Changes and Prospects of US Policy toward Southeast Asia

Driven by the Asia-pacific rebalancing and the Indo-pacific strategy, the gravity of US global strategy has shifted from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-pacific region, with Southeast Asia gaining marked prominence in the framework. While the US continues to put greater weight on the region in its Indo-pacific strategy, there are various factors that constrain it from achieving its objectives.

Southeast Asia has always been an important part of US geopolitical strategy and has served as a bridgehead in forging its Asia-pacific strategy. When Donald Trump first came to power, he did not have an overall Asia-pacific strategy or a specified Southeast Asia policy, and was therefore criticized by US strategic circles. After nearly two years of adjustments, the Trump administration finally decided to replace its “Asiapacific” strategy with the “Indo-pacific” strategy in order to strengthen its Southeast Asia policy. A systematic review of the recent changes in the United States’ policy toward Southeast Asia helps us understand the implementation of its Indo-pacific strategy and the future development of its Southeast Asia policy.

The Turn-around in US Southeast Asia Policy

In the past two years, the Trump administration, gradually realizing the importance of Southeast Asia in its Indo-pacific strategy, has taken various measures to increase investment in the region, reversing its policies in four major aspects.

From focusing on the bilateral to stressing both bilateral and multilateral relations

Soon after taking office, Trump changed the multilateral Asia policy of

the Obama administration and announced in a highly-publicized manner the US withdrawal from the Trans-pacific Partnership (TPP). This was the first time that the United States manifested a strong disdain toward multilateral trade agreements, principles and legal orders, causing discontent among Singapore, Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries. Trump did not give much consideration to the East Asia Summit which carries great symbolism as a forum for the “Asia-pacific”. After his visit to the Philippines in November 2017, he did not attend the East Asia Summit, which was held soon after.

Since the commencement of its Indo-pacific strategy, the Trump administration, while emphasizing the importance of its bilateral relations with Southeast Asian countries, has been more inclined to utilize regional multilateral mechanisms on a rather selective basis. The administration’s first National Defense Strategy released in January 2018 articulated the geographical implications and strategic objectives of the Indo-pacific concept. In June 2019, the US Department of Defense released Indo-pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region, considered as the official launch and implementation of the US Indopacific strategy.1 The report stated that Southeast Asia is a region where US allies and partners are concentrated, and that the US will strengthen mutual security cooperation with the Philippines and Thailand, reinforce its partnership with Singapore, and enhance security relations with Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Laos and Cambodia. Senior US officials including Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, then Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan, and National Security Advisor Robert O’brien, visited Southeast Asia one after another to promote the Indo-pacific strategy on occasions such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shangri-la Dialogue. 1 In April 2018, Alex N. Wong, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the US Department of State, while interpreting the Indo-pacific strategy, described the first year of the Trump administration as a year of introducing the strategic concept, and the following three years as a period of formulating and implementing the strategy. See Qiu Chaobing, “Indo-pacific Strategy of the Trump Administration and its Impact on China’s Regional Security,” Journal of American Studies, No.5, 2019.

Despite the raging COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the United States has continued its diplomatic activities in Southeast Asia. In April, the US initiated an extraordinary meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers to discuss cooperation in the fight against the coronavirus, in an effort to restore ASEAN countries’ confidence in cooperation with the US. In July, Pompeo made a statement denying China’s legitimate rights and interests in the South China Sea while one-sidedly endorsing the claims by Vietnam and the Philippines, in an effort to strengthen its relations with ASEAN and those member countries involved in South China Sea disputes. In August, Pompeo had phone calls with the foreign ministers of Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei successively, asking them to support the US position on the South China Sea issue. The US and ASEAN held online high-level consultations regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. David Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, took this opportunity to attack China on the South China Sea issue and lobby ASEAN countries to join the US in its sanctions against China.

