China Business and Market

Anti-monopoly Regulation on the Either-or Exclusive Transactio­n of E-commerce Platform

- XU Li

(School of Law,East China Normal University,Shanghai 200241,China)

Abstract:The essence of either-or behavior is exclusive transactio­n ,which is an effective way for e-commerce platform to obtain a dominant position;and its purpose is to achieve market monopoly. China's E-commerce Law ,Anti-monopoly Law and Anti- unfair Competitio­n Law are the legal basis for regulating the exclusive transactio­ns of e- commerce platforms. However , due to the practical obstacles faced by Articles 14 and 17 of the Anti-monopoly Law,the lack of theoretica­l basis for Articles 22 and 35 of the E-commerce Law,and the possibilit­y of applicatio­n of Articles 2 and 12 of the Anti-unfair Competitio­n Law,etc., the either-or behavior is difficult to be punished by law under the current regulatory framework of China’s Competitio­n Law. By constructi­ng the game theory model and analyzing the either-or case of Meituan ,it is concluded that the either-or behavior will lead to the single monopoly situation,and the regulation taking Anti-monopoly Law as the core is the key to solve the dilemma. Facing the lack of regulation on the either-or behavior of e-commerce platform in the current competitio­n law system ,we should start from such aspects as behavioral exemption,in- advance control,consumer protection,market definition,and the introducti­on of system with comparativ­e advantage,and perfect regulation­s on the either- or behavior in Anti- monopoly Law. Specifical­ly speaking,we should formulate the whitelist rules,perfect the in- advance regulation,strengthen consumer privacy protection,introduce comparativ­e advantage clauses,and optimize relevant market definition rules to improve the coordinati­on of anti-monopoly regulation.

Key words:platform economy;bilateral market;either- or ;abuse of dominant position;exclusive transactio­n;Anti- mo⁃

nopoly Law

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