China International Studies (English)

China-nordic Blue Economic Passage: Basis, Challenges and Paths

- Zheng Yingqin

In building the blue economic passage leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean, China and the Nordic countries should jointly explore a new mode of mutually beneficial and win-win cooperatio­n, which requires thinking in an innovative manner, and relies on practicall­y tackling challenges and jointly seeking solutions.

In June 2017, the Chinese government issued the Vision for Maritime Cooperatio­n under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is the first systematic proposal containing ideas and blueprints for promoting maritime cooperatio­n within the BRI framework. The Vision suggested focusing on the constructi­on of three blue economic passages.1 As one cornerston­e of the Belt and Road Initiative, building the blue economic passage is also a concrete action in the constructi­on of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. By laying the foundation for maritime partnershi­ps, and by fostering connectivi­ty, exchanges and cooperatio­n in the fields of marine access and infrastruc­ture, marine economy, marine culture and marine technology, building the blue economic passage would improve the allocation of resources and facilitate the developmen­t of marine economic network. Of the three blue economic passages, the one “leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean” is particular­ly striking, because of two reasons. First, as the Arctic Ocean connects Asia, Europe and North America, and roughly 90% of internatio­nal trade among the three continents takes place in the northern hemisphere, this passage could become a very significan­t route for internatio­nal trade. Second, most countries adjacent to this passage in the Arctic region are developed economies, with a comparativ­ely

exceptiona­l geopolitic­al environmen­t. To construct this passage would have to involve cooperatio­n with developed economies, strict environmen­tal requiremen­ts, and complex geopolitic­al implicatio­ns.2 Therefore, in addition to the economic dimension, the constructi­on of this passage will also be particular­ly instructiv­e for improving exchanges and cooperatio­n in the fields of environmen­t, ecology and scientific research.

The Nordic region is an essential region on the route of the blue economic passage leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. Therefore, the significan­ce of cooperatio­n between China and the Nordic countries is of paramount importance. The Nordic region consists mainly of five countries which are traditiona­lly regarded as small states: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland; and their self-governing territorie­s (provinces), namely the Faroe Islands (Denmark), Greenland (Denmark) and the Aland Islands (Finland). The cooperatio­n between China and the Nordic countries involves interactio­ns between the world’s largest developing country and these smaller, yet highly developed economies. The uniqueness of the Arctic region and the Nordic countries’ pioneering accomplish­ments in scientific research mean that cooperatio­n in the fields of scientific and technologi­cal innovation will become a central part of the blue economy passage. In light of this, it is necessary to conduct more in-depth studies on the feasibilit­y and approaches for China and the Nordic countries to jointly build a blue economic passage that links Europe via the Arctic Ocean.

Basis and Motivation­s of China-nordic Blue Economic Passage

There are advantageo­us conditions for common efforts by China and the Nordic countries to build a blue economic passage linking Europe via the Arctic Ocean. In particular, both sides share similar views about their maritime strategies and cooperatio­n, have complement­ary demands, mutually relevant policies, practical experience, and enjoy a positive

atmosphere for collaborat­ion. All this together has created a rational foundation and cooperatio­n momentum for the constructi­on of the blue economic passage.

Conceptual basis: highly compatible views on maritime developmen­t

Congruence on ideas is the fundamenta­l motivation for cooperatio­n. China and the Nordic countries have a high degree of consensus on developing the marine economy, promoting sustainabl­e marine use, and enhancing global ocean governance cooperatio­n. This can be demonstrat­ed in the ocean policies of both sides.

First, both sides emphasize the importance of the marine economy. The Vision released in 2017 by the Chinese side points out that “sharing a blue space and developing the blue economy” is the main theme of cooperatio­n in the joint efforts to build the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and advocates new concepts and new practices of the blue economy. Geographic­ally speaking, as the Nordic countries are all coastal countries, the marine economy plays a key role in their national economies. The Nordic countries have highlighte­d the developmen­t of the marine economy in their maritime strategies and policy documents. For example, in its ocean strategy released in 2017, the Norwegian government explicitly declared that its chief strategic goal is “for Norway to be the top oceanbased economy.”3