At the same time, the United States has also attempted to initiate a new multilateral mechanism outside the East Asia Summit. It proposed to upgrade the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with Japan, India and Australia from the previous departmental level to the ministerial level. In September 2019, the QUAD foreign ministers held their first dialogue. In March 2020, in the name of responding to the coronavirus pandemic, the US convened a meeting with the vice foreign ministers of Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India and Vietnam. Since then, this sevencountry meeting takes place on a monthly basis and has become more institutionalized not only to discuss the development of the pandemic but also issues such as supply chain cooperation and economic recovery plans. The vice foreign ministerial dialogue of the seven countries seems to be an attempt to create an expanded version of the QUAD, in which a new strategic framework can be built to include more members from Northeast and Southeast Asia. In August, US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun announced that the four QUAD countries will meet in Delhi, India in

autumn 2020, and at that meeting South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand would be invited to join the QUAD Plus. The United States is engaged in an attempt to formalize closer defense ties with countries in the Indopacific region, creating a mechanism similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with an aim to counter “potential threats” from China.2

From prioritizing security to pursuing both political and economic interests

Soon after Trump came to power, the United States began to reset trade arrangements with Asia-pacific countries, especially with its major trading partners. The US tariff “stick” has forced Japan, South Korea and other countries to make concessions. Consisting mostly of small and medium-sized nations, Southeast Asia has received some preferential trading treatments from China, Japan, South Korea and European countries, and countries in the region are also major recipients of aid from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Therefore “America First” is perceived in the region as a policy of refusing to make any contribution. In August 2018, the US government, based on an eligibility review for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), attempted to cancel “tax exemption” for Thailand and Indonesia, and subject Southeast Asian countries to higher tariffs. This caused a sharp decline in US economic influence in the region.

During this period, the United States strengthened its security presence in Southeast Asia by provoking regional tensions and increasing the security dependence of regional countries on the US, and thereby bringing these countries into its strategic orbit. The US played up the “China threat,” while more frequently conducting the so-called “freedom of navigation operations,” strengthening combat exercises, and intensifying intervention in the South China Sea. Throughout the period of the Obama administration, the US

carried out four “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea, but the Trump administration has increased the frequency to two every three month. In February 2019, the US and the ten ASEAN countries held their first joint maritime exercise at the naval base in eastern Thailand to “search, verify and legally prosecute” suspicious boats. USCGC Berthoff and USCGC Stratton of the US Coast Guard sailed into the South China Sea to enhance the fishery law enforcement capacity of countries surrounding the South China Sea, which was characterized by the Voice of America as a new US instrument and heralded multi-level US involvement in the South China Sea. The US also increased its arms sales to Southeast Asia. In May 2019, it announced that it was selling 34 Scaneagle drones to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam; and in August, it sold 60 Stryker armored vehicles to Thailand. By doing so, the US elevated the level of military and security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, strengthened its military presence in the region, and built the Southeast Asian fulcrum of its Indopacific strategy.

Since the end of 2018, the US policy toward Southeast Asia has made an apparent shift toward combining political and economic initiatives. Apart from security issues, it has also maintained the economic partnership with ASEAN, which has been operating under a comprehensive economic cooperation framework. In the past two years, US trade relations with Southeast Asia have improved against a background of a generally gloomy global trend. In 2018, the US became the top export market for Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. According to data from the US Department of Commerce, the share of US garment imports from Vietnam rose from 16 percent to nearly 21 percent.3 In addition, the Trump administration concluded a new investment deal with Southeast Asian countries based on the US-ASEAN Connect initiative in the Obama era. In November 2018, the US and ASEAN leaders announced the Statement on Cybersecurity Cooperation to promote US investment in digital infrastructure in the 3 Malcolm Cook, “Southeast Asia’s Growing US Market,” September 4, 2019, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/ media/commentaries/southeast-asias-growing-us-market-by-malcolm-cook.

region. The US has also proposed an initiative of smart city partnerships with ASEAN countries, and signed a memorandum of understanding with Singapore for cooperation on smart city development.

To promote trade and investment, the Trump administration established a new overseas financial coordination agency to mobilize state and societal resources at different levels and support the private sector’s business expansion in the Indo-pacific.4 In October 2018, the United States established the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) by incorporating the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Development Credit Administration (DCA) and the Small Business Administration at the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The new DFC’S financing capacity for international development rose from US$29.5 billion to US$60 billion, and it is allowed to invest in local currencies in regions where investment in US dollars is risky. This is the most comprehensive overhaul of US policy closely related to its goals in foreign aid, economic development and national security, since the establishment of the OPIC in 1971 and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004, and the launch of the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003. It is therefore considered the largest adjustment of US commercial loans to developing countries in 50 years. In November of the same year, the OPIC signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Australia’s Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (Efic), establishing a trilateral partnership for infrastructure investment in order to promote cooperation in the Indo-pacific, and work on national priority infrastructure projects of recipient countries. The partnership agreement enables the three countries to streamline the process of joint investment in energy, transportation, tourism and infrastructure.

