Casino host ‘deregistered’ after government probe
Violations of anti-money-laundering rules alleged
VANCOUVER — B.C.’s gaming regulator has revoked the registration of River Rock Casino’s director of VIP gambler relations after an investigation into allegations of “third-party cash buy-ins” that violated anti-money-laundering regulations, Postmedia News has learned.
Lisa Gao, the employee deregistered by B.C.’s gaming policy and enforcement branch, has worked with VIP gamblers at Richmond’s River Rock Casino since 2012, according to her LinkedIn profile.
Postmedia confirmed Gao’s case with the B.C. government and asked B.C. Lottery Corp. to comment on the allegations. BCLC would not comment, and referred the questions to the Ministry of Attorney-General.
In response to questions about Gao’s case, the Ministry of Attorney-General confirmed that in early November, the enforcement branch began investigating an employee at River Rock Casino, “after it was alleged the employee acted in direct violation of B.C. Lottery Corp. and Fintrac directives about third-party cash buy-ins.”
The Ministry of Attorney-General confirmed that following a probe into third-party cash buy-ins involving a River Rock employee, the enforcement branch reviewed the employee’s registration in late November and “rendered a decision.”
The decision is considered preliminary and could be varied, according to the ministry. The branch has received a request to review the decision, and a final review is underway.
However, without registration from the branch, a VIP host cannot work at River Rock Casino, a government official said. Gao’s LinkedIn profile continues to advertise that she is River Rock’s director of VIP relations.
Postmedia’s repeated attempts to reach Gao through her LinkedIn account, and ask her about her employment status, were not successful.
In Canada’s anti-money-laundering regime, Fintrac — Canada’s anti-money laundering agency — must receive reports from BCLC on all suspicious and large cash transactions at B.C. casinos.
Fintrac’s guidance explains that a third party is a person who instructs another person to make a financial transaction on their behalf, and that global authorities are aware of money-laundering and terrorist-financing cases involving third parties.
“It is not uncommon for criminals to use third parties as a method to evade detection by distancing themselves from the proceeds of crime,” Fintrac’s guidance on third-party cash-transaction compliance states.
Postmedia asked River Rock’s operator, Great Canadian Gaming, to comment on Gao’s case and employment status, but executives were not made available.
“As a matter of policy and confidentiality, we do not comment on individual employee matters,” Terrance Doyle, chief operating officer of Great Canadian Gaming, said in a statement.
“What I can say is that we would never condone or allow any conduct that is inconsistent with our company policies or with the rules put in place by our regulators.”
Gao’s professional profile says she has worked at River Rock since 2010, and before that she worked in Shenzhen, a city in China’s Guangdong province.
Her profile says “under the direction of the executive director” as director for VIP guest relations, she worked “closely with all key department heads.”
In addition to directing other VIP hosts, Gao was responsible for overseeing table play in River Rock’s exclusive “VIP Prive Program.”
According to the Richmond casino’s website, in this high-limit baccarat betting area “highly qualified” hosts ensure VIPs “are treated to dedicated service around the clock.”
The investigation of a prominent River Rock employee comes while Peter German, the independent reviewer hired by Attorney-General David Eby, continues to probe the circumstances that allowed VIP gamblers from China to flood B.C. casinos with suspicious cash.
Eby hired German following the release last September of an audit by MNP, which noted about $13.5 million in $20 bills was accepted in River Rock Casino in July 2015. Police fear much of the cash was proceeds of crime from drug-traffickers.
MNP’s audit said large volumes of cash were being dropped off at the casino, usually late at night, and “the majority of this cash is being presented by high-roller Asian VIP clients.”
Investigations showed some VIPs had been allowed to buy gambling chips at River Rock with more than $500,000 in small bills at a single time, and casino staff were accepting the cash even though there was “no known source of funds.”
MNP’s audit suggested the primary function of VIP staff at River Rock is to maximize revenue, and “accountability gaps may have contributed to an organizational desensitization to cash, through continued exposure to high-volume bulk cash, especially in the VIP areas.”