Second, both sides stress the sustainabi­lity of marine use and advocate a balance between marine developmen­t and conservati­on. The Chinese Vision emphasizes that the marine economy is a “blue engine” for sustainabl­e developmen­t, and that “ensuring the health of the ocean contribute­s to improving human well-being for present and future generation­s.” The Vision also advises the protection and sustainabl­e use of oceans and marine resources, and calls for jointly building a blue economic passage by

protecting the marine environmen­t and taking a path of green developmen­t. The maritime strategies of the Nordic countries emphasize the need to meet the sustainabl­e developmen­t goals proposed by the United Nations, and have recommende­d “blue growth through green restructur­ing,”4 calling for the developmen­t of marine innovation industries to achieve sustainabl­e use of oceans. For example, the Swedish government states in its maritime strategy document: “Marine-based industries need to be founded on economic, social and environmen­tal sustainabi­lity.”5 The Norwegian government emphasizes: “The future growth of marine economy requires us to seek resources in a sustainabl­e manner, and requires us to treat oceans as a whole.”6

Third, both sides argue for internatio­nal cooperatio­n in ocean governance. As the Vision puts it, strengthen­ing maritime cooperatio­n “conforms with the prevailing trend of developmen­t, openness and cooperatio­n.” The Vision explicitly states that “China encourages countries along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to align their strategies, further promote all-around and pragmatic cooperatio­n, and to jointly build unobstruct­ed, safe and efficient maritime transport channels. Together, we will build platforms for maritime cooperatio­n and develop the Blue Partnershi­p.” China calls for building a maritime community with a shared future so as to join hands with the rest of the world to address global ocean governance issues.7 The Nordic countries have always advocated regional and global multilater­al cooperatio­n in the marine sector. Committed to building a multilater­al cooperatio­n platform on Arctic issues, the five Nordic countries are actively seeking the inclusion of additional stakeholde­rs. For example, Iceland hosts the Arctic Circle and Norway the Arctic Frontier platform. These internatio­nal forums all welcome global Arctic cooperatio­n, including

the participat­ion of Asian countries.

Interest motivation: great demands for maritime cooperatio­n

The pursuit of interests is the strongest driving force for cooperatio­n. The common interests and realistic needs of the Nordic countries make them destined to become China’s natural partner in building a blue economic passage.

For China, two realistic demands would be fulfilled if it and the Nordic countries would jointly build a blue economic passage leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. One is the practical necessity for a marine transporta­tion route, and the other is the need for cooperatio­n in the field of marine scientific and technologi­cal innovation. First of all, the foreign trade volume of China, the world’s largest trading country, accounts for about 10% of the world’s total. Sea routes are an imperative factor in China’s foreign trade and economic developmen­t. It is estimated that if the Arctic route is used to connect Northern Europe with China, South Korea and Japan, the sailing distance will be shortened by about 40% compared with the route through the Suez Canal, while fuel consumptio­n will also be reduced by about 20%. An authoritat­ive study has concluded that “if the Arctic route is fully operationa­l to replace the traditiona­l route, China can save US$53.3 billion to $127.4 billion in internatio­nal trade shipping costs per year.”8 Moreover, although the Arctic route may face severe natural conditions such as icebergs, ice blocks and extreme cold, it is still a comparativ­ely safe route because there are no human security threats such as piracy and terrorism. In addition, China faces the challenge of becoming an ocean power through technologi­cal innovation. Its developmen­t of oceans needs to shift from an extensive mode to a technology- and innovation­driven sustainabl­e mode, seeking a more effective and integrated use of marine resources. The Nordic countries are world leaders in marine technologi­cal innovation, especially in the areas of marine renewable energy,

green ship technology, sustainabl­e marine management, seabed mineral extraction, blue bio-economy, and carbon dioxide capture. If China and the Nordic countries could unite in building a blue economic passage, it would boost China’s ability to keep up with the world’s top marine technology innovation and support both sides in complement­ing each other’s advantages.

