India’s “Link West” Strategy: Origin, Progress and Prospects

The “Link West” strategy is the inevitable result of India’s continuous improvement of its comprehensive national strength, representing an important tool to enhance its status as a major power. While its connotation and regional extension continues to develop, its overall effectiveness remains in question and requires further observation.

Academic circles have long focused on India’s Indo-pacific strategy and “Act East” policy toward the Asia-pacific theatre, with far less attention being paid to India’s overall strategic layout concerning the vast area of its west wing. Since 2014, India has invested a tremendous amount of diplomatic efforts and material resources in its “Look West” policy and subsequently “Link West” strategy, seeking to actively expand its political and economic influence, while also bulking up its security footprint. These efforts have primarily focused on countries in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean islands, and continental Africa, particularly East Africa. As a result, India has become an important external geopolitical variable in these regions. India’s “Link West” strategy is gradually beginning to take shape, currently supporting and serving the country’s diligent strive toward the national dream of becoming a great power.

Origin and Main Considerations of India’s “Link West” Strategy

Led by the National Congress Party (INC), the United Progressive Alliance’s (UPA) first term in office (2004-2009) witnessed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put forward the policy of “Look West.” The policy was proposed with the intent of highlighting West Asia’s strategic importance to India’s energy security, strengthening economic and trade relations with West Asian countries (India is probably one of the only countries in the world

that still calls the Middle East “West Asia”), and promoting free trade talks with the countries concerned.1 The UPA government talked about its “Look West” policy at various intervals throughout its second term (2009-2014). However, these mentions led to very few substantive follow-up measures. Moreover, during his ten years in office, Prime Minister Singh made very few visits to the Middle East, having attended the Non-aligned Movement summits in Egypt and Iran, while also paying a few state visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar. According to C. Raja Mohan, an Indian strategic analyst, unlike Southeast Asia which has ASEAN as a strong regional cooperation mechanism, there is no institutional framework in the Middle East that can normalize India’s interaction with the region, with any proposal for political cooperation having to be first initiated by India.2

After victory in the 2014 general election, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government, led by Prime Minister Narenda Modi, took over the Singh administration’s policy of “Look West” and gradually expanded it into a “Link West” strategy. Modi officially announced the strategy during a historic visit to the United Arab Emirates in August 2015. Subsequently, the diplomatic team in the BJP government gradually expanded and enriched the connotation of the “Link West” strategy, with the policy toward the Middle East at the core. Since then, India has more directly voiced its intention to extend the strategic space and broaden the strategic depth beyond its western boundary, and has taken action in a more proactive manner. To some extent, there has been a remarkable degree of cross-party consensus in India to expand the country’s interests westward. It is only that the BJP, which has the most prominent strategic consciousness and well-defined intent, has provided the clearest perspective on future regional initiatives. Historically speaking, Modi’s visit to the UAE in August 2015 was comparable to that of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao’s visit to Singapore in September 1994, when,

in his now-famous “Singapore Speech,” he first initiated India’s “Look East” policy. Modi’s “Link West” strategy was formally written into the India-uae joint statement.

Of course, India’s strengthening of strategic exchanges with countries in its western neighborhood originated from the two sides’ needs of each other. From the perspective of countries involved with India’s “Link West” strategy, the traditional geopolitical landscape in West Asia and North Africa has experienced significant changes following the turbulence since 2010. Gulf countries such as the UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are all “looking east” in search of new alternatives to their national security needs, while expectantly awaiting more active participation in regional affairs by China, India and other Eastern powers. At almost the same time, the global energy market is undergoing deep structural changes. Oil and gas from the Middle East are increasingly being funneled toward South and East Asian markets rather than previous transatlantic markets. Furthermore, in the face of mounting pressure from radical extremist political forces within West Asia, most countries in the region have begun to place increased significance on India’s potential as “a new provider of public security goods.”3

Geographically, India neighbors the Middle East, Africa and island nations in the western Indian Ocean across the sea, shares a long history of cultural ties with these countries, and has developed increasingly closer economic, trade and investment relations. The national security of India is dependent on the Middle East and Africa’s ability to provide a stable source of energy. After the political turmoil in West Asia and North Africa, international terrorist and extremist forces, represented by the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), expanded into West Asia and North Africa, even tapping into the South Asian subcontinent. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, ISIS competed with the Taliban, al-qaeda and other local terrorist forces for “global jihadi dominance.” The security situation, which made the Indian government feel anxious and threatened, has forced the Indian

diplomatic circle to re-examine its West Asia policy and increase participation and involvement in security affairs of countries in its west wing, in order to keep the security risks at bay. With growing comprehensive national strength, India’s original impulse to become a great power has been activated again, but this time around India has a more abundant supply of resources and available means with which to promote its great-power strategy.

