TRANSLINK: A BUMPY, WINDING RIDE
In early days, TransLink relied on fuel tax as its main revenue source and debt was manageable. By 2005, cracks were appearing, in the face of major road and bridge projects. By 2009, debt had climbed to $ 3.4 billion ( all fi gures adjusted to 2013 dolla
2001:
Two years after TransLink is created, fuel tax is the leading source of cash, at 10 cents a litre. Debt is manageable relative to total revenue and the cost of running the system.
2003:
What a year. Revenues exceed expenses, driven up by an 11.7- per- cent spike in transit ridership, as a result of the Universal Transit Pass program for 58,000 students at the University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University.
2005:
Uh oh. Homeowners get slammed with a neardoubling of money collected through property taxes as TransLink pursues three- year, $ 2- billion transportation plan that includes eight major road projects and bigticket projects such as the Canada Line, Evergreen Line and Golden Ears Bridge. Long- term debt creeps up to $ 1 billion.
2007:
Debt balloons to $ 2.2 billion, as Golden Ears Bridge is half- built, and other projects are taking shape. TransLink waits for province to help bridge a $ 400- million funding shortfall.
2009:
The cost per passenger peaks at $ 4.33. The debt monster climbs to $ 3.4 billion as the Canada Line, Golden Ears Bridge, Central Valley Greenway and Coast Meridian overpass come online. Province and feds contribute $ 70 million and TransLink $ 30 million to install turnstiles and a smart- card system.
2011:
The cost per passenger is lower, following transit audit. But the ratio of long- term debt to revenue is now $ 2.77 for every dollar collected, compared with a ratio of $ 1.37 to $ 1 in 2001.
2012:
The transit system stalls. Total service hours remain unchanged from the previous year even as operating costs eclipse $ 900 million. Audit fi nds TransLink is living “beyond its means.”