For Northern Europe, cooperatio­n with China to build a blue economic passage would also fulfill practical material needs. The passage can open up the Chinese market to bring more economic benefits. It would be also conducive to Arctic governance. First, the Nordic countries, as export-oriented economies, are faced with an immediate demand to enlarge external markets and receive more internatio­nal investment. China on the other hand has been persistent in promoting economic globalizat­ion and deepening its reform and opening-up, which provides ample direct market opportunit­ies for Nordic enterprise­s. According to the Nordic Council’s statistics, China ranks first as a source for Nordic imports, and second as a destinatio­n for Nordic exports among non-european states. In 2018, China’s trade with the Nordic countries reached US$43.19 billion, with the latter enjoying a surplus. By the end of 2018, the Nordic countries had made a total of 3,770 investment­s in China, amounting to US$11.34 billion; China had invested US$10.38 billion in the Nordic countries.9 Second, with the rising potential of natural resources exploratio­n and utilizatio­n in the Arctic Ocean, the Nordic region faces impediment­s such as insufficie­nt funds for maritime infrastruc­ture constructi­on, increased investment demand and high developmen­t costs. According to estimate by the Guggenheim Partners, infrastruc­ture constructi­on in the Arctic will requires about US$1 trillion of investment over the next 15 years.10 Therefore, the Nordic countries such as Finland, Norway and Iceland are

very active in striving for the acquisitio­n of investment by external countries into the region. With its robust economic strength, China can provide the Nordic countries with the public goods necessary for their regional developmen­t.

Policy foundation: Nordic support for Chinese participat­ion in Arctic affairs

The Nordic countries support China’s participat­ion in Arctic governance, which lays the policy foundation for jointly building the blue economic passage. The constructi­on of the passage linking Europe via the Arctic Ocean would involve the constructi­on of the Arctic waterway and infrastruc­ture, the exploratio­n and utilizatio­n of Arctic Ocean resources, and Arctic environmen­tal protection programs, which are also key components of Arctic governance. Currently, eight Arctic countries are the primary actors in Arctic affairs. In contrast with the United States and Canada, which resist external countries’ involvemen­t in Arctic affairs, the Nordic countries have rather inclusive attitudes. The intensifyi­ng impact of climate change is intertwine­d with scientific research, resource utilizatio­n, environmen­tal protection, geopolitic­s and other issues in the Arctic. These considerab­le challenges and difficulti­es would be too overwhelmi­ng for the Nordic countries to tackle on their own, given their relatively limited comprehens­ive national strengths. Therefore, the Nordic countries are in favor of a solution based on cooperatio­n at the interregio­nal level and on a global scale. Moreover, with more external countries becoming involved, the Nordic countries would be better able to balance the dominance of the United States, Russia and other big players in the Arctic. China’s constructi­ve participat­ion in Arctic affairs has played a positive role in regional governance, and is in line with the expectatio­ns of the Nordic countries. China has advocated the joint constructi­on of the Ice Silk Road, and this proposal has received positive responses from countries such as Iceland, Finland and Norway. According to Finnish President Sauli Ninisto, the Ice Silk Road “is not only a plan for more roads, railways and shipping routes,

but also a vision for promoting understand­ing among different peoples.”11 The Icelandic government has expressed strong interest in the Ice Silk Road, and supports this initiative to enhance connectivi­ty between Europe and Asia.12 Northern Europe also has expectatio­ns for deepening multilater­al cooperatio­n with China. In February 2016, the Nordic Council of Ministers made a decision to “explore opportunit­ies for greater Nordic sub-regional cooperatio­n with China,” and also planned to conduct a two-year study on “how expanded cooperatio­n with China can be incorporat­ed within its scope of activities.”13 China and Northern Europe have decided to focus their future cooperatio­n on key areas such as entreprene­urship and business, sustainabl­e developmen­t, research and education, cultural exchanges and social welfare.14

Practical basis: positive cooperatio­n experience from both sides

China and Northern Europe have carried out extensive and effective cooperatio­n in various fields involving the Arctic and the Arctic Ocean, thus gaining the essential experience for building a blue economic passage. First, the two sides have signed bilateral agreements to plan and standardiz­e their cooperatio­n. For example, as early as 2012, China and Iceland signed the Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperatio­n and the Memorandum of Understand­ing on Cooperatio­n in the Field of Marine and Polar Science and Technology. In 2014 China and Denmark signed the Memorandum of Understand­ing on Green Maritime Technology and the Shipbuildi­ng Industry to promote win-win efforts of the two countries in the fields of green maritime technology, shipbuildi­ng and ship intelligen­ce. The Joint Work Plan for Promoting Future-oriented New-type Cooperativ­e Partnershi­p

