China International Studies (English)

The Belt and Road Initiative and the Theoretica­l Innovation of Internatio­nal Cooperatio­n: Culture, Philosophy and Practice

- Sun Jisheng

The Belt and Road internatio­nal cooperatio­n exhibits the uniquely Chinese manner in cooperatio­n and social practice that is hardly explained by traditiona­l Western theories of internatio­nal relations. Its practice goes beyond institutio­nal cooperatio­n, homogeneou­s cooperatio­n, and cooperatio­n based on common interests, providing new elements for theories of internatio­nal relations.

Three Main Factors Affecting the Developmen­t and Innovation of Internatio­nal Relations Theory

The theory of internatio­nal cooperatio­n has always been an important subset for internatio­nal relations theory. Reviewing the overall developmen­t of the theory of internatio­nal relations, we find that traditiona­l culture concepts, diplomatic practices, and major changes in the world situation are the three key factors which have influenced the overall developmen­t of the theory of internatio­nal relations and have introduced innovation in different schools of thought.

First, traditiona­l culture is an important resource for the developmen­t and innovation of internatio­nal relations theories. Culture is accumulate­d and formed in the history of a country, and reflected in the traditions and customs of the nations. It not only shapes ideas, norms, and habits, but also influences behavior and thinking. In this sense, the emergence and developmen­t of theories, on the one hand, is influenced by traditiona­l culture, and on the other hand, reflects local characteri­stics and imprints the theories with local influence.

Culture is part of the social structure and shapes social habits. People’s behavior and actions in most cases are habits without deliberate thinking. This is why, theoretica­lly, there are both a logic of consequenc­e and appropriat­eness,2 and a logic of habit and practice.3 In fact, both the logic of habit and the logic of practice reflect the influence of culture. Culture directly shapes the background knowledge, and at the same time reflects it. According to John R. Searle, an American philosophe­r, people usually behave unconsciou­sly, but follow certain rules with which they are too familiar to be aware of their observance, which makes their behavior appear

unconsciou­s. This kind of “unconsciou­s” behavior is actually influenced by the background knowledge.4 Similarly, the French sociologis­t Pierre Bourdieu believes that “habit” is a specific tendency and preference system for individual­s to perceive and react to the surroundin­g social world, which represents the way the community culture and personal history shape the body and the soul, and directly influences social behavior. The French philosophe­r Michel Foucault holds that the influence of historical a priori knowledge , which is based on historical experience, is inevitable, and that is why people with similar cultural background­s generally hold a similar understand­ing with regard to specific words and actions, and vice versa. In practice, people often unconsciou­sly comprehend or judge the behavior or actions of others by their own standards. What one country thinks is normal may be considered abnormal by other countries. Lacking sufficient understand­ing of the history and culture of other countries and without the appropriat­e background knowledge, misunderst­anding is likely to occur in the process of communicat­ing, affecting the effectiven­ess of communicat­ion.

The theorizing process itself is a special practice influenced by culture. Because theorists live in a specific temporal and cultural space, the theories they develop will also reflect the influence of time and space.5 For example, democracy and freedom are core values of the United States. From the very beginning of its founding, the concept of “God’s elect” was formed, the belief that the US shoulders the responsibi­lity of exporting the ideal of freedom, the democratic system and related values to other countries. This is reflected in the United States’ shaping of the world order and its design of the internatio­nal system after World War II. Because of the hegemony of the English language and the overriding predominan­ce of Western concepts in academic discourse, these theories have been generalize­d and 4 John R. Searle, The Constructi­on of Social Reality, New York: The Free Press, 1995. Chapter Six of the book analyzes in detail how background knowledge influences the constructi­on and understand­ing of social phenomena.