Through an analysis of relevant official policy documents, we can see that India is in fact promoting its “Link West” strategy in a mostly pragmatic and steady manner, without unrealistic ambitions beyond its capacity.

First, rallying Muslim support and improving the image of the BJP. Before coming to power, Narendra Modi was regarded as a “Hindu nationalist,” and the BJP was not very popular among Muslims. In the religious riot in 2002 which killed more than 1,000 people, mostly Muslims, in India’s Gujarat, Modi, as the state’s Chief Minister, was condemned for failing to stop the killing. On this ground, he was once “politically segregated” by the United States and the United Kingdom with his admission into the countries refused. After the BJP took power, conflicts between Hindus and Muslims have flared up significantly, and religious extremism and social intolerance has increased sharply. In order to improve the political image of Modi and the BJP, both at home and abroad, the government has made great efforts to improve relations with Islamic countries in West Asia and North Africa, and has significantly strengthened anti-terrorism and security cooperation with Middle East countries.

Second, winning over overseas expatriates, and acquiring overseas remittances to assist the government’s economic reform. At present, there are about 9 million Indian expatriates living in the Gulf region, accounting for nearly 90% of the total Indian overseas labor population. Of which 3.3 million are in the UAE.4 The large number of low-paid Indian laborers has not only alleviated the labor shortage in Middle East countries, but has also become an important people-to-people link between India and these

countries, playing the role of a bridge in the promotion of India’s Middle East policy. With the help of expatriates, the Indian government hopes to intensify ties with the countries to its west, and maintain continuous input of overseas remittances, so as to solve the domestic problem of capital shortage. The Indian government also intends to take economic advantage of oil-rich countries in the Middle East to implement its “Make in India” and “Smart City” initiatives and promote Modi’s “new deal.”5

Third, ensuring a stable energy supply and enhancing India’s energy security. At present, India is the fourth largest consumer of crude oil products in the world, ranking behind the United States, China and Japan. India is highly dependent on crude oil imports, most of which come from the Middle East. It has been India’s national strategic priority to ensure a stable, inexpensive and adequate supply of energy from the Middle East and Africa.

Fourth, the “Act East” and “Link West” strategies are complementary, aimed at making up for the shortcomings in India’s neighborhood diplomacy. Since coming to power, the Modi government has reoriented the “Look East” policy to what is now “Act East” in the Asia-pacific theatre. To the south, India has focused on consolidating its leading position in the Indian Ocean region. To the north, it is actively promoting the “Connect Central Asia” policy, while expanding strategic investment in Afghanistan. Only in the western direction is there a lack of clear-cut strategic planning. Within the framework of the “Link West” strategy, the Indian government is taking the opportunity to strengthen substantive interaction with all stakeholders, so as to attend to all major strategic considerations, build the “concentric diplomacy” with India as the core, and highlight India’s status and style as a great power.

Promotion of India’s “Link West” Strategy

Under the articulate planning of the Modi government’s diplomatic team,

India’s “Link West” strategy has gradually taken shape in the Middle East, on the African continent and in the West Indian Ocean, with some breakthroughs been achieved.

Cultivating the Middle East into core “Link West” area

In the past, India’s foreign policy focused on improving relations with its South Asian neighbors, strengthening contacts with its “extended neighbors” such as Southeast Asian countries, and interacting with global powers such as the United States, China and Russia.6 Although the Middle East is vital to India, the Indian government was unwilling to devote what it considered “too much” political and diplomatic energy to the region, maintaining a “detached and dissociated” attitude toward Middle East affairs.

After Narendra Modi was sworn in as Prime Minister in 2014, he began to pursue a nationalist-driven “pragmatic political diplomacy,” emphasizing that Indian politicians must regard national interests as the supreme end in managing domestic and foreign affairs, and should not be influenced by the ruling team’s feelings, moral ethics, ideals or traditional ideologies. As then Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who is now India’s Minister of External Affairs, once stated, India’s position on the global stage has improved significantly over the past five years, and as a result, the world now has increasingly higher expectations for India. Under Modi, India’s foreign policy has undergone a paradigm shift, with more personality and distinction. Modi’s style underlines pragmatism in diplomatic decisionmaking, and unpredictability of the cards in hand. Defense issues are included in the diplomatic agenda, and attention is paid to increasing economic and trade relations and developing soft power. Under this new paradigm, India’s relations with the UAE, Iran and Saudi Arabia become the new growth points of Modi’s diplomacy.7

Driven by the transformed diplomatic concept, the Indian government has included political exchanges, trade and investment, security cooperation and people-to-people interactions as the new four pillars, with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel as major pivots. In multiple arenas, India has been consolidating the bond of interests with Middle East countries, to highlight its special interests, concerns and advantages in the region. India has made remarkable achievements in its Middle East diplomacy over the years, which can be seen in the following four aspects.

