New Situation and Future Prospects for Maritime Cooperation between India and Vietnam

The maritime cooperation between India and Vietnam has been deepening on a regular and institutionalized basis with specific achievements. It stems not only from the continuation of their respective foreign policies, but also from their shared interests in the face of China’s growing influence in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Maritime cooperation is an inherent component of bilateral cooperation between the two maritime states of India and Vietnam. In recent years, India has continued to promote its Look East policy and even upgraded it to Act East policy, while Vietnam has strengthened its balancing diplomacy among major powers. The maritime cooperation between India and Vietnam has been deepening on a regular and institutionalized basis with specific achievements, which influences both their bilateral relations and the regional situation.

Process and Characteristics of India-vietnam Maritime Cooperation

India and Vietnam have long maintained friendly diplomatic relations without historical burdens or realistic conflicts of interest. During the Cold War, the relationship between the two countries was mainly manifested in mutual political and moral support, without bilateral cooperation in security and maritime fields. When World War II ended, then Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, for the sake of national independence and liberation, once turned to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for help. However, India gave only moral support instead of any practical assistance at that time. After the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Nehru visited Vietnam in 1954 and became the first foreign head of state to visit the country. In

the 1970s, although both India and Vietnam held a hostile position toward China, there was still no progress in their security cooperation. For example, Vietnam sought Indian assistance in enhancing its arms self-sufficiency in 1978, but the Indians “politely shelved the request.”1

Marked by the signing of a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in 1994, security cooperation between India and Vietnam saw progress after the Cold War. India also joined in the exploration of Vietnam’s offshore oil and gas resources. With a rapid development in their relations since the start of the 21st century, the two countries launched cooperation in the field of maritime security. During then Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai’s visit to India in 2000, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes described Vietnam “the most trusted friend and ally,” saying that India would strengthen bilateral security cooperation with Vietnam, including joint defense training and the supply of advanced weapons. He also proposed the development of a permanent naval presence at the Cam Ranh Bay base.2 Since then, maritime security cooperation between the two countries has been gradually strengthened. In 2007, when then Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited India, the bilateral relations were upgraded to a strategic partnership, and a mechanism for strategic dialogue was established. However, even though India-vietnam maritime security cooperation continuously advanced before 2011, the cooperation was limited in content, with no rapid progress achieved. During the visit of then Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang to India in 2011, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described India and Vietnam as maritime neighbors facing common security challenges. “We believe that it is important to ensure the safety and security of the vital sea lanes of communication. We have agreed to continue and strengthen our exchanges in these fields.”3 Since then,

cooperation between India and Vietnam in the maritime field, especially maritime security, has become a priority in developing their bilateral relations. While China’s relations with Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and other Indian Ocean countries witnessed further development, India and Vietnam have steadily accelerated their maritime cooperation in the context of rising tensions in the South China Sea.

Frequent visits by Indian warships to Vietnam ports

Since Vietnam’s naval strength is relatively weak, Indian and Vietnamese naval exchanges are mainly one-way visits to Vietnamese ports by Indian warships. With the intensified maritime cooperation between the two countries, Indian warships have paid frequent port visits to Vietnam, from Ho Chi Minh City in the south all the way up to central and northern ports of Nha Trang, Danang, Haiphong, and even to the most sensitive Cam Ranh Bay. In July 2011, India’s tank landing vessel INS Airavat was invited to visit Nha Trang Port, which was the first time a foreign naval vessel was allowed access to Nha Trang.4 Since then, Indian warships have paid three visits to Danang in June 2013, October 2015 and May 2018, two visits to Haiphong in August 2014 and September 2017, and one visit to Cam Ranh Bay in May 2016.

Regular joint naval exercises

Joint military exercises constitute a traditional part of India-vietnam maritime cooperation. As early as 2000, the two countries launched joint naval exercises. With the upgrading of their bilateral relations, the exercises have become more frequent and normalized, and three were held in the South China Sea in June 2013, August 2015 and May 2018. Frequent joint exercises between maritime forces of the two countries demonstrate the increasing depth of maritime cooperation. Although Vietnam has worked to diversify its foreign relations since the end of the Cold War, with particular

emphasis on developing relations with major powers outside of the region, India was for a long time the only country to conduct routine joint naval exercises with Vietnam until February 2016, when Vietnam conducted its first joint naval exercise with Japan.

