China International Studies (English)

The “Modi Doctrine” and the Future of China-india Relations

- Rong Ying

Pursuing an “India First” mantra, the “Modi Doctrine” has achieved much progress in the diplomatic field, but challenges old and new remain. To fulfill their respective aspiration­s of national rejuvenati­on, China and India should take a positive view of each other’s developmen­t, further expand areas of cooperatio­n, and properly manage difference­s and competitio­n.

In May 2014, the Modi administra­tion took office in India. Over the past three years and more, India’s diplomacy has been vibrant and assertive, and has formed a distinctiv­e and unique “Modi Doctrine,”1 a strategy for the rise of India as a great power in the new situation. Fully understand­ing the characteri­stics and trends of the “Modi Doctrine” will be of great practical significan­ce in maintainin­g the healthy and stable developmen­t in China-india relations in the long run.

The “Modi Doctrine” Contribute­s to India’s Rise

The “Modi Doctrine” has inherited and further developed a major power diplomatic strategy for India since the end of the Cold War. It also reflects Modi’s personal political philosophy and style of administra­tion with the following contents and characteri­stics:

Exhibiting authority and offering benefits in the neighborho­od

Relations between India and its neighborin­g countries in South Asia

have always been the focus of India’s diplomacy. From the “Gujral Doctrine” to the peaceful diplomacy between India and Pakistan proposed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, all previous Indian government­s have regarded the South Asian region as their diplomatic priority. After taking office, the leaders of all neighborin­g countries in South Asia were the first to be invited by the new prime minister to attend his inaugurati­on ceremony, and the first country he visited as Prime Minister was Bhutan, the smallest country in South Asia, again highlighti­ng his policy of giving priority to the developmen­t of relations with neighborin­g countries in South Asia. In the past, India and Bangladesh relations have experience­d continual discord as a result of disputes over enclaves. Modi finally resolved the situation through the joint efforts of both parties after he took power, thereby eliminatin­g a major obstacle that has affected the relations between the two countries for several decades.2 While continuing to provide massive assistance to Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Afghanista­n, the Modi government pays more attention to its control over them. If these countries do not heed the will of India, India will not hesitate to inflict heavy penalties on them. In 2015, India imposed an economic blockade on Nepal because of constituti­onal issues. In order to exert pressure on Pakistan, the Modi government was not averse to crossing the border to attack the base of the anti-indian organizati­on in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.3

The starting point of Modi’s South Asia diplomacy is to increase its control over small and medium-sized neighbors and to impede the presence or growing influence in the region of other forces outside South Asia. South Asia policy under the “Modi Doctrine” focuses on tightening the interest bond between India and neighborin­g countries, and better serving India’s economic and social developmen­t strategy by promoting regional and sub-regional connectivi­ty. In recent years, India has accelerate­d

cooperatio­n mechanisms such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisecto­ral Cooperatio­n and the “Bhutan-bangladesh-india-nepal Connectivi­ty Cooperatio­n,” with a view toward forging an India-led regional and subregiona­l cooperatio­n framework. The concept and practice of the “Modi Doctrine” reflected in South Asia diplomacy, when compared to previous administra­tions, has highlighte­d both its own authority as well as the benefits it can provide to its neighbors, and is more concerned about its dominance in South Asia.

Strengthen­ing common interests in the larger periphery

Since its launch of the Look East policy in 1992, India has expended much talk but little action, and in its relations with its ASEAN partners, India has failed to play a major role. After taking office in 2014, Modi proposed the strategy of Act East, emphasizin­g practical actions to enhance relations with ASEAN. After that, high-level exchanges between India and the ASEAN countries have been frequent, and India continues to voice its opinion on issues of concern to ASEAN. According to Indian media, India has identified ASEAN as the guest of honor during the 2018 “Republican Day” celebratio­n. The ten leaders of ASEAN members will be invited to attend the celebratio­ns and to visit India.4 One of the priorities of India’s Act East is infrastruc­ture connectivi­ty, that is, accelerati­ng the constructi­on of transport corridors connecting the east and west, promoting road constructi­on in the northeaste­rn region, and removing the “bottleneck­s” hindering connectivi­ty within ASEAN. With the aid of Japan and other countries, the Indian section of the “Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport (KMMTT)” linking Calcutta of India to the Sittwe Port of Myanmar has been fully launched. The India-myanmar-thailand highway project has been advanced at a faster pace.