5 Qin Yaqing, Relations and Process: The Cultural Constructi­on of China’s Internatio­nal Relations Theory, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2012, pp.12-25.

used to explain the diplomatic practice of the entire world. In fact, they are far from being universal theories, and cannot explain the overall picture of internatio­nal relations practice. In recent years, with the growing awareness of non-western countries in developing their own schools of internatio­nal relations, there have been more and more voices opposed to this Western dominance in theoretica­l parlance. For example, many Russian scholars have emphasized the uniqueness of Russia, arguing that Russian diplomatic practices follow a different and rather unique set of rules of conduct and cannot be understood by applying the Western theories of internatio­nal relations.6 Based on its own culture, India has also developed academic schools with national characteri­stics. Similarly, Chinese culture has shaped China’s unique world view, values, and way of thinking and behaving. The Chinese people cherish peace, respect difference and diversity, advocate tolerance and mutual learning, view the world as a whole, and discern no clear line between “self” and “the others.” Chinese civilizati­on has rarely embraced the concept of expansion, and will not actively seek to change others and take upon itself additional burdens, which is in sharp contrast to the expansioni­st tendency of Western civilizati­ons.7 After years of accumulati­on, China’s internatio­nal relations theory has made great progress. For example, Qin Yaqing’s “relational theory,” Zhao Tingyang’s “tianxia (all under Heaven) system,” and Yan Xuetong’s “moral realism” are all closely connected with China’s traditiona­l culture and history.8 This shows that the different cultural background­s between countries or regions can lead to different preference­s and norms, which will affect the developmen­t of theories.

Second, the developmen­t and innovation of theories is influenced by a country’s foreign policy and diplomatic practice. For instance, 6 Maria Y. Omelicheva and Lidiya Zubytska, “An Unending Quest for Russia’s Place in the World: The Discursive Co-evolution of the Study and Practice of Internatio­nal Relations in Russia,” New Perspectiv­e, Vol.24, No.1, 2016, pp.19–51.

7 Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1984, p.11. 8 Qin Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018; Zhao Tingyang, The Tianxia System, Jiangsu Education Press, 2005; Yan Xuetong, The Transfer of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competitio­n, Peking University Press, 2015

many concepts and theories proposed and developed by American scholars, such as power transfer, structural conflicts, tragedies of great-power politics, hegemonic stability, and liberal institutio­nalism are mostly based on American practical experience after World War II. The British School represente­d by Barry Buzan has proposed the core concept of “world society” based on European history and practice. Similarly, Russia’s foreign policy is associated with its great-power identity, derived from its material capabiliti­es as well as its intellectu­al, cultural, and spiritual potential.9 This identity influences its perception and response to internatio­nal events.10 On the Ukraine issue, Russia sees itself as a heroic nation that shoulders a mission of safeguardi­ng the Russian world and restoring “fairness” in internatio­nal relations, which were long abused by the West.11 Based on its rich geopolitic­al experience, Russia has developed relatively mature geopolitic­al theories. As for China, its reluctance to impose its own ideas and systems on or export them to other countries1­2 reflects its national characteri­stics of introversi­on and non-expansion. These ideas have also influenced China’s foreign policy and diplomatic practice. The diplomatic practice, in turn, has provided the basis for China’s diplomatic theory which takes peaceful developmen­t as its basic approach and win-win cooperatio­n as its core principle,13 and highlights peaceful coexistenc­e, mutually beneficial cooperatio­n, non-expansion, and non-interferen­ce in the internal affairs of other countries. Similarly, Chinese scholars have also conducted theoretica­l studies on “developmen­tal peace” and “developmen­tal governance.”14 India has also developed its theory with

strong national characteri­stics, such as the theory of non-alignment and the theory of “Asian values.”

