Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Opportunities, Challenges and Prospects

The recent DPRK-US summits have generated a new opportunity for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but differences between the two sides are still stark and difficult to resolve. Denuclearization is possible but will not be a smooth process, and the two sides shall learn from the history and avoid committing errors of the past.

The DPRK-US Agreed Framework of 1994 and the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-party Talks in 2005 once generated hope for settling the DPRK nuclear issue, but their implementation was stalled for a number of reasons, not least the change of administration in the US and the consequent policy adjustment. The recent summits between leaders of the DPRK and the US have generated a new opportunity for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but differences between the two sides are still stark and difficult to resolve. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is possible, but it will not be a smooth process. The two sides shall learn from the history and avoid committing errors of the past.

Two Highlights in Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

More than 20 years have elapsed since the first DPRK nuclear crisis. Since then there have been two opportunities for resolving the issue. The first one was the signing of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework after bilateral negotiations. And the second was the Six-party Talks hosted by China that produced the September 19 Joint Statement, the February 13 Joint Statement signifying the initiation of denuclearization, and the October 3 Joint Statement listing second-phase actions for implementing the former statements.

DPRK-US Agreed Framework: defusing the first nuclear crisis

In 1994, the DPRK-US Agreed Framework was signed after three rounds of high-level talks following the meeting between then DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and former US President Jimmy Carter. The DPRK promised to first freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. Also, the DPRK claimed to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and agreed to take steps to implement the inter-korean Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The United States promised that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK, and that it would supply to the DPRK light-water reactors (LWR) and heavy oil as alternative energy. Thus, the two sides moved toward normalization of political and economic relations. Following the signing of the Agreed Framework, relations between the two countries did improve to some extent. The US partly removed the economic sanctions it had imposed on the DPRK and even prepared to normalize bilateral relations. In response, the DPRK agreed to suspend launching long-range missiles during on-going bilateral negotiations on missiles and normalization of relations. The two sides conducted discussions on the issue of removing the DPRK from the US list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism” as well as establishing diplomatic relations. Unfortunately, US President Bill Clinton did not pay a visit to the DPRK, nor did he normalize relations with Pyongyang. After George W. Bush took office, he defined the DPRK as an “axis of evil” and a target for “preemptive strikes,” undermining the historic opportunity created by the Clinton administration to mitigate bilateral tensions and plunging the relations back onto the track of confrontation. The second DPRK nuclear crisis was thus triggered. The second crisis arose because of the following three reasons.

First, the DPRK-US Agreed Framework was not implemented in earnest. Neither side completely fulfilled their obligations, which damaged mutual trust and confidence in the execution of framework commitments. With the misjudgment there would be a rapid collapse of the DPRK, the

US was not motivated to carry out the agreement. Also, as the US Congress rejected supplying financial support and members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization did not agree on their contribution of funding, there was a funds shortage preventing the completion of the agreement. In addition, the US dragged its feet in supplying LWRS and heavy oil at that time. As for normalizing political and economic relations, the US did not loosen any restrictions on the DPRK in trade or investment. Thus, no aid, other than for humanitarian purposes, was allowed. Constrained by Congress, the US government was unable to remove the DPRK from the “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list, nor set up a liaison office. In response to the US inertia, the DPRK was reluctant to carry out the agreement unilaterally and it adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Moreover, the US suspected that the DPRK was still secretly conducting nuclear development and demanded inspection of Pyongyang’s “suspicious underground nuclear facilities,” claiming that the DPRK “had admitted its nuclear development plan.”1

Second, the change of US government brought about shift in US policy toward the DPRK. On the nuclear issue, the Clinton administration emphasized direct dialogue, striving to win concessions from the DPRK with promises of aid, improved relations, reduced nuclear threat and less criticism of Pyongyang’s political system. Clinton was willing to resolve the issue step by step, conducting negotiations on nuclear and missile issues respectively. However, the Bush administration, though still engaging with the DPRK, adopted a tough stance, with the intention of changing Pyongyang’s regime and political system, even threatening a preemptive strike. Believing that only sanctions and pressure could force the DPRK to make concessions, the administration emphasized conducting comprehensive negotiations with the DPRK and made clear it was unwilling to make a deal with a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” by providing aid, which was met with strong response from the DPRK.

