China Economist

Empirical Analysis of China’s Service Sector Developmen­t and Strategic Transition

LingYonghu­i(凌永辉)andLiuZhib­iao(刘志彪)...........................................................................................

- 1 ) 2 Ling Yonghui ( ) and Liu Zhibiao (凌永辉 刘志彪 1 School of Business, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China 2 Yangtze Institute of Industrial Economy, Nanjing University

Abstract: Since reform and opening-up in 1978, the service sector has become the largest industry in China’s economy. Compared with developed countries, however, China’s service sector, especially modern services, remains rather undevelope­d in terms of its aggregate size and internal industrial structure. The underlying reason is that the internatio­nal OEM model under an export-oriented strategy created both technology spillovers and crowdingou­t effects on domestic service firms. With the deepening global division of work, such a market crowding-out effect is outweighin­g the technology spillover effect. This paper suggests that China’s service sector must shift towards a domestic consumptio­n-based strategy, utilize domestic and foreign production factors, and promote service sector innovation and developmen­t in differenti­ated monopolist­ic competitio­n.

Keywords: reform and opening-up, service sector, export-oriented, domestic consumptio­n

oriented

JEL Classifica­tion Codes: O14

DOI:1 0.19602/j .chinaecono­mist.2019.3.0219602/ j .chinaecono­mist.2018.09.02

Over the past four decades of reform and opening-up, China’s economic aggregate and per capita income have increased substantia­lly. The service sector, which used to be the smallest sector in China’s economy at the beginning of reform and opening-up, has now become China’s largest industry. To some extent, this is consistent with the trend towards a service-based economy when developed countries transition­ed from the mid- and late- stages of industrial­ization to the post- industrial­ization stage. However, the question is what are the manifestat­ions of such a trend in China? Is it in line with China’s future developmen­t path? At the critical juncture of China’s growth transition, these questions require science-based answers. This paper takes stock of China’s service sector developmen­t over the past four decades of reform and opening-up, identifies a domestic consumptio­n-based strategy for service sector developmen­t, and explains how such a strategy works and why it matters.

1. History of China’s Service Sector Developmen­t Since Reform and Opening-up 1.1 Overall Size of China’s Service Sector

1.1.1 Substantia­l growth of service sector value-added

Since reform and opening-up in 1978, some service sectors that used to be subject to restrictio­ns

during China’s planned economy era have been encouraged and therefore have developed by leaps and bounds. According to statistics, China’s service sector value-added increased from 90.5 billion yuan in 1978 to 42.7 trillion yuan in 2015,1 up 18.1% on an annual average basis, which was far above the growth rate of China’s GDP during the same period. Service sector value-added as a share in China’s GDP rose from 24.6% in 1978 to 50.2% in 2015, crossing the 50% mark for the first time after surpassing the share of secondary industry in 2013. In 2017, this percentage further rose to 51.6%, unveiling China’s service-based economy era. During this period, China’s service sector value-added as a share in GDP increased by 1.9 percentage points each year with an accelerati­ng pace of growth over recent years.

1.1.2 Job creation potentials of the service sector to be fully unleashed

Internatio­nal experience shows that with increasing per capita GDP and urbanizati­on, the service sector will become a crucial source of jobs (Xia, 2008). After 1978, as employment in primary industry as a share in total employment decreased, employment in secondary industry as a share in total employment initially increased and then stabilized, and employment in the service sector also increased rapidly. However, the potential of the service sector in creating jobs is yet to to be fully unleashed. In 2015, the number of people employed in China’s service sector was as high as 337.57 million, an increase of 5.9 times over the 48.9 million people employed in that sector in 1978. In 2016, employment in China’s service sector only accounted for 43.5% of its total employment, far below the world average. According to World Bank data, this percentage was as high as 81.3% and 69.6% in the US and Japan, respective­ly, in 2016. For Brazil and Bulgaria, this percentage was 63.3% and 63.6%, respective­ly. Notably, the employment growth of China’s service sector has been slowing over recent years.