Indian support for Vietnam’s naval build-up

Since 2000, helping Vietnam enhance its maritime strength has been an important part of India-vietnam maritime cooperation. With the deepening of bilateral relations in recent years, India has been giving increasing assistance to the Vietnamese Navy in its military build-up, including providing maritime military equipment and helping train qualified naval personnel. After Vietnam purchased Kilo-class submarines from Russia, India agreed to help Vietnam with personnel training in accordance with the bilateral Action Plan 2011-2013 signed with Vietnam.5 In November 2013, the Indian Navy announced that it would train 500 Vietnamese submarine personnel. In terms of arms support, India has become the second largest military partner of Vietnam after Russia. Upgrading Vietnam’s naval armament level has become an important area of the two countries’ technical cooperation in weapons and equipment. In his visit to Vietnam in September 2014, then Indian President Pranab Mukherjee promised to provide Vietnam with a Us$100million loan to help Vietnam purchase four patrol boats from India and prepare to provide Vietnam with the Indian Navy’s most advanced Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles. One major issue between the two sides during then Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to India in October of the same year was India’s sale of four naval patrol boats to Vietnam. During his visit to Vietnam in September 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged to provide Vietnam with a Us$500-million credit line to simplify the procedures for purchasing defense equipment. At the same time, the two countries signed an agreement on India assisting Vietnam in building

maritime patrol boats.6 When then Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang visited India in March 2018, India reiterated its commitment to strengthening defense ties with Vietnam, including giving support to Vietnam in its military build-up. The two countries agreed to speed up the implementation of India’s Us$100-million loan to help Vietnam build high-speed patrol ships, and to sign as soon as possible a framework agreement on India’s commitment, made in 2016, of a Us$500-million defense credit line.7

Cooperation in exploration of offshore oil and gas resources

The two countries’ cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of offshore oil and gas resources has been a traditional field of their maritime cooperation. In recent years, the two countries have taken bigger steps in exploration of oil and gas fields in the South China Sea, and have got more involved in territorial disputes of the waters. During then Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang’s visit to India in October 2011, the two countries signed an agreement on oil and gas cooperation between the National Petroleum Group of Vietnam and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India, expressing their intention to strengthen cooperation in oil and gas exploration, which includes cooperation in Blocks 127 and 128 (both involving disputed waters) allocated by Vietnam. Since then, although Block 127 was abandoned as no oil and gas resources were discovered, the exploration agreement for Block 128 has been extended several times. During President Tran Dai Quang’s visit to India in March 2018, the two countries signed a joint statement in which the Vietnamese side stressed that it welcomed Indian enterprises to expand their oil and gas exploration activities in the “continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Vietnam.”

Coordination on the South China Sea issue

Before the Modi government came to power in 2014, India generally maintained a low profile toward the South China Sea issue. After Modi took office, however, the issue became an important leverage of India’s Act East policy. The South China Sea issue has frequently become part of highlevel talks between the two countries, with both sides covering up their geopolitical intentions with rhetoric such as “freedom of navigation, safety of navigation, and respect for international law.” After the award of the Chinaphilippines South China Sea arbitration case was issued in the Philippines’ favor on July 12, 2016, India and Vietnam appealed to the parties concerned to settle disputes in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). During Modi’s visit to Vietnam in September of the same year, the joint statement issued by the two countries referred to the South China Sea arbitration case, calling on all parties to “respect the diplomatic and legal processes.”9 During President Tran Dai Quang’s March 2018 India visit, the joint statement reiterated the importance of “maintenance of freedom of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea, full respect for diplomatic and legal processes, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to the threat or use of force, and in accordance with international law.”10

Motivations of India-vietnam Maritime Cooperation

Since the end of the Cold War, India and Vietnam have attached great importance to their strategic coordination. The smooth conduct of their maritime cooperation is closely related to the deep-rooted friendship and coordination between the two countries. During the Vietnam War, India

disregarded pressure from the United States and gave moral support to Vietnam. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979, India also stood by Vietnam. The two countries’ recent strengthening of maritime cooperation stems not only from the continuation of their respective foreign policies, but also from their shared interests. China’s growing influence in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean is one important consideration for India and Vietnam to further maritime cooperation. In addition, Washington’s supportive attitude, objectively speaking, has spurred maritime cooperation between the two countries.

