Ghost of the Arrow
Killing of iconic fighter left Canada dependent on U.S. defence industry
Stephen Harper must have felt airsick this week after Auditor General Michael Ferguson exposed gross mismanagement of the F-35 procurement process.
Much of the blame rests with Defence Minister Peter Mackay, on whose watch the errors were made. But the seeds of the F-35 debacle were sown way back in 1959 — when former Conservative prime minister John Diefenbaker killed off the Avro Arrow.
The iconic Arrow was designed and built in Canada to fulfill this country’s need for a twin-engine, high-speed fighter-interceptor jet.
The Arrow was poised to become the world’s fastest aircraft — until the U.S. government persuaded Diefenbaker that missiles were about to render manned fighter jets obsolete. The prime minister ordered the program shut down, and all the aircraft destroyed, in favour of the U.s.-made, nuclear-armed Bomarc ground-to-air missile.
It was a colossal mistake, for the age of the manned fighter jet was far from over. In 1961, the Diefenbaker government purchased 66 U.s.-made CF-101 Voodoos to fill the gap left by the cancelled Arrows. Two decades later, the Voodoos were replaced by CF-18S, which were also designed and manufactured in the U.S.
The fact of the matter is: Washington has long sought to off-load some of the costs of military technologies by pressuring its allies to buy U.s.-made equipment. This increases sales and drives down the per-unit costs. It also brings money in from abroad, either directly or through the subsidiaries of U.S. defence companies — of which there are now many in Canada.
Exacerbating matters, our generals are sometimes co-opted by those same U.S. companies. The prospect of a lucrative postretirement position lobbying for Lockheed Martin or Boeing or General Dynamics can make it difficult to think critically and objectively about this country’s needs.
F-35s are called “fifth generation” fighter jets because of profile characteristics and surface materials that make them difficult to detect on radar — and therefore ideal for “shock and awe” attacks on Baghdad or Tehran.
Under U.S. pressure, Canadian officials made stealth a mandatory requirement for replacements for the non-stealthy CF-18S. This excluded all but the F-35s from consideration, even though Canada has no demonstrated need for this technology.
Officials also overlooked the fact that stealth entails compromises. For instance, F-35s can fly only 2,220 kilometres without refuelling, unless non-stealthy external tanks are added. Our 30-year-old CF-18S have a range of 3,330 kilometres, which is handy in the Arctic.
The F-35’s stealth profile limits it to a top speed of just Mach 1.6, compared with the Mach1.8 of the CF-18. Way back in 1958, a test version of the Avro Arrow hit Mach 1.9, and was expected to later reach Mach 2.5.
The F-35 also has a limited carrying capacity for missiles and bombs, which puts it at risk of being overwhelmed if outnumbered by non-stealthy fighters.
Finally, stealth planes require more maintenance and have a lower “mission capable rate” than comparable, non-stealthy planes. The U.S. Congressional Research Service reports that after five years of service the F-35’s sister plane, the F-22, has a mission capable rate of just 60 per cent.
The added maintenance adds considerably to costs, which explains why Ottawa has not released any projections about the maintenance contract it will have to sign with Lockheed Martin, the maker of the F-35.
Even worse, the F-35 development and testing program has consistently failed to meet its objectives. The planes will not be in full production until at least 2019, two years later than planned.
Costs have skyrocketed, with the Pentagon now estimating that the U.S. government will spend a staggering $1.45 trillion (U.S.) over the lifetime of the F-35s. The same report pegged the perplane cost at $135 million — plus $26 million for each engine.
Until this week, the Harper government was still claiming that the F-35s would cost Canada no more than $75 million each, because they would be made during a period of “peak efficiency.” But it is inconceivable that a cashstrapped U.S. Congress will ever accept what would, in effect, be a multi-billion dollar subsidy to Canada.
Frank Kendall, the head of weapons acquisition and development for the Pentagon, recently said that the F-35 program in the U.S. represents “acquisition malpractice.”
Clearly, malpractice has also occurred in Canada. Yet Harper would not be in this mess if Diefenbaker had allowed the Arrow to live — and Canada had retained the capacity to develop and build its own fighter jets.