between China and Finland (2019-2023), jointly formulated by the two countries, is concerned with Arctic scientific collaborat­ion, technologi­cal innovation and cooperativ­e efforts in sustainabl­e developmen­t of the Arctic. Second, the two sides have jointly built offshore infrastruc­ture and Arctic research bases to enhance mutually beneficial cooperatio­n. For example, the Norway Offshore Fish Farm, built by China’s Wuchang Shipbuildi­ng Industry Group, is the world’s largest semi-submersibl­e intelligen­t offshore fish farm. Finland’s Aker Arctic Technology Inc was involved in designing China’s polar research icebreaker. The Finnish technology giant Wartsila provides main engines, exhaust gas cleaning equipment and power solutions for China’s scientific research vessels. In 2014, China launched its first Arctic scientific research station in Ny-alesund, Norway, setting a milestone in the continued deepening of Sino-norwegian Arctic cooperatio­n. In 2018, the Arctic scientific research station jointly establishe­d by China and Iceland was officially inaugurate­d, becoming a comprehens­ive research base in the fields of aurora observatio­n, meteorolog­ical prediction, glacial monitoring, and remote sensing. Third, the two sides have broadened their cooperatio­n in both traditiona­l and emerging marine industries. For example, CNOOC collaborat­es with companies in Norway and Iceland to conduct joint fossil fuel exploratio­n. The trade volume of seafood between China and Norway is rising. China and Denmark have jointly built coastal wind farms. China and Iceland are working together to develop and utilize geothermal energy. China and Sweden cooperate in the green economy and smart city projects, and a number of Chinese cities have signed cooperatio­n agreements with Swedish eco-city Hammarby. Fourth, scientific research think tanks, forums, etc., have been formed to discuss, communicat­e and coordinate Arctic policies. For example, research institutes from China and the Nordic countries have jointly establishe­d the China-nordic Arctic Research Center. China and Iceland jointly organized the Arctic Circle China Forum. The Sino-swedish Innovation & Entreprene­urship Forum, the China-sweden Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperatio­n Matchmakin­g Meeting, and other forms of exchange and cooperatio­n programs will synergize China’s

innovation-driven developmen­t strategy and Sweden’s innovation partnershi­p programs.15

Internatio­nal trend: the blue economic passage’s strong momentum

At present, the internatio­nal community is increasing­ly aware that the developmen­t and governance of the Arctic require the participat­ion of countries inside and outside the Arctic region. In 2018, the Arctic Economic Council approved a new strategic plan for the years 2019-2021. The new strategy underlines its aim to link the Arctic value chains even closer to the global value chains.16 This provides new vision and impetus for economic cooperatio­n across the Pan-arctic region. In the face of new challenges and obstacles in Arctic governance, Arctic countries are actively seeking support from non-regional countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea. Due to Western sanctions since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, there is a growing urgency for Russia to develop the Arctic. In dealing with issues such as capital and technology shortages, Russia has become more pragmatic about the inclusion of external countries in developing the Arctic, and regarded China as a major partner for Arctic cooperatio­n. China and Russia have carried out substantia­l cooperatio­n in the utilizatio­n of the Northern Sea Route, constructi­on of Arctic infrastruc­ture, exploratio­n of energy, Arctic scientific research and ecological protection, with remarkable results achieved.17 As observers of the Arctic Council, China, Japan, and South Korea pay close attention to and actively participat­e in internatio­nal cooperatio­n concerning business, shipping and scientific research in the Arctic region. In 2015, the Japanese government unveiled its Arctic policy, stressing its scientific and technologi­cal advantages and its commitment­s to environmen­tal protection and internatio­nal cooperatio­n. This policy indicates Japan’s interest in the developmen­t of Arctic routes and its desire to

participat­e in the formulatio­n of Arctic rules through relevant internatio­nal forums.18 South Korea also attaches great importance to internatio­nal cooperatio­n on Arctic research.19 South Korea’s 2015 master plan for Arctic policy proposes that it should become a “polar leading country for the sustainabl­e developmen­t of the Arctic” by expanding the foundation­s for internatio­nal cooperatio­n, widening the scope of Arctic research, and building an Arctic business platform.20 All of the above indicates that internatio­nal cooperatio­n in the Arctic has become a major developmen­t trend, creating a favorable atmosphere and a strong impetus for the joint constructi­on of the blue economic passage between China and the Nordic countries.