India’s intention to restrict Chinese access to the Indian Ocean

Having made great achievements in the economic field, India developed its Look East policy into the Act East policy,11 and gradually strengthened security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, including maritime security cooperation. India has made its relations with ASEAN countries the focus of its Act East policy, with the purpose of playing the role of “security provider” in the region and showing its influence in the Western Pacific. In fact, as early as 2000, then Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes declared that India’s maritime interests extended all the way from the northern Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.12 Pursuing Look East for years, India was increasingly eager to demonstrate its influence in the region and realize its great-power dream. Due to its special geopolitical status, especially its long-standing complicated disputes with China on territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, Vietnam has naturally become the first partner of choice for India’s Act East policy.13 Finding an opportunity to expand maritime interests

in the South China Sea, India regards Vietnam as the core country in its Act East policy, an important part of its “Necklace of Diamonds” strategy, and especially as a top choice for maritime security cooperation.14 Since the Modi government formally proposed the Act East policy, India, almost without exception, has explicitly highlighted Vietnam as one of the most important pillars for the policy during high-level talks with Vietnam. For example, Modi “reaffirmed that Vietnam was an important pillar of India’s Look East Policy” during Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to India in October 2014.15 In November 2018, Indian President Ram Nath Kovind delivered a speech in Vietnam’s National Assembly, pointing out that while all diplomatic relations play an important role for India, the relations between India and some countries and regions, including Vietnam, are of special significance; and Vietnam plays an important role in India’s Act East policy.16

India has been adopting an exclusive Indian Ocean strategy, believing that the Indian Ocean is “India’s ocean.” India is particularly opposed to China’s expansion of its strategic space in the Indian Ocean. Some scholars are of the view that “the Indian Ocean is an indispensable sphere of influence for India, and India will not allow the Indian Ocean to become a channel for China to rise as a maritime country.”17 In order to slow China’s entry into the Indian Ocean, India has the attempt to counter-balance China by strengthening maritime cooperation with Vietnam and other countries having disputes with China. China’s deepening relations with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have only made India more anxious. Some Indian strategists believe that the purpose of the Chinese Navy’s increased presence in the Indian Ocean region is to force India to focus on South Asian affairs,

but India can expand its naval presence into Southeast Asia to break China’s “String of Pearls” strategy and build up India’s “Necklace of Diamonds.”18 In recent years, with rising tensions in the South China Sea, the Indian strategic circle increasingly believes that China has been working to boost its presence in the Indian Ocean after it obtains a dominant position in the South China Sea, and thus India should cooperate with the United States, Japan and Australia in the Indo-pacific region to counter-balance China’s growing influence.19 Many Indian experts have even openly claimed that India-vietnam maritime cooperation is intended to balance China. For instance, R. S. Vasan, a retired commodore of the Indian Navy, interpreted India’s recent deepening oil and gas exploration cooperation with Vietnam in part of the South China Sea disputed by China and Vietnam as a response to the construction of China-pakistan Economic Corridor in disputed Pakistancontrolled Kashmir.20 Indian scholar Baladas Ghoshal also believes that India has a strong political motive to cooperate with Vietnam in exploring and developing Blocks 127 and 128 in the South China Sea, as it hopes to use them as bargaining chips in its negotiations with China on other issues.21 Another Indian scholar said explicitly: “India may find that it is unable to block Chinese entry into the Indian Ocean, but can counter-pressure by going into China’s own maritime backyard of the South China Sea. This is a simple but potentially effective response.”22