First, India has successfully withstood US pressure and continued to deepen cooperation with Iran. Despite the threat of American sanctions, India has, until now, continued to import Iranian crude oil. In May 2018, US President Donald Trump announced America’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and restarted all-round sanctions against Iran, including its oil sector, auto industry and international financial transactions. All countries or companies that violated US sanctions and continued their dealings with Iran are threatened with “serious consequences.” As the second largest buyer of Iranian crude oil, India has disregarded the threat and continued to import Iranian crude oil via various methods of payment. India’s stateowned refiners insisted on purchasing Iranian energy at Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) prices. With the expiration of India’s exemption from US sanctions pertaining to its import of Iranian crude oil, Iran hopes that India will continue importing its crude oil, and offers to render the development rights of its natural gas fields to Indian state-owned oil and gas companies. In other words, India is not only doing business with a country whom the US considers an enemy, but is also actively looking to develop alternative payment systems to circumvent its use of the US dollar. Indian experts believe that the Indian government is “seeking the most cost-effective sources of energy and hardware,” while showing the US that India is “not like some banana republic that can be pushed around” and “will look after its own interests above all, even if faced with pressure from a superpower.”8

Through powerful lobbying, India has been exempted from US sanctions in its development of Iran’s Chabahar Port. In February 2018, India signed an agreement with Iran to lease Chabahar as the trade route through to Afghanistan and Central Asia. It has also actively participated in the construction of a railway from the port to Zahedan, a border city of Iran adjacent to Afghanistan. Under joint pressure from both the Indian government and American domestic lobby groups, in December 2018, the US State Department declared that sanctions on the development of the Port of Chabahar, its accompanying railway projects and Iran’s oil delivery to Afghanistan will be exempted on the grounds that it is beneficial to resolving the Afghan problem. India, Iraq and Afghanistan immediately reached an agreement detailing trade and transit corridors, followed by India taking formal control over the Chabahar Port. According to India’s domestic public opinion, the takeover of Chabahar Port “will provide key material supply routes to Afghanistan, and facilitate India’s bypassing of Pakistan in its trade with Central Asia, while also preventing the Pakistani Port of Gwadar from becoming a trade outlet for Central Asian countries.”9

In addition, India is working in concert with Iran and Russia to promote the International North-south Transport Corridor (INSTC) project. In May 2018, Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed the idea of jointly advancing the INSTC, which connects India, Iran, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia and Europe. According to India’s vision, the corridor, when completed, will greatly shorten the freight distance from South Asia to Nordic Europe, and may even offer an alternative transport route to the Suez Canal. With the signing of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea by the five coastal countries in August 2018, new opportunities have emerged for cooperation in oil and gas development in the Caspian Sea. Iran’s active participation in regional energy cooperation has provided new momentum for India and Russia to restart

development of the INSTC.

Second, the Indian government has made the UAE a strategic springboard for its entry into the Middle East. Modi’s state visit to the UAE in August 2015 was the first by an Indian Prime Minister since the visit of Indira Gandhi in 1981. The two countries signed a series of cooperation agreements in economic, defense, security and cultural fields, and upgraded the status of their bilateral relations to that of “comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation,” which instilled new energy into India’s interaction with the Middle East region. During his visit, Modi called the UAE “India’s most important partner in trade and counter-terrorism.”10 In February 2018, Modi visited the UAE once again and identified the country as “India’s primary trade and investment partner for growth and development.”

There has been an incremental consolidation of India-uae bilateral cooperation on security and defense. It seems that the UAE appreciates India’s concept of security, specifically the view that “state-sponsored or supported cross-border terrorism poses a grave threat to regional security and so must be curtailed and stopped.”11 Where sectarian conflicts and geopolitical competition are rife, the UAE can provide India with a relatively neutral and stable foothold. At present, in their joint combat against extremism, terrorism and piracy, India and the UAE have established a number of strategic security dialogues. The two countries have also intensified military cooperation and are working together to jointly produce equipment for national defense. Through regular joint military exercises as well as the training of sea, land, air, and special forces, the two sides have also strengthened maritime security cooperation in the Gulf and Indian Ocean.

