The US Enhancing Ties with Sri Lanka: Motivations and Restraints

The rapid growth in US-SRI Lanka relations is the latest attempt by the US to implement its Indo-pacific strategy in South Asia. As the strategy materializes, the intensified US involvement in the region will bring new variables to the security situation in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

As the Trump administration promotes its Indo-pacific strategy in a very high-profile manner, the position of South Asia in the US foreign strategy has been growing in importance, which has led to an elevation of relations between the US and many countries in the region. In particular, the development of US-SRI Lanka relationship is worth reviewing, not only because it sets an example of growing relations between the US and small “Indo-pacific” countries, but also because it will bring new variables to the security situation in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

New Changes in US-SRI Lanka Relations

The United States and Sri Lanka established diplomatic relations in 1948. Since then US Vice President Richard Nixon visited then Ceylon in 1953, relations between the two countries have remained generally stable. From 1956 to 2015, the US government has provided Sri Lanka with more than $2 billion in total assistance.1 However, during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s term as President of Sri Lanka (2005-2015), especially at the end of the country’s protracted civil war, the US stopped military assistance to Sri Lanka on the grounds of human rights violations by the Sri Lankan government. Various other types of assistance were also greatly reduced, leading to a decline of

bilateral relations.2

The Sri Lankan presidential election in January 2015 marked a transition for US policy toward the South Asian island country. The election of pro-western Maithripala Sirisena was viewed by the Obama administration as an opportunity to improve the US-SRI Lanka relationship. In February of the same year, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Nisha Biswal visited Sri Lanka and pledged to help Sri Lanka’s new government overcome challenges and promote its “100-day reform” program, with the hope of expanding cooperation between the two countries. John Kerry’s visit to Sri Lanka as Secretary of State soon afterwards was the first of its kind since 2004, and was hailed as a milestone,3 as the US began to reassess Sri Lanka’s strategic importance and adjust its policy toward the country. Since then, the US-SRI Lanka relationship has warmed up rapidly.

Politically, the two countries have maintained frequent visits by senior officials, and have established high-level dialogue mechanisms. In the three and a half years after John Kerry’s visit, senior officials from the US State Department, Congress, and the military have visited Sri Lanka for a total of 13 times.4 In February 2016, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera visited the US and the two sides launched the first US-SRI Lanka Partnership Dialogue. In September of the same year, the Sri Lankan Parliament and US Congress signed a cooperation agreement to share information on each other’s legislative system. At the second US-SRI Lanka Partnership Dialogue was held in Colombo in November 2017, the two

countries agreed to further strengthen contact and cooperation, in order to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 2018.5

Economically, the US has further increased its assistance to and imports from Sri Lanka. In order to “reward” Sri Lanka’s democratic process and further expand markets, the US has gradually increased its assistance to and trade cooperation with Sri Lanka. In the 2015 fiscal year, the US assistance to Sri Lanka totaled $3.92 million. In FY 2017, this number surged to $39.79 million, an increase of 915%.6 In May 2018, the US Department of Agriculture provided Sri Lanka with $14.1 million to help it increase milk production.7 Among all trading partners of Sri Lanka, the US ranks third in terms of trade volume (after India and China), but it has always been Sri Lanka’s largest export market. Every year, 25% of Sri Lanka’s products are exported to the American market, giving it a trade surplus. Furthermore, according to the US Census Bureau, Sri Lanka’s exports to the US increased by 8% from 2014 to 2015, and have been maintaining steady growth every year since then. Sri Lanka’s trade surplus has also reached about $2.5 billion in each of the years, and the surplus with the US in 2017 accounted for 80.6% of their bilateral trade.8 Since taking office, President Donald Trump has pursued an “America first” policy and trade protectionism, and has launched investigations into “unfair” trade practices against many of its trading partners. However, Sri Lanka has been spared. In fact, Sri Lanka’s trade surplus with the US is much higher than the trade surpluses of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Those four countries were investigated for “unfair trade” in April 2017, and their 2017 trade surpluses

accounted for 70.2%, 48.1%, 48.8% and 61.3% respectively of their bilateral trade volumes with the US.9

