SITE C DAM SHOULD BE COMPLETED

The 299-page report on Site C delivered this week by the B.C. Utilities Commission provides a wealth of information, but has not made the provincial government’s decision on the fate of the project any easier. It would, however, have informed the deliberations of the previous government had it chosen to take advantage of the expertise available through the BCUC.

The commission looked at three options: to cancel the project, to suspend it temporarily and to complete it. It dismissed the suspend-and-restart option as too costly, leaving the choice a go or a no-go. The report makes clear that there are risks whether the hydroelectric project goes ahead or is terminated.

It said the cost of the project could escalate from the proposed $8.3 billion to more than $10 billion — possibly as much as $12.5 billion — and said construction is a year behind schedule and it is unlikely to meet its 2024 in-service date. B.C. Hydro’s mid-load electricity demand forecasts may have been too optimistic, the report said, meaning Site C could be generating power that is not needed.

The BCUC determined that a low-load assumption was most appropriate for resource planning, in which case alternative energy sources, such as wind and geothermal, could supply power at lower unit costs.

The BCUC has effectively punted Site C back into the political realm.

But the future is impossible to predict. Compliance with the Paris Agreement on climate change, municipal efforts to eliminate all use of fossil fuels, the growing popularity of electric vehicles and electrification of other aspects of the transportation system, a switch from natural gas to electricity for home heating and cooling as well as industrial uses, and changes in government policy to encourage electricity consumption (not to mention federal plans to bring in one million immigrants over the next three years) may push demand beyond the assumptions by either B.C. Hydro or the BCUC.

The report said alternative energy sources would have to offer sufficient savings to offset the cost of cancelling Site C, pegged at $1.8 billion, also noting the risks if the cost of wind power is higher than estimated and no geothermal resource is developed. In this scenario, Site C comes in with lower unit costs.

Whether the project goes ahead or is cancelled, there may be costs incurred to compensate First Nations — for Site C opponents who claim their territorial rights have been infringed, and supporters who were promised employment and other benefits for signing on.

Deep into the report, on page 187, the BCUC lays out the dilemma for the government. The cost to ratepayers of Site C and an alternative portfolio of commercially feasible generating projects (along with demand-side management initiatives) are “virtually equivalent.”

With that pronouncement, the BCUC has effectively punted Site C back into the political realm. In the short term, the NDP government could appease its Green party partners and like-minded supporters by cancelling the project. It would have to contend with ending employment for more than 2,000 workers, betraying six First Nations that depended on the dam being built, and sending a message to investors that projects simply cannot be done in B.C. — even ones the government initiates.

Premier John Horgan and his cabinet should eschew short-term thinking and consider not just the next election cycle, nor even our own lifetimes, but the needs of future generations. Site C, like the hydroelectric projects that preceded it, will deliver clean, reliable power well into the next century. It should be completed.