The US government has established platforms to facilitate US business in Southeast Asia. In July 2018, the American Chamber of Commerce hosted 4 Cai Zucheng, “The Implementation and Impacts of the Trump Administration’s Indo-pacific Strategy in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Strategy and Decision-making, No.5, 2019, pp.74-86.

the Indo-pacific Business Forum, discussing policies to promote private investment in the Indo-pacific. A good number of US senior officials and principal business leaders attended the forum, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, Energy Secretary Rick Perry, then Administrator of the USAID Mark Green, then President and CEO of the OPIC Ray Washburne, and then Acting Chairman and President of the Export-import Bank Jeffrey Gerrish. Green said that the USAID would play a catalytic role in development by prioritizing economic stimulus policy reforms of host countries and removing obstacles to private investment.

Under the guidance of the US government, American internet companies have accelerated their investment and acquisitions in Southeast Asia, and expanded mobile payment and online banking businesses. In August 2019, Facebook’s instant messaging software Whatsapp negotiated with Indonesian travel service provider Go-jek, mobile payment providers DANA and OVO, and Indonesian state-owned Bank Mandiri to operate in the region with Indonesian digital wallets. In June 2020, Google established a data center on Google cloud platform in Jakarta. In July, Google and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings discussed investing US$500 million to $1 billion in Southeast Asian e-commerce platform Tokopedia to expand its sales network. Internet companies such as Microsoft and Amazon are also looking for partners in the region, hoping to use local brands to expand the “super APP” mobile internet business model.5

From a maritime-based approach to parallel advance of land and sea agendas

The Trump administration’s Southeast Asia policy used to revolve around the oceans in the region, focusing on maritime ASEAN countries. The US Asia strategy, with “Indo-pacific” replacing “Asia-pacific,” also emphasizes the importance of maritime Asia for US geostrategy, suggesting maritime Asia as a hedge against continental Asia. Southeast Asia is at 5 “Gold Rush in Southeast Asia: Google and Temasek Plans US$1 Billion Investment in Tokopedia,” Tencent, July 4, 2020, https://tech.qq.com/a/20200704/003681.htm.

the junction of the oceans and the continent, a crucial position in the US strategic compass. In the promotion of its Indo-pacific strategy in Southeast Asia, the US is working harder on countries such as Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand to pull the ASEAN countries closer to the US strategy.

To exert its influence on continental Asia, the US has been playing up the water resources issue in order to provoke disputes between China and other Mekong River countries on the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) platform. Pompeo proposed, at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2018, to strengthen LMI cooperation initiatives with Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar. When a saddle dam of the Xe Pian-xe Namnoy hydropower project, built by a South Korean company, collapsed in southeastern Laos in the same month, US officials groundlessly accused China of its operations in the upper Mekong causing negative impact. In August 2019, at the 12th LMI Ministerial Meeting, Pompeo made unjustified accusations about China building dams and dredging the course of rivers in the upper Mekong River. At the Special US-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on COVID-19 in April 2020, Pompeo claimed that “Beijing’s upstream dam operations have unilaterally altered flows of the Mekong … with catastrophic results during the most recent dry season for the 60 million people who depend on the river for food, energy, and transportation.”6 In September, the US upgraded the LMI to the Us-mekong Partnership and held its first ministerial meeting to blast China on water issues.