Third, deep-rooted contradictions were unsettled. There were two

intentions behind the DPRK’S willingness to reach agreement with the US. First, to address its current severe political and security challenges through normalizing relations with the US. Second, to persuade the US into removing economic sanctions, conducting economic cooperation with Western countries, and receiving aid and loans from world financial institutions for developing its economy. However, the US had no intention of establishing a political relationship with the DPRK and was averse to help the DPRK improve its economic situation. The US did not expect to go beyond suspending the DPRK’S nuclear program and preventing any backlash against the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Therefore, the DPRK-US Agreed Framework did not address the deep-rooted origins of the first nuclear crisis, namely the contradictions in the political and security architecture on the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War.2

September 19 Joint Statement: a symbol of significant progress

The second opportunity to settle the DPRK nuclear issue appeared with the Six-party Talks in 2005. The September 19 Joint Statement indicated that the six parties, namely China, the DPRK, the US, the ROK, Russia and Japan, reached agreement on the denuclearization of the Peninsula in a peaceful and verifiable manner. As an improvement on the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the US confirmed that it would not strike or invade the DPRK using nuclear or conventional weapons; the US and the ROK assured that there were no nuclear weapons on the ROK’S territory; the DPRK promised to abandon all nuclear weapons and its existing nuclear program; besides with the US, the DPRK also agreed with Japan to take steps to normalize their relations; and not only the US, but also the other parties of the Talks, were willing to provide energy support for the DPRK. Moreover, the statement was supplemented with content including conducting negations among parties directly concerned on constructing a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula, and discussions among the six

parties to strengthen security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The situation might now be different if all parties had worked with each other to fulfill the commitments made in the September 19 Joint Statement. Unfortunately, in the same month the statement was signed, the US Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on the DPRK in the name of money laundering and distribution of superdollars through the Delta Asia Financial Group in Macao. Considering the US was unwilling to change its hostile policy, the DPRK insisted on removal of financial sanctions as precondition for its reengagement in the Six-party Talks. With no concessions forthcoming, the Six-party Talks could not be renewed. In the end the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test.

With the mediation of China, the DPRK returned to the Six-party Talks while the US unblocked the DPRK’S of US$25 million in Delta Asia. As a result, the February 13 Joint Statement and the October 3 Statement were passed at the Six-party Talks. All parties agreed on implementing the September 19 Joint Statement in a gradual approach, in accordance with the principle of “action for action.” The DPRK agreed to close and seal its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and accepted a disablement process with the purpose of full dismantlement, which would be subject to monitoring and verification. Also, the DPRK agreed to submit its entire nuclear program accurately. In addition, the DPRK and the US, and the DPRK and Japan started negotiations on normalizing bilateral relations. On the part of the US, it began launching the procedure of removing the DPRK from the “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list and ending applying Trading with the Enemy Act to the DPRK. Besides, the five other parties agreed to provide the DPRK with economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance equivalent to the value of roughly 1 million tons of heavy oil. In terms of progress, the DPRK closed five nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, with some facilities sealed up by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The DPRK also submitted a detailed report of its nuclear development and destroyed the cooling tower in Yongbyon. In response, the US announced temporary removal of the DPRK from its “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list and stopped applying Trading

with the Enemy Act to Pyongyang. Nonetheless, DPRK-US and DPRKJAPAN relations did not make much progress, and the aid worth 1 million tons of heavy oil was not completely delivered. In February 2009, the new US administration launched a large-scale joint military exercise with the ROK named Key Resolve. In April, the DPRK announced the launch of the Kwangmyongsong-2 satellite, which was considered by the US government as a launch of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile. The US then promoted the adoption of a Presidential Statement by the UN Security Council, with the ROK and Japan, “condemning” the DPRK. In response, the DPRK’S Foreign Ministry stated that it would no longer take part in the Six-party Talks and would not be bound by any agreement reached in the Talks, announcing the country would reactivate its nuclear facilities, restore the disabled facilities, and reprocess spent fuel rods. The Six-party Talks ultimately failed for the following two reasons.