Economic and trade ties between India and the UAE have been promoted rapidly through frequent two-way investment and personnel

exchanges. In 2017, trade between the two countries reached US$52 billion, with more than 2.5 million Indians working in the UAE. Remittance funds to India accounted for 34% of the UAE’S total remittance outflows, with a quarterly average of $4.5 billion.12 In the first half of 2018, India became the UAE’S second largest trading partner, and the bilateral trade volume is expected to exceed US$100 billion by 2020, at which point India will become the UAE’S largest trading partner. According to statistics from the Dubai Department of Economic Development, India’s direct investment in Dubai, from 2015-2018, amounted to 61.2 billion dirhams (US$16.68 billion) stemming from a total of 109 projects. In 2018 alone, Indian investors launched 31 direct investment projects in Dubai, totaling 3.71 billion dirhams (US$1.01 billion).13 Central banks of the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on currency swaps totaling 35 billion rupees (US$491 million) in December 2018, and are exploring the possibility of carrying out direct trade in the dirham or rupee, which will reduce their dependence on the US dollar and other international hard currencies. In terms of personnel exchanges, there are currently over 950 flights between the two countries every week, and India’s rich people are concentrated in cities like Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

With the utmost efforts on the part of India, the UAE’S giant sovereign wealth fund has increased its investment in India. According to report of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, by the end of November 2018, the assets of the UAE’S sovereign wealth fund reached as high as US$1.18 trillion. Of this amount, the assets of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority totaled US$684 billion, ranking first in the Arab world and third in the world. The UAE has earmarked a total of US$75 billion in sovereign funds for investment in India. Of that amount, US$1 billion has already been transferred to India’s National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) to promote industrial

growth and infrastructure construction in India.14 During Modi’s visit to the UAE in 2018, an agreement was reached with the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority to establish strategic partnership between the two countries’ infrastructure sectors.

In addition, the UAE has greatly promoted India’s strategic petroleum reserve program. At present, more than half of India’s oil and energy needs are satisfied by imports from the Gulf. With an oil reserve of 97.8 billion barrels, the UAE is India’s main source of oil imports. As early as March 2014, the two countries reached an agreement to cooperate on the establishment of India’s strategic oil reserves. In recent years, the Indian Government has been actively expanding its strategic oil reserves, initially planning for an underground oil reserve of 5 million tons, and the UAE is now an important partner in this plan. In February 2018, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) signed a 40-year contract with the Abu Dhabi National Petroleum Corporation (ADNOC) to jointly exploit crude oil from the UAE’S Lower Zakum oil field, with India acquiring onetenth of shares in the field. In November of the same year, state-owned oil companies of the two sides signed a preliminary agreement to lease half of India’s underground crude oil reserve base to the UAE’S state-owned oil company. In March 2019, ADNOC signed a 35-year agreement with an Indian consortium led by the Bharat Oil Company, which would have access to exploring an onshore oil and gas block in the UAE. The many large-scale and long-term energy cooperation agreements between the two countries epitomize the recent positive and progressive strides secured by India’s Middle East diplomacy.

Third, India has shaken off its staid diplomatic tradition and promoted simultaneous relations with both Israel and Arab countries. During the Cold War, India chose to stand with the Soviet Union-led socialist camp, supported Arab countries during the Arab-israeli conflicts, stood by the Palestinian people for their rights to self-determination and

the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and rejected contact with Israel. In 1988, India became the first non-arab country to recognize the Palestinian state. The actions were aimed at complying with the wishes of many Muslims at home, garnering more funding and resources from Arab countries, while also highlighting India’s leadership in the third world as a hedge against Pakistan’s influence in the Islamic world.

After Modi came into power in 2014, India changed the low-profile practices it had employed over the years, and rapidly reprioritized its strategic cooperation with Israel. During Modi’s visit to the United States in September 2014, he held a high-profile meeting with Jewish leaders in the US, advocating for increased consultation with the US on Middle East issues. This was regarded as an “innovative and sudden change” in the course of New Delhi’s traditional Middle East policy. Modi visited Israel in July 2017, becoming the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel in the 70 years since India’s independence. India-israel relations have also been upgraded to a that of a “strategic partnership built by nature.” The bilateral defense industrial cooperation has readily developed against the backdrop of India’s intention to gradually get rid of its dependence on Russian weapons and equipment. At present, about 40% of Israel’s arms exports go to India, with defense transactions between the two countries reaching at least US$1 billion annually. On multilateral occasions where India has to voice its opinion, such as when a vote is needed from India in its capacity as a member of the United Nations Security Council, it has begun to abstain from voting on resolutions for Palestine, providing its tacit support for Israel instead. The BJP government has actively developed relations with the United States and Israel, and adjusted its support for Palestine, meaning that India’s Middle East policy has begun to tilt toward the US and Israeli camp.15