The US has strengthened its health cooperation with the Mekong countries. In 2019, the USAID and the public health authorities of Thailand established a regional public health laboratory network to share information and resources on new infectious diseases in Southeast Asia. The US also organizes disease prevention and control training programs for the Mekong countries, introducing measures to protect against the threat of new forms

of influenza. After the outbreak of COVID-19, the US has stepped up its diplomacy by announcing USAID assistance of US$2 million, $2.7 million, and $18.5 million to Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar respectively, to respond to the pandemic.7

From relying on single policy tool to exploiting diverse instruments

2018, the US government and Congress have intensively promulgated laws related to maritime security, defense cooperation, trade relations, and young leaders initiatives. Trump signed three major bills into law. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 reauthorizes for five years the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, and rebrands it the Indopacific Maritime Security Initiative, making Southeast Asia a priority region for US aid and training. The NDAA also requests the Defense Secretary to submit a five-year plan for the Indo-pacific Stability Initiative (IPSI) to the Congress as soon as possible to strengthen US military capabilities in the region. The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act attempts to reform US development finance capabilities, encourage the private sector to invest in overseas infrastructure projects, and in particular facilitate marketbased cooperation with less-developed countries to spur inclusive economic growth and increase US investment in Southeast Asian countries. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act outlines a new counter-terrorism partnership program in Southeast Asia and more joint military exercises in the South China Sea, which will increase maritime domain awareness in the region, promote economic partnerships with regional countries, and enlarge energy infrastructure investment in accordance with the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (2016-2025).

The US Congress has accelerated the legislative process concerning Southeast Asia. In order to express its dissatisfaction with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s re-election, the House of Representatives passed the Cambodia Democracy Act twice in 2018 and 2019, which would impose sanctions on individuals in power who “undermined Cambodian democracy,” including restricting visas and freezing their properties in the United States.8 In September 2019, the House of Representatives passed the Southeast Asia Strategy Act to strengthen strategic engagement with Southeast Asia in a comprehensive and systematic manner, including integrating the ongoing and 8 “H.R.5754 - Cambodia Democracy Act of 2018,” https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/housebill/5754; “H.R.526 - Cambodia Democracy Act of 2019,” https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/ house-bill/526.

planned initiatives in the region to promote human rights and democracy, and enhance the rule of law.9 In June 2020, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution, recognizing the importance of the partnership between US and Southeast Asian youth leaders to advance the Indo-pacific strategy, and reiterating the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI) as a platform for promoting US soft power and good governance in Southeast Asia.10 An additional dozen resolutions and bills are waiting to go through the legislative process in the House of Representatives. These include the South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2019 (H.R.3508), a resolution “expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to recognize the resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees” (H.res.952), a resolution on advancing Us-vietnam partnership (H.res.1018), a resolution “recognizing the historical significance … of the Vietnamese people who fled their wartorn country … in search of freedom and democracy” (H.res.941), and the Cambodia Trade Act of 2019 (H.R.1376). The resolutions and bills under legislative process in the Senate include a resolution on promoting Usvietnam partnership (S.res.607), a resolution on promoting US-ASEAN partnership (S.res.406), and the South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2019 (S.1634).

Second, the US has strengthened targeted assistance. After Trump took office, the White House announced “America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again,” which slashed foreign assistance budgets while canceling or merging some accounts for foreign aid. On the insistence of the Congress, the assistance budget was maintained at the original level, but the government now enjoys greater discretion in the distribution of spending. To move forward with the Indo-pacific strategy, the Trump administration has reduced its assistance for the Middle East and Central America in order to refocus on Southeast Asia.

In terms of military assistance, in August 2018, Pompeo announced 9 “H.R.1632

10 “S.res.392,” https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-resolution/392. - Southeast Asia Strategy Act,” https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/1632.

at the ASEAN Regional Forum that the US would provide an additional assistance of nearly US$300 million for the Indo-pacific region. This program covers Southeast Asia and South Asia, of which US$290 million will be spent through the Foreign Military Financing program to strengthen maritime security, humanitarian aid, disaster prevention and peacekeeping capacity building, and US$8.5 million for funding international narcotics and law enforcement affairs. In December of the same year, Trump signed the Asian Reassurance Initiative Act and pledged to make available US$7.5 billion in total within 5 years ($1.5 billion per year) to promote military, diplomatic and economic activities in the Indo-pacific region, and to enhance security partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.11

In terms of human rights promotion assistance, the Asian Reassurance Initiative Act requests US embassies and consulates in the Indo-pacific to strengthen the promotion of human rights. The Department of State must submit a report within 90 days on the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance in Southeast Asia. From 2019 to 2023, an annual budget of US$210 million is made available to promote democracy in the Indo-pacific region through the Democracy Fund and the National Endowment for Democracy, making full use of universities, communities and multilateral mechanisms to strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency and accountability. In addition, funds will be appropriated to support Indo-pacific young leaders initiatives, including YSEALI and other people-to people exchange programs.12

In terms of technical assistance, in July 2018, Pompeo launched the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP) for the region, with an initial investment of US$25 million to improve digital connectivity in partner countries and expand export opportunities of US technology. During Pence’s visit to Singapore, the two countries concluded a deal on cybersecurity technical assistance, agreeing to employ US technology to 11 “S.2736 - Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018,” September 25, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/ bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2736.