First, the shift in US policy toward the DPRK resulting from the change in administration. Bush was extremely hawkish in his first term as US President, but turned to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic policy in his second term. Empowered by Bush, the pragmatists in his administration, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, took the lead in US policy toward the DPRK. They advocated negotiation with the DPRK by “offering and acquiring at the same time,” conducting discussions on issues of regime security and energy compensation to address Pyongyang’s concern and initiating negotiations on normalizing diplomatic relations. The DPRK, in return, agreed to close and seal its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, accept disablement of the facilities, and submit its entire nuclear program accurately. However, soon after taking office as US President in January 2009, Barack Obama demanded the DPRK perform “complete and verifiable denuclearization” rather than only suspending its nuclear program. Also, the US proposed “denuclearization ahead of normalization of bilateral relations.” In response, the DPRK stressed that denuclearization could only be performed when the US gave up its hostile policy, removed nuclear threats against Pyongyang and nuclear

umbrella for Seoul, and took steps to improve bilateral relations. Afterwards, the Obama administration carried out the policy of “strategic patience,” indicating that there would be no negotiation before the DPRK promised to abandon its nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the US strengthened unilateral and multilateral sanctions on the DPRK, and enhanced its military and extended deterrence. The DPRK’S proposal of unconditional reactivation of the Six-party Talks was disregarded by the US, and the talks were thus long suspended.

Second, inherent flaws of the Six-party Talks mechanism. Lacking effective supervision, restraint and enforcement mechanisms, the Six-party Talks failed to keep each party committed to their promises. Thus, there was nothing to prevent any failure or rejection to deliver commitments. Likewise, the September 19 Joint Statement did not define any concrete subjects for the DPRK’S denuclearization process, leading to “confusion” over highly enriched uranium, which became a major variable affecting the follow-up of the Six-party Talks.3 Given the fact that no practical measures were taken by the US, Japan and the DPRK to improve relations, there was profound mistrust between the DPRK on the one hand and Japan and the US on the other, undermining smooth implementation of the agreement. Due to lack of further conciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas in the September 19 Joint Statement, once conservative forces came to power in the South, there was a sharp deterioration in inter-korean relations. Besides, the replacement of armistice with a peace treaty was not put forward to address the DPRK’S security concerns.

DPRK-US Summit: New Opportunity for Denuclearization

On June 12, 2018, incumbent leaders of the DPRK and the US held a historic meeting in Singapore. DPRK leader Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump signed a joint statement, in which they agreed to build a new

type of bilateral relations. They also stated their shared desire to construct a peace mechanism and achieve complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It marked a return to the track of negotiation for the DPRK nuclear issue as well as a new opportunity to realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Since the year 2018, the two leaders have exchanged letters and sent special envoys to convey messages, indicating the two countries share the intention to achieve a political solution and have adopted a top-down approach to settle the issue. A certain degree of trust was attained after the meeting in Singapore. The two sides were said to have reached consensus on promoting security and cooperation in exchange for denuclearization. According to report of the Korean Central News Agency, “the two leaders have reached consensus on the significance of abiding by the principle of gradual and synchronized actions in the process of pursuing peace, stability and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”4 Proceeding from strategic considerations of the DPRK and the US respectively, both sides have practical needs for the bilateral negotiations to bear fruit. Other countries like the ROK, China and Russia also welcome dialogue between the DPRK and the US, and the settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue through political approaches.

DPRK strategic policy adjustment offering opportunity for denuclearization

In the third plenary session of the seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in April 2018, Kim Jong Un declared that the DPRK’S strategic line would now focus on economic development, and he denoted a willingness to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The adjustment not only originated from the DPRK’S internal motivation of striving for security and development, but was also related to new administrations coming to power in both the US and the ROK, as well as the resolute attitudes of the international community including China, the ROK

and Russia to realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

First, the adjustment of the DPRK’S strategic line derives from its security demand. The DPRK considers “accomplishing the great historic cause of nuclear and missile development” as a critical point to conduct policy adjustment. With the successful launch of intercontinental missiles, the DPRK, in the face of growing threats of war from Washington, has enjoyed certain nuclear deterrence and now has the strength and confidence to negotiate with the US. The superior approach to preventing warfare is to suspend nuclear development and abandon nuclear weapons.

Second, the adjustment stems from the DPRK’S pursuit of development and stability. The economy of the DPRK has met with numerous obstacles due to rounds of severe sanctions. By giving economic development priority, the government can pacify the domestic population while demonstrating its friendliness to the outside world and moderating its relations with the US and the ROK, in a bid to get the sanctions lifted.

Third, new administrations in both the US and the ROK raised the DPRK’S expectation of acquiring security in exchange for nuclear power. In Kim Jong Un’s consideration, Trump is distinct from other politicians who intend to subvert other countries’ regimes, and attaches less importance to ideology. As a deal-making leader, Trump is more easy-going compared with the establishment and the hardliners in the US. Kim also believes that Moon Jae-in is different from Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, and seeks for peaceful coexistence and common prosperity of the two Koreas, instead of pursuing unification through absorption or conquest.