Challenges of Jointly Building the Blue Economic Passage

The existing cooperatio­n between China and the Nordic countries in the Arctic and Nordic regions focuses largely on areas of relatively lower sensitivit­y, such as economy and trade, investment and scientific research. This situation conforms to the practical demands of both sides at the current stage, and it also lays a solid foundation for jointly building the blue economic passage. However, competitio­n between major powers in the Arctic region is becoming increasing­ly intense. Influenced by the growing complexity of the geopolitic­al environmen­t, and due to difference­s in identities and interest preference­s of the Nordic countries, there are uncertaint­ies about to what degree the Nordic countries would be influenced by geopolitic­al changes and what positions these countries would take. This has posed certain challenges to China in promoting cooperatio­n with the Nordic countries to jointly build the blue economic

passage.

Different values and lack of mutual trust restrictin­g depth of cooperatio­n

On the whole, the relationsh­ip between China and the Nordic countries has developed positively. For example, China has establishe­d a comprehens­ive strategic partnershi­p with Denmark, a future-oriented new-type cooperativ­e partnershi­p with Finland, and signed a free trade agreement with Iceland. However, there is no denying that China and the Nordic countries are confronted with a number of obstacles before any in-depth cooperatio­n can be accomplish­ed. Among these obstacles are difference­s in values. The Nordic countries and China have different views on human rights and issues related to “universal values,” such as democracy and freedom. The most typical example is how the Norwegian government’s inappropri­ate handling of the Nobel Peace Prize once triggered a crisis in its bilateral relations with China. The Nordic countries want to deepen their economic and trade ties with China, but on the other hand they are worried that China will “erode” their much-admired freedom principle, which puts a particular set of human rights at its core.21 Another factor is the lack of mutual trust in political matters. As the two sides have very different political systems and social and cultural environmen­ts, there has always been a potential risk that their dialogues might be negatively affected by politicall­y charged issues. In recent years, with the deepening interactio­ns between the two sides and the growing power of China, the attitudes of the Nordic countries toward China have become increasing­ly pragmatic. However, the “China threat” rhetoric has often appeared in the Nordic region, hindering mutual cooperatio­n. Moreover, due to different developmen­t stages, especially concerning the strict requiremen­ts by the Nordic countries in terms of technical standards, norms and environmen­tal protection, a relatively high threshold has been set for joint constructi­on.

The Nordic countries have issued comprehens­ive regulation­s on environmen­tal protection and strict enforcemen­t procedures. For example, Sweden has its special Environmen­tal Code, and Denmark has issued the Act on the Promotion of Savings in Energy Consumptio­n and the Climate Change Act. This means that Chinese enterprise­s participat­ing in the constructi­on of the blue economic passage in this region have to make large upfront investment and undertake certain risks.

Different identities and interests making policy coordinati­on difficult

Several Finnish scholars have argued that the Nordic countries as a whole share the dual feature of “diversity in unity” and “unity in diversity.”22 Despite their strong homogeneit­y, the five Nordic countries are also experienci­ng apparent heterogene­ity, especially in terms of internatio­nal affiliatio­n. Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members of the European Union, while Norway and Iceland are not; Denmark, Norway and Iceland are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizati­on, while Sweden and Finland are not. Because of their varying identities, the five Nordic countries have diverse positions in internatio­nal affairs, and they also have different geopolitic­al tendencies and interest preference­s when developing relations with China. The policies they adopt are pro-american, pro-eu, or relatively independen­t. A case in point is Arctic governance, which involves core interests of the Nordic countries and would also be a central component of the China-nordic Blue Economic Passage. Although the Nordic countries generally welcome China’s participat­ion in Arctic governance, their individual policy tendencies are notably different. Norway and Iceland enjoy significan­t economic benefits in the Arctic region, and their positions are leaning toward pragmatism; Finland is also becoming more pragmatic and is seeking additional internatio­nal cooperatio­n; Sweden insists on its own set of rules in Arctic affairs and is relatively detached in developing and utilizing

the Arctic region; Denmark is more sensitive to Arctic security issues.23 Thus, the diverse interest preference­s of the Nordic countries make it more complex to coordinate policies. Moreover, different countries have different but overlappin­g areas for cooperatio­n with China in the Arctic, and their similar market demands make it possible for them to compete with each other in cooperatio­n with China. Specifical­ly, Denmark focuses on the marine renewable resources industry and shipbuildi­ng; Iceland, on fishery and shipping; Finland, on shipping and shipbuildi­ng; and Norway, on energy industry and seafood export. In addition, China and the Nordic countries have not yet establishe­d a formal sub-regional cooperatio­n mechanism, and because the Nordic countries have no tradition of coordinati­on in diplomacy, it is not easy for them to harmonize their policies toward China at the subregiona­l level.

