamism renders them illequipped to govern the areas they control,” he wrote.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban successfully won hearts and minds in parts of the country suffering at the hands of corrupt administrators. By offering their own, pious version of justice they were able to persuade local militia leaders to join up with Mullah Omar’s forces.
But by 2001, hundreds of thousands of people had fled Afghanistan’s high unemployment and hard-line law, suggesting that draconian Islamic states tend to fail if given enough time.
So far, Baghdadi’s Islamic State has managed to make progress in a similar way, capitalizing on anger at the government of Nouri al-Maliki. But it is bolstered by numerous fellow travellers, including tribal leaders and Baathists, whose different agendas may mean the fragile coalition is only temporary.