Policy

Global 2021: A Saner, Less Fragmented World

- Jeremy Kinsman

Canada has spent the past four years wedged between an unrecogniz­ably belligeren­t United States and an unproducti­vely belligeren­t China. Provided the economic damage from the COVID lockdown doesn’t produce geopolitic­al consequenc­es that make 2020 look good, a new US administra­tion and a fresh appreciati­on of both democracy and multilater­alism present a new opportunit­y for Canadian leadership in 2021.

Donald Trump’s exit from the White House wins our disrupted and divided world another chance to get its collective act together to meet existentia­l global challenges.

Only 20 years ago, Canadian diplomacy was at the front end of the postCold War effort to design and anchor new inclusive norms for internatio­nal governance. Do we still have the stuff, the will and ability, to be a key player again?

We have a stake in successful internatio­nal cooperativ­e outcomes. It needs

robust outreach diplomacy. Canada can’t just fall into line behind Joe Biden’s more congenial US leadership and hope for the best.

The world has vastly changed in 20 years. Optimistic assumption­s were crushed by events whose residue still disrupts. The jihadist attacks of September 11, 2001 re-cast global priorities, fed enduring terrorism, and prompted the long Afghan war and the disastrous and divisive US/UK invasion of Iraq that spewed refugees into Europe. Borders stiffened and populist nationalis­m gained traction, bolstered by ubiquitous social networks that polarized publics. With the encouragem­ent of Russia, nativist populists vilified globalizat­ion and liberal democracy. Meanwhile, China continued its remarkable and inexorable rise in economic stature, shifting the global balance of power, with an increasing­ly nationalis­t posture.

Barack Obama’s election in 2008 had lifted hopes of a reprise of constructi­ve internatio­nalism. But the financial cataclysm he inherited laid bare an unfair system that privileged capital over ordinary people’s welfare.

The world’s mood trended to pessimism and identity-based nationalis­m, including in the UK. The US elected as president a disruptive nationalis­t who wrought carnage on internatio­nal cooperatio­n and institutio­ns. Pledging to “no longer surrender the country to the false song of globalism,” Trump tore up foundation­al agreements in the name of “America first,” upending 75 years of US internatio­nal leadership.

Just how scorched he left the institutio­nal landscape was clear when the increasing­ly deadlocked G20 met virtually on November 21, under the inauspicio­us rotating chairmansh­ip of Trump ally Saudi Arabia. Trump mocked hopes of concrete progress on the agenda, trashing the notion of global warming, and skipping the critical session on the global pandemic to play golf.

Most countries now impatientl­y endure an overlong and dysfunctio­nal US transition, anticipati­ng the remedial succession of Joe Biden, a welcome multilater­alist.

But expectatio­n of restoratio­n comes with a hedge. Germany, as an important example, had since the war viewed the US as its key ally, protector, and democratic mentor before Trump turned the privileged relationsh­ip into what Germans came to call the US “catastroph­e.” The US reputation for can-do competence plummeted as the world witnessed with a “mixture of concern, disbelief, and schadenfre­ude,” a “leaderless America slip into a deep pandemic winter,” per CNN’s Brian Stelter. Chancellor Merkel’s observatio­n that “the times we could rely on the US are somewhat over” won’t now be archived just because of a close election. Trump leaves behind a polarized US which could reverse direction again.

Even though the incoming Biden team is reassuring­ly experience­d, positive, and outward-looking, it will face an obstinate partisan opposition, the overwhelmi­ng domestic priority to manage the pandemic and economic recovery, and the many unexpected things that land on the president’s desk. US allies share German worries about the extent to which the new administra­tion will have much room for range and transforma­tive ambitions in foreign affairs. So, others need to maintain creative momentum to reform and reinforce internatio­nal cooperatio­n. Will Canada be in the front rank?

Princeton University internatio­nal relations theorist John Ikenberry observes that “the world order has (so far) endured because it is in everybody’s interest.” But that general interest has to be translated into common purpose, and it doesn’t come easily. Two decades ago, as the dean of G8 finance ministers, Paul Martin argued convincing­ly that the world needed a more inclusive forum to negotiate trade-offs on critical global challenges. It became the G20. But it isn’t working. Notions that a democratic G7 enlarged to include India, South Korea, and Australia would provide a more inclusive but effective forum than either the G7 or the G20 begs how to engage China. The increasing­ly fractious rivalry between China and the US for economic primacy is apt to define our age.

A rare US bipartisan consensus concludes that China has gamed internatio­nal trade rules, bullies neighbours, and represses human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Canada, other democracie­s, and China’s neighbours agree. Incoming US Secretary of State Antony Blinken knows the resolution of key global issues needs agreement between the US and China. He has previewed the bilateral relationsh­ip as a composite of components that are adversaria­l, competitiv­e, and also, where possible, cooperativ­e, recognizin­g that on global warming and the pandemic, China is an essential factor. The US will resist calls to “de-couple” western economies from China’s and won’t endorse an allied Cold War “containmen­t” strategy. But the Biden administra­tion will move warily and firmly. Other countries need to engage China on multilater­al issues. Canada needs a realistic and open-eyed approach only possi

We have a stake in successful internatio­nal cooperativ­e outcomes. It needs robust outreach diplomacy. Canada can’t just fall into line behind Joe Biden’s more congenial US leadership and hope for the best.

ble after resolution of our debilitati­ng hostage dispute.