Moreover, military and security cooperation between the two countries has developed rapidly. The US-SRI Lanka military cooperation was basically interrupted at the end of 2007. However, with their bilateral relations warming up, a security dialogue was launched in August 2016, and the two countries agreed on a timetable for security cooperation over the next three years. The acceleration of bilateral military and security cooperation is reflected in senior officials’ exchanges, warship port visits, military exercises, military capability assistance and personnel training. Notably, US warships have been frequently visiting Sri Lanka. In March 2016, the US Seventh Fleet’s flagship USS Blue Ridge visited Colombo, the first visit by an American naval vessel since 2011. In October 2017, the 11th “carrier strike group” led by the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz visited Colombo, which was the first US carrier to visit Sri Lanka in nearly 32 years. According to incomplete statistics, US Navy ships have visited the ports of Sri Lanka at least 14 times since March 2016.10 As for military exercises, the Sri Lankan Navy has participated in Us-led naval exercises, including the Pacific Partnership (on disaster relief ) and CARAT (on naval combat capabilities). In addition to the above-mentioned naval exercises, the two armed forces have jointly exercised in many other fields such as Operation Pacific Angel (on military medicine), Pacific Airlift Rally and airborne patrols. It is particularly noteworthy that in August 2018, the Sri Lankan Navy, for the first time, participated in the Us-hosted RIMPAC exercises. In addition, in order to enhance Sri Lanka’s maritime security capabilities, the US has gradually relaxed restrictions on the country’s defense exports and increased military assistance. In May 2016, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) of the US State Department announced

that it would lift the license restrictions on defense exports to Sri Lanka and review export licenses on a case-by-case basis.11 In August 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced military and security assistance of $39 million to Sri Lanka.12 In the same month, the US Coast Guard officially handed over the Hamilton-class cutter USCGC Sherman to the Sri Lankan Navy.

To promote democracy and human rights in Sri Lanka, cultivate goodwill among Sri Lanka’s young people toward the United States, and to enhance its soft power and influence toward Sri Lanka, the US government attaches great importance to its public diplomacy in the South Asian country, mainly through disaster relief, medical assistance, educational exchanges and online media. In June 2017, then US Ambassador to Sri Lanka Atul Keshap announced 350 million rupees (about $2.3 million) in humanitarian aid to those affected by floods and landslides in Sri Lanka. In addition, the US also provides financial assistance to support Sri Lanka’s livelihood projects including AIDS prevention, clean drinking water, and dairy processing. In February 2018, Acting Director of US Peace Corps Sheila Crowley and Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Tilak Marapana signed an agreement on reestablishing the Peace Corps in Sri Lanka. The first group of 25 Peace Corps volunteers will be on duty in 2019.13 As the Sri Lankan government eases control on free speech, mobile social networks such as Facebook and Whatsapp have been growing rapidly, and have become the main channels for many domestic users to access news and information. Moreover, the US has also been increasing the number of Sri Lankan students enrolled in

American educational institutions. According to the Open Doors report released by the US Institute of International Education (IIE) in November 2018, in the 2017-18 academic year, the total number of Sir Lankan students studying in the US was 3,309, an increase of 14.8% compared with 2,882 in 2014-15.14

The United States sees Sri Lanka’s political transition as a “window of opportunity”. In the past three years, the US influence has expanded in political, economic, military, and cultural fields, rapidly enhancing the relationship between the two countries in a short period of time. This prompted US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Shannon to say at the second US-SRI Lanka Partnership Dialogue, “today our relations are at an all-time high.”15

US Motivations for Strengthening Bilateral Ties

The adjustment of US policy toward Sri Lanka started during the Obama administration and was strengthened after Trump took office. This type of continuity is rare in the Trump administration, given his tendency to overturn his predecessor’s diplomatic legacy. The Obama administration adjusted its Sri Lanka policy mainly in order to consolidate the democratic process and ameliorate the country’s human rights situation. However, Trump is more focused on addressing the bilateral relations from the perspective of its Indo-pacific strategy. There are several major reasons why the US is seeking to strengthen its relationship with Sri Lanka.