Last, the international community, including China, the ROK and Russia, strives to promote denuclearization of the Peninsula and thus motivates the DPRK to improve its relationship with the US. Leaders of China and the DPRK have held four summits. China advocates improving DPRK-US relations as well as inter-korean relations, completely supports the settlement of the Peninsula issue through political means and wishes to play an important role in the process of realizing denuclearization and permanent peace of the Peninsula. Through three summits with leaders of the

North, the ROK unfolded a new era of “reconciliation and peace” between the two sides and played its role as the mediator in promoting the historic DPRK-US meeting. In addition, Russia has also acted positively in advancing denuclearization of the Peninsula.

Settlement of DPRK nuclear issue regarded as major diplomatic achievement and asset for Trump’s re-election

Considering the DPRK’S nuclear and missile development as a longstanding major threat to US national security, Trump has attached great significance to the issue and is indeed seeking to resolve it. He criticized his predecessor’s “strategic patience” policy and put forward his “maximum pressure and contact” policy toward the DPRK. He is confident that he can resolve the DPRK nuclear issue, which his predecessors had failed to settle, and regards a solution as a major diplomatic achievement and asset for his re-election. Following the midterm elections, the Democratic Party now dominates the House of Representatives and the Congress is divided. As conflicts between the two major political parties intensifies, Trump’s political agenda has been severely obstructed. As a result, facing a serious crisis in domestic affairs, Trump has become a “crippled president” and thus strives for shining results in foreign affairs. A breakthrough in the DPRK nuclear issue requires no higher price than the US easing some of the sanctions it has imposed on the DPRK. Trump has already claimed many times that he has made progress on the DPRK issue by pointing out the return of detained US citizens and remains of US soldiers, as well as suspension of nuclear and missile tests by the DPRK. He even declared that were he not elected President, there might have been a war between the two countries.5 Additionally, he claimed that he had a good relationship with Kim Jong Un and was determined to conduct renewed diplomatic attempts with the purpose of maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula.

DPRK-US Denuclearization Negotiations under Challenges

The year 2018 witnessed the launch of political negotiation process for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, it did not proceed smoothly because of long-standing disputes and contradictions between the DPRK and the US concerning the nuclear and missile issue.

First, there is a lack of mutual trust between the DPRK and the US. After the failure to implement the DPRK-US Agreed Framework and the September 19 Joint Statement, hardliners in the US have questioned the sincerity of the DPRK to conduct denuclearization. They consider the DPRK’S adjustment of its national strategic line to be merely tactical while its ultimate purpose is to earn time for developing nuclear weapons and missiles. They claim that the DPRK has been secretly developing relevant capabilities. On the other hand, the DPRK is worried about its security if it conducts denuclearization. In addition, it believes that the US military deployment in the region is in fact aimed at strategically constraining China and Russia, which reflects Washington’s insincerity to promote peace on the Peninsula.

Second, there are major divergences between the two sides in understanding the connotations of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. From the DPRK’S perspective, it is unjust for the US to interpret “denuclearization of the Peninsula” as “denuclearization of the DPRK.” It asserts that “denuclearization of the Peninsula” does not merely concern the two Koreas, but also means removing the nuclear threats surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the US should not deploy any strategic nuclear weapon on the Peninsula and its neighborhood. Thus, the US should first completely remove its nuclear threat against the DPRK before the latter dismantles its nuclear deterrence.6

Third, there are differences regarding the procedures and approaches for realizing denuclearization of the Peninsula. Mainstream

opinion in the US remains committed to the successful “Libya model” or “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” (CVID). To prevent irritating the DPRK, the US altered the expression into “final, fully verified denuclearization” (FFVD). However, no matter how it is expressed, the US insists on the policy of “denuclearization before compensation,” alleging that sanctions will only be lifted when complete nuclear dismantlement is verified. Thus, sanctions are considered the key means to pressure the DPRK. The US hardliners also believe that the two sides shall first agree on a roadmap of denuclearization which addresses specific procedures and timeline, and want the DPRK to submit progress reports for inspection. Moreover, as early-harvest measures, the US wants the DPRK to transfer a substantial amount of its nuclear warheads, nuclear materials as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles out of its territory. They also expect the DPRK to make full declarations, submit to thorough inspections and finally completely dismantle all nuclear facilities, which the DPRK is naturally reluctant to do without security guarantees. The DPRK does not concur with the measures of declaration and inspection before there is mutual trust between the two countries. In the DPRK’S view, its status shall not be mentioned in the same breath as Libya’s and it calls for a denuclearization approach that is “gradual and synchronized.” The DPRK wishes to autonomously select the sites it dismantles without being subject to declaration and inspection, although it accepts verification after each dismantlement until the accomplishment of complete denuclearization. Meanwhile, the DPRK requires security assurances from the US, the relaxation and removal of sanctions, economic support as well as normalization of bilateral relations.