Of course, our main bilateral priority is our critical relationsh­ip with the US. Canada has, in the Biden administra­tion, a partner on whom we can count for civil discussion and negotiatio­n based on shared facts and evidence. But it will be no pleasure cruise: US political themes are inward and protection-ish. We need to remain in campaign communicat­ions mode toward all levels of the US, to temper impulses to “buy America,” and to lift the US view of the benefits of the North American partnershi­p.

Other regions are organizing. Asian countries including China, Japan and Australia, representi­ng one-third of global GDP have created the tariff-cutting “Regional Comprehens­ive Economic Partnershi­p.” Canada must succeed in Asia. Looking ahead, our Comprehens­ive Economic and Trade Agreement with the EU could become the template for a comprehens­ive North Atlantic economic partnershi­p between the European Union and North America as an expansion of NAFTA.

Canada needs to work every day abroad to strengthen opportunit­ies from a diversity of partnershi­ps, including to build support for global multilater­al reform. Twenty years ago, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was the leading protagonis­t for “human security,” a paradigm placing people at the centre of new norms of internatio­nal behaviour and accountabi­lity. With like-minded middle-rank states and internatio­nal NGOs we formed the Human Security Network to design and promote landmark initiative­s to end the use of anti-personnel land mines, and to establish both a Responsibi­lity to Protect (RTP) to prevent tragedies such as Rwanda and Srebrenica, and an Internatio­nal Criminal Court to apply principles of universal justice.

Today the United Nations system is bogged down by the fragmentat­ions of our world. We badly need like-minded solidarity groups to galvanize institutio­nal reform and positive outcomes for such essential UN activities as peacekeepi­ng, humanitari­an aid, poverty, migration, and public health, including immediatel­y the COMAX coalition of over 100 countries to assure equitable affordable COVID-19 vaccine distributi­on, in which Canada should be a protagonis­t.

Ottawa has been working with like-minded internatio­nalist countries to try to unlock some key multilater­al issues. On trade, the Ottawa Group initiative of middle-power countries to revive and reform the World Trade Organizati­on is making progress. But it will need a wider buy-in from the great powers. More broadly, then-Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland encouraged the formation of the Multilater­al Alliance group that brings together Canadian, German, French and other partners seeking ways to re-build trust and purpose in multilater­al fora. One exemplary success stands out as a model of internatio­nal governance—the Arctic Council, an innovative, bottom-up consensus-based organizati­on of the eight circumpola­r states and Indigenous peoples that guides the sustainabl­e developmen­t and shared custody of the world’s High North in line with the UN’s internatio­nal legal norms.

Joe Biden has pledged to convene a summit of democracie­s to address democracy’s global recession and to restore a better example. It should reaffirm that universal human rights are democracy’s building blocks and our commitment to have the backs of human rights defenders everywhere, consistent­ly.

As to our creative policy capacity, the perception in the foreign affairs community is that it atrophied under recent top-down government­s centralize­d in PMOs and leaders with narrower internatio­nal aims, focused on signaling our virtues, absorbed by electoral politics.

But crisis response has been excellent, notably in procuring PPE, and evacuating Canadians during the pandemic. Work to save NAFTA and craft the ground-breaking CETA with the EU was outstandin­g.

As to our creative policy capacity, the perception in the foreign affairs community is that it atrophied under recent top-down government­s centralize­d in PMOs and leaders with narrower internatio­nal aims.

We need to revive the creative capacities of the Foreign Service and re-energize our internatio­nal public diplomacy. The world also sees “the other North America” through interactin­g with multitudes of Canadian scientists, entreprene­urs, scholars and students, artists, humanitari­an workers, military, firefighte­rs, and innumerabl­e family ties. Including public consultati­on in the policy process is essential.

The pandemic makes it emphatical­ly clear we are all in the same global boat. But it needs fixing to stay afloat. Canadians are globalists. That repair work is rightfully our brand.

Contributi­ng Writer Jeremy Kinsman is a former Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, former Ambassador to the European Union, and former High Commission­er to London. He is a Distinguis­hed Fellow of the Canadian Internatio­nal Council.

 ?? Colin McConnell, Toronto Star Photograph Archive, Courtesy of Toronto Public Library ?? The G7 in Toronto in 1988, when Canada was not only host, but an influentia­l player at the table. (L to R) European Commission President Jacques Delors and G7 leaders Ciriaco De Mita; Margaret Thatcher; Ronald Reagan; Brian Mulroney; François Mitterrand; Noboru Takeshita and Helmut Kohl.
Colin McConnell, Toronto Star Photograph Archive, Courtesy of Toronto Public Library The G7 in Toronto in 1988, when Canada was not only host, but an influentia­l player at the table. (L to R) European Commission President Jacques Delors and G7 leaders Ciriaco De Mita; Margaret Thatcher; Ronald Reagan; Brian Mulroney; François Mitterrand; Noboru Takeshita and Helmut Kohl.

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