Prospects of Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula

Marked by the remarkable easing of tension, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has undergone major and fundamental changes. Obstacles to its further progress remain due to deep structural contradictions, but there are new and to some extent irreversible factors that guide the situation in a favorable direction.

For some time now, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has undergone major and fundamental changes. The effort to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue has again returned to the track of dialogue. Both the DPRK-US relations and the DPRK-ROK relations have achieved breakthroughs. As the DPRK shifts its strategic focus to economic development, the tension on the Peninsula has eased remarkably, which was unseen for many years and has far-reaching implications for Northeast Asian political landscape. An analysis of the contributing factors to this relaxation of tension and an appraisal of the various parties’ stances would be essential to evaluate the future development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and more broadly in Northeast Asia.

Major Changes in Situation on the Korean Peninsula

Due to the entanglement of interests among the different parties and the confrontation triggered by the DPRK’S continuous push of its nuclear and missile programs, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has fluctuated between tension and detente since the end of the Cold War, threatening to spin out of control in 2017. With the denuclearization process returning to the track of dialogue, the overall situation on the Peninsula has undergone major changes with a detente that has been unprecedented both in extent and depth.

Consensus broadened on denuclearization of the Peninsula

The DPRK nuclear and missile issue has long been one sticking point of Northeast Asian security. As the DPRK’S nuclear and missile programs continued to advance, the conflict of different parties’ positions on denuclearization of the Peninsula reached its climax in mid-2017, threatening to push the situation on the Peninsula into an uncontrollable crisis. However, shortly after the Hwasong-15 intercontinental missile test in November 2017, the DPRK issued a statement, claiming that “the historical mission of improving national nuclear strength and missile capability has finally been completed,” which was construed by the outside world as a possible signal of suspending its nuclear and missile tests. During a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on his visit to China from March 25 to 28, 2018, DPRK leader Kim Jong Un said that, in accordance with the legacy of Chairman Kim Il Sung and General Secretary Kim Jong Il, it is the unwavering position of the DPRK to remain committed to the denuclearization of the Peninsula. It was further decided at the third plenary session of the seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) on April 21 that nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile launches from that day forward would be suspended. To ensure transparency of the suspension of nuclear tests, the DPRK would abandon its northern nuclear test site. On April 27, the Panmunjom Declaration was issued, whereby the DPRK and the ROK confirmed “the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.”1 On June 12, a US-DPRK joint statement was issued following the historic summit between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore, in which “reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”2 Despite the absence of an agreement at the second

Trump-kim summit in February 2019, it was reported by KCNA, the DPRK’S state news agency, that Trump and Kim would “continue productive talks to resolve problems discussed at their Hanoi summit, in order to bring about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”3 Kim Jong Un also declared in his 2019 New Year address that the DPRK “would neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them.”4

In the past few years, the DPRK’S position on the nuclear issue has continued to escalate toward the objective of “self-protection by possession of nuclear weapons.” The divergence between the DPRK and the other countries in the Six-party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been growing and has become a source of tension. The above-mentioned statements of the DPRK since the end of 2017 represented a reversal in its position. Although there remain many differences in what each of the parties considers requirements for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and in their interpretations of the DPRK’S statements on the matter, it is undeniable that the parties have reached consensus on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a more positive and explicit way than what we have seen in recent years.

Tentative results achieved in denuclearization process

Other than the remarkable broadening of consensus on denuclearization, relevant notable and tangible results have also been witnessed on the Peninsula over the past year.

On May 24, 2018, the DPRK detonated several tunnels and ancillary facilities of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and announced that the test site be officially abandoned. During a meeting with reporters from China, the US, Russia, the UK and the ROK, Deputy Director of the DPRK’S Nuclear Weapons Institute revealed that there were four tunnels in the nuclear test site, including Tunnel 1, which had been abandoned since the first nuclear test in 2006, Tunnel 2, which carried out the second to the sixth nuclear tests from 2009 to 2017, and

Tunnels 3 and 4 which was completed and ready for use in nuclear tests at any time. On that day, the DPRK destroyed Tunnels 2, 4 and 3 in turn, and destroyed more than ten ground buildings for observation, research and guard. On July 23, it was reported by 38 North, a Us-based website specializing in analysis of the DPRK’S situation, that the country had begun dismantling key facilities at the Sohae satellite launching station.5 Moreover, earlier reports revealed that Kim Jong Un had indicated in his meeting with Trump that he would destroy a missile engine test site,6 and according to US satellite images on July 20, the DPRK had begun to dismantle missile launchers, including orbital structures used to assemble rockets before launch and rocket engine test benches used to develop liquid fuel engines for ballistic missiles, which are believed to have played an important role in the development of the DPRK’S intercontinental ballistic missiles. 38 North commented that this was an important first step for Kim Jong Un to fulfill the commitments made at the DPRK-US summit.7

As an indispensable step in continuing the process of denuclearization, a series of initiatives aimed at reducing military tensions and boosting mutual trust have also achieved initial results. For example, during the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, the US and the ROK postponed their joint military exercises Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, scheduled in early March, to April 1, shortened the duration of the two-month exercises to one month, and reduced the scale of the exercises accordingly. In order to create a favorable environment for dialogue, including the first Trump-kim summit, Defense Departments of the US and the ROK announced in June that the joint military exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG), originally scheduled for August, would be suspended. This was the first time in 24 years that the two countries have suspended joint military exercises for the sake of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. In October 2018, the US and the ROK decided once again to suspend the Vigilance Ace joint military exercise in order to “provide more opportunities for diplomatic settlement of the

North Korean nuclear issue.”8 After the second Trump-kim summit, the two militaries announced that they would suspend Key Resolve and Foal Eagle from 2019 and replace them with smaller-scale special training.9

Shift of the DPRK’S strategic focus to economic construction

Another significant event with far-reaching implications to the Peninsula and closely related to denuclearization is the DPRK’S national strategic adjustment to prioritize economic development. At the third plenary session of the seventh WPK Central Committee on April 20, 2018, Kim Jong Un announced that the strategic task of simultaneously advancing economic and nuclear power development, which was put forward in 2013, has been successfully completed, and that the current strategic line is for “the whole Party and the whole country to concentrate all efforts on socialist economic construction.” The resolution of the meeting stated that the DPRK “will concentrate all its efforts and mobilize all the human and material resources of the country to strive for the construction of a strong socialist economy and achieve epoch-making improvement of people’s livelihood.” The resolution also stated that “in order to create an international environment conducive to socialist economic construction and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the world at large, we should actively maintain close ties and dialogue with neighboring countries and with the international community.”10

In order to implement the resolution of the plenary session, the DPRK, on the one hand, proposed the goal of accelerating domestic economic reform with a focus on science, technology and education, and, on the other hand, strived to improve its investment environment and step up international