At the same time, the Indian government is also trying to hedge its bets and walk a tightrope in a complex regional web of Middle East relations. As it insists, “Building a closer relationship with Israel does not mean, India must

downgrade its relations with the Arabs. Delhi’s stakes in the Arab world are massive and range from energy security to counter-terrorism. Neither Israel nor Arabs are asking India to choose between them; both of them want stronger and deeper relationship with Delhi.”16 In April 2018, Saudi Arabia approved Air India’s request to fly directly from New Delhi to Tel Aviv via Saudi airspace. For the past 70 years, Saudi Arabia has banned commercial flights to Israel via its airspace. This shows that the current geopolitical environment in the Middle East has undergone significant changes, and India’s influence in the region is growing. To dispel the notion that India’s Middle East policy was partial to Israel, Modi paid a special and unprecedented visit to Palestine in February 2018. In addition, the Indian government has made parallel efforts to spur closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and other Middle East countries, actively implementing the “greater Middle East strategy” under the framework of “Modi Doctrine.”17

Finally, India has been furtively working to enlarge its military and strategic presence in the Gulf region. During Modi’s visit to Oman in February 2018, a memorandum of understanding was signed between defense ministries of the two countries. In order to “strengthen bilateral security cooperation in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean,” Oman agreed to open Port Duqm to Indian warships for maintenance and other services. Oman has been India’s traditional defense partner in West Asia, and the two sides continue to be allied in joint anti-piracy operations. Due to its geostrategic location facing the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, Duqm is favored by the Indian military. In the long run, it may even develop into one of the largest ports in the Gulf region. The port is less than an hour’s voyage from the west coast of India, which facilitates the Indian military’s presence and its penetration into the wider region of West Asia and even East Africa. India’s strategic circle believes that as the Chinese navy increases its activities

in the western Indian Ocean and establish military bases in Djibouti, India’s interest in Port Duqm, which is only a 40-minute flight away from Mumbai, will increase dramatically.

Utilizing comparative advantages and initiating the Asia-africa Growth Corridor

Successive Indian governments have attached great importance to its operations in Africa, vigorously promoting trade and investment links between the two sides, and expanding India’s influence on the continent. Whether in East Africa, West Africa and southern Africa, Indian expatriates possess outsized economic strength and exhibit fabulous wealth, playing an important role in African economic activities. According to report compiled by the Export–import Bank of India and African Export-import Bank, between 2001 and 2014, bilateral trade between India and Africa soared from US$7.2 billion to US$78 billion, making India Africa’s fourth largest trading partner. In terms of investment, India’s stock of direct investment on the continent increased from US$11.9 billion in 2010 to US$15.2 billion in 2014, while African countries’ stock of direct investment in India increased in the same period from US$57 billion to US$73.3 billion, covering important industries such as oil, natural gas, agriculture, retail, health care and telecommunications.18 From 2017 to 2018, due to the adverse state of global trade and investment environment, trade between India and the African continent declined to US$62.66 billion, yet still maintaining a high level. India cooperated with a total of 42 African countries on 189 projects totaling nearly US$11.4 billion. With cumulative investments of US$54 billion, India was the fifth largest investor in Africa.19 In response to the backlash of trade protectionism and international trade conflicts, India held

a conclave on India-africa project partnerships in March 2019. The event, participated by government officials and business delegates from more than 35 African countries, focused on the strategy to increase the bilateral trade to US$150 billion in the coming years. India also pledged to promote the export of African manufactured products through preferential tariff schemes and assistance to African capacity-building, while also expanding its investment in African infrastructure, agricultural and food processing, energy, services and information technology.20

Over the years, India has steadily increased its aid and foreign investment to African nations in exchange for pan-african support for India’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Since India hosted the first India-africa Forum Summit in 2008, more and more African leaders have participated in the event and their ranks have continued to grow. At the third India-africa Forum Summit in 2015, India announced that it would provide US$10 billion in concessional loans and US$600 million in free aid to Africa over the next five years from 2015 to 2020, which was hailed as the arrival of “Africa time” for India.21 In May 2018, Indian President Ram Nath Kovind visited Zambia, Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea, and signed agreements on railway construction, loan provision, and assistance in the construction of vocational training centers. Almost simultaneously, India announced that it would build conference centers in 21 African countries, including Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Togo, Gabon and Liberia. To help Niger host the 2019 African Union summit, the first conference center is scheduled to be built in Niamey, the capital of Niger. These convention centers will be named after Mahatma Gandhi as “symbols of long-lasting Indian presence in Africa showcasing support and friendship for the continent.”22