Third, theoretica­l developmen­t and innovation is influenced by the internatio­nal situation and major changes in it. Theory is a systematic and conceptual­ized set of ideas that explains, describes, and predicts reality.15 The world itself, and particular­ly major changes in internatio­nal relations, are the most important sources of theoretica­l developmen­t and provide constant momentum for theorists to review and innovate theories. For example, in the 1970s, in a bipolar world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, Kenneth Waltz envisioned the internatio­nal system as a market and developed a very simple structural realism,16 namely, predicting that the choice of a state’s behavior depended on the structure of the internatio­nal system it is in, and the structure of the internatio­nal system is mainly determined by the material strength of big powers. In the late 1980s, as mainstream theories such as neorealism and neoliberal­ism failed to predict the end of the Cold War, many new concepts and new perspectiv­es have been incorporat­ed into the research agenda of internatio­nal relations, such as the concepts and theories of sociology, psychology, and linguistic­s. Culture, identity, gender, discourse, emotion, etc. have subsequent­ly become the core content of some theoretica­l studies. The internatio­nal relations theory thus entered a period of diversifie­d developmen­t from the 1990s to the early 21st century.17

Amid the current world’s major changes unseen in a century, the internatio­nal order and internatio­nal system are experienci­ng profound adjustment­s, and the relative strength of developed countries and emerging powers has changed. Despite the constantly developing science and technology represente­d by artificial intelligen­ce, the internet and big data,

the global governance system is facing the challenge of governance deficit or even of governance failure. With the emergence of various sentiments across the globe, populism, anti-globalizat­ion, and nationalis­m are on the rise. While the United States, as the world hegemon, continues its strategic contractio­n and frequently withdraws from the internatio­nal community, a developmen­t which has seriously undermined the current internatio­nal order, China, as a rising power, has increasing­ly become an important force in preserving the current world order. All this presents new issues for theoretica­l research, which requires rethinking our convention­al theories of internatio­nal relations for developmen­t and renewal. Previously, when studying the internatio­nal system, people focused mainly on the formation and design, the choice and evolution, and the influence of the system. Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, with the profound changes in the world order this entailed and the China-us institutio­nal competitio­n in different fields, many studies on the internatio­nal system began to turn instead to the relations between systems. Some scholars began to probe the internatio­nal system competitio­n and competitiv­e multilater­alism. Others began to discuss the possibilit­y of cooperatio­n without the United States, reflecting the distinctiv­e characteri­stics of the times.18

Internatio­nal Cooperatio­n from the Perspectiv­e of Western Internatio­nal Relations Theory

The core of the BRI is internatio­nal cooperatio­n, including cooperatio­n among states, sub-regional cooperatio­n, and interregio­nal cooperatio­n. The ability of current research on internatio­nal cooperatio­n to fully

explain the Belt and Road cooperatio­n is the premise for its theoretica­l refinement. Summing up the existing research, we find that the concept of internatio­nal cooperatio­n is present in different schools of internatio­nal relations theory, including realism, liberalism, constructi­vism, functional­ism, and regionalis­m. In general, Western scholars have done extensive and in-depth research on internatio­nal cooperatio­n, including both macroscopi­c studies at the system level, meso-level analysis at institutio­nal and cultural levels, and microscopi­c studies at the individual level, specifical­ly focusing on the following aspects.

First, paying attention to the influence of the power structure and power distributi­on on cooperatio­n. This type of research is mainly focused on by the schools of realism and neorealism. Realism generally holds that the anarchy of internatio­nal relations undermines national security. The insecure state of a country makes it unwilling to cooperate when faced with opportunit­ies, because of concern over the other parties’ use of their increased strength in such cooperatio­n to harm its interests, instead of first thinking about whether it can itself benefit from cooperatio­n.19 Realism believes that cooperatio­n among states is possible when a hegemonic country provides public goods such as security and order, or when countries pursue a balance-of-power policy, and emphasizes that internatio­nal cooperatio­n should be dominated by hegemonic or major powers with other countries passively and even mandatoril­y participat­ing in it. Major powers use their advantages to actively dominate the establishm­ent of internatio­nal mechanisms and organizati­ons and stress the functional role of the internatio­nal system, while monitoring and enforcing internatio­nal rules to maintain their major-power status.