12 Ibid.

enhance the cybersecurity of ASEAN states. In February 2019, the US Trade and Development Agency provided funding and technical assistance to the Department of Information and Communications Technology of the Philippines to support its national broadband network and improve its information infrastructure.

Third, the US has tried to manipulate non-governmental organizations. Through think tanks and functional NGOS, the US has selectively disseminated information to influence local public opinion in the interest of its diplomacy in Southeast Asia. The US government has funded “shadow think tanks” to publish so-called “professional reports” to play up the Mekong water resources issue and carry forward its Mekong strategy.13 The Sustainable Infrastructure Partnership (SIP), managed by the international development non-profit organization Pact under the LMI, operates activities in relation to water resources, energy and food issues in lower Mekong countries, and funded the Eyes on Earth and the Global Environmental Satellite Applications for a research report on the Mekong River. In April 2020, on the occasion of Pompeo’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum, the report, “Monitoring the Quantity of Water Flowing Through the Upper Mekong Basin under Natural (Unimpeded) Conditions,” was released, concluding that, based on scientific data, dams on the upper Mekong have severely affected water volume and environment in the lower Mekong basin. The report was published on the website of the Lmi-supported Mekong Water Data Initiative (MWDI) and translated into five languages. Local reporters from The New York Times and the Voice of America also quoted “professional comments” from think tanks such as the Stimson Center and the Council on Foreign Relations, accusing China of building dams on the upper Mekong. These reports resonated with the local media and amplified the effect of public opinion. 13 “Shadow think tanks” are established by the government or receive government funding, which advocate government policies and have clear political preferences, though claiming to be non-political and neutral. See Matthew P. Funaiole, “An Upswell of Solidarity: China’s Mekong Dams Face Online Backlash,” April 24, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/upswell-solidarity-chinas-mekong-dams-faceonline-backlash.

The US government has also been hyping up maritime issues through the Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) conceived of and designed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The AMTI specializes in the study of Asian maritime security issues, particularly of the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Based on high-definition satellite images of islands, reefs, ports and ships from various sources, the AMTI analyzes the images in the context of international and regional situation and writes academic reports. It draws on funds from the Korea Chair, the Japan Chair and the Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy at CSIS, as well as the government and corporate contributions from Japan and the Philippines. When the Trump administration hyped the issue of militarization of islands and reefs in the South China Sea, the AMTI wasted no time in bombarding the media with the US viewpoints and served as a public opinion manipulator. The AMTI is actually the “shadow tool” of the US government that speaks for US official positions on related issues.14

Reasons for Adjustment of US Southeast Asia Policy

Given the rising importance of ASEAN in the future international outlook, the United States believes that it is necessary to bring it into play in the Indopacific strategy. As China-us rivalry intensifies, the US is working to offset China’s recent growing influence in the region.

Rising importance of ASEAN in the US Indo-pacific strategy

Southeast Asia has long been the strategic focus of the US in the Asiapacific region, and second only to its alliance with Japan and Australia. By replacing the Asia-pacific strategy with the Indo-pacific strategy, the Trump administration captures the need for placing more importance on Southeast Asia. Re-conceptualizing its relationship with countries in the region both in philosophy and in terms of the substance of cooperation, the US has made

changes in its promotion strategies. According to the US definition of the Indo-pacific, ASEAN is no longer at the center of Asia-pacific integration, but rather in the eye of storm of the Indo-pacific strategy. In June 2019, Shanahan stressed at the Shangri-la Dialogue that “the Indo-pacific is our priority theater. We are where we belong. We are investing in the region.”15

The US Indo-pacific Strategy Report states that the Asia-pacific and the Indian Ocean regions are closely connected, and that the ASEAN countries are in the node position and serve as the outposts for sea powers to head inland on the continent. The US defines ASEAN based on N. J. Spykman’s “rimland theory” and re-examines the geopolitical implications of the assumption that “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia.”16 Southeast Asia is located on important international maritime transit lanes, with fine ports and military bases possessing prime development potential. US control of the seas in Southeast Asia will pose a threat to the Asian continent, blocking communication passages between heartland and maritime countries. After careful design, the Trump administration plans to use Southeast Asia as a bridgehead to push its Indo-pacific strategy and as the juncture to connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans as well as the seas and the continent.

