Living the high life

On October 27th the Bank of Canada announced the end of its bond-buying scheme (though it will still reinvest the proceeds of maturing securities). The bond market had already reached the same conclusion before the announcement, and is pricing in a small interest-rate increase over the next year. Investors’ expectations for rate rises in Britain have ratcheted up dramatically (see chart). As we wrote this, the Bank of England was due to decide whether to raise its policy rate.

Such moves have been mirrored in America and the euro area, albeit on a smaller scale. The Federal Reserve announced a tapering of its asset purchases on November 3rd. That had been widely expected, but the move index, which tracks the volatility of American interest rates, has this month hit its highest level since the early days of the pandemic. On October 28th Christine Lagarde, the head of the European Central Bank, pressed back against market expectations that interestrate increases could begin as soon as the second half of 2022, noting that an early rise would be inconsistent with the bank’s guidance. That failed to stop two-year German bond yields inching up the day after, to their highest level since January 2020.

The movements so far are not large enough to constitute a bond-market tantrum on the scale of that seen in 2013, when the Fed also announced a taper. But the fact that the mood is much more febrile than it has been for most of this year reflects the uncertainty over the economic outlook, particularly that for inflation.

Whether the markets prove to be right on the timing of interest-rate rises or whether central bankers instead keep their original promises will depend on how persistent inflation looks likely to be. Central bankers have said that price rises so far are transient, reflecting an intense supply crunch. But some onlookers believe that a new inflationary era may be on the way, in which more powerful workers and faster wage growth place sustained pressure on prices. “Instead of decades in which labour has been coming out of people’s ears it’s going to be quite hard to find it, and that’s going to raise bargaining power,” says Charles Goodhart, a former rate-setter at the Bank of England.

Recent moves also highlight the sometimes-complex relationship between financial markets and monetary policy. In normal times central bankers set shortterm interest rates, and markets try to forecast where those rates could go. But bond markets might also contain information on investors’ expectations about the economy and inflation, which central bankers, for their part, try to parse. Ben Bernanke, a former chairman of the Fed, once referred to the risk of a “hall of mirrors” dynamic, in which policymakers feel the need to respond to rising bond yields, while yields in turn respond to central banks’ actions.

All this makes central bankers’ lives even harder as they try to penetrate a fog of economic uncertainty. Yet there is some small relief to be had, too. If investors thought inflation had become sustained, instead of being driven largely by commodity prices and supply-chain snarls, yields on long-dated government bonds would have begun to move significantly. So far, however, investors have dragged interest-rate increases forward rather than baking in the expectation of permanently tighter monetary policy. The ten-year American Treasury yield, for instance, is still not back to its recent highs in March.

Furthermore, some bond markets are still calm. In Japan, consumer prices were just 0.2% higher in September than a year ago, and are still in deflationary territory once energy and fresh food are stripped out. The Bank of Japan’s yield-curve-control policy remains in place, contrasting with the collapse in Australia. Setting policy is a little easier when investors are more certain of the outlook. That, sadly, is not a luxury many central bankers have. 

Cautionary tales from high-inflation economies

In recent months the world economy has come to resemble a badly microwaved dinner: generally hot, but with some bits merely lukewarm and others positively scorching. Consumer prices globally are likely to rise by 4.8% this year, according to the imf, which would be the fastest increase since 2007. But price rises in emerging markets are running ahead of those in the rich world, and a few unfortunates, such as Argentina, Brazil and Turkey, are feeling particular pain. Their experience helps illustrate how and when inflation can get out of hand.

Although inflation rates in emerging markets tend to be higher and more volatile than those in advanced economies, they did generally decline between the 1970s and the 2010s, much like those in the rich world. The median inflation rate among emerging economies fell from 10.6% in 1995 to 5.4% in 2005 and 2.7% in 2015, thanks to efficiency-boosting developments like globalisation and improved macroeconomic policymaking. The imf expects consumer prices in emerging economies to rise by 5.8% this year, which is not a huge departure from recent trends; prices rose at a similar pace as recently as 2012. But some economies have strayed well above the mean. Inflation stands at 10.2% in Brazil, 19.9% in Turkey, and 52.5% in Argentina.

Such high inflation reflects more than soaring food and energy prices. In advanced economies and many emerging ones, a jump in prices usually triggers a restraining response from the central bank. That response is more powerful when central banks are credible, say because inflation has been low in the past, and the fiscal picture benign. Then people behave as if a price spike will not last—by moderating wage demands, for instance—which reduces inflationary pressure.

This happy state can be disturbed in a number of ways. Compromising the independence of the central bank is sometimes enough to make the temperature rise. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, has declared himself an enemy of interest earnings and leant on the central bank to reduce its benchmark rate, a step he claims will bring down inflation. Over the years he has sacked a number of central-bank officials, most recently three members of the bank’s monetary-policy committee in October. Such antics have contributed to cap