Certainly, the majority must rule — but it should surely be an actual majority, not a phoney one.
Criticism of alternative voting systems often apply to first past the post as well
The faults of first past the post, the subject of my last two columns, are mirrored in the virtues of the systems that would replace it.
There are any number of alternatives, but broadly speaking they break into two types: proportional, where a party’s share of the seats in Parliament hews closer to its share of the popular vote; and preferential, where voters, rather than simply marking an x beside their choice, rank them in order.
Some proportional systems are also preferential, but a preferential ballot on its own does not imply proportionality. Like first past the post, it’s still a “winner take all” system, only the winning candidate must get a majority of the vote, rather than a mere plurality. Usually this is achieved by combining first choices with the second and third choices of voters of other candidates.
What makes a system proportional is the use, in place of single-member ridings, of multi-member districts: thus, in a district with five members, a party winning 20 per cent of the vote would elect one member, while a party with 40 per cent would get two, and so on — in contrast with first past the post, where only the first-place candidate in a riding is elected, though he might have received 30 per cent of the vote or less.
At one extreme, the whole country might be treated as a single district, as in the Netherlands; rather than representing particular ridings or regions, candidates are elected from party lists. For obvious reasons, no one is likely to propose that for Canada. Rather, the likely contenders are 1: a hybrid system known as “mixed member proportional,” in which some MPs, say half, are elected in single-member ridings, while the rest are elected in multi-member districts (voters mark one x beside their favoured local candidate, and a second beside their party), and 2: the single transferable vote, which combines smaller districts with preferential ballots.
The relative strengths and weaknesses of each of these can be debated at another time. For now, it’s enough to note how they differ from first past the post. Rather than some votes counting for more than others, as under first past the post, under PR every vote counts equally (or nearly so). Rather than focus their efforts on a few “battleground” ridings, then, parties must campaign hard in every part of the country — because every vote (or nearly so) helps to elect someone.
Voters who now trudge to the polls feeling the whole exercise is pointless — because their candidate is unlikely to win — or switch their vote to some other party for fear of “splitting the vote,” can vote for the candidate they actually prefer: either because second and third choices also count (under a preferential ballot) or because they can also vote for their party (as under MMP).
Would this, as commonly claimed, mean “the end of majority governments”? No, it would mean the start. Under first past the post, parties can and do win a majority of the seats with less than 40 per cent of the vote: under proportional representation, a majority means a majority. Only since it is rare for one party to win that much support on its own, governments are typically made up of coalitions of parties.
Would that mean institutionalizing the sort of crisis atmosphere we associate with multi-party governments? No, that’s a function of the system we have now. Under first past the post, relatively small changes in popular vote can produce quite enormous swings in seats. So in a minority parliament whichever party is up in the polls at any given moment will be tempted to force an election. Under PR, there is no such payoff: small changes in votes mean small changes in seats. Coalitions, as a consequence, tend to endure.
Wouldn’t that mean handing disproportionate power to a minority of the electorate, as larger parties courted the support of the smaller? It can. But there’s always the next election to bear in mind: if a small party is seen to overplay its hand, or a large party to be too eager to bargain, it will pay the price with the electorate. Besides, that’s as true, in a way, of the present system: parties pay vastly disproportionate attention to a small number of swing voters.
But isn’t the virtue of first past the post, with all its distortions, that it makes it easier for voters to “throw the bums out”? Perhaps — but where’s the evidence? Under first past the post, Canada has had some of the longest-lasting dynasties in the democratic, or indeed the undemocratic world: the 42-year reign of the Conservatives in Ontario, the 43 straight years under their counterparts in Alberta, or the dominance of the federal Liberals for most of the past century.
The more fundamental objection to reform, I suspect, is less practical, more philosophical. Indeed, defenders of the status quo tend
Under first past the post, parties can and do win a majority of the seats with less than 40 per cent of the vote: under proportional representation, a majority means a majority. — Andrew Coyne Parties pay vastly disproportionate attention to a small number of swing voters.
to find the criticisms of reformers almost literally incomprehensible. Where reformers complain of the disconnect between a party’s share of the popular vote and its share of the seats, status quo advocates ask why there should be any connection at all. We elect parliaments, they will say, not governments; each riding is a separate election in itself.
Quite so. But why does that require that only one member should be elected from each riding? Why should only the votes cast for the first-place candidate achieve representation in Parliament, and not others?
Certainly, the majority must rule — but it should surely be an actual majority, not a phoney one, drawn from a body that represents all of the people, and not just some of them.