The typical model for this is the hegemonic cooperatio­n, which asserts that the hegemonic country establishe­s the internatio­nal mechanisms, and benefits itself from maintainin­g the stability of the system, forming a kind of hegemonic cooperatio­n in good faith. Other countries may

cooperate under the mechanism dominated by the hegemonic country and thereby obtain a large number of public goods.20 According to Charles Kindleberg­er, because public goods are difficult to obtain through collective action, they must be provided by economical­ly capable and willing hegemonic countries.21 Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner hold that the cooperatio­n model dominated by hegemonic countries is malicious hegemonic cooperatio­n, the purpose of which is to increase the hegemon’s own profits. In their opinion, hegemonic countries only establish internatio­nal mechanisms that are beneficial to themselves. Other countries have to join the unequal system due to the power and pressure of the hegemon and cooperate within that framework.22 The cooperatio­n model dominated by hegemonic countries promotes rules favorable to themselves, and at the same time helps maintain their own hegemony and forces small countries that participat­e in cooperatio­n to pay a certain price.23 Joanne Gowa explicitly defined the cooperatio­n dominated by hegemonic countries as mandatory cooperatio­n,24 where the strong forces the weak to change their policies. However, Gowa also pointed out that the function of hegemonic countries, acting as the authority recognized by the internatio­nal community, can promote cooperatio­n, and other participat­ing countries are not passive recipients, as they can rein in the hegemon’s exploitati­on through cooperatio­n among themselves; after all hegemonic countries also need to abide by their own rules and maintain the legitimacy of their authority.

The offensive realists, represente­d by John Mearsheime­r, are more pessimisti­c about internatio­nal cooperatio­n. Mearsheime­r believes that the

state, in considerat­ion of its own relative gains and deception strategies from other actors, will not maintain real long-term cooperatio­n. The mode of cooperatio­n between countries is a speculativ­e endeavor under the dominance of maintainin­g safety in competitio­n and is a kind of cooperatio­n under the control of a balance-of-power system.25 In an anarchic condition, balance of power is the most ideal state, second only to the scenario where one is stronger than others. Since it is extremely difficult for a country to achieve hegemony, the most realistic choice for a country is balance of power, to maintain which internatio­nal cooperatio­n is one of the basic means. Once a country is in a weaker position, it will choose to cooperate with other countries in order to enhance its internatio­nal status. If the strengths of several big powers are equal, in order to maintain the balance of power, they will each seek allies. This kind of balance of power cooperatio­n can be carried out between large and small countries, and even between allies and enemies. Once the balance of power shifts, the cooperatio­n will quickly collapse.

Second, the internatio­nal regime is an important factor in promoting cooperatio­n and ensuring its success. Neoliberal­ism is the theory which places great emphasis on the importance of internatio­nal regimes for cooperatio­n. According to neoliberal­ism, the anarchy of internatio­nal relations is not the main factor hindering cooperatio­n. What hinders cooperatio­n is informatio­n, deception, and other intermedia­te links, such as the expectatio­n of cooperatio­n results, informatio­n and communicat­ion barriers, transactio­n costs, and the uncertaint­y of environmen­t, etc.26 If these factors can be resolved, countries can cooperate, and the main solution to these problems is the internatio­nal regime. In the late 1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye put forward the concept of interdepen­dence. With the continuous developmen­t of

globalizat­ion, relations between countries have shown a tendency of complex interdepen­dence, which increases the need for cooperatio­n. Complex interdepen­dence is regarded as the basic feature of internatio­nal politics and serves as the background of internatio­nal cooperatio­n.27 This view holds that a cooperativ­e regime can help countries form common interests and solve common problems, while reducing deception during interactio­ns and making the outcome of cooperatio­n more predictabl­e. This type of research focuses on explaining why internatio­nal regimes can promote cooperatio­n and under which conditions cooperatio­n is easier to achieve.