Fourth, both countries consider the efforts of the opposite side are insufficient. In the DPRK’S opinion, it has suspended nuclear tests, destroyed nuclear test sites and returned the remains of US soldiers, while the US merely suspended the its joint military exercises with the ROK, which can be reactivated at any time, and even backed away from its stance on a declaration to end the Korean War and developing a peace mechanism for the Peninsula. On the other hand, the US considers that the DPRK has not

taken any substantial measures for denuclearization. Parts of the facilities can be restarted or rebuilt, and the production of nuclear missiles has not been suspended. Thus, the US believes a peace treaty can only be considered after the DPRK’S submission of its nuclear program. The DPRK wants the US to declare the end to the war as soon as possible, launch the negotiation to replace armistice with a peace treaty, relax the sanctions imposed on it, and take steps to improve bilateral relations and build mutual trust. In the long term, Pyongyang hopes the sanctions imposed by the UN and the US can be lifted, bilateral relations with the US normalized, and a peace mechanism set up when the entire Korean Peninsula is denuclearized. On the other hand, the US hopes to reach an agreement with the DPRK on a roadmap for full denuclearization through negotiations, starting with the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The US also demands the DPRK suspend production of nuclear weapons and missiles, discard and transfer out existing intercontinental ballistic missiles, make a complete declaration of its nuclear weapons and production facilities, accept inspection and supervision by experts, and finally dismantle and destroy its nuclear facilities, materials, weapons, missiles, launch stations as well as other weapons of mass destruction. The US has drawn up an emergency plan to cope with possible diplomatic failure of negotiations with the DPRK.

Prospects of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

On February 27-28, 2019, the second summit between leaders of the DPRK and the US was held in Hanoi, Vietnam. Although the two leaders conducted constructive conversations, there were still huge divergences between them on lifting sanctions and substantial measures for denuclearization. First, the approaches to denuclearization. The DPRK is in favor of a step-by-step approach. According to the current level of mutual trust between the two sides, the DPRK points out that the biggest step it can take is to perpetually abandon the production facilities of nuclear materials such as plutonium and uranium in Yongbyon in a process conducted by both sides and subject to the

supervision of US experts. However, the US wants a larger deal and demands the DPRK take bolder actions based on its present commitments, preferably in the form of a package deal. Second, the lifting of sanctions. The DPRK hopes to lift the sanctions that obstruct its economic development and affect people’s livelihoods, which were imposed by UN Security Council between 2016 and 2017 in five resolutions, but the US considers these sanctions the most effective way of putting pressure on the DPRK and views any relaxation of them as de facto removal of the entire sanction regime. DPRK First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son Hui said at a news conference that Trump responded positively to the proposal of a “snapback mechanism,” under which the US takes the lead in lifting sanctions against the DPRK, and reserves the right to resume them should any violations of the conditions occur. However, this proposal ran aground due to the opposition of Trump’s National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.7

Although the Hanoi summit did not produce any tangible achievements, it did have a positive meaning. At the summit, the two sides exchanged their thoughts on issues concerning denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, setting up a new type of DPRK-US relations, and promoting a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. Bilateral mutual understanding was advanced through the event. As Trump said, the DPRK announced it would not conduct any nuclear or intercontinental missile tests, and after the summit the ROK and the US also decided to suspend Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises from this year. According to DPRK media, the two leaders agreed to meet again and continue working-level dialogues to address issues negotiated at the summit.

However, due to intricate contradictions between the two sides and their insistence on different stances, the above-mentioned working-level dialogues has not been initiated. The current deadlock has resulted in a “two-track strategy” from both sides. On the one hand, the DPRK and the US have not shattered their expectations for settlement through dialogue, and both are

