WHAT CAN BE DONE?
deal of public education and virtually all publicity was in favor of our action.
I was very open and transparent in all three of my cases. I did the poles twice (in 1985 and 1996) and my other, much more minor conviction was at the command center also, where I spray-painted the signage. I had sent notice to law enforcement—I always included them in media releases—that I would be doing it. Since the military base existed for the sole purpose of launching nuclear war, I sprayed messages on their signs as warnings.
Again, the transparency, the emphasis on remaining nonviolent, and especially the outreach to the public explaining myself were crucial.
It worked. We shut down the base. The real power of our effort was the coalition we built. The Plowshares actions were only one component of the campaign’s multipronged effort and I took special care to work through that with the full core of leadership ahead of time. We were very divided when we began discussions but two days later all 18 of us had a plan that we all liked. My action was not unilateral—the group, which could fairly be said to represent the campaign, consented. No one was the boss and everyone felt heard and valued.
The current spate of destruction of businesses, including minority-owned, is hard to explain, unless part of that explanation involves reactionary agents provocateurs who seek to exacerbate racial tensions. It’s their mission to make nonviolent protesters look bad and thereby alienate the public, while also making the public grateful for the “thin blue line” protecting them from the dangerous “thugs” in the rampaging mob.
Such actions demand the ongoing, repeated work of exerting nonviolent discipline, denouncing ill-advised property destruction, and fielding peace teams to de-escalate violence and explain what the campaign organizers are asking for. While it’s always a good time to make efforts to maintain nonviolent discipline, a nonviolent campaign gains the most advantage by preparing ahead of time, knowing that a publicly stated commitment to nonviolent means—and training and statements that demonstrate that commitment—can help inoculate them against agents provocateurs, opportunists, and misguided activists who engage in violence.
There is also a need to work with all media to contextualize this and to train them to report accurately that the alienating acts of a few are not in accord with the nonviolent intentions of the many. If, for instance, the core organizers let it be known that the demonstrations will last for three hours that day and they hope everyone disperses at the conclusion, then reporters may put boundaries on what they report as the campaign’s actions, and rogue behavior committed later can legitimately be condemned as having nothing to do with the movement.
Is it fair that a campaign has to do all this to avoid acquiring an unfavorable image with the public? Of course not; if it were fair, we wouldn’t have to surround the precinct police station in the first place. We do what we must to draw in more of our neighbors, not drive them away.
Tom Hastings is Assistant Professor and co-coordinator of the undergraduate program in Conflict Resolution at Portland (Oregon) State University, USA. This article first appeared on the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict's "Minds of the Movement" blog and is reprinted here with ICNC's permission.