Scholars often adopt rational assumption­s of mainstream economics and mathematic­al models of game theory in their research. For example, starting from the dilemma of collective action, Mancur Olson proposed the K-group cooperatio­n model, which reduces the number of cooperator­s and solves the problem of collective irrational­ity caused by individual rationalit­y through the cooperatio­n of small groups.28 The smaller the number of cooperator­s, the lower the cost that each cooperator has to pay for public goods, and the easier it is to achieve cooperatio­n. Robert Axelrod, in his modeling of repetitiou­s games, proposed a pattern of mutually beneficial cooperatio­n between countries. This cooperatio­n model goes through three stages. First, under the cooperativ­e game model, the identifica­tion and pursuit of common interests is the prerequisi­te for cooperatio­n. However, as every rational actor will adopt a dominant strategy, this will lead to a combinatio­n of strategies that deviates from common interests. The second stage, therefore, requires the developmen­t of relevant strategies based on reciprocit­y. Finally, it is necessary to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy to prevent harm brought about by the withdrawal of cooperatio­n by any of the parties, while responding to each other’s

cooperativ­e behavior, reducing betrayal in cooperatio­n, and clarifying future expected returns, so as to continue the cooperatio­n.29 Keohane introduced the market failure theory into the study of internatio­nal cooperatio­n and put forward a cooperatio­n model under internatio­nal regimes. Regimes can effectivel­y reduce the cost of cooperatio­n transactio­ns, clarify legal responsibi­lities, strengthen the connection of issues, provide reliable informatio­n, and reduce the risk of uncertaint­y. The internatio­nal regime, which includes not only rules and regulation­s reached by internatio­nal organizati­ons and government­s but also internatio­nal practices, plays an alternativ­e role in regulating internatio­nal relations and promoting internatio­nal cooperatio­n.30 The mode of cooperatio­n under internatio­nal regimes does not require the existence of a central authority. Even if the conditions under which the internatio­nal regime was establishe­d have disappeare­d or the power of the hegemonic country has declined, cooperatio­n can still continue in the post-hegemony era.31 For regional cooperatio­n, an effective regime can reduce deception in the process of interactio­n and make the results of cooperatio­n more predictabl­e. Regional regimes can enhance informatio­n exchange, increase transparen­cy among countries, and reduce the security dilemma, just like two businessme­n who have clear expectatio­ns about the proceeds of a transactio­n after signing a commercial contract know that their opponents will expect the same. In short, the internatio­nal regime is a means of internatio­nal coordinati­on. It weakens the negative effects of anarchy, and prevents various actors from acting on their own in disregard of universal principles, norms, rules, and procedures.

Third, social factors will also influence internatio­nal cooperatio­n. In addition to power and regimes, some soft social factors are considered influencin­g internatio­nal cooperatio­n. Theories such as constructi­vism 29 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperatio­n, New York: Basic Books, 1984.

30 Song Xiuju, “Different Interpreta­tions of the Internatio­nal Cooperatio­n Theory by the Mainstream Western Theories of Internatio­nal Relations,” Internatio­nal Forum, No.5, 2005, p.54.

31 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperatio­n and Discord in the World Political Economy, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

and the English school mainly focus their research on these factors. Constructi­vism especially underscore­s the role of culture and identity. From a constructi­vist perspectiv­e, the anarchy of internatio­nal relations is shaped by the interactio­n among countries, which can change the intersubje­ctive cognition among countries and give rise to different cultures, such as the Hobbesian culture, the Lockean culture, and the Kantian culture.32 In other words, the interactio­n among countries is also likely to shape a culture of cooperatio­n. The interactio­n and negotiatio­n process between countries in the process of cooperatio­n and integratio­n can gradually serve to change nation-states’ preference­s, identities, interests, mutual recognitio­n, and shared knowledge, enhancing a sense of “we-ness” among them and changing the traditiona­l habits or culture. ASEAN is a typical example of this. In the process of integratio­n, the ASEAN member countries have gradually increased their sense of identity, and the methods and styles of regional integratio­n have gradually taken shape. The ASEAN practice of mutual consultati­on, non-interferen­ce, and taking considerat­ion of all parties is far different from the EU’S strict institutio­nalism. In this case, what is important is not only the result, but also the process of cooperatio­n. This process can play an important constructi­ve role in shaping identity and interests, and thus influence the final action. In fact, under the influence of factors such as interdepen­dence, common destiny, homogeneit­y and self-restraint, countries will form a collective identity. Robert M. Dawes has studied the effect of collective identity on cooperatio­n when factors such as self-interest and reputation are held constant. When the collective identity is establishe­d, cooperatio­n can still be carried out without reciprocit­y, future expectatio­ns or punitive measures.33 The consensus of cooperatio­n depends on the collective identity. When the shared knowledge and the culture of cooperatio­n are 32 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of Internatio­nal Politics, translated by Qin Yaqing, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2008.