Apart from the prominence of its strategic location, the economic size and influence of ASEAN countries is also growing. Southeast Asia has a population of 650 million in total and is endowed with a wealth of natural resources. Since the 1990s, its economy has been developing rapidly to become an emerging industrialized region. The region has been playing an important role as the world’s economic gravity moves to East Asia and has become one of the important engines for global economic growth. In 2019, the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the ten ASEAN countries was close to US$3 trillion, and their overall economic scale has overtaken that of the United Kingdom and France. With the rise of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the ASEAN countries, by exploiting the late-comer advantage, 15 Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Shangri-la: Shanahan Stresses Continued U.S. Role in Indo-pacific,” June 1, 2019, https://news.usni.org/2019/06/01/shangri-la-shanahan-stresses-continued-u-s-role-in-indo-pacific. 16 N. J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, New York: Harcourt Brace Co., 1944, p.43.

will continue to upgrade their status in the world economic outlook. If the Trump administration does not increase its trade and investment input in Southeast Asia, US economic influence in the region will be weakened, which will significantly impede its overall strategic advancement.

At the same time, the collective identity of Southeast Asian countries has grown stronger as ASEAN has become a representative of regionalism. Being an advocate and a leader of regional cooperation, ASEAN provides a platform of consultation and consensus-building among member states in the process of regional integration, and has become an important force in the international strategic structure. ASEAN centrality demonstrates the growing ASEAN diplomatic and strategic independence, and therefore it has become a pressing need for the United States to make systematic adjustments to its Southeast Asia policy to win support for its Indo-pacific strategy, or at least prevent any resistance to the strategy.

Competing with China for influence in Southeast Asia

The recent tendency shows that in the changing influences of China and the United States in Southeast Asia, as one rises the other falls. The US is concerned that the growing Chinese influence undermines its own, and therefore it is pushing back.

According to the “State of Southeast Asia: 2019” survey conducted by the ISEAS-YUSOF Ishak Institute of Singapore, 73 percent of the respondents hold the view that China has the greatest economic influence in the region and its overall influence exceeds that of the United States. Close to half of the respondents think that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will bring ASEAN member states closer into China’s orbit. Nearly six out of ten respondents think US power and influence on the global stage has deteriorated compared to that of the previous year, and one third of the respondents have little or no confidence in the US credibility as a strategic partner and provider of regional security. In June 2020, a CSIS survey shows that China is seen as holding slightly more political power and influence than the US in Southeast Asia today and considerably more power relative to the United States in 10

years. In terms of economic power and influence, the region views China as much more influential than the US today, and this gap is expected to grow in the next 10 years.17

To change the dynamics of influence in Southeast Asia, the US has employed various measures to deter the ASEAN countries and denounce China in an attempt to whittle away and push back Chinese influence. Secretary of State Pompeo has continuously pressured Southeast Asian countries through bilateral and multilateral channels to take sides between the US and China. Before the ASEAN summit in June 2019, the US openly requested Southeast Asian countries to make the “right choice,” as Randall Schriver, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-pacific Security Affairs, told Southeast Asian countries at the 35th anniversary gala of the US-ASEAN Business Council to choose independent, free, fair and open partnerships between the US and China.18 Instead, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore suggested at the Shangri-la Dialogue that Southeast Asian countries should not be forced to take sides.19 Meanwhile, the US is also cozying up to Southeast Asian countries. Then Acting Defense Secretary Shanahan emphasized the military, financial and technological superiority of the US as an opportunity for countries in the region. “The United States is rapidly developing the technologies critical to deterring and defeating the threats of the future,” he said, “Partners who pursue interoperability with us as part of a regional security network will be able to access much of these technologies and benefit from the compounding effects of US investments and progress.”20

The US has launched a public opinion offensive against China in Southeast Asia and made every effort to discredit it. In July 2020, Pompeo called China’s claims of rights and interests in the South China Sea illegitimate by twisting the facts of the South China Sea issue and misinterpreting international laws such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. US foreign missions in Southeast Asian countries joined him in slandering China, while US diplomats in Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar spoke to local media and published articles making false charges against China on China-us trade relations, the COVID-19 pandemic, and China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries.