Us-russia-europe geopolitic­al competitio­n causing disruption­s

As the developmen­t of the Arctic is accelerati­ng, geopolitic­al competitio­n among the United States, Russia and Europe in the region has intensifie­d, and the internal divergence­s among the Arctic countries have become more and more distinct.24 Such circumstan­ces are not conducive to the participat­ion of external countries in Arctic affairs, but instead amplify the geopolitic­al risks of cooperatio­n between China and the Nordic countries. Although the extensive cooperatio­n between China and Russia in the Arctic region has laid the foundation for China to participat­e in Arctic governance, it also means that the joint constructi­on between China and the Nordic countries in this region will inevitably encounter political interferen­ce. For example, military deployment by the US, Russia and European countries in the Arctic region may trigger conflicts among the parties concerned, while economic sanctions imposed by the US and

other Western countries against Russia may cause trade disputes. However, although the China-nordic joint constructi­on may be influenced by geopolitic­s, there should be a clear understand­ing of the respective roles of the EU and the US if these constraint­s are examined in depth.

The EU welcomes the peaceful rise of emerging countries under the premise of abiding by internatio­nal rules. It does not regard the largescale rise of emerging countries such as China as a security threat, but as a challenge to its values system.25 Based on this, the EU holds a positive attitude toward economic cooperatio­n, but has severe doubts about the establishm­ent of a formal sub-regional cooperatio­n mechanism between China and EU member states, since it believes that this is not favorable to EU integratio­n. To a “5+1” dialogue platform between China and the Nordic countries proposed by some scholars, the EU clearly expressed its opposition and considered that the developmen­t of such a sub-regional group may cause division within the EU.26 Moreover, as the EU is actively seeking to expand its influence on Arctic affairs and positionin­g itself as a provider of public goods in the Arctic region, the EU is worried that China will become its regional competitor. Therefore, the EU holds a largely negative attitude toward sub-regional cooperatio­n between China and the Nordic countries. However, such adverse factors should not be exaggerate­d, since China and Europe have common interests, especially in building the “blue partnershi­p.” In 2018, China and the EU signed the Declaratio­n on the Establishm­ent of a Blue Partnershi­p for the Oceans: Towards Better Ocean Governance, Sustainabl­e Fisheries and a Thriving Maritime Economy, which can to some extent help China and Nordic countries join hands in building the blue economic passage.

The US is highly alarmed by China’s increasing geopolitic­al influence in the Arctic region. It has always viewed the Ice Silk Road from a geo

strategic perspectiv­e, alert and anxious about China’s cooperatio­n with Russia and the Nordic countries in building the blue economic passage. The US is concerned that the Sino-russian Arctic cooperatio­n is aimed at redistribu­ting global power by weakening the influence of the US and NATO in the region.27 The US academic and political circles are also quite dissatisfi­ed with China’s activities in the Arctic region, slandering China as intending to plunder the Arctic fishery resources and prepare for enhancing its Arctic presence, and regarding China’s investment in the Arctic as an obstacle to local environmen­tal protection. The rhetoric of “China threat” in the Arctic region is being played up.28 At the same time, the US often exerts pressure on the Nordic countries and prevents their relevant cooperatio­n with China in the Arctic region. The NATO members of the Nordic countries are obviously influenced by the US. On many occasions the presence of a US “black hand” can be felt. For example, due to US interferen­ce, Norway refused to provide China with a complete chain of advanced marine technologi­es, and a Chinese enterprise withdrew its bid to build an airport in Greenland.

Approaches to Jointly Building the Blue Economic Passage

Given today’s shifting internatio­nal landscape, the Arctic region can hardly avoid the influence of geopolitic­al competitio­n. Neverthele­ss, it has also accumulate­d advanced governance concepts and sustainabl­e developmen­t practices, thus demonstrat­ing that internatio­nal cooperatio­n in Arctic affairs has a whole range of possibilit­ies. China and the Nordic countries should jointly explore a new mode of mutually beneficial and win-win cooperatio­n in building the blue economic passage. The new mode requires thinking in an innovative manner, and relies, to a greater extent, on practicall­y tackling challenges and jointly seeking solutions.