First, the US wants to make Sri Lanka a fulcrum of its regional strategy. Despite a small country, Sri Lanka, due to its location, is the strategic frontier and gateway from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Known as the “super connector,” Sri Lanka has always been the key or hub of

great-power competition in the region. Moreover, Sri Lanka is on a crucial international shipping route, which approximately 60,000 ships use every year. These ships account for 66% of the world’s oil trade and 50% of the world’s containers. Sri Lanka is 1,600 nautical miles from Singapore, and 1,200 nautical miles from Diego Garcia, with three major ports (Colombo, Hambantota and Trincomalee), all of which are suitable for the docking of various military vessels. Therefore, Sri Lanka’s important strategic position has attracted the keen attention of US strategic circle. In the eyes of the US military (especially the Navy), Trincomalee is a rare logistics and supply base and a significant component of the tactical triangle formed together with the US Diego Garcia base and Singapore’s Changi base, which can completely control the waters from the Strait of Malacca to the Bay of Bengal. The US Naval War College suggested early in 2011 that it would be greatly beneficial for the US if it could sign a logistics cooperation agreement with Sri Lanka, allowing the US military to use Sri Lanka’s ports or airports, an agreement similar to the one signed with Singapore.16 At a hearing of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in June 2018, the new US Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives Alaina Teplitz said, “Both nations are positioned astride key shipping lanes that connect the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, the free navigation of which is vital to US economic and security interests.”17 In February 2019, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia Thomas Vajda made clear that Sri Lanka is located at the junction of the “Indo-pacific region,” and thus the US views it as a “key partner” and a “valued friend.”18

To strengthen its control over key points of maritime trade routes as well as to enhance its security presence in the Bay of Bengal and the

broader Indian Ocean, the US government is seeking to develop relations with Sri Lanka under the framework of its Indo-pacific strategy, and build the country into the main fulcrum of US regional strategy. In March 2016, Ambassador Atul Keshap said that a strong relationship between the two countries would help bring stability, security, prosperity and a rules-based order to the “Indo-pacific region.” In a speech to the House Armed Services Committee in April 2017, then Commander of the US Pacific Command Harry Harris listed Sri Lanka as one of the eight security partners requiring US attention. Besides India, Sri Lanka was the only South Asian partner mentioned in the speech.19 During celebrations for the 70th anniversary of the establishment of US-SRI Lanka relations in February 2018, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas A. Shannon said that the two states should “work together to enhance the shared objectives of security and stability in the Indo-pacific region, the importance of which President Trump, Secretary Tillerson, and our National Security Strategy have all underscored.”20 In December 2018, the two chambers of the US Congress passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, which proposes expanding cooperation with South Asian democratic partners, including Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In August 2018, the US Department of State proposed the Bay of Bengal Initiative, which explicitly states that the US should strengthen civil and military cooperation with other partners in the Bay of Bengal, listing Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal as the recipients of security aid.21

At present, the US has been focusing on intelligence gathering, port visits and personnel exchanges, so that the Indo-pacific Command will be

able to quickly obtain more of the region’s marine safety information and become familiar with the future war environment. In December 2018, the US Navy aircraft carrier USS Stennis docked at the outer sea of Trincomalee, employing the carrier-based aircraft for replenishment. In January 2019, Stennis used the Bandaranaike International Airport in Sri Lanka for air replenishment. All this indicates that the US is attempting to build a simple and temporary air replenishment base in Sri Lanka. In February 2019, Commander of the US Indo-pacific Command Philip S. Davidson stated that the command would continue to focus on cooperation with the Sri Lankan Navy.22

Second, the US is seeking to counter China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka. As China is considered the main strategic competitor, the competition with China for influence in small- and medium-sized countries is very important in US strategic planning.23 Therefore, the US deems its relations with Sri Lanka, which occupies an important geostrategic position in South Asia, to be a priority in the region. US officials and the media are full of suspicion and vigilance against China’s huge investment and port construction in Sri Lanka. A report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) claimed that although the current trade and investment behavior of China does not directly threaten US interests, it is not in the interests of the US if the influence of its own or its allies is marginalized in Sri Lanka.24 The website of CNN published a report, stating that “China adds another ‘Pearl’ (Sri Lanka) to its ‘String’.”25 The New York Times claimed that “China is challenging the American dominance in Asia,” saying that “a Chinese submarine sailed into a port built with Chinese investment. It

marked a new era, in which China is converting its economic power into military power— and, in poorer democracies, into political influence.”26 Moreover, US Vice President Mike Pence has attacked China on multiple occasions, asserting that China is leading Sri Lanka into a “debt trap,” and thus forcing the latter to hand over to China a port, one that was jointly built with China’s state-owned enterprises and full of commercial risks. He believes that this port will soon become a military base of the Chinese Navy.27 In February 2019, Thomas Vajda also implied at the Pathfinder Panel Discussion that China-sri Lanka cooperation was based on “commercial selfinterest” and has a “hidden agenda.”28 What he referred to as the “hidden agenda” is the suspicion that the construction and lease of the Hambantota Port was militarily motivated. In August 2018, the Pentagon released the 2018 China Military Power Report, and the beginning of the report gives the example of Hambantota Port as the proof of China’s efforts to expand its regional and global presence.

