Why sentence for mosque killer is fair
Proving act was terrorism would have been too difficult, Phil Gurksi writes.
In January 2017, Canada witnessed an event that is thankfully rare, at least in comparison with our southern neighbour.
I am referring to the mass shooting at a mosque in Quebec City, carried out by a man named Alexandre Bissonnette. He entered the place of worship during evening prayers and opened fire, killing six men and wounding five, some horribly. He was charged with several counts of first-degree murder and attempted murder. He pleaded guilty and recently a judge handed him a life sentence with no parole eligibility for 40 years.
The judge’s decision, a 246page verdict that took him nearly six hours to read aloud, has been criticized on several levels. Many wanted the murder sentences to be consecutive, which would have seen Bissonnette sentenced to 150 years in prison. Some fear the possibility that a parole hearing could allow Bissonnette to regain his freedom in four decades (Note: parole hearings do not guarantee parole: mass murderer Paul Bernardo had one last October and parole was denied).
What I want to focus on is the disappointment among some that the crime was not labelled an act of terrorism. Bissonnette killed those defenceless men out of “a visceral hatred for Muslim immigrants,” in the words of the judge. Under Canadian law, an act of terrorism is a serious act of violence motivated by political, ideological or religious reasons. Was this mass shooting not a clear example of that? Undoubtedly, some are convinced that had the shooter been a Muslim, terrorism charges would have been laid under section 83.1ff of the Criminal Code.
The matter is more complicated than that. The judge did acknowledge that the crime was one of hate, for instance. In Canadian law, judges have the latitude to add to a sentence if they believe the crime was motivated by hate (section 718.2 provides that power, while hate speech is covered in sections 318 and 319).
As I see it, all terrorism is hatred in one form or another but not all hate crimes are terrorist in nature. It is possible for someone to target another based on gender, ethnicity, creed or race but it is not necessary for there to be an underlying political, ideological or religious motivation.
The Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC — also known as the Crown) may have seen no need to enter terrorism charges in this case. That there were six counts of first-degree murder was never in doubt. To prove that these acts were terrorist in nature, the Crown would have to prove that they were carried out for the reasons cited above. This is actually much harder than it looks. Had Bissonnette pledged allegiance to a known terrorist group — in this instance, far right or neo-Nazi rather than the more often encountered Islamist extremism — that might have altered the Crown’s approach. But that evidence does not appear to have been available. Had the case hinged on proving terrorism and the prosecution failed to demonstrate the link beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge might have faced a tough dilemma.
I understand the feeling some hold that there is a double standard when it comes to terrorism in Canadian law. Acts of terrorism do cause visceral reactions: fear, terror, anxiety, etc. As a consequence, those guilty of such acts should receive the maximum penalty. But Bissonnette’s acts have been punished severely: a 40-year minimum is significant. It was not necessary to introduce the notion of terrorism to arrive at this decision.
Doubtless there will continue to be debate among security professionals and academics for years to come. In the end, however, the guilty party is paying a high price for snuffing out the lives of six innocent Canadians. There is much merit in that court decision.