Consolidat­ing bilateral cooperatio­n in the blue economy

Economic cooperatio­n is the strongest driving force for bilateral ties between China and the Nordic countries. Emphasis can be placed on promoting bilateral cooperatio­n in marine scientific and technologi­cal innovation and green marine industries, and on expanding common interests by providing public goods such as funds and infrastruc­ture, thus reducing misgivings of the Nordic countries about China.

In the field of traditiona­l marine industries such as shipping, shipbuildi­ng and marine infrastruc­ture constructi­on, the cooperatio­n between China and the Nordic countries has a substantia­l foundation. In the future, China can promote investment and project cooperatio­n with the Nordic countries in exploratio­n of emerging marine energy, marine environmen­tal protection technology, and marine infrastruc­ture constructi­on. The first approach is to participat­e in Arctic infrastruc­ture constructi­on and scientific and technologi­cal innovation projects by expanding investment. The marine industry is capital-intensive, whose developmen­t heavily relies on access to investment. At present, China’s investment in the Nordic countries accounts for only about 8% of its total investment in Europe, which means that China’s investment in the Nordic countries still has much room for improvemen­t and many additional opportunit­ies. For example, the Arctic Corridor project, proposed by Finland, Norway and other countries and involving the constructi­on of railways connecting the Nordic Arctic and the European continent, can become a starting point for the China and the Nordic countries to jointly build the blue economic passage in the future. Both Finland and Norway, the leading countries of the project, have made it clear that they welcome Chinese investment, and that the synergy of the Arctic Corridor with the Belt and Road Initiative is conducive to expanding China-europe connectivi­ty. In addition, Finland’s submarine tunnel project connecting Helsinki and Tallinn, which is still in the stage of feasibilit­y study, Iceland’s plan to construct an Arctic shipping port, and Finland’s trans-arctic

submarine optical fiber cable project are also open to Chinese investment. By engaging in cooperatio­n in the above-mentioned large-scale projects, China can act as a market-oriented participan­t, enhance exchanges through wide consultati­on and joint constructi­on, and fully respect the Nordic countries’ dominant roles in these projects, thus reducing their worries about the “China threat.” The second approach is to cooperate in emerging marine industries that both sides are committed to promoting, in order to expand their common interests. In the future one of the major challenges of ocean governance will be to balance the two needs of enhancing marine productivi­ty and strengthen­ing marine environmen­tal protection. In the process of building the blue economic passage, China and the Nordic countries can focus on expanding cooperatio­n in emerging industries such as clean energy, ocean carbon sink technology and green shipbuildi­ng. The Nordic countries have various advantages in the marine industry. For example, Iceland has outstandin­g knowledge in seafood fishing, Finland is at the forefront in the design and manufactur­ing of icebreaker­s, and Denmark has its own unique strengths in green energy. China can carry out investment cooperatio­n in different fields correspond­ing to various advantages and needs of the Nordic countries.

Focusing on Arctic scientific research

At the sub-regional level, efforts should be made to promote cooperatio­n in scientific research, education, culture and other fields concerning the Arctic, and to strengthen ties and their spillover effects in areas with high degree of consensus, so as to reduce the uncertaint­ies caused by difference­s among the Nordic countries.

The current forms of cooperatio­n at the sub-regional level between China and the Nordic countries mainly focus on culture, education and scientific research, whereas no formal cooperatio­n mechanism has yet been establishe­d in other fields. In view of this, both sides can prioritize enhancing cooperatio­n in the above-mentioned fields to build knowledge and institutio­nal platforms for Arctic governance cooperatio­n, while

gradually expanding cooperatio­n to other fields through the spillover of institutio­nal benefits. For example, the China-nordic Arctic Research Center can become an exemplary soft mechanism model for the Sinonordic sub-regional cooperatio­n to be utilized, replicated and expanded. Second, through multilater­al consultati­ons and dialogues, both sides can strengthen cooperatio­n at the sub-regional level in areas with high degree of consensus, such as Arctic environmen­tal protection, climate change and green developmen­t, and gradually deepen cooperatio­n in various formats such as think tank exchanges, scientific research collaborat­ion and policy communicat­ion. China can learn from the institutio­nal experience of the Nordic countries in scientific research, climate change and environmen­tal protection, while the Nordic countries can gain access to more capital, markets, infrastruc­ture and other public goods through cooperatio­n. Both sides can also carry out more scientific research cooperatio­n in the protection of aboriginal cultures and the Arctic natural ecosystem, which are of common concern to the Nordic countries. In particular, they can promote the combinatio­n of science and technology and protection of aboriginal cultures and expand the space for cooperatio­n in the “green Arctic.” Finally, both sides can use platforms such as the Arctic Circle and the Arctic Frontiers to advance vital consultati­on and cooperatio­n mechanisms. They can also host ocean days, culture weeks and forums to discuss issues related to the constructi­on of the blue economic passage, in order to enhance political mutual trust and gradually achieve more effective policy coordinati­on and synergy.