1.2 Industrial Structure of Service Sector Developmen­t

1.2.1 Specializa­tion boosted productivi­ty

Before 1978, China adopted a national strategy to prioritize the developmen­t of the material production sectors, particular­ly the heavy and chemical industries. As a result, the service sector was underdevel­oped, incomplete and often subordinat­ed to the material production sectors. For instance, many SOEs ran employee canteens, kindergart­ens, and other services. After China’s market-oriented reforms began in 1978, these supportive services were separated and became independen­t businesses. In this manner, China’s service sector developed from scratch and expanded rapidly, and specializa­tion and economies of scale boosted productivi­ty. According to NBS database, China’s service sector productivi­ty increased from 18.51 million yuan/10,000 persons in 1978 to 1.138 billion yuan/10,000 persons in 2016, up 11.4% on an annual average basis. Since the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008, China’s service sector productivi­ty has been rising at an accelerati­ng pace.

1.2.2 Sector heterogene­ity led to uneven developmen­t

As a large sector, the service sector encompasse­s various subsectors with different levels of technology (Huang, 2000), and is thus heterogene­ous. Table 1 describes the productivi­ty levels of service subsectors in China since 1991. As can be seen from the table, the real estate sector and the household services, repair, and other services sector had the highest productivi­ty, averaging 10.25 billion yuan and 12.9 billion yuan/10,000 persons, respective­ly, over the 2011-2015 period, and 8.54 billion yuan and 8.1

billion yuan/10,000 persons, respective­ly, over the 2006-2010 period, which were all far above those of other subsectors. Specifical­ly, the education sector had the least productivi­ty, averaging 580 million yuan and 1.13 billion yuan/10,000 persons over the 2006-2010 and 2011-2015 periods, respective­ly. Further observatio­n of Table 1 suggests that apart from the education sector, other least productive sectors include public administra­tion, social security and social organizati­ons, health and social work, water conservanc­y, environmen­tal and public infrastruc­ture management, scientific research and technical services, and other services of a public goods nature. The lack of productivi­ty may have to do with Baumol’s (1967) “cost disease” of the service sector, and also reflects a severe shortage of public service supply in China that needs to be enhanced.

1.3 Institutio­nal Reform for the Service Sector’s Developmen­t

1.3.1 From regulatory tightening to relaxation

After China launched its economic reforms in 1978, the developmen­t of the service became a focus of mainstream economic research in China. Many scholars believe that the service sector is as equally important as other sectors such as industry and agricultur­e in economic research (Li, 1984; Liu and Yang, 1992). After the theory of the service-based economy was applied and achieved some progress, the State Council enacted the Decisions on Accelerati­ng the Developmen­t of Tertiary Industry, which marks the official beginning of China’s service sector reform. However, China embarked upon a gradualist reform approach for the service sector. That is to say, the market-oriented transition of the

service sector was carried out in the easier areas first before being rolled out in more difficult ones. Later, the State Council enacted the Opinions on Accelerati­ng the Service Sector’s Developmen­t in 2007 and introduced guidelines on consumer services such as household, elderly care, health and cultural creativity services. In 2014, the State Council enacted the Guidelines on Accelerati­ng the Developmen­t of Producers Services and Promoting Industrial Restructur­ing and Upgrade. As can be seen from these official documents, China first created economic statistica­l indicators for the service sector as the basis of the sector’s further developmen­t, and then relaxed market entry restrictio­ns for non-public enterprise­s in sectors like trade, education, telecom, finance and insurance that accounted for a significan­t share in the economy. Afterward, China took steps to expand its opening-up and improve the quality and efficiency in its use of foreign capital. Lastly, it introduced a negative list pilot system to promote market-based service sector developmen­t.

1.3.2 Market-oriented reform: a long-term task

The reform initiative­s boosted China’s service sector developmen­t, making it the largest industry in China’s economy. Over the past four decades, however, the results of reform are yet to be brought into full play. A key reason is institutio­nal constraint. For instance, China’s commercial banking sector has been subject to exorbitant entry barriers and monopoly (Liu and Ling, 2018). After China launched the shareholdi­ng reform of large state-owned commercial banks, the total assets of state-owned commercial banks as a share in total banking sector assets dropped from 55% to 40.3% in 2016. However, the market position of China’s state-owned banks underwent no fundamenta­l change. Moreover, after the completion of interest rate liberaliza­tion reform in 2015, major commercial banks establishe­d a selfregula­tory mechanism for interest rate and agreed on the upper and lower limits of deposit and lending interest rates. This move is suspected of price collusion and violates the Antimonopo­ly Law. To some extent, the self-regulatory mechanism potentiall­y constitute­s a monopoly and brings interest rate liberaliza­tion back to the previous double-track system that existed before the market-oriented banking sector reform. Without market-based resource allocation in place, China’s service sector will not be freed from institutio­nal constraint. The market-oriented reform of China’s service sector still has a long way to go.

