On the Supervision Strategy of Government Audit Outsourcing under the Background of Incomplete Information Game
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责任编辑:方程
(Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing101149,China)
Abstract:In order to improve financial information transparency of the public sector,and alleviate the resource shortage pressure of audit institutions,government financial report audit outsourcing has become the realistic choice. But outsourcing can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard,which ask the government to implement effective supervision on related agency. Static game analysis on the imperfect information relation between government and related social agency shows that:regulatory penalties can significantly reduce regulatory intensity;and the supervision of social media has strengthened the substitution between the intensity of punishment and the intensity of supervision. Counterbalancing related social agency through both the supervision of government and social media can provide the development of government financial report audit outsource with guarantee. During this process,we should strengthen the supervision,perfect related incentive and penalty mechanism,and strengthen related training.
Key words:incomplete information game;government audit;outsourcing;moral risk;supervision on outsourcing
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