Compared with other major countries, India’s activities on the African continent are still relatively small in scale, but it is catching up and tapping steadily into its unique diplomatic and commercial advantages in its relations with the African continent at large. For example, India has a large group of immigrants with high social status in African countries. These immigrants are better integrated into the local society than more recent Chinese immigrants. India does lag behind China in its economic diplomacy toward Africa, but it is relatively successful in security cooperation with Africa, and has effectively safeguarded India’s interests in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, India is strengthening cooperation with Africa in terms of technology transfer, training and technical guidance. So far, nearly US$1 billion has been invested in a joint venture with the African Union to build a pan-african electronic network, linking India’s leading universities and hospitals with African partners.23

In recent years, India has joined Japan in promoting the Asia-africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). At the 52nd Annual Conference of the African Development Bank held in Gujarat, India in May 2017, the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), a think tank affiliated to India’s Foreign Ministry, distributed the Asia-africa Growth Corridor Vision Document.24 Modi declared to African delegates on the occasion that “the Indian government regarded Africa as the top priority in formulating foreign and economic policies.” He also announced that India and Japan would make use of Japan’s strong financial resources and advanced technology, as well as India’s long-standing relations with Africa, to build a port network connecting AAGC members. The two countries will also work together to promote “free ocean” and infrastructure partnership which they

jointly initiated. Moreover, Modi has deliberately mentioned Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the Congress Party, and his valuable legacy of supporting the struggle for African liberation (the BJP usually avoided talking in public about the achievements made by the Congress Party, its political opponent), and compared India’s aid to Africa with that of China, claiming that India’s aid to Africa came entirely “with no strings attached.”25

In the above-mentioned vision document, the AAGC’S overall goal is to connect the African continent with India, South Asian and Southeast Asian countries, build a “free and open Indo-pacific,” and hedging against and diluting China’s Belt and Road Initiative through re-exploration of ancient sea routes in the Indian Ocean and creation of a new maritime corridor. In addition to developing maritime corridors, the AAGC also plans to build industrial and transport infrastructure between Asia and Africa, which will further integrate Asian and African economies into a “new and globally competitive economic group.” India and Japan intend to connect the Port of Jamnagar in western India with Djibouti, the port near Madurai in Tamil Nadu in southern India with Port Mombasa in Kenya and Port Zanzibar in Tanzania, and Port Calcutta in eastern India with Port Sittwe in Myanmar.

India and Japan plan to realize the AAGC in three stages. In the first stage, based on the importance of Indian Ocean coastal countries and existing bilateral partnerships, the two countries will focus on seven countries on the eastern coast of Africa, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa. In the second stage, as part of an expanding partnership network, island nations of the West Indian Ocean such as Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and the Comoros, will be given priority in the India-japan partnership. In the third stage, countries on the western coast of Africa, especially Cote d’ivoire, Ghana and Gambia, will become the focus of India and Japan.26

Consolidating India’s Indo-pacific strategy and actively exerting influence on West Indian Ocean region

The Indian government went through a process of trial and error in its perception of the Indo-pacific concept and the United States’ Indo-pacific strategy, before turning to promote its own version of Indo-pacific strategy. At first, India was pleased to see the success of the American Indo-pacific strategy, and even cooperated actively for a time. However, it later found that there were significant differences between the Indo-pacific concepts of the two sides. Compared to Washington’s intention to construct “Indopacific” into a new system of security alliances aimed at containing China, India’s Indo-pacific strategy mainly serves to highlight its international status and expand its visibility within the Pacific region. Balancing China by enlisting American support and raising its profile in front of the US by playing the “China card” are both tactics that are important for India’s strategic objectives. From India’s point of view, if it endorses the American Indo-pacific strategy, the US will take the opportunity to increase its military presence in the Indian Ocean region, which will exert strategic pressure on India. India emphasizes a “free, open and inclusive Indo-pacific,” but is deeply concerned that an excessively open region may jeopardize Indian dominance. The US Indo-pacific strategy will not only provide an excuse for the US and China to gain access to the Indian Ocean, if handled improperly, the region will become a new geopolitical staging ground for the next phase of the China-us competition, thus objectively shrinking India’s strategic maneuvering space in the Indian Ocean.27