open to negotiations. In a speech at the Republican Jewish Coalition 2019 Annual Leadership Meeting in April 2019, Trump stated that he has a very good relationship with Kim Jong Un and stressed he wanted to achieve “the right deal” with the DPRK.8 On April 11, after meeting with ROK President Moon Jae-in, Trump indicated that he was always open to dialogue with Kim and did not rule out possibility of a third summit, but achievements could not be made in one single action. On April 12, at the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, Kim Jong Un said that the DPRK would be willing to have another attempt, conducting a third summit with the US as long as Washington demonstrates proper attitude by putting forward proposals acceptable to Pyongyang. On the other hand, striving for predominance in denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the two sides have continued to put pressure on each other, seeking for settlement on their own terms by compromising the other’s stance. The US is reluctant to give up a package deal while the DPRK is sticking to a gradual and synchronized approach. Also, the US is unwilling to remove any existing sanctions. Although Trump stressed that because of his relationship with Kim Jong Un, he would not take tougher measures despite the numerous options available to reinforce them, but sanctions at the current level will be maintained, and conditions are not yet ripe to reactivate the Kaesong Industrial Region and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region. On April 17, Bolton stated that the third US-DPRK summit is only possible if “real indications” of denuclearization appear.9 In response, Kim Jong Un said that it is not necessary to have a summit with the US just for the purpose of removing sanctions, but until the end of this year the DPRK will wait for decisions from the US.10 Domestically, Kim is holding high the banner of self-reliance, “to strike back heavily against those who misunderstand that we would surrender ourselves to international sanctions.”

In addition, by partially restoring the facilities of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (also known as Tongchang-ri Space Launch Center) and inspecting tests of tactical weapons, Kim has demonstrated his stance of never yielding to US unilateral requests. Externally, DPRK officials have denounced Bolton’s remarks and demanded Pompeo retreat from the frontline of negotiations, in a bid to force the US to alter its tough stance. Likewise, the DPRK has also put pressure on the ROK by slowing down the development of their bilateral relations. It criticized the ROK for its obedience to the US and accused the Moon government of being constrained by domestic and US conservative forces and showing no willingness, let along making real efforts, to forge new relations with the North in an independent approach, instead continuing joint military exercise with the US under a new banner. Moreover, Kim has also sought political, diplomatic and economic support from Russia, holding a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In order to break the deadlock between the DPRK and the US, Moon Jae-in has appealed for a fourth meeting with Kim Jong Un, desiring to mediate between Pyongyang and Washington, so as to facilitate the third summit between Kim and Trump. Source from the ROK Blue House has indicated that if a summit between Moon and Kim is held, Moon will deliver an oral message from Trump to Kim, the content of which shall generate positive influence on the Kim-trump summit. As for Russia’s position, Putin indicated at the news conference following his meeting with Kim Jong Un that as denuclearization implies the DPRK’S disarmament to a certain extent, Pyongyang needs guarantees of its security and sovereignty. The Six-party Talks format is thus “highly relevant to develop a system of international security guarantees” for Pyongyang.11 On the DPRK side, in his meeting with Putin, Kim Jong Un pointed out that it was the unilateral and hostile attitude of the US during the second summit that has resulted in the current deadlock on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region. The recent situation is quite dangerous and risks falling back to the original point. In Kim’s opinion,

the peace and security on the Korean Peninsula is entirely dependent on the United States’ attitude, and the DPRK will be fully prepared for any potential scenario.

Looking from the history of the denuclearization process, the Korean Peninsula issue is extremely complicated and thus its settlement requires not only incomparable wisdom and patience, but also resolute political determination. It depends on many factors to promote smooth progress of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the future. The first one is whether the DPRK and the US can forge some mutual trust, and achieve compromise through mutual concessions. Second, whether an agreement on the connotations and roadmap of denuclearization can be reached by the two sides, so as to reduce disputes in the future. This would help instill confidence in realizing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Third, whether there will be discussions, in the process of denuclearization negotiations, on establishing a peace mechanism for the Peninsula and normalizing DPRKUS relations, with the purpose of addressing the deep-rooted security and development contradictions between the two countries. Fourth, whether there are effective supervision, restraint and enforcement mechanisms to prevent backtracking or unilateral interpretations of commitments made. Fifth, whether both sides adhere to the principle of “action for action,” take practical measures to improve bilateral relations, and enhance mutual trust through earnest fulfillment of promises. Sixth, whether Trump is able to win a second term. The reelection of Trump might be beneficial for the political settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue. However, if he is not re-elected, the divergence on the issue between Trump and his successor and the resultant policy adjustment will bring uncertainty in the future. Seventh, whether there are simultaneous measures for enhancing inter-korean and DPRK-JAPAN relations. What is most important, experience and lessons of the past shall be reflected and summarized by all relevant parties so as to prevent strategic misjudgments and committing the same errors, and make progress toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.