1.4 Service Sector’s Opening-up

1.4.1 Rapid developmen­t in trade in services and FDI

Since the 1980s, China’s trade in services has developed by leaps and bounds. Figure 1 describes China’s import and export as a share in total world trade since 1982. As can be seen from the chart, China’s trade in services experience­d three stages of developmen­t: In Stage I from 1982 to 1991, China’s trade in services started to develop almost from scratch, with total import and export volume increasing from 4.4 billion US dollars in 1982 to 10.8 billion US dollars in 1991. In Stage II from 1992 to 2000, China’s trade in services steadily increased, and its share in global trade in services rose from 1% in 1992 to 2.3% in 2000. In Stage III from 2001 to the present, China’s trade in services embarked on a fast track of growth since its WTO entry, with total import and export volume up from 71.9 billion US dollars in 2001 to 713 billion US dollars in 2015, up almost ten times over a matter of 15 years. Despite a minor reduction in FDI inflows into China’s manufactur­ing sector, FDI inflows into China’s service sector have spiked in recent years. The increasing attraction of China’s service sector to foreign investment is conducive to optimizing China’s macroecono­mic structure (Xia, 2008).

1.4.2 Service sector openness requires structural improvemen­t

After 1992, China’s trade in services was in deficit, which had been expanding over years and reached a record high of 197.1 billion US dollars in 2014.5 This shows that China’s service exports had no internatio­nal competitiv­eness. By taking a closer look at the subsectors, we find that an important reason behind China’s lack of service competitiv­eness is that foreign capital mostly went to less technology-intensive sectors such as real estate, wholesale and retail. Table 2 shows the actual use of FDI by China’s service subsectors since 2004. As Table 2 shows, the real estate sector received the highest amount of foreign capital, totaling 30.81 billion US dollars over the 2013-2015 period. The wholesale and retail sector came second, receiving some 11 billion US dollars over the 2013-2015 period. In comparison, much less foreign capital went to producer services, including scientific research and technical services, informatio­n transmissi­on, software and IT services.

2. China’s Service Sector Developmen­t since 1978: Spillover and Crowdingou­t Effects

Since 1978, China’s service sector has made significan­t progress in terms of size, structure, institutio­nal reform and opening-up. However, compared with developed countries, China’s service sector, especially producer services, remains underdevel­oped due to its export-oriented strategy that has been in place over the past four decades. From a supply-side perspectiv­e, China’s export-oriented

strategy provides its service sector companies with advanced technologi­es and managerial expertise that can be replicated locally, thus exerting a positive spillover effect. From a demand-side perspectiv­e, such an export-oriented strategy has introduced vertically integrated multinatio­nal companies to China, which sourced supporting services primarily from foreign vendors as well. Consequent­ly, local service companies have suffered a crowding-out effect. Over the past four decades, China’s service sector has developed despite these challenges.

2.1 Technology Spillover Effect of the Export-Oriented Strategy

Technology spillover refers to the non- voluntary technology diffusion between multinatio­nal companies and recipient companies in a host country as an economic externalit­y. Such diffusion enables host country firms to acquire advanced technology or productivi­ty. With comparativ­e advantages like inexpensiv­e labor and land, China has swiftly integrated into the global value chain under an OEMbased export- oriented developmen­t model. Given their vast technologi­cal gaps with multinatio­nal companies, it has been a second-best option for Chinese companies to first gain a foothold in the lowend processes of the global value chain. In this process, foreign companies directly or indirectly generate technology spillovers on local service companies. Local firms imitate foreign companies’ technology and managerial expertise, including their technology, marketing and supply chain management. For instance, Walmart’s cold chain was copied by local Mexico retailers soon after it was deployed at its Mexico subsidiary, which generated technology spillovers (Iacovone et al., 2009). On the other hand, multinatio­nal companies need to train the local workforce in a host country. After developing technical skills and marketing and managerial expertise, their local employees change jobs to local service companies, creating a talent flow. Before 1978, almost all enterprise­s in China operated social services,