Personnel adjustments in the US government

At the time when Rex Tillerson was Secretary of State, the power of the Department of State was marginalized. Trump bypassed the Department, interfering in personnel appointments and giving presidential instructions on major foreign policy decisions such as the “Muslim Ban” executive order in 2017. With low morale in the department, many senior positions for Southeast Asian affairs were long vacant. Tillerson’s Asia policy was more “problem-driven,” focusing on the North Korean nuclear crisis and the South China Sea issue.

Since Pompeo came to office, the State Department has taken a firmer grip on utilizing the power in foreign affairs to push forward US Southeast Asia policies. Pompeo tends to be more “strategy-oriented,” and jumps in full speed ahead with Trump’s Indo-pacific strategy. In July 2018, in his remarks “America’s Indo-pacific Economic Vision” addressed to the Indopacific Business Forum hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce, Pompeo defined the Indo-pacific strategy in economic terms and proposed private investment initiatives in the region, including the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership, the Asia EDGE (Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy) initiative and the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network. In August of the same year, Pompeo visited Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia to promote the Indo-pacific strategy and accelerate

its implementation. His close relationship with Trump has helped to enhance the role of the State Department in the foreign policy decision-making process. With his experience as the head of the US intelligence service, Pompeo redesigned the architecture of the Department of State and lifted morale. The department has taken swift actions filling up vacancies of senior diplomatic positions in Southeast Asia. In July 2019, Rafik Mansour was appointed Chargé d’affaires in Singapore and Michael Desombre nominated as Ambassador to Thailand. In May 2020, George Sibley was appointed Chargé d’affaires in Myanmar.

Trends of US Southeast Asia Policy

The United States’ Southeast Asia policy serves its global strategy. Driven by the Asia-pacific rebalancing and the Indo-pacific strategy, the gravity of US global strategy has shifted from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-pacific region, with bipartisan consensus on the overall strategy and concerted efforts in the promotion of the new strategic framework. Southeast Asia has gained marked prominence in the US strategic framework. In the future, the US will work more in this region and make it the forefront of US regional strategy regardless of whether Biden comes to power or Trump is reelected.

The US will continue to invest in multilateral mechanisms in the region. First, it will engage itself more with regional economic mechanisms. When Biden takes office, he is likely to follow the policies of the Democratic Party on trade issues and join the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement. Second, the US will advance a regional security mechanism, expanding the membership of QUAD dialogue based on the vice foreign ministerial meeting of seven Indo-pacific countries. In doing so, the US will work to include major countries in the region in the Us-led multilateral security framework by choosing allies and selecting more partners for dialogue.

In the future, the US will also put more efforts in promoting democracy

in Southeast Asian countries. The Trump administration has increased pressure on the Philippines, Cambodia and Myanmar on human rights issues, but not yet made it the focal point in foreign policy. In the years to come, the US will continue to promote American democratic values in Southeast Asia. Under a Biden administration, investment in the promotion of democracy in the region will grow.

While the US continues to put greater weight on Southeast Asia in its Indo-pacific strategy, there are various factors that constrain it from achieving its objectives.

Reactions of Southeast Asian countries to US policies

Centrality is the keyword by which ASEAN defines its position in the regional security architecture and the regional order, and a talisman with which it plays its crucial role. For member states, ASEAN centrality is a necessary condition to protect the region from foreign interference. The unique role of ASEAN helps to safeguard the region and its members in interacting with countries outside the region. However, the US Indo-pacific strategy is an extension of “America First” in the region, which has, to some extent, weakened ASEAN centrality and its dominance in regional order arrangements. For this reason, the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-pacific and the US Indo-pacific strategy may remain divided on the question of who will dominate the regional order in the future. In addition, the US attempts to build a new multilateral security mechanism will inevitably arouse the vigilance of ASEAN countries, adding to their disputes regarding regional security arrangements. The above two contradictions limit the effectiveness of US Southeast Asia policy.

