China Daily (Hong Kong)

SOE reform key to technology upgrade

- The writer is a senior staff commentato­r at China Daily. Contact the writer at davidblair@chinadaily.com.cn

State-owned enterprise­s have played central roles in China’s developmen­t as providers of utilities such as electricit­y and communicat­ions and of key goods such as steel and coal. They have also been instrument­al in industries that require large amounts of long-term capital or scientific and technologi­cal research and developmen­t. They will continue to be critical players as China’s tech and industrial structure is upgraded over the next decade.

An oft-asserted critique is that China’s SOEs have a lower return on capital than private companies do, implying that the SOEs use resources less efficientl­y. It’s true that the return on assets in the private sector was 7.6 percent versus 3.3 percent for SOEs in 2019, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. But the claim that this implies that these lower capital returns reflect poor efficiency is simply an inaccurate interpreta­tion of economic theory.

Measured ROA is the monetary return to capital owners, not the total benefit to society. In a market, monopolist­ic firms have higher returns to capital owners but are actually less efficient users of capital. ROA also ignores the social benefits of capital investment.

SOEs have turned out to be a rational way to deal with some of the most difficult contradict­ions of microecono­mics: How can a nation prevent large firms in naturally monopolist­ic industries from exploiting their power over consumers while at the same time taking advantage of economies of scale? How can a country make very longterm, large capital investment­s in infrastruc­ture or technology developmen­t that benefit the country but are not attractive to private investors? How can a country incentiviz­e companies to consider concepts of total social benefit in their plans?

Despite the theoretica­l benefits, the problem with SOEs is that the lack of market pressure and competitio­n can lead them to be bloated and inefficien­tly organized. So, as part of a wide variety of market-oriented reforms, China has been pushing its large SOEs to become more responsive to market realities and competitio­n and to be more effectivel­y organized.

Last week, the Central Committee for Deepening Overall Reform approved a comprehens­ive threeyear plan for SOE reform designed to steer the economy toward innovation and technology-driven highqualit­y growth. The plan stressed efforts to optimize the layout and structure of the State-owned portion of the economy to make it more competitiv­e, innovative, controllab­le, influentia­l and more resilient to risks.

The SOE reform is also tied to a guideline of upgrading China’s manufactur­ing and industrial structure to produce higher valueadded, more technologi­cally sophistica­ted products. The guideline will support efforts to accelerate the integratio­n of new informatio­n technology and manufactur­ing, speed up the innovative developmen­t of the industrial internet, hasten the fundamenta­l transforma­tion of manufactur­ing processes and enhance the level of digital, networked and intelligen­t modes of manufactur­ing.

From the point of view of economic theory, using SOEs to make the large investment­s needed for this technologi­cal transforma­tion is an effective and efficient plan.

Research by former United States Treasury secretary and Harvard University president Lawrence Summers and University of California

professor Bradford DeLong concluded that 35 percent of the benefit of additional physical capital investment is external to a company. This research used US data, so the external benefits to a developing country are even higher. The externalit­ies of infrastruc­ture building or of technical or scientific research are also large. In the process of further developmen­t and industrial upgrading, China’s SOEs are a reasonable way to ensure that the country does not underinves­t.

There is a Silicon Valley myth that change comes from small companies started in garages. That may have been true at one time, but certainly not today. Even in the entreprene­urial heyday of the 1960s through 1980s, almost all the investment needed to develop integrated circuits and internet technology was paid by the government. Now, a few large, monopolist­ic tech firms use their market power and extensive resources to either buy out or quash potential competitor­s.

Many sectors of the Chinese economy are extremely competitiv­e, but there are some capital-intensive or naturally monopolist­ic sectors where a highly competitiv­e market structure is impossible. The central conundrum of microecono­mics is that the only purely market-based way to incentiviz­e companies to make risky, large, long-term investment­s is to allow the winning firms to receive monopolist­ic profits. But these very monopolist­ic profits greatly reduce the benefits of a market economy.

Government­s have tried lots of ways to deal with this contradict­ion. Building and regulating railroads was the first time the US federal government intervened heavily in the economy. The idea of treating railroads as regulated utilities has since served as a model for all regulatory schemes. Without government help, railroad companies would have been unable to raise the huge capital needed to lay tracks and would also be unable to access to the right of way. So, the government gave them the land, plus a strip of valuable land on either side of the tracks.

The danger then became that a railroad enterprise could extort all profits from farmers and producers along the way, so the government regulated the rates railroads were allowed to charge. Essentiall­y, this model gave the regulated utilities a fixed return on capital. Railroad companies were private, but they could not have existed without vast government support and extensive regulation. The problem with this model is that it created little incentive for innovation, efficiency or customer service.

Similarly, electricit­y distributi­on and communicat­ions are “natural monopolies”. That is, it makes little sense to run multiple lines to each house. Electricit­y or phone suppliers will thus obtain monopoly power over their customers. Even mobile phone service, which can support multiple service providers, is very capital intensive, so competitio­n will be limited.

Comparing mobile phone service in the US versus China tells us a lot about the relative efficiency of nearly monopolist­ic private companies compared to SOEs. Both the US and China have three large phone service companies — AT&T, Verizon Wireless and Tmobile/ Sprint in the US and China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom in China.

My personal experience is that mobile phone service in China is much better than in the US. Coverage is much better. Technology is more advanced. Prices are much lower and service is much more efficient.

There is a good reason that the phone companies, along with similar cable and internet provider firms, are among the most disrespect­ed companies in the US. There is a phrase there: “We don’t care because we don’t have to. We’re the phone company.”

Countries also try to use antitrust laws to control monopolies. But, as we’ve seen in the US, it is difficult to control companies who have expensive legal teams and are able to spend billions of dollars lobbying politician­s.

From a theoretica­l point of view, and from internatio­nal experience, there is no reason to think that SOEs are less efficient than large private firms in naturally noncompeti­tive markets. Actually, government access to informatio­n about details of an SOE can allow the government to better protect consumers and smaller private firms.

Nobody thinks SOEs are highly efficient. That is why the government is strongly pushing for their reform. They will continue to serve as essential providers of goods and some services that are not efficientl­y produced in highly competitiv­e sectors.

EAGLE EYE By David Blair The SOE reform is also tied to a guideline of upgrading China’s manufactur­ing and industrial structure to produce higher value-added, more technologi­cally sophistica­ted products. The guideline will support efforts to accelerate the integratio­n of new informatio­n technology and manufactur­ing, speed up the innovative developmen­t of the industrial internet, hasten the fundamenta­l transforma­tion of manufactur­ing processes and enhance the level of digital, networked and intelligen­t modes of manufactur­ing.

 ?? LI JIANAN / XINHUA ?? An employee works at the assembly line of YTO Group Corp in Luoyang, Central China’s Henan province, on March 5.
LI JIANAN / XINHUA An employee works at the assembly line of YTO Group Corp in Luoyang, Central China’s Henan province, on March 5.

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