Liu Jianwei

is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defense Economics and Management, Central University of Finance and Economics.

1 US and EU economic sanctions include sanctions for implementing resolutions of the UN Security Council and sanctions initiated outside of the UN framework. Sanctions in this paper refer to the latter, namely, autonomous or unilateral sanctions.

2 Iran is a typical case. After the EU substantively cooperated with the US sanctions against Iran in 2010, Iran suffered a currency and economic crisis and had huge economic losses. But for Russia, the effect of the US-EU joint sanctions is controversial. Some studies believe that economic sanctions are the main cause of Russia’s economic downturn in recent years, while others believe that economic sanctions have little to do with it, nor have they changed Russia’s position on Crimea and conflicts in eastern Ukraine. There are even some that believe sanctions stimulated Russia’s economy and the patriotism of Russians. The US political circle often attributes the poor effect of sanctions against Russia to the EU, and has criticized the EU for its half-hearted implementation of sanctions.

3 Notes on the statistics: 1) effective statistics start from the establishment of the EU on November 1, 1993 and end on December 31, 2018; 2) economic sanctions are defined in the narrowest terms, namely trade, financial and investment restrictions, excluding measures like arms embargoes and aid suspension; 3) data of US sanctions comes from presidential executive orders, while data of EU sanctions comes from common positions under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy or decisions by the European Council; 4) sanctions targeting the same country but for different reasons are counted as different sanctions, for example US sanctions against Iran on counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and human rights grounds are counted as three different sanctions.

4 Kristin Archick and Derek E. Mix, “U.S.-EU Cooperation on Ukraine and Russia,” CRS Insights, March 13, 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/in10129.pdf.

5 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Shanghai People’s Press, 2011. 6 The EU was established in November 1993 and the actual statistical year began in 1994. Since the EU did not launch economic sanctions against Iran and North Korea outside the UN Security Council until 2010 and 2016, the two cases were included in the two statistical periods 2009-2013 and 2014-2018 respectively. 7 Secondary sanctions, also called extraterritorial sanctions, refer to restrictive measures on economic exchanges with third (or secondary target) countries, with the purpose of forcing third countries to suspend economic relations with, and hence increase pressure on, the target country. In history, the US and the EU (or its predecessor) once had serious disputes over US secondary sanctions against the Soviet Union (1982), Cuba (1996) and Iran (1996/2000), which directly restrained relevant bilateral cooperation. However, marked by the US promulgation of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) with multiple provisions on secondary sanctions in 2010, the US-EU dispute was significantly mitigated.

8 There are two other common measures, arms embargoes and travel restrictions, but whether they belong to economic sanctions remains controversial.

9 The EU opposed US comprehensive sanctions for its economic interests and for humanitarian considerations.

10 Although the UN has imposed strict sanctions on Iran and North Korea, it has not prohibited general trade with the sanctioned countries, so they are still targeted sanctions.

11 Daniel W. Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” International Studies Review, Vol.13, Issue 1, pp.99-101.

12 “Embargoed and Sanctioned Countries,” https://www.export.pitt.edu/embargoed-and-sanctionedcountries.

13 Joakim Kreutz, “Hard Measures by a Soft Power?” BICC Paper 45, https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_ bicctools/paper45.pdf.

14 One exception is the European Community’s sanctions against the Soviet Union in 1981 due to the Poland issue. See Joakim Kreutz, “Hard Measures by a Soft Power?” BICC Paper 45, p.9.

15 The new qualified majority requires 55% of voting EU member states, representing at least 65% of the population of voting members for a European Commission proposal to be approved, while the blocking minority requires at least four member states to block a proposal.

16 Francesco Giumelli, The Success of Sanctions, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2013, pp.26-28.

17 The US sanctions against Iran originated in the 1979 Iran hostage crisis and have since undergone numerous adjustments.

18 Sascha Lohmann, “The Convergence of Transatlantic Sanction Policy against Iran,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.29, No.3, 2016, p.941.

19 Stefan Lehne, “The Role of Sanctions in EU Foreign Policy,” December 14, 2012, https:// carnegieeurope.eu/2012/12/14/role-of-sanctions-in-eu-foreign-policy-pub-50378.

20 Sascha Lohmann, “The Convergence of Transatlantic Sanction Policy against Iran,” p.938. 21 Ibid., p.940.

22 Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew, “The Use and Misuse of Economic Statecraft,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.97, No.6, 2018, p.143.

23 Stefan Lehne, “The Role of Sanctions in EU Foreign Policy,” December 14, 2012.

24 Robin Niblett and Derek Mix, “Transatlantic Approaches to Sanctions: Principles and Recommendations for Action,” CSIS Report, December 2006, https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlanticapproaches-sanctions-principles-and-recommendations-action.

25 Simond de Galbert, “Transatlantic Economic Statecraft,” CSIS Economic Statecraft Series, June 21, 2016, p.9.

26 Tom Keatinge, et al., “Transatlantic (Mis)alignment: Challenges to US-EU Sanctions Design and Implementation,” RUSI Occasional Paper, July 2017, p.5; Robin Niblett and Derek Mix, “Transatlantic Approaches to Sanctions.”

27 Simond de Galbert, “Transatlantic Economic Statecraft,” p.9.

28 Henry Foy, et al., “Berlin Hits Back at US Move to Tighten Sanctions on Russia,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/27e28a44-51b0-11e7-a1f2-db19572361bb.

29 Dominik Tolksdorf, “U.S. Sanctions Law and Western Coordination on Russia Policy,” Kennan Cable, No.29, December 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/kennan_cable_29_-_tolksdorf.pdf.

30 Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare, Public Affairs, 2013. 31 Simond de Galbert, “Transatlantic Economic Statecraft,” pp.6-8.