Asia has history of dealing with political ‘ bottlenecks’
Struggle for power: This is not the fi rst time a young ruler has dealt brutally with one of his senior offi cials
For students of Asian history, the current political intrigue in North Korea presents a rare contemporary glimpse into the region’s past — namely, East Asia’s historic dynastic political system ( and how its political mechanisms operate).
Yes, North Korea ( or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as Pyongyang calls it) technically does not have kings and emperors like ancient dynasties that dominated East Asian political history until the fall of China’s Qing dynasty in 1912. But in fact it is one of the last places where one can see the Asiatic- style dynastic system working in real life — the strict passing of the leadership reins down the central ( royal) bloodline, eras of unrest during leadership transition, the all- or- nothing struggle for power among the core elites, among other aspects.
It’s been a month since news of Jang Song- thaek’s fall from power reached the outside world. The uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Jang, was the right- hand man to the younger Kim’s reign and one of the senior officials former ruler Kim Jong Il entrusted with the succession process after the elder Kim’s death two years ago.
The ramifications of the fall of someone so senior in the ranks of the DPRK has been well- covered by media observers worldwide. Many, if not most, conclude that this is the younger Kim’s first major attempt to consolidate power within Pyongyang’s ruling elites.
Many continue to keep a keen eye on the DPRK, with speculation running rampant about how this will affect its relations with its neighbours — most notably, with main rival South Korea and key ally China.
And as unfathomable as it is in modern political culture for a young leader to deal so brutally with a relative and a senior official so entrenched in North Korean politics, for someone familiar with Asian political history, the story of Kim’s purging of Jang has so many precedents in the last 2,000 years that they are almost hard to count.
In the history of Korea one can see the source of its leaders’ paranoia. Both of the large, unitary Korean dynasties in the last millennium — Goryeo ( 918- 1392) and Joseon ( 1392- 1897) — were founded after top- level generals seized power from their kings.
Goryeo was founded by the prime minister of the previous regime after he overthrew his king in 918, and Joseon was born after general Yi Seong- gye turned back his forces ( originally ordered into military conflict with China) from the border and seized power in 1388.
Similarly, the Confucianism based dynastic system in ancient China also produced young leader/ senior official purges and struggles similar to those seen today in Pyongyang. The most prominent cases include Qing’s Kangxi Emperor purging ruling regent
Oboi ( when Kangxi was 16 and eight years into his reign) and Ming’s Jianwen Emperor ( at age 21) purging a number of his uncles to consolidate power from 1398 to 1402 .
In both of these historic Chinese cases, the circumstances are remarkably similar to the current situation: The presence of a leadership transition “bottleneck” early in the dynasty/ ruling system’s existence, where a young, unestablished leader is flanked by powerful officials who present a potential roadblock for the full transition of power to the new leadership.
Historically, these “bottlenecks” are turning points for the dynasties in question. If successfully navigated, it usually leads to the development of a steady system of transition for future leaders. If not, the dynasty falls into internal leadership strife — a leading cause of the collapse of dynasties historically.
The volatility of any such power struggle can be seen in the results of the two cases above: Kangxi was successful and went on to become one of the longest reigning emperors in Chinese history ( at 61 years).
Jianwen’s purges, meanwhile, triggered the revolt of one uncle, who sacked the capital and became the new Yongle Emperor in 1402. ( The fate of the ousted Jianwen continues to be debated among Chinese historians.)
In Pyongyang, Kim will turn 31 on Wednesday . The shakeup that eliminated Jang also eliminated North Korea’s top political liaison to China, a key ally responsible for much of the food and economic aid to the DPRK regime. Meanwhile, observers in Seoul are already preparing for another round of military show of force from the North, which can often be seen as a domestic rallying cry for Pyongyang in the face of questions regarding its leadership.
On New Year’s Day, Kim delivered an annual address highlighting the strengthening of national unity after it purged “counterrevolutionary factionalists” — a term speculated to be a reference to Jang. Kim also hinted at improving the economy in the DPRK, and even tipped his hand at a potential olive branch to Seoul in establishing a “favourable climate” with South Korea.
( Seoul has already dismissed the statement, noting a similar line in Kim’s speech last year was followed by threats of military attacks in April.)
Whether the political intrigue in Pyongyang will look the same in 2015 as it does right now will be on the minds of every regional player, from Seoul and Beijing to Washington to Tokyo — and beyond. And as history shows, what’s to come is anyone’s guess.