Nebulous threats, draconian response

Since the Harper Conservatives introduced Bill C-51, commentators have been guessing as to whether the terror legislation represents a purely political gambit, or a political liability being pushed through for other reasons. As the bill receives its (limited) debate in Parliament, it’s worth reviewing how C-51’s component parts fall on that spectrum.

At the outset, let’s note that if the Conservatives’ only goal was to introduce some bill dealing with terrorism, any of C-51 could have been omitted, while plenty of other options were available. So what is included in the bill and why?

■ Part 1 of C-51 authorizes the unlimited sharing of information with any federal government agency involved in national security. In other words, it intrudes on the privacy of every single Canadian, while offering no direct benefit to security.

Given the obvious potential for political controversy, we should closely scrutinize the substantive effect — which is to enshrine in law the principle that security trumps privacy for all purposes, with no public recourse. The Conservatives’ preference for an allknowing, unaccountable security apparatus seems to be the main connecting theme in C-51.

■ Part 2 deals with Canada’s no-fly list. Unlike the other parts, it represents a relatively small change: while more people might face restrictions, the absence of advance warning and accountability is nothing new. So this part may be seen more as policy housekeeping than as a political wedge.

■ Part 3 includes C-51’s amendments to the Criminal Code. But unlike the purely political changes the Conservatives have made to criminal law elsewhere (including their new “throw away the key” legislation), this part may have some wide-ranging repercussions in practice.

It’s doubtful that we’d see many people charged under C-51’s new offence provisions, particularly given the likelihood they would be found to be unconstitutional if tested. But that doesn’t mean the part wouldn’t have some alarming spillover effects.

First, it could seriously chill the free speech of people who fear that protest or even innocuous political discussion (including support for this generation’s equivalents to Nelson Mandela or Martin Luther King) could result in prosecution.

Moreover, in creating an offence based on communication alone, Part 3 allows police and security forces to investigate people based on nothing more than their political activity. And even if such investigations don’t lead to charges, they will create an environment of mutual suspicion between citizens and security services.

■ Part 4 provides for the broad new powers handed to CSIS. And since it’s hard to imagine the Conservatives believed for a second that a secret police service could be introduced without controversy, this is likely the part they’re most determined to push for ideological reasons.

In the short term, Part 4 would allow CSIS to interfere in politics and other public activity under the guise of national security. And in the longer term, it would change the allocation of Canada’s public resources — with the price of increased surveillance and disruption counterbalanced by cuts to social supports.

■ Finally, Part 5 stacks the deck in favour of the government in security certificate proceedings by limiting the ability of citizens to challenge the decision to hold them without charges.

In sum, C-51 isn’t made up of policies that are especially popular (or even defensible) on their own.

Instead, it relies on the theory that Canadians will swallow severe and unwanted restrictions on our rights in the name of fighting nebulous threats.

And that calculation is all the more reason to fight the bill, rather than backing down based on political fears.