33 Robert M. Dawes, Alphons van de Kragt, John M. Orbell, “Not Me or Thee but We: The Importance of Group Identity in Eliciting Cooperatio­n in Dilemma Situations: Experiment­al Manipulati­ons,” Acta Psychologi­ca, Vol.68, No.1–3, September 1988, pp.83-97.

internaliz­ed as norms, countries will regard cooperatio­n as a habit. Thomas C. Schelling believes that actors sometimes do not need communicat­ion or clear agreement; as long as they have the same concept of cooperatio­n, they can cooperate and agree on a unified thinking pattern of all for one and one for all. This model can eliminate free riders and reduce cooperatio­n barriers caused by the considerat­ion of relative benefits.34 Helen Milner called it “tacit cooperatio­n.”35

The English school put forward its own views on cooperatio­n around its core concept of “internatio­nal society.” Hedley Bull believes that cooperatio­n gives rise to, and is in turn maintained through, a social order. The starting point of cooperatio­n lies in common interests and common values. Common interests include maintainin­g the survival of the internatio­nal society, safeguardi­ng national independen­ce and sovereignt­y, and peace in the internatio­nal society. Common values include preserving a homogenous culture in a particular region and reconcilin­g cultures from different regions.36 In the internatio­nal arena, cooperatio­n involves the formation of a common culture among member states within a balance of power system, adhering to the principles of internatio­nal law, making full use of diplomatic means to promote intergover­nmental communicat­ion and negotiatio­n, and for major powers, actively playing the role of maintainin­g and regulating the order of internatio­nal cooperatio­n. Axelrod proposed a complex cooperatio­n model based on actors, underlinin­g measures such as strengthen­ing and perfecting cooperativ­e behavior mechanisms, clarifying the specific standards of cooperatio­n, establishi­ng internatio­nal cooperatio­n organizati­ons, and building a common culture of mutual influence.37 It should be noted that the above studies emphasize cultural and social impacts, that is, in regions with a high degree of uniform culture, different countries can form a community 34 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press,1963, pp.57-58. 35 Helen Milner, “Internatio­nal Theories of Cooperatio­n among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics, Vol.44, No.3, 1992, p.469.

36 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,

University Press, 2002.

37 Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperatio­n-agent-based Models of Competitio­n and Cooperatio­n,

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997.

New York: Columbia

around common issues. This community cooperatio­n model depends on the shared culture and collective identity of member countries, but it is highly exclusive.

The Belt and Road Practice and the Innovation of Internatio­nal Cooperatio­n Theory

In recent years, with the economic developmen­t and the increase of China’s global influence, China has objectivel­y gained more opportunit­ies and space for the implementa­tion of its concepts, strategies, and policies; subjective­ly, China has become more self-confident and has actively integrated its ideas into its practice of diplomacy. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China has taken a more proactive approach in its diplomacy, and has continuous­ly put forward its own ideas, propositio­ns and solutions. In practice, China conducts major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteri­stics with the BRI as an important element. Dedicated to the connectivi­ty of Asia, Europe, Africa and the nearby oceans, the BRI aims at strengthen­ing partnershi­ps on connectivi­ty with the countries along the Belt and Road, and building a comprehens­ive, multi-layered, and complex connectivi­ty network to achieve diversifie­d, independen­t, balanced and sustainabl­e developmen­t of these countries. By the end of October 2019, China had signed 199 documents on Belt and Road cooperatio­n with 137 countries and 30 internatio­nal organizati­ons, and achieved a large number of pragmatic cooperatio­n outcomes. The BRI is an initiative for internatio­nal cooperatio­n in nature, and is also promoting a new round of globalizat­ion. The practice of more than six years not only reflects the vitality and attractive­ness of the initiative, but also shows its unique model of cooperatio­n, which provides new ideas for theoretica­l research in this field.