Based on the above understanding, Modi elaborated upon the Indian version of Indo-pacific strategy in a comprehensive and systematic way at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018. At this meeting, he declared that “India does not see the Indo-pacific region as a strategy or as

a club of limited members,” and that the quadrilateral dialogue among the US, Japan, Australia and India is not an organization set about to target and dominate other countries. He also stressed the importance of freedom of navigation and Indo-pacific interconnectivity, criticizing regional trade protectionism, while highlighting India’s independence on major strategic issues.28 Modi’s Shangri-la speech did not fall in line with the expectations of the US and Japan, and was tantamount to India making a public claim that in the future it will proceed forward on a path based primarily on its own interests, while promoting its version of Indo-pacific strategy. In order to allay China’s concerns, India proposed bilateral maritime dialogues to explain New Delhi’s attitude and position on the aforementioned quadrilateral dialogue.

Concerned that its backyard might turn into a battlefield of majorpower competition, India has taken measures in recent years to actively exert influence in the West Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has issued a new operational deployment plan, which calls for continuous presence of at least one large Indian warship at all strategic outposts in the Indian Ocean region. India has made great efforts to consolidate its regional security and defense system with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Moreover, in order to ensure that these three countries adopt a “pro-india” policy, India has redoubled its intervention in the internal affairs and local elections of the countries. As for the island nations of the West Indian Ocean such as Seychelles, the Comoros, Madagascar and Mauritius, India regards them as critical pivot points in the AAGC, as well as strategic strongholds for the India-led security initiative in the West Indian Ocean region. In January 2018, India signed a 20-year security agreement with Seychelles, in which Seychelles leased the Assumption Island to the Indian Navy for the purpose of building naval bases and airstrips. The Indian Navy has also upgraded the functions of its coastal surveillance radar station in Madagascar, and sought to expand berthing rights in Mozambique’s Maputo Port. India

declared publicly that the purpose for its recent military modernization and build-up, coupled with the overall increase of its regional military presence, is aimed at “combating piracy, maritime terrorism and other criminal acts.” However, its real intention is to monitor the regional maritime activities of major powers on the eastern coast of Africa, especially such important intelligence as military exercises and exchanges with African countries. In Mauritius, political elites have strong historical ties with India, to the point that Modi once called the country “Little India.”29 The Indian military has actively helped Mauritius develop the Archipelago of Agalega. In September 2018, the Indian representative even acted on behalf of Mauritius and raised sovereignty claim over the British occupied Chagos Archipelago at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Indian experts maintain that connecting these offshore stations with its on-shore naval commands and island-based operating bases will allow the Indian Navy a larger operational expanse beyond its immediate buffer zones, and greatly enhance India’s capability to establish sea-denial in the Indian Ocean.30

In addition, despite its vigilance over Washington’s strategic intentions, India continues to deepen cooperation with the US and its allies in the Indian Ocean. When Modi visited the United States in 2014, he declared that “America is an integral part of our Look East and Link West policies.”31 In September 2018, Foreign and Defense Ministers of India and the US held their first “2+2” dialogue, focusing primarily on their global strategic partnership, and signed the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). The agreement allows the US to transfer

encrypted communication security equipment to India. The encryption platforms include C-17 aircraft, as well as Apache and Chinook helicopters. The agreement will greatly improve the data sharing and coordinated operation capabilities of the two militaries, specifically in terms of command, control, communications, surveillance and reconnaissance during their joint monitoring of activities by other major powers in the Indian Ocean. As early as 2016, India and the US signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), agreeing to use each other’s military bases for replenishment. In addition, the two countries are now prepared to restart their Defense Policy Group (DPG), which has been suspended for four years, and continue to finalize the text of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA), which will allow them to share and exchange land, maritime and aviation data.32 At the same time, in the Indian Ocean region, India has also strengthened horizontal interactions with US military allies such as Japan, France and the United Kingdom. In August 2018, India and Japan agreed to start negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA). In March 2018, India and France signed the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), granting Indian forces access to France’s air bases in Réunion and Djibouti, and French fleet bases in Abu Dhabi and the Comoros.33 In March 2019, the two countries agreed to establish an ocean monitoring center in India to identify and track the trajectory of global ships in the Indian Ocean. By signing security agreements with the United States and its allies, India is actively exerting influence in the West Indian Ocean region, and has strengthened capacity for coordinated operations with “like-minded countries” across various security fields, demonstrating and maintaining its role as both gatekeeper and manager of the Indian Ocean region.