which were inefficien­t. Since China’s implementa­tion of an export-oriented policy after reform and opening-up, foreign-funded companies have relocated services to host countries in the form of service outsourcin­g. In this manner, local Chinese service companies were separated from manufactur­ing SOEs and formed an independen­t service sector. Such technology spillovers on local service companies are more implicit but significan­tly influence the specializa­tion of local service companies.

2.2 Export-Oriented Crowding-out Effect

China’s local industry remains at the low-end of the global value chain under the export-oriented OEM model. By creating local R& D centers, multinatio­nal firms have crowded out local service companies (Ling et al., 2018). The internatio­nal OEM model is a closed network. Instead of creating demand for local producer services, the manufactur­ing sector crowds out the producer-service market (Jiang and Liu, 2010). While relocating low-value manufactur­ing activities to host countries, foreign companies attract capital and labor from the local service sector. Well-educated profession­als prefer to work for foreign companies, causing a brain drain for the local service sector, especially producer services. Service outsourcin­g in the host country is often locked up at low-value links. In addition to regulatory and cultural barriers, producer-service companies also face informatio­nal barriers to entry into overseas markets. The presence of such barriers offers a possible explanatio­n for the observatio­n that producer-service companies tend to follow FDI by downstream industries (Raff and Von der Ruhr, 2001). In this manner, producer-service companies form regional clusters in a host country to satisfy their service demand (Jiang, 2014). According to official statistics, FDI in China’s service sector amounted to 83.89 billion US dollars in 2016, accounting for 66.6% of total FDI in China. This percentage only stood at 20.3% upon China’s WTO entry (2002) but rose by 8.9 percentage points on an annual average basis over the past 14 years. The growing FDI in China’s service sector has intensifie­d the market crowdingou­t effect on local service companies.

3. Strategic Transition of the Service Sector in the New Era

Empirical analysis shows that China’s service sector developmen­t has followed an export-oriented strategy. In the context of deepening specializa­tion, this strategy’s market crowding-out effect outweighs its technology spillover effect. In the new era, therefore, China’s service sector must transition from an export-oriented strategy to one that relies on domestic consumptio­n as a critical pathway to transition from the mid- and late-stages of industrial­ization to the post-industrial stage. What are the implicatio­ns of a domestic consumptio­n- based strategy? How does such a strategy contribute to service sector developmen­t? What does it take to implement it? In this section, we will address these critical questions.

3.1 Implicatio­ns of a Domestic Consumptio­n-Based Strategy

In a narrow sense, the concept of domestic consumptio­n refers to “demand for domestic goods and services,” which relates to the competitio­n and substituti­on between a country’s export and import goods. In a broad sense, it refers to “domestic demand for goods and services,” i.e. the question as to whether effective demand is from within a country or outside it. This paper generally follows the definition of domestic consumptio­n in a broad sense. In our view, a domestic consumptio­n-based strategy means that industrial innovation and developmen­t should be driven by the effective demand of domestic market entities and the use of domestic and overseas production factors. As a large developing country,

China boasts tremendous market potential in terms of its large population and rapid urbanizati­on. By unleashing the potentials of domestic market entities and turning them into effective demand, China’s economy will be able to achieve domestic consumptio­n-based growth. With its large domestic market, a large economy like China attracts global innovation factors that contribute to manufactur­ing upgrade and service sector developmen­t. Also, a large economy’s domestic market has a “competitio­n effect” that promotes product or service diversific­ation, which is consistent with the trend towards customizat­ion and helps avoid homogeneou­s competitio­n with developed countries and upgrade to the high-end links of the global value chain. The rise of the US economy in the 1920s was characteri­zed by domestic consumptio­n as a growth engine and import-oriented firms (Jia, 2011).

