Should we send troops back to Afghanistan?

NATO is asking, but Canada must heed recent lessons, Nipa Banerjee says.

On the eve of the 2017 NATO Summit in Brussels, which the prime minister will attend, NATO allies have been asked to abide by the principle of burden-sharing and contribute more troops to join NATO’s train, assist and advise mission in Afghanistan. Currently, Canada has no troop presence in Afghanistan, other than a handful to protect Canadian personnel at the embassy in Kabul.

Since 2001, however, Canada has not shirked its share of the burden. Canada’s military involvement in the country ranges from troop deployments to the U.S.led Operation Enduring Freedom, partnering with NATO in securing Kabul and its periphery, to combat operations in Kandahar, with close to 3,000 armed forces deployed at the height of the combat. Canada contributed the second-largest contingent to the NATO mission for training of Afghan security forces. And when Canada fully withdrew its troop presence in Afghanistan in March 2014, it continued a large volume of development aid.

Considering the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, major alliance powers agreed at the 2016 NATO Summit to retain some troops, while Canada promised cash contributions to help pay salaries of Afghan security forces. A commitment of total aid of $150 million a year up to 2020 was made, with a larger portion of the total commitment reserved for supporting development programs.

It is not known yet what the Canadian government’s response will be to the new request for troops. Increasing troops is an obvious reaction, given the strengthened Taliban insurgency, the precarious and continually deteriorating security situation, and rising Afghan military and civilian casualties. The deplorable state of security is hampering the operation of development programs. Improved security is essential for protecting these development investments. Yet any decision on new troop deployment — not only for Canada but other NATO allies — requires review of a number of critical issues.

Notably, NATO’s current request for troops is not for engaging in direct combat with the Taliban (and fortunately so) but for professional development and training of Afghan forces to improve their performance in the battleground. NATO already has approximately 13,450 troops for this purpose. Yet Afghan forces still appear to lack the edge over the Taliban. Therefore, will a mere troop surge, without an assessment of the effectiveness of the training and advice provided by NATO, make a big difference? A performance measurement exercise of the training mission is critically needed to identify the lessons from past experience and develop a new approach to training.

Afghan forces are beset by insider attacks, desertions, attrition and lack of leadership and morale, the root cause of which is corruption pervading the Afghan ministries of defence and interior, according to America’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

The introduction of additional troops alone is unlikely to resolve these issues.

The recommendation is not for Canada to stay away from the train-and-assist mission. Strengthening of the capabilities of Afghan troops to secure Afghanistan will help ensure returns from the aid dollars Canada invests in Afghanistan. But Canada’s continued involvement must be based on lessons learned.

It is concerning that the Department of National Defence displays little interest in learning from past experiences. Recently, DND ignored an invitation from organizers of a forum with SIGAR about lessons learned from the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan. Officials did not see the need to attend such a session since Canadian troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan. DND displays no recognized need to learn from the past.