............................................................. 中国对其他金砖国家农产品出口贸易竞争力研究 王品飞

（Beijing Wuzi University，Beijing101149，China）

Abstract：Establishment of managerial performance-related pay has important effect on stimulating managerial enthusiasm， improving corporate governance mechanism and promoting corporate sustainable development. However，managers have incentives to manipulate corporate performance and to increase their payment by adopting earnings management. Meanwhile， given that Chinese corporate majority shareholders’control is associated with“interest entrenchment effect”as well as“interest alignment effect”，the existing of majority shareholders and their roles on corporate governance need to be further studied. Based on the perspective of majority shareholders’governance，the authors analyze the underlying mechanism through which majority shareholders’ control impacts on the relation between managerial performance- related pay and earnings management. Meanwhile，the authors adopt Chinese A- share listed companies from 2009 to 2017，and investigate the relation between managerial performance-related pay and earnings management. Furthermore，the authors consider the current ownership structure of Chinese listed companies and examine whether the above relation changes with the controlling of majority shareholder. It is found that Chinese listed companies establish performance-related pay for their managers，which restricts earnings management behaviors. Especially for companies with increased controlling power of majority shareholders，the effect of performance-related pay on earnings management is more pronounced. The results suggest that performance- related pay for managers is associated with effective corporate governance. As increased interests alignment between majority shareholders and corporate，majority shareholders effectively adopt controlling power to supervise managers’behaviors，thus enhance the corporate governance effect of performance- related pay on managerial opportunistic behaviors. Therefore，the authors verify the complementary effect between majority shareholder’s controlling and managerial performance-related pay on limiting corporate earnings management.

Key words：managers；performance- related pay；earnings management；majority shareholder’s controlling；corporate

governance