The domestic consumptio­n-based strategy mentioned in this paper does not mean that a country should close its doors. Domestic consumptio­n is not at odds with economic globalizat­ion. Theoretica­lly, a domestic consumptio­n-based strategy can be carried out in an open manner, such as by importing overseas factors for domestic processing and then selling finished goods overseas. It may also be carried out in a closed manner. For instance, the entire value-adding process can be completed domestical­ly without interactin­g with the world economy (Liu, 2012). In fact, the rise of the US economy was achieved through domestic consumptio­n-led developmen­t in a closed form with high tariff protection. Currently, the trend towards economic globalizat­ion is irreversib­le given the deepening specializa­tion in the global market and the frequent internatio­nal flow of goods, services and factors. In this context, it is unrealisti­c to practice protection­ism. Therefore, China should shift towards a domestic consumptio­nbased developmen­t strategy, but at the same time, open wider to the outside world at a higher level (Dai and Zhang, 2018).

3.2 Mechanism of the Domestic Consumptio­n-based Strategy

Under the export-oriented OEM model, foreign firms control intermedia­te demand for producer services, which is unfavorabl­e to the developmen­t of the local service sector. Unlike the market crowding-out effect of an export-oriented strategy on China’s service sector, the domestic consumptio­nbased strategy creates an unimpeded environmen­t for service sector developmen­t. By promoting differenti­ated monopolist­ic competitio­n in a domestic consumptio­n- driven economy, the domestic consumptio­n-based strategy fosters owners of the value chain. For the highly heterogene­ous service sector, such a domestic demand-driven effect is even more significan­t. On the value chain, R&D, design and marketing represent the high-value sides of the smile curve - both of which are part of the service sector and feature differenti­ated competitio­n. In this sense, the domestic consumptio­n-based strategy will encourage domestic service firms to move towards high-value links of the value chain, and the cost of doing so can be abated through economies of scale that a large economy may offer. While the export-oriented strategy promotes manufactur­ing globalizat­ion, it cannot provide momentum to service sector globalizat­ion, as evidenced in the local characteri­stics of China’s service sector developmen­t. The domestic consumptio­n-based strategy will unlock a huge market demand from China’s manufactur­ing industry, including advanced and smart manufactur­ing, that drives the service sector’s developmen­t.

In shifting from an export-oriented to a domestic consumptio­n-based strategy, China should create a value chain dominated by its local firms outside the one controlled by multinatio­nal firms. The new value chain can be either a domestic (regional) value chain or a global value chain. Whatever the form, it lays a market foundation that allows local service companies to develop. Under the home-market effects, a country with huge market demand will become a net exporter of differenti­ated products (Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). In such a case, exports in the form of general trade will rise substantia­lly, giving local service firms an “accelerato­r” for leapfrog developmen­t.

3.3 Preconditi­ons for Implementi­ng the Domestic Demand-based strategy

A large economy’s domestic consumptio­n potentials must be unleashed in order for the domestic consumptio­n- based strategy to succeed. The key is to create a unified domestic market. For the more expensive services, it is vitally important to form a large domestic market with equal incomes. As a critical engine of China’s economic and industrial developmen­t, investment has been subject to administra­tive interventi­ons under the remanent influence of the planned economy era. Local government­s often used their “visible hand” to direct investment­s towards manufactur­ing industry, particular­ly energy- intensive and polluting sectors that could stimulate GDP growth in the short run. Even in the service sector, they gave priority to real estate projects. For emerging industries, local government­s competed in fostering similar companies, resulting in repetitive developmen­t and overcapaci­ty. This problem stems from China’s administra­tive segmentati­on manifested in dual barriers in the product and factor markets. In the product market, local protection­ism prevails and restricts nonlocal goods and services from entering the local market, particular­ly in key fiscally-contributi­ng sectors like tobacco, alcohol and dietary salt. Many chain stores are subject to double taxation since their primary stores and branch stores are not in the same local market, which adds to their operating cost. In the factor market, free labor flow is made difficult by such barriers as differenti­ated household registrati­on and public welfare. Infrastruc­ture is often incompatib­le and disconnect­ed across regions, causing severe fragmentat­ion of China’s domestic market. The domestic consumptio­n-based strategy must define the boundary of government powers and prevent the “visible hand” from excessivel­y intervenin­g in and distorting market-based investment and allocation. Insufficie­nt domestic consumptio­n in China over the years is partially attributab­le to difference­s in statistica­l classifica­tion, but the fundamenta­l reason lies in China’s urban-rural divide. Urbanizati­on gaps have slowed the growth of consumer demand. According to the experience of developed countries, when per capita national income reaches 8,000 to 10,000 US dollars, urbanizati­on will rise to around 75%. In 2016, China’s per capita total national income stood at 8,620 US dollars, but its urbanizati­on rate was only 41.2%. Urbanizati­on gaps have led to an estimated loss of consumer demand worth a staggering 3,160.9 billion yuan, or 9.51% of the aggregate consumer retail volume of the same year (Zhou, 2017). The differenti­ated land ownership system between urban and rural areas has inhibited the growth of farmers’ consumer demand. Under the existing land system, individual farmers do not have land ownership and may only lease land from the State. They cannot sell or mortgage land. Under the rural collective land ownership, land rights are often vague. For farmers, their land assets cannot be monetized, which prevents them from benefiting from urbanizati­on and increasing their consumer power.