Vietnam’s intention to balance China in the South China Sea with Indian support

China’s self-defense counterattack against Vietnam in 1979 has had

a profound impact on Vietnam’s security concept and strategic thinking. When conflicts erupted along the China-vietnam border, the Soviet Union failed to fulfill its obligations under the Vietnam-soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation by giving only symbolic moral and formalistic support to Vietnam. Therefore, after its reform and opening-up, or Doi Moi, in 1986, Vietnam no longer resorted to alliances with major powers as the means to safeguard its security interests. Instead, it has gradually shifted its “one-sided” foreign policy to a more diversified diplomacy. With the end of the Cold War, Vietnam made greater readjustments to its foreign policy. It carried out all-round diplomacy and accelerated its integration into the international community. In accordance to its own judgment of international situation, Vietnam has gradually formulated a comprehensive and diversified foreign policy with the focus on keeping a balance among major powers. In particular, “soft balance” against China by seeking help from outside major forces has become the core element in Vietnam’s balancing diplomacy. Since the normalization of relations with China in 1991, Vietnam has pursued a typical hedging strategy toward China. On the one hand, Vietnam relies on Chinese support for its political stability and economic development; on the other hand, Vietnam is on full guard in its China policy since the two countries are entangled in historical resentment and realistic conflict of interests.

Compared with Vietnam-china relations, Vietnam and India have no historical burden and both countries were friends of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which has made them naturally intimate. Therefore, when Vietnam carried out its Look West policy, India, which cherishes great-power aspirations, has become a big shoulder for Vietnam to rely on. At the same time, Vietnam’s deepening of its relations with India conforms to the principle of diversification in its overall foreign policy. In particular, maritime cooperation with India can improve Vietnam’s position in its wrestling with China in the South China Sea. The South China Sea disputes, which have worsened since 2009, have pushed Vietnam closer to India. Both countries are wary of China, and Vietnam’s desire to counter China by engaging India in the South China Sea coincides with India’s expectation of

expanding its influence to the Western Pacific through enhanced maritime security cooperation with Vietnam. Comparatively speaking, Vietnam is more proactive in maritime cooperation with India, not only allowing Indian warships to visit its sensitive ports, but also constantly encouraging India to participate in the exploration of oil and gas resources in disputed waters of the South China Sea.

Support and instigation from the US

Strategically, India adopts an accommodating approach to the United States, while the US embraces and supports India’s proactive role in the Asiapacific region.23 With Washington paying more attention to the Asia-pacific, it welcomes and encourages India and Vietnam to strengthen their maritime cooperation, and also supports India to play a bigger role in the Asiapacific region. As early as the beginning of this century, the US encouraged the Indian Navy to intensify coordinated actions with the US Navy in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia to enhance India’s maritime force.24 In July 2011, when then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited India, she made the appeal: “India’s leadership has the potential to positively shape the future of the Asia-pacific ... and we encourage you not just to look east, but continue to engage and act east as well.”25 When the Modi government came to power in 2014, it announced that the Look East policy would be upgraded to Act East policy. It should be said that Hillary Clinton’s words in 2011 served as catalyst for this to a certain extent. Since Vietnam occupies a pivotal position in India’s Act East policy, India is bound to deepen cooperation with Vietnam to act in concert with Washington’s Asia-pacific strategy. On the US part, it also welcomes and supports Vietnam’s vigorous

maritime cooperation with India, and hopes that India-vietnam cooperation will help promote its Indo-pacific strategy which is aimed at curbing China. On June 1, 2019, the US Department of Defense released India-pacific Strategic Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region. Although the Report emphasized the core importance of the quadrilateral alliance among the US, Japan, India and Australia, it also regarded some ASEAN countries including Vietnam as key players.26

Prospects of India-vietnam Maritime Cooperation

With the deepening of bilateral relations and the changes taking place in Asia-pacific geopolitics, maritime cooperation will continue to be the most important part of India-vietnam comprehensive strategic partnership. Of course, the further development of their maritime cooperation also faces many constraints.

On the one hand, India-vietnam maritime cooperation will continue to advance in a high-profile manner. China’s growing capability in safeguarding its rights and interests in the South China Sea in recent years, and the rise of China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region has prompted India and Vietnam to strengthen their maritime cooperation. India’s ambitions to become a major power in the region have also contributed to deepening its relations with Vietnam. India’s relations with regional players like Vietnam are being viewed through the prism of tensions floating in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, and Indo-vietnamese affinity seems to have “thrown caution to the winds” as far as China is concerned.27 In recent years, Vietnam has permitted Indian warships to visit the port of Ho Chi Minh City in the south to central and northern ports of Nha Trang, Danang and Haiphong. The Indian Navy has thus expanded its range of activities in