Third, the US is seeking to promote democracy in Sri Lanka, and foster and enhance its political influence in that country. Although the issue of democracy does not receive as much attention from the Trump administration as it did from the Obama administration, it is still an important driver of US policy toward Sri Lanka. The US is trying to promote “democratic consolidation” in Sri Lanka by advocating human rights and public diplomacy. By doing so, the US can set an example for other countries in South Asia, including Bhutan, Nepal, and the Maldives. Additionally, the US will be able to influence Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, helping establish the cornerstone for long-term development of US

Sri Lanka relations. The actual practices of the US are very diverse and concealed. For example, the US links its assistance to human rights and democracy in Sri Lanka, so that it can force the recipient to agree to conditions attached. As for the national reconciliation and war crime accountability in Sri Lanka, the US has adopted both soft and tough approaches, exerting pressure on Sri Lanka’s high-level officials and treating them in different ways. It puts pressure on Sri Lanka’s government by influencing the public opinion through various non-governmental organizations and social media. Moreover, the US is also attempting to use personnel training to win over the main reserve force of the Sri Lankan army, and promote Sri Lanka’s military modernization and professional transformation, in order to ultimately enhance the democratic awareness and pro-american sentiments inside Sri Lanka’s armed forces.

The US is concerned about the democratization process in Sri Lanka, mainly because of geopolitical considerations. For example, when the prowestern new government came to power in 2015, the US completely changed its high-pressure stance on human rights issues, and offered to help Sri Lanka by postponing a UN Human Rights Council report about Sri Lanka’s war crime allegations till September 2015. In October 2018, when Mahinda Rajapaksa became Prime minister, however, the US started to actively intervene. Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy even publicly accused Rajapaksa of “running the government as a criminal enterprise” when he was in power.29 Some experts and media in the US suggested that the assistance to Sri Lanka should be reconsidered and that there should be pressure on Sri Lanka over human rights issues.30

The primary purpose of the US policy is to integrate Sri Lanka into the overall planning of its regional strategy so that it can balance out China’s influence in the country. However, to put in perspective, Sri Lanka

is not economically significant to the US. The US has neither the intention nor the capability to commit large investment to Sri Lanka’s infrastructure building.

Prospects for the US-SRI Lanka Relations

In the course of incorporating Sri Lanka into its regional strategy, the United States is confronted with multiple restraints and variables due to its own limitations, and Sri Lanka’s unique geopolitical environment, non-aligned diplomatic traditions and domestic political instability.

From the perspective of Sri Lanka, it has its own concerns about developing relations with the United States. First, Sri Lanka hopes that with assistance from and market and technology exchanges with the US, it can accelerate its economic development and eventually become a trade hub that connects the East and the West. However, Sri Lanka also worries that the US will intervene in its internal affairs in the name of advocating “democracy” and “human rights,” which might incite ethnic feuds and religious rivalries within the country and ultimately undermine Sri Lanka’s political stability. In March 2018, anti-muslim riots broke out in Sri Lanka. The government condemned Facebook for failing to control the hateful rhetoric that had spurred the riots.31 Second, Sri Lanka wants to use the United States’ power to balance its dependence on China and its suspicion against India. However, since Sri Lanka has just emerged from its civil war, it doesn’t want to become the battlefield of great powers or a cat’s paw of the US to balance out China in the “Indo-pacific region.” Sri Lanka also worries that greatpower competition will mean interference its internal politics since the major powers will cultivate and support their respective agents or parties in Sri Lanka, which will cause political confrontation and civil disorder. Scholars in Sri Lanka advocate that their country should adopt a neutral “equidistant

diplomacy” in order to prevent close military cooperation with the US from affecting trade with China and Chinese aid.32 After all, compared with the pie-in-the-sky promises that the US is offering, the actual funds and trade from China are what Sri Lanka really needs.

