Second, the situation is worsened by the Modi administration’s overwhelming confidence.

Since Modi took office in 2014, many achievements have been made in both the domestic and foreign affairs of India. In foreign affairs, the India-U.S. security partnership has strengthened the alliance, and the IndiaJapan security agreement has reached a new level. The trilateral dialogue between the United States, Japan and India has become increasingly concrete and high-reaching. The scale of the Malabar naval exercise involving all three countries has grown and could soon involve Australia too. The India-Africa Forum Summit and the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation are attracting more and more participation.

In domestic affairs, Modi launched the Goods and Services Tax, India’s biggest tax reform since independence, and established the first unified market in the nation’s history. Modi’s strong cash ban enabled leapfrog development of domestic mobile payments. And largely thanks to Modi’s whirlwind influence, his Bharatiya Janata Party won a landslide victory in the politically crucial northern state of Uttar Pradesh, further consolidating the party’s dominance of India politics.

In each of the past three years of the Modi administration, India has had an impressive macroeconomic performance. Not only has its GDP growth rate surpassed that of China, but it has also become the top market for international green-field investors. Surprising successes of past aggressive policies have stimulated even bolder and more aggressively impulsive moves from the Modi administration. The Donglang standoff is one of them.

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang scheduled his first visit to India two months after he took office in 2013. The Chinese Government even broke the tradition of ensuring that the premier’s South Asian trip included both India and Pakistan. And Li called Modi to congratulate him soon after Modi took office. On many occasions, Xi has proposed discussions with Modi on the possibility of aligning the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative with India’s development programs, including the Monsoon Plan, Spice Route and Cotton Route.

In general, the Chinese Government’s diplomatic policies toward India are intended to broaden consensus to reduce the impact of differences between the two countries on bilateral relations. However, China’s good intentions are often frustrated by India’s negative diplomatic responses, which are made because the Modi administration doesn’t believe China and India can develop bilateral ties and conduct strategic cooperation without first settling disputes, especially on their border issues. Furthermore, they misconstrue Chinese diplomatic reactions as intending to check the rise of India. The Indian Government treats China as its archrival, and this has inspired it to embrace various security cooperation strategies offered by the United States and its allies to contain China and curb its influence.

The Modi administration’s resulting hostility toward China is putting China-India relations on thin ice, and the dynamic could quickly shift from cooperative and competitive to adversarial. However, the more adversarial China-India relations become, the easier it would be for India to take extreme precautions against China. The Donglang standoff is one example.

So how the Donglang standoff is ultimately resolved will likely present a possible turning point for the Chinese Government’s South Asia policy.