Diplomatic Costs of The Domestic Agenda
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison revealed he had declined to meet with the new Chinese Ambassador to Australia Xiao Qian. In terms of formal diplomatic protocol, this is correct as it is appropriate for the foreign minister to meet with the ambassador and this meeting did take place.
From a broader perspective, the prime minister’s reluctance to meet or engage with the ambassador is symptomatic of Australia’s unwillingness to help thaw the current sour Australia-China relations.
The Australian Government proclaims that it is open to minister-to-minister conversations and meetings with China, but it constantly sets preconditions for those interactions to take place. These moves are based on an inaccurate interpretation of a 2020 event.
By 2020, Australia-China relations were already not smooth. China’s Deputy Head of Mission Wang Xining explained that an embassy official “was offered an opportunity to explain why our relationship is not in good shape, so she tried to enumerate certain points that your government and my government don’t agree upon.”
This was an untitled background briefing paper, but it was presented in the Australian media as a formal list of 14 demands made by China as a condition for resuming official relations. The issue was further exaggerated as an attack on Australian sovereignty.
This inaccurate assessment of China’s concerns has been a major barrier to the resumption of bilateral discussions. Australia insists that China withdraws these so-called “14 demands” as a precondition to any new discussions. China does not see the need to do so because these were just an untitled briefing paper with no formal official status.
This mischaracterization is the primary cause of the stalemate in Australia-China relations. Ambassador Xiao has attempted to reach out and help thaw the frosty relationship. Unfortunately, the Australian leadership has not been amenable to these approaches.
The Australian Government is facing an election in a few weeks, so they have an interest in promoting security issues as a way of winning votes. This means they are frightened of any suggestion that they are not “standing up” to China. The domestic political agenda cannot be discounted when assessing Australia’s desire to help normalize its relations with China.
This “strongman” approach was further consolidated with the leaking of a proposed draft agreement between the Solomon Islands and China. The reaction from Australia was predictable because it always views the South-West Pacific as its “Pacific Family.” The nation does much work in the region, but mostly self-serving. As the Solomon Islands’ prime minister pointed out, Australian aid is usually implemented by companies.
Additionally, the neutrally independent “Pacific Family” does not appreciate the political pressure applied to them to reject Chinese proposals.
Most recently, this has included pressure to stop vital undersea Internet cables being supplied by Huawei, the Chinese tech giant, and the Australian interference in telecommunication services for the region. The Government of Papua New Guinea has also been under pressure to approve the construction of a joint U.S.-Australia naval base on Manus Island.
A decade ago, Australia inflicted deep cuts to aid to this “Pacific Family,” and despite recent boosts in assistance, the level of support is not the same as it was a decade ago. This, coupled with Australia’s rejection of genuine concerns over the impact of climate change, has left the region open to working with others who can assist.
Australia has a smug opinion of its status in the “Pacific Family,” so the Solomon Islands announcement of cooperation with China came as a surprise. Bill Shorten from the opposition Labor Party described this as “a major foreign policy blunder.”
Declining to meet with the Chinese ambassador and the reaction to the situation in the Solomon Islands are both part of an accelerating election campaign in Australia. These reactions also reflect an unwillingness to step back from its small-scale confrontation with China. Perhaps when the heat of the election campaign is over, a new government may adopt a more considered approach to the relationship. BR
The author is a national board member of the Australia-China Business Council. This article was first published on the China Focus website Comments to yanwei@cicgamericas.com