After Modi took office, India’s neighborho­od strategy has accelerate­d markedly. He emphasized that India’s interest should no longer be confined

to the South Asian subcontine­nt, but should be extended to a vast area from the Gulf of Aden to Malacca. India’s “Neighborho­od First” strategy has quickly pushed the country westward to the Middle East and Africa.5 For over three years, Modi has not only visited major countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Iran, but he has also become India’s first Prime Minister to visit Israel. India has also opened up strategic channels to Afghanista­n and Central Asia, and tightened its political and economic relations with the Gulf countries in the Middle East via Iran. It is true that his proactive moves in the Middle East are also aimed at isolating Pakistan diplomatic­ally, but more importantl­y, Modi seeks to better safeguard India’s strategic interests such as energy security in the Gulf region, thus serving the long-term need for the country to be a great power.6

Taking initiative to become an Indo-pacific leading force

After taking office, the Modi government has attached great importance to the affairs in the Indian Ocean region, accelerate­d its promotion of an Indian Ocean strategy, and proposed the five-pronged strategy on the Indian Ocean. India proclaims itself to be the “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean region. It focuses its efforts on strengthen­ing maritime security cooperatio­n with small and medium-sized Indian Ocean countries including Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Their cooperatio­n includes building an Indian Ocean coastal radar surveillan­ce network that reflects India’s presence and influence.7 India has also accelerate­d its constructi­on of military facilities in the Bay of Bengal and invited Japan, Australia and other countries to participat­e in the constructi­on of the

Andaman Sea Naval Base aimed at building it into a strategic outpost in the Indo-pacific region.8 Since 2016, India has hosted the Indian Ocean Internatio­nal Symposium in its striving for a greater voice in the region. India made it clear that Indian Ocean affairs “should mainly be managed by the countries in the Indian Ocean region,” and has tried hard to exclude the strategic presence of other major forces there, in order to prevent any challenge to its dominance over the Indian Ocean.9

For a long time, India had adopted a rather vigilant and exclusioni­st attitude toward any incursion of other major powers into the Indian Ocean. Since Modi took office, India has adjusted its policy to put more emphasis on the strategic cooperatio­n and coordinati­on with the US, Japan and other countries, taking advantage of the power of the US and Japan in an attempt to maintain its own advantageo­us position in the competitio­n among the major powers in the Indo-pacific region. In 2015, the military exercise Malabar between the US and India extended an invitation to Japan to participat­e. When Modi visited the United States in June 2016, he clearly demonstrat­ed the strategic significan­ce of bilateral cooperatio­n in the Indo-pacific region. India’s strategic sector responded positively to the initiative of the United States and Japan to construct an “Indo-pacific Alliance”. The Indian government, while making a show of reluctance to join, was actually ready to embrace it. In the eyes of its domestic media, India has adjusted its strategic goal to become a

India proclaims itself to be the “net security provider” in the Indian Ocean region, and focuses its efforts on strengthen­ing maritime security cooperatio­n with small and medium-sized Indian Ocean countries.

great power, and that “the constructi­on of a ‘multipolar Asia’ — or balancing China — is turning out to be as important as the search for a ‘multipolar world,’ which for so long had been code words for hedging against American unilateral­ism.”10

Pursuing better position in major power interactio­ns

After taking over, Modi has continued the diplomatic policies of previous Indian government­s which emphasized relations with the United States. In September 2014, during his visit to the United States, Modi and Obama jointly published an article in The Washington Post emphasizin­g the global influence of the strategic cooperatio­n between the two countries and expressed the will to “jointly work to maintain freedom of navigation and lawful commerce across the seas.”11 In January of the following year, Modi invited Obama to attend India’s Independen­ce Day celebratio­n, during which the two countries issued a joint statement on the vision of strategic cooperatio­n. India-us cooperatio­n in defense and security has been further strengthen­ed. The United States promised to help India build its aircraft carrier and transfer anti-submarine technology to India. The two countries also signed an agreement on logistics support, which further enriched their strategic cooperatio­n, especially defense cooperatio­n. After Trump came to power, India was initially quite skeptical about the trend of US domestic and foreign policies. Modi was concerned that Trump’s “America First” policy would undermine the momentum of India-us relations. In June 2017, after Modi’s visit to the United States, Us-india bilateral relations continued on a stable footing. At the same time, India has also begun to actively expand its relations with the EU in order to hedge against uncertaint­ies in the domestic and foreign policies of the US.