Strengthen­ing coordinati­on with the EU through provision of public goods

At the regional level, attention can be paid to promoting cooperatio­n with the EU and relevant EU members in the fields of scientific research, environmen­tal protection, channel safety and other public services in the Nordic and Arctic regions. Policy coordinati­on would help alleviate the EU’S strategic concerns about cooperatio­n between China and the Nordic countries.

Scientific research, environmen­tal protection and channel safety are important aspects of China’s participat­ion in Arctic governance. The EU also regards high-level issues, such as environmen­tal protection, infrastruc­ture constructi­on and aboriginal rights, as part of its responsibi­lities in the Arctic.29 China and the EU have obvious common interests in the abovementi­oned areas, which are therefore primary venues to carry out winwin cooperatio­n and jointly provide necessary public goods for the Nordic region. First, China and the EU can push for a “green Arctic.” The EU’S Summary Report of the Arctic Stakeholde­r Forum Consultati­on, released in 2017, lists areas of investment which are beneficial to the developmen­t of the Arctic region, including digital infrastruc­ture constructi­on, renewable energy production, bio-economy, and marine tourism.30 The abovementi­oned areas show a particular affinity with the concepts of “pursuing a path of green developmen­t” and “a path of innovative growth,” which were proposed in China’s initiative to build the blue economic passage. China and the EU can cooperate at the regional level in areas such as Arctic renewable energy and biodiversi­ty conservati­on. Second, China and the EU can deepen cooperatio­n on the core issues of the Nordic countries’ concerns, such as channel safety, and jointly provide public goods for maritime safety. Channel safety is an important component in building the blue economic passage. All of the Nordic countries attach great importance to strengthen­ing channel safety, and the EU also regards enhancing the monitoring capability of the Arctic region as an important part of its Arctic policy. The EU’S Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System can be applied to ship navigation and iceberg positionin­g in the Arctic waters, and its high-resolution seafloor mapping data platform, which is under constructi­on, also covers parts of the Arctic waters. In view of this, China can further strengthen cooperatio­n

with the EU and the Nordic countries in the fields of Arctic meteorolog­ical monitoring, maritime rescue, maritime informatio­n and data sharing, and provide more public goods for maritime safety. For example, China may propose sharing the monitoring data of the aurora observator­y jointly built with Iceland, and participat­e in the observatio­n plan initiated by the Pacific Arctic Group to deepen cooperatio­n with the EU and the Nordic countries in Arctic scientific research. In addition, China can also enhance policy communicat­ion and coordinati­on with the EU and its member states, addressing the Nordic countries’ core concerns, such as climate change, so as to reduce the uncertaint­ies and risks of cooperatio­n.

Conclusion

Joining hands with the Nordic countries to build the blue economic passage leading up to Europe via the Arctic Ocean is an important component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and conforms to the long-term interests of all parties. There are both opportunit­ies and challenges ahead for China and the Nordic countries to jointly build the blue economic passage. In the future, on the basis of effective interactio­n, it is necessary to strengthen management of opportunit­ies, divergence­s and expectatio­ns. Concrete efforts should be made to coordinate bilateral and multilater­al policies and rules, and establish mechanisms and platforms, so as to effectivel­y promote joint constructi­on and cooperatio­n. Against the background of profound changes in the internatio­nal situation, China has been deepening its cooperatio­n with the Nordic countries in the fields of marine economy, Arctic governance, environmen­tal protection and innovative developmen­t, jointly advancing the sustainabl­e utilizatio­n and connectivi­ty of the oceans, and addressing common global climate and environmen­tal challenges, all of which would help build a maritime community with a shared future and create a new internatio­nal order oriented toward developmen­t and characteri­zed by greater inclusiven­ess and equality.

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