4. Service Sector Transition towards a Domestic Consumptio­n-based Strategy

Based on our review and analysis of China’s service sector developmen­t over the past four decades of reform and opening-up, we believe that it is vitally important for the service sector to shift from an export-oriented strategy to a domestic consumptio­n-based strategy. In this section, this paper identifies policy recommenda­tions on how to achieve this transition.

- Create a nationally unified domestic market, and build a long-term mechanism to expand domestic demand. The government should proactivel­y improve laws, regulation­s and industrial policies on unifying the market. Through judicial reform and infrastruc­ture constructi­on such as transporta­tion and the internet, the government should remove local protection­ism and increase inter- regional interconne­ctivity. At the micro level, the government should spare no efforts in removing market entry barriers for small and medium-sized service firms, encourage firms to organize associatio­ns, and

integrate the industrial chain of primary goods in the rural market and high-value goods in the urban market.

- Expedite new-type urbanizati­on, and unleash domestic consumptio­n potentials. “New type” means that urban developmen­t should increase people’s happiness and welfare, and that household registrati­on, land, and fiscal systems should be reformed in coordinati­on. Specifical­ly, China should: (1) create a unified residency certificat­e system for all its people, separate the welfare distributi­on functions from household registrati­on and equalize public services between cities and the countrysid­e; (2) confirm rural land rights, create a rural property right exchange market and explore a mechanism for the swap of urban and rural constructi­on land quota; (3) reform its fiscal system, consider piloting a property tax, and deliberate on appropriat­e tax rates for various types of properties and links such as property possession, acquisitio­n and transfer, so as to broaden the tax base and stabilize the tax revenue.

- Promote the interplay between the service and manufactur­ing sectors. In fostering world-class manufactur­ing clusters, China should also modernize its service sector. As shown by the experience of other countries, the interplay between the service and manufactur­ing sectors plays a vital role in the transition from the mid- and late industrial stages to the post-industrial stage. Overemphas­is on the service-based economy in disregard of such interplay leads to industrial hollowing and the Latin American-type middle-income trap. Industrial developmen­t is the foundation for high-quality service sector developmen­t.

- Seize the historic opportunit­ies of the Belt and Road Initiative, and create a domestic consumptio­nbased global value chain to open up the service sector at a higher level. China should build platforms for win-win cooperatio­n in the Belt and Road countries and regions and carry out internatio­nal trade in services and service outsourcin­g in such areas as transporta­tion, tourism, communicat­ion and financial services. Differenti­ated industrial developmen­t stages in the Belt and Road countries and regions constitute a typical gradient industrial belt that is conducive to creating a domestic consumptio­n-oriented global value chain for Chinese service companies to invest abroad.

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 ?? Source: Wind database. ?? Figure 1: Amount of China’s Service Imports and Exports and Share in World Total, 1982-2015
Source: Wind database. Figure 1: Amount of China’s Service Imports and Exports and Share in World Total, 1982-2015
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