While increasing­ly promoting its strategic relations with the United States and other Western countries, India continues to maintain its

traditiona­l relations with Russia and has attached great importance to strengthen­ing cooperatio­n and coordinati­on with emerging powers. India has actively promoted the trilateral dialogue among China, Russia and India, striven to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperatio­n Organizati­on, paid more attention to its strategic investment in the BRICS cooperatio­n mechanism, and actively participat­ed in such mechanisms as the Asian Infrastruc­ture Investment Bank and the New Developmen­t Bank. India plays its role among the major powers such as the US and Russia, and strives to achieve benefits on all sides. Such an approach has not only maximized its political security and economic interests, but more importantl­y has maintained and strengthen­ed its initiative in the interactio­n at the strategic level among the major powers.

Actively forging Indian “footprint” in global governance

Limited by its present stage of developmen­t and the influence of domestic politics, combined with the country’s dissatisfa­ction with the current internatio­nal system dominated by developed Western countries, India had for a long time played the role of “spoiler” in multilater­al negotiatio­ns. Stephen Cohen, a South Asia expert from the United States, once said that India has often been seen as a “nay-sayer” in multilater­al negotiatio­ns.12 For a long time, India was accused of insisting on its own position in the global climate change debates and in the Doha round of WTO negotiatio­ns based on its domestic political and developmen­t needs. Robert Zoellick and Susan Schwab, both US trade negotiator­s, have criticized India’s negative stance. Zoellick called India a ‘do-nothing country,’ and for Schwab, Indians are ‘elephants hiding behind mice’ in their reluctance to share greater responsibi­lity for providing global public goods.13

After taking office, Modi surprising­ly adjusted the Indian position on global issues such as climate change, the Doha round of WTO

negotiatio­ns and sustainabl­e developmen­t. When Modi visited Germany in 2015, he made it clear that India would actively promote global issues including climate change negotiatio­ns.14 India has actively participat­ed in the negotiatio­ns while overcoming domestic difficulti­es and has played an important role in the conclusion of the Paris Accord. In June 2017, after US President Trump announced the withdrawal of the Paris Agreement, India clearly expressed its opposition and stressed its adherence to relevant internatio­nal obligation­s. India has also been actively participat­ing in internatio­nal agenda-setting to address climate change. It proposed to create an internatio­nal solar alliance to make full use of renewable energy for sustainabl­e developmen­t. India’s positive attitude towards global issues and its role in the transforma­tion of the global governance system have attracted the attention of all parties.

Seeking changes to create a personal diplomatic style

After taking office, Modi’s strong and decisive governing style and pragmatic governance philosophy began to affect the diplomatic field. Modi paid special attention to enhancing delivery in diplomatic efforts. External Affairs Minister Smt. Sushma Swaraj said that the Modi doctrine is “led by vision and implemente­d through delivery”.15 In the past three years since Modi assumed power, India’s diplomatic delivery has indeed improved. Many foreign aid projects have been promptly implemente­d and the projects that had been delayed for many years have also been completed in time. Indiasuppo­rted projects such as the Parliament building and the Salma Dam in Afghanista­n, the Duriappah Stadium in Sri Lanka, and the trauma center in Nepal have been completed and put into operation as scheduled, which fully reflects the shift of India’s diplomatic style under Modi’s government.16