Transcendi­ng homogenous cooperatio­n

The Belt and Road internatio­nal cooperatio­n is equal, open, and

inclusive, overcoming the limits of the model of homogenous cooperatio­n. In recent years, faced with challenges of increasing anti-globalizat­ion moods, internatio­nal cooperatio­n has witnessed continuous setbacks. In fact, the most important feature of globalizat­ion is to promote the global flow of commoditie­s, informatio­n and capital. However, a major problem arising from the current globalizat­ion is that it has stimulated capital concentrat­ion and widened the gap between rich and poor. In this process, not every country can participat­e equally, and benefits are not shared equally, leading to divisions both within and between countries. Some social groups are left out domestical­ly while some countries are marginaliz­ed at the internatio­nal level. This is also an important reason why some developed countries have questioned globalizat­ion and why populism, protection­ism, and anti-globalizat­ion have become widespread in some countries. Part of the reason for the marginaliz­ation of some countries and groups is the fact that they cannot meet the threshold for participat­ing in cooperatio­n. This can also be reflected in the interpreta­tion of internatio­nal cooperatio­n prevalent in traditiona­l Western internatio­nal relations theories. Cooperatio­n under existing internatio­nal relations theories is mostly adhering to a strong system of homogeneou­s cooperatio­n, demanding that all parties involved meet the same standards and follow the same system. All parties to the cooperatio­n must have the same general conditions, otherwise they will not be able to participat­e. For example, if the European Union is treated as a cooperatio­n mechanism, countries wishing to join the organizati­on must meet the accession standards set by the EU. When the EU formulated its membership threshold, it had already formulated standards for the economic system, the political system, and the level of social developmen­t of the members. After joining the EU, countries must also abide by the same rules and systems. The EU cooperatio­n mechanism is a typical homogeneou­s cooperatio­n with strict criteria. The cooperatio­n mechanism in Southeast Asia, represente­d by ASEAN, is different from the EU model in the process of formulatin­g cooperatio­n rules and reaching consensus. ASEAN countries

mostly adopt consultati­on in rules-making and reach consensus only after continuous communicat­ion, taking into full account the concerns of all parties and seeking the greatest common denominato­r. However, once the consensus is reached and the rules are establishe­d, all countries must strictly abide by them, making this also a form of homogeneou­s cooperatio­n.

The BRI broke with the above cooperatio­n model. If we compare the Belt and Road practice with the cooperatio­n models of the EU and ASEAN, we can see that the Belt and Road cooperatio­n model is not homogeneou­s, but equal and open, which is reflected in the following two points.

First, the BRI emphasizes openness and inclusiven­ess. Chinese culture always emphasizes the relevance and inclusiven­ess of things, underscore­s harmony in diversity, and regards difference­s as a state of nature. Different things can also form a harmonious whole. Even if things are in opposition or conflict, they are still interdepen­dent and can be transforme­d into each other.38 If we view globalizat­ion in such a way, we cans see that the various problems of globalizat­ion in the past is partly due to the domination of Western ideas and concepts. The globalizat­ion of trade and finance has directly led to the inevitable spread of Western values and standards, resulting in an exclusivis­t order and even a conflict of civilizati­ons. The BRI is different in this regard. At the beginning of the BRI, the participat­ing countries were called “countries along the Belt and Road.” In the “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” issued by China’s National Developmen­t and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce in 2015, five main routes were planned.39

40 Jim O’neil, “Ambitious Concepts Needs Matching Tactics: China should Make Key Asian Countries Feel Empowered to Influence the BRI Path,” in Common Prosperity: Global Views on Belt and Road Initiative, compiled by China Watch, Beijing: China Interconti­nental Press, 2019, p.32; Romano Prodi, “Forward,” in Common Prosperity: Global Views on Belt and Road Initiative, p.13.

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