Tri-County Vanguard

Breached site was ‘high risk’ for some

- Jim Vibert

A website containing intimate, sometimes agonizing personal and family details — from child custody records to medical and income assistance files — was inexplicab­ly assessed as a “low risk” by the government entrusted with the protection of that sensitive informatio­n.

Nova Scotia’s Auditor General Michael Pickup was recently at a total loss to explain to the legislatur­e’s public accounts committee how the government could possibly come up with that risk assessment for its Freedom of Informatio­n Access (FOIA) site.

Pickup’s incredulit­y grew when he explained the site was the first-ever attempt to run a software applicatio­n called Accesspro on a platform known as Amanda 7.

That alone should have elevated the risk level and necessitat­ed the kind of security testing the site was not subjected to until after it was breached last spring. By then, thousands of records, including personal files, had been downloaded by users who exploited a gaping hole in the security.

Freedom of informatio­n requests fit into a couple of very different, broad categories. Journalist­s, opposition politician­s and other interested Nova Scotians seek informatio­n about government programs, decisions and spending.

Those are standard FOI requests.

But individual Nova Scotians also seek access through Freedom of Informatio­n to their own personal files held by government. Many of those files are highly sensitive and relate to people and families experienci­ng real crises.

Both kinds of informatio­n were held on the FOIA site.

The government’s responses to standard FOI requests were available for all, while the personal files were “protected” behind a thin veil of digital security that was penetrated using a widely known technique to mine data.

A little historical context never hurts. Some years ago, a minister of Community Services divulged a fragment of personal informatio­n gleaned from the file of an income assistance recipient. That minister — the late Edmund Morris — recognized his transgress­ion and resigned.

He was honour-bound to do so.

Yet, when vast amounts of personal informatio­n escape from the current government’s weak grasp via a security breach termed “an utterly preventabl­e disaster,” by the auditor general, no minister of the Crown is held accountabl­e, none is in jeopardy of losing his or her seat at the cabinet table, and no one feels honour-bound to do a damn thing.

From the perspectiv­e of the people whose personal or family informatio­n was on that site, the risk was high. The nature of the informatio­n made it high risk.

But clearly, the government’s risk assessment wasn’t based on considerat­ion of those people or the potentiall­y devastatin­g consequenc­es they could suffer should their informatio­n fall into the wrong hands.

Therein lies the problem.

The government’s risk assessment was backwards, or inside out, but it was the opposite of what it should have been.

The government assessed the FOIA website as low risk to the government and as it turned out, they even got that wrong.

The risk the province was imposing on Nova Scotians whose private informatio­n was on that website was not a factor in arriving at the low-risk assessment. It couldn’t have been.

How could smart civil servants, fully aware of the sensitive nature of the informatio­n in question, assess the risk to those people as anything but high? They couldn’t. The logical explanatio­n is that they didn’t consider those people at all.

That explanatio­n leads unavoidabl­y to a government that puts itself and its own interests first, ahead of the interests of the people it ostensibly serves. It did in this case.

It’s also a sign the government has lost sight of its purpose and the senior bureaucrac­y has failed to instill — or worse, killed — the “public service” ethic, the understand­ing that service to the public comes first, always.

The auditor general tells us the government didn’t take even the most basic steps to safeguard informatio­n on the site. Indeed, post-breach, an IT security firm identified 28 vulnerabil­ities on the site, eight of which were considered serious.

That assessment was done in a matter of days. Had it been done before the site went live, the government could have saved itself some political embarrassm­ent.

But, much more importantl­y, it could have saved the folks whose personal files it lost a lot of hurt and worry.

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