Under the influence of Modi’s governing style, the risk-taking and practicabi­lity of India’s diplomacy are also on the rise. In order to clear out separatist rebels, Indian troops crossed the border into Myanmar.17 In 2016, India risked a conflict with Pakistan and crossed the border to attack a militant camp in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, at one point causing great anxiety both at home and abroad. Modi has adjusted the diplomatic philosophy of non-alignment. While insisting on advancing all-round diplomacy, Modi has adopted a “coalition not alliance” strategy on many major regional and internatio­nal issues so as to increase India’s bargaining chips in the great power games. This clearly reveals the relative pragmatism of his policy with shades of strategic speculatio­n. Modi has also made it clear that India should position itself in a leading power globally, rather than simply serving as a balancing force.18 While adhering to strategic autonomy, India should determine its position on issues based on its own interests and pay more attention to safeguardi­ng its economic interests. Modi stresses that India should strive to maintain its strategic independen­ce while playing a role among major powers. India will not become a vassal of any other country and will not rely on security guarantees from others.19

New Issues for “Modi Doctrine”

The “Modi Doctrine” is the product of India’s rapid economic growth and consequent increase of its overall national strength over the past 20 years. As an emerging power, India has been supported in recent years by the internatio­nal community, especially the United States and other Western countries. This has not only enhanced India’s internatio­nal status but has also

provided ample room for Modi’s government to play a role in foreign affairs. With its rapid economic growth and rising internatio­nal influence, India’s sense of being a major power and self-confidence has soared to an all-time high. It is generally felt that India has become one of the world’s powers with a major say in internatio­nal affairs. People feel that their country is no longer a “second-class” country, one that “has neither the money to buy anyone nor the strength to influence any one.”20

The “Modi Doctrine” reflects the influence of India’s traditiona­l strategic culture. India’s diplomacy not only stresses strength but also morality. While holding high the banner of idealism, it follows the path of realism. It is a result of the India’s traditiona­l pluralisti­c strategic culture. Modi strives to strike a balance in the strategic interplay of the major powers, and seeks to seize the initiative in the checks and balances among major powers, so as to hedge any changes in the power structure and seek tangible strategic benefits. This is an adept skill of India’s diplomacy.

The “Modi Doctrine” serves India’s rise to a leading power. Since taking office, Modi has proposed to make developmen­t and good governance the goal, and to promote major revolution­ary changes, so as to fundamenta­lly change India and establish a grand ideal of a new political culture for India to rise in an all-round way.21 In his speech at the 70th anniversar­y of independen­ce in August 2017, Modi put forward a vision of “New India”, a clean and beautiful country by 2022 when the country will be celebratin­g the 75th anniversar­y of its independen­ce. He proposed the idea of “Sakha Saath, Sakha Vikas”, which literally means “collective efforts and inclusive growth”.22 The “Modi Doctrine” is becoming a booster for building New India.

The “Modi Doctrine”, neverthele­ss, also faces many new problems and challenges.

Task of developmen­t remains complicate­d and arduous

The vision is ever beautiful, but the reality is somewhat threadbare. Despite its rapid developmen­t and remarkable achievemen­ts, India starts with a very weak foundation. It suffers from a large poor population and backward infrastruc­ture, and the economic driving force is sluggish. India’s manufactur­ing competitiv­eness is weak. And whether it can maintain its rapid growth in the next two or three decades has always been a big issue. In India, ethnic groups, religions, caste and class issues are all over the country. Social and economic developmen­t has brought about a gap between the rich and the poor. At the same time, the expectatio­ns of all walks of life for greater developmen­t have also been constantly raised, putting pressure on Modi’s government.

India’s economic growth has shown signs of slowing down recently, with poor macroecono­mic indicators. Economic growth slowed to 5.7% in the first quarter of fiscal 2017, the lowest in three years.23 After Modi took office, he undertook bold measures to push forward with reforms such as demonetiza­tion and tax reform, all of which left a profound impression. However, there are still many important reforms that need pursuing. India’s current macroecono­mic difficulti­es have already raised concerns in various sectors both at home and abroad. Former Indian Finance Minister Yashwant Singh expressed his particular concern in an article. He believes that the Modi government’s diplomatic performanc­e has exceeded people’s expectatio­ns, but progress in economic reform has hardly been satisfacto­ry. Ashley J. Tellis, the Indian-american scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for Internatio­nal Peace, says that India cannot be considered a “leading” power unless it consolidat­es its economic foundation, improves the governance ability and realizes its military capabiliti­es.24

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