the South China Sea. In addition, as India remains an important choice for Vietnam to diversify its weaponry sources, cooperation in naval equipment technology between the two countries will become only more evident in the future. Officials and spokespersons of both countries have not denied the widely reported news that India will provide Brahmos anti-ship cruise missiles to Vietnam. For example, a spokesman for Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs vaguely answered this question when he said that security and defense cooperation is an important part of Vietnam-india comprehensive strategic partnership, and the procurement of defensive weapons conforms to Vietnam’s national defense policy of peace and self-defense.28 Indian defense officials also said that providing defense equipment for Vietnam is an important aspect of the two countries’ comprehensive strategic partnership.29 From statements made by officials of India and Vietnam, the two sides are maintaining close consultations on India’s supply of Brahmos missiles. Therefore, maritime cooperation, especially maritime security cooperation, will continue to be the focus of the bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership. In the March 2018 joint statement, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation in maritime domain, including anti-piracy and security of sea lanes, and agreed to further promote bilateral consultation on maritime issues in the spirit of the proposal for an ASEAN-INDIA Strategic Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation.30 At the 16th meeting of the India-vietnam Joint Committee in August 2018, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj announced that the first bilateral maritime security dialogue would be soon organized.31

On the other hand, India-vietnam maritime cooperation also faces

many constraints, which means that although the cooperation stirs public opinion, it makes slow progress in reality. First of all, Vietnam pursues a balanced diplomacy toward great powers. The bottom line is to refrain from provoking China. Therefore, it is impossible for India and Vietnam to form a maritime alliance. Australian scholar David Brewster believes that while Vietnam is seeking to diversify its international relationships and enmesh itself in ASEAN, it is willing to do so only within a framework of public deference towards China.32 The description of “deference” is obviously an exaggeration; in fact, Vietnam’s China policy has typical hedging features. As Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said, Vietnam’s policy toward China adheres to a combination of cooperation and competition. In terms of India-vietnam maritime cooperation, Vietnam’s courteous but insincere attitude toward India’s desire for permanent naval presence at the Cam Ranh Bay base shows that it will not agree to any deployment of foreign forces in the militarily sensitive facility. In addition, some scholars believe that it is indeed Vietnam’s status as a party to South China Sea disputes that makes it unable to be as flexible as Singapore in fully conducting maritime cooperation with foreign powers such as India, especially in the security field. Hanoi may not wish to be viewed as “being closely aligned to any individual or groups of extra-regional powers that could be potentially misconstrued by China as a form of containment strategy.”33

Second, Vietnam’s relatively backward naval equipment has, to a certain extent, restricted the promotion of cooperation projects with India such as maritime military exercises. Currently, most naval visits and joint exercises between the two countries are just “one-way,” only held in the adjacent waters of Vietnam. However, owing to the sensitivity of the South China Sea issue, India and Vietnam are not able to conduct frequent joint military exercises deep in the South China Sea. And the Vietnamese Navy’s ability

falls short of its wishes to conduct joint exercises in the Indian Ocean with its Indian counterpart in the short term.

Finally, the inefficiency of Indian bureaucracy in policy implementation hinders India-vietnam maritime cooperation. India’s bureaucratic apparatus is sluggish, especially when it comes to security cooperation with other countries, which requires coordination among Defense, External Affairs and Finance Ministries.34 This has greatly reduced policy implementation efficiency. India-vietnam maritime cooperation is also deeply troubled by the inefficiency of Indian bureaucracy. For example, the Indian President promised in his visit to Vietnam in 2014 to provide a Us$100-million military purchase loan, but the loan was not put in practice until Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang visited India in 2018.

Impact of India-vietnam Marine Cooperation on South China Sea Disputes

India-vietnam maritime cooperation would be acceptable if it did not concern other countries. However, it often involves disputes in the South China Sea, which is not conducive to the regional situation and CHINAASEAN maritime cooperation, or to the cooling of tension and settlement of disputes in the South China Sea. Moreover, India’s involvement in the South China Sea issue is neither helpful to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of cooperation among countries in the region, nor conducive to the maintenance and development of China-india relations.

Since the latter half of 2016, with the joint efforts of China and ASEAN countries, significant progress has been made in the settlement of South China Sea disputes through the adoption of a “dual-track” approach. China and ASEAN countries have reached consensus on the single draft negotiating text of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and the situation in the South China Sea has calmed down. However, it seems that