Prospects of India’s “Link West” Strategy

As an emerging power, India’s strategic advancement and expansion toward the West will not stop. The connotation and extension of India’s “Link West” strategy will continue to develop. However, since this strategy is relatively new in regards to its implementation by the Indian government, its overall effectiveness remains in question and requires further observation. Former Indian National Security Advisor Mayankote Kelath Narayanan believes that India’s “Act East” and “Link West” strategies provide a new dimension for India’s diplomacy in East and West Asia, but in these two regions, especially in West Asia, India’s diplomacy still lacks the flexibility needed to cope with a rapidly evolving situation. Despite its long-term presence and influence in West Asia, as well as its 9 million expatriates in the region, India has not yet become a major participant in West Asian affairs, and its presence and influence, felt by other players in the region, are no match to that of Russia, China or even Iran. Under Modi’s leadership, India’s diplomacy has undergone some changes in style, but there seems to be too few substantively fundamental changes. While implementing the “Link West” strategy, India’s diplomacy may need to become more mature and sophisticated so as to overcome the increasingly unfavorable complexities.34

If Narayanan’s views are to be further developed, there are at least four factors which will affect the overall effectiveness of India’s “Link West” policy.

The first relates to how much India is actually ready to spend in implementing the strategy. All diplomatic strategies require support in the form of human, material and financial input, and strategies cannot be implemented without incurring costs. India and the target countries of “Link West” strategy indeed share a similar socio-cultural history, but most of the countries in the region, especially those in East Africa, belong to an

under-developed class of countries which desperately require financial support. Some countries are even now engaged in protracted political turmoil and wars. They need substantial financial assistance in infrastructure construction, economic development and improvement of people’s livelihood. Moreover, India’s own development also relies on a large amount of external financial and technical assistance, which will undoubtedly limit its energy and resources that can be invested toward countries in the “Link West” strategy.

The second factor concerns whether India can break up the existing geopolitical power structures in regions covered by “Link West.” At present, these regions are not terra nullius in the geopolitical arena. They are spheres of influence of traditional great powers such as the US, Russia, the UK and France, with fierce rivalries playing out among them, leaving limited space for India to exert its influence. As a rising force, India’s penetration into the region may trigger a pointed response from countries with vested interests. Generally speaking, rather than a proactive initiative to provide public goods for the region, the “Link West” strategy is India’s passive response to prevent its own interests from being undermined. In the Middle East, India’s focus still centers on energy security, trade and investment. As has become evident following previous analysis of this strategy, India is still reluctant to get involved in complex regional disputes. As for Africa, India is committed to the continent, but only according to its capability, with the main aim geared toward winning African support for its permanent membership in the UN Security Council. However, India’s active management of its relations with the island nations of the Indian Ocean highlights its ambition to dominate Indian Ocean affairs.

The third factor concerns the continuity of India’s cooperation with the target countries. A common feature of India, and countries in West Asia, East Africa and the West Indian Ocean is the lack of continuity in their domestic and foreign policies. General elections and regime changes in regional countries often signify the interruption of foreign policies implemented by previous governments. Faced with an uncertain regional political

environment, if India wants to see long-term success of “Link West” strategy, it must pursue a steadfast and sustainable diplomatic course. To gain benefits, the target countries will also adopt a balanced diplomatic approach to their relations with the major powers, and thus their expectations on and trust in India may undergo fluctuations.

The final factor is India’s efficient implementation of the strategy. In India itself and the target areas, strategic planning and concrete implementation are seriously out of step. In these countries the strategic planning is usually well done on paper; however, practical implementation of the strategy often falls short of expectations. In fact, India’s characteristically weak ability to put established policies into practices has been criticized by international rating agencies.

Conclusion

The “Link West” strategy is the inevitable result of India’s continuous improvement of its comprehensive national strength, representing an important tool for India to enhance its status as a major power. Although it is relatively new, and is confronted with many unfavorable factors, the strategy has indeed activated India’s ambition to carry out its major-power diplomacy and pursue major-power status. The strategic connotation and its regional extension will continue to develop in the future. As India invests more and more diplomatic resources in the “Link West” region, and as the Indian Ocean gradually becomes a new battleground for global geopolitical competition, the strategic layout of the “Link West” strategy will have significant and far-reaching implications on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, maritime trade and the overall safety of vital energy transport corridors. China should actively explore common interests between itself and India in relevant regions, while taking positive and effective measures to safeguard its legitimate interests and reasonable appeals.