The false debate over false majorities

To move forward, electoral reform needs open dialogue, writes Stewart Prest.

In the wake of convening comments by Maryam Monsef, minister of democratic institutions, to an enthusiastic crowd in Ottawa last week, the debate over electoral reform has finally begun in earnest. Notwithstanding the minister’s emphasis on the need for inclusivity and consensus-building in our approach, however, there are early warning signs that the discussion will be deeply polarized, with proponents of different systems talking past one another all too often.

On one side, some advocates of proportional representation (PR) carry on with the zealotry of true believers. On another, some supporters of first-past-the-post (FPTP) speak with a dismissiveness verging on arrogance.

The issue of “false majorities” is both emblematic of the problem, and helpful to illustrate a possible solution. Simply put, it’s an issue that many PR advocates see as deeply significant, and many FPTP supporters refuse to acknowledge exists at all. Such a deep divide should not be possible when advocates on both sides are committed to responding to arguments in good faith. One may differ on how best to choose one option over another, but when opposing sides of an argument cannot even agree on the fact that there is a debate to be had, we have a problem.

So, let me suggest an alternative way forward. I’d like to reframe the issue not as a problem that either does or does not exist, but rather as the locus of an important trade-off in how we conceptualize representation.

Basically, we can conceive of the difference as being over how “best” to represent Canadians and their views in Parliament. To simplify somewhat, FPTP ensures that after an election, a particular person in the House of Commons represents each voter. You vote in a riding-level election, and the winner of that election is your voice in Parliament whether you voted for her or not. After an election, all voters can point to a single person responsible for representing them in the House. What they may not be able to do, however, is point to someone who represents their point of view.

Conversely, in the various forms of PR, the equation is reversed. The one-to-one relationship between voter and representative is weakened, or jettisoned completely.

In exchange, though voters cannot always identify a single specific individual charged with being their representative after an election, they can all point to a party that represents their point of view in Parliament.

The many varieties of PR propose different ways to achieve that effect, but it is a primary goal for all of them. Mixed member proportional systems (MMP) accomplish it by having some MPs elected from party lists, while other representatives continue to be elected at the riding level, generally via FPTP. The single transferable vote model (STV) achieves it by electing multiple members in each riding, with voters ranking their candidate preferences. Ranked votes are allocated by mathematical formula, transferring votes from eliminated candidates, and excess votes from winners, to those remaining.

That’s the trade-off. If you value that one-to-one relationship, even when it comes at a cost of many voters feeling they have no one who shares their perspective in Ottawa, that’s fine. Conversely, if you value a system where voters can always identify their “voice” in Parliament, even if it’s not necessarily attached to a particular person, then that’s fine, too.

This focus on the many trade-offs among desirable yet mutually incompatible values is the best way to structure the debate over reform.

However, pursuing that course is often easier said than done. It requires a style of open discussion that does not come easily, particularly when many of those most engaged on the issue have already made up their minds one way or another.

We should make the effort, however, as Canadians will benefit far more from attempts to understand and explain, rather than to simply win the argument.