From the US perspective, there is also controversy about developing relations with Sri Lanka. For example, is the democracy in Sri Lanka worthy of reward or has it been rewarded too early (like with Myanmar)? In the name of promoting human rights and democratization in Sri Lanka, the United States’ long-term goal is to intervene in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs and cultivate pro-american forces in order to make Sri Lanka the Singapore of the Indian Ocean. However, the short-term goal is to seize the opportunity of winning over Sri Lanka and strengthening the bilateral military cooperation in order to balance out influence of China. As stated earlier, to pursue its short-term interests, the US has been adopting a flexible approach on human rights issues and an active approach to providing economic assistance, but there is controversy over how to achieve a balance between the two approaches. Some US Congressmen and several human rights organizations say that in order to balance out Chinese influence, the Trump administration is turning a blind eye to Sri Lanka’s human rights issues, and the strategy of “prematurely over-rewarding” will eventually harm the moral image and long-term interests of the US in that region.33 They criticize the Trump administration for not doing enough to promote political reconciliation in Sri Lanka, and maintain that introducing external judges or supervision from international organizations is necessary. However, it would absolutely be unacceptable to the Sri Lankan government. Another point of view is that the US must be cautious when playing the “human rights card” in Sri Lanka because there is a good

chance that the latter might further lean toward China if there is too much pressure.

Additionally, India is another important factor. India has long viewed Sri Lanka and the Bay of Bengal as its “strategic backyard” and it views itself as the “net security supplier” of the Indian Ocean. It is very sensitive to the presence of external forces. At present, the Us-india relationship has been grown rapidly. The US has been encouraging India to play a greater role in the Bay of Bengal, while India has also been acquiescing to the security cooperation between the US and countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh and Myanmar. However, what India actually wants is to reduce these countries’ dependence on China, instead of letting the US seek a longterm presence in the region. As Indian scholars have pointed out, although India recognizes the importance of improving its relations with the US, there is still an instinctive fear of being deceived by the US and losing its strategic autonomy.34 This perception will constrain the prospects of India joining the US in putting pressure on Sri Lanka.

Due to Sri Lanka’s internal political changes and the United States’ limited ability to implement its Indo-pacific strategy, Sri Lanka and the Bay of Bengal are currently not at the forefront of US strategic ranking. However, with the development of the Indo-pacific strategy, the region’s status in the US strategy will become more prominent in the future, and the supporting role of Sri Lanka will be increasingly significant. In the near future, the US is expected to continue applying the following strategies toward Sri Lanka. On the human rights issue, the Trump administration will continue to apply pressure and seek to intervene in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs by linking it with economic assistance. In terms of infrastructure construction, the US will cooperate with Japan and India in order to interfere with or disrupt the implementation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Sri Lanka. As for regional diplomacy, the US will utilize India’s enthusiasm, playing both the “India card” and the “China card” to highlight the security rivalry between

the two countries in the Bay of Bengal. By touting the alleged “String of Pearls” strategy of China and thus stimulating India’s active response, the US will be able to play the balancing role in the so-called “China-india tug of war over Sri Lanka.” Militarily, the US will also further strengthen cooperation with the Sri Lankan Navy. By focusing on personnel training, intelligence gathering and marine information monitoring, it is becoming familiar with the battlefield environment. Moreover, the US will also push for the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Acquisition and Crossservicing Agreement (ACSA) with Sri Lanka in order to establish a logistics replenishment base. Sri Lanka’s Easter bombing attacks in April 2019 will also inject a new impetus into anti-terrorism cooperation between the two countries.

Conclusion

Despite a small country, Sri Lanka holds an important strategic position. The rapid growth in US-SRI Lanka relations is the latest attempt by the US to implement its Indo-pacific strategy in the Bay of Bengal since 2015. In the past few years, the US has developed its ties with Sri Lanka out of strategic, security and democracy promotion considerations. However, its efforts to intervene in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs and instigate geopolitical competition between China and India in the country are contrary to the idea of “freedom and openness” that it has been advocating, and instead conduct of obvious coercion and confrontation. As its Indo-pacific strategy is materializing, the US will strengthen its involvement in the Bay of Bengal, which will bring new variables to China’s neighborhood security and the advance of Belt and Road projects. In the period before the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in late 2019 and 2020, US-SRI Lanka relations may undergo further changes, which deserves close attention.