For many years, ASEAN has been striving to seek strategic autonomy, not allowing itself to be swayed by the policies of major powers, and has managed to handle well its relationships with major powers. Amid the competition between China and the United States, ASEAN hopes to balance China with the US, and prevent China from growing too strong without any rivalry in the region. At the same time, it is unwilling to become the

pawn of the US against China and become a victim in the game of the great powers. According to Joshua Kurlantzick, Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia of the US Council on Foreign Relations, Southeast Asian states have generally been skeptical of several strands of the Trump administration’s regional policy, worrying the White House’s “Free and Open Indo-pacific” concept is too binary an idea. Several have worried that the Trump administration could force countries in the region to choose openly between Washington and Beijing.21 Thus, Southeast Asian countries have tried to enhance policy flexibility and seek a balance between the two countries. Taking 5G for example, despite constant US lobbying and pressure, major ASEAN countries have chosen to maintain an open attitude to the construction of 5G communications networks.

The US intervention in the internal affairs of ASEAN countries may also spark reactions against the US policy. The Trump administration has constantly touched upon the sensitive nerves of Southeast Asian countries, interfering in the internal affairs of the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Malaysia on issues such as elections, human rights, and ethnic and religious relations, which causes considerable discontent in these countries. ASEAN countries have also been working for economic independence in an effort to guard against possible US rip-offs. The central banks of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have launched a settlement initiative of transactions in local currencies in order to reduce financial dependence on the US dollar. Agus Martowardojo, Governor of the Bank of Indonesia, said that 94 percent of Indonesian exports and 78 percent of imports were settled in US dollars, and the new framework aimed to diversify to other currencies.22

When it comes to security, countries in the region have been trying to keep US military bases out of their territories. The upgrade of the US

military base in the Philippines has been repeatedly postponed. In December 2018, Delfin Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense of the Philippines, stated that the Philippine Defense Department had been requested to review the provisions of the Philippine-us Mutual Defense Treaty in order to decide whether to maintain, strengthen or terminate the treaty. In February 2020, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte officially announced he would terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, before suspending the move later. The constitutions of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia prohibit foreign military bases on their territories, and the general public opinion in these countries is negative towards the basing of US troops there.

Limited US investment in Southeast Asia

In contrast to the trade-off of huge market resources to gain geopolitical benefits, which was prevalent in the past, the US share in the global market today has decreased, and the decline of US trade advantages has caused more frictions with its trading partners. With the “America First” policy, the US has moved ahead with trade protectionism against major trading partners such as China, Japan and the European Union as well as Southeast Asian countries, especially targeting Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam that have a larger export surplus with the US. In April 2018, in the US Treasury Department’s report on macroeconomic and foreign exchange policies of major trading partners, Thailand was deemed to be a target of surveillance. In August 2020, the Treasury revealed that the State Bank of Vietnam purchased approximately US$22 billion in 2019, which lowered the real exchange rate of the Vietnamese dong by 3.5 to 4.8 percent, suggesting that Vietnam may be classified as manipulating foreign exchange rates. The rising risk of trade frictions with the US is exerting greater pressure on the economic growth of various regional countries. In this regard, Southeast Asian countries will take hedging measures to stabilize their economies, including diversifying trading partners and more closely integrating the regional economy.

Huge debt also constrains US investment in Southeast Asia. In August 2020, US government debt exceeded US$26 trillion for the first time, a size 121 percent of the country’s GDP in 2019. Since the beginning of 2020, the government debt has risen by nearly US$3 trillion. On the other hand, US corporate debt has hit US$3.9 trillion, accounting for almost half of the world’s total debt. The high US debt has caused great concern in the international community. In July 2020, the international rating agency Fitch lowered the outlook for its US government credit rating to “negative,” suggesting that the soaring public and private debt as well as a high deficit had eroded the sovereign credit of the United States even before the outbreak of COVID-19.23 The United States has fallen into its own “debt trap,” and the projects it advances in Southeast Asia are facing problems of funding shortage.

Progress in CHINA-ASEAN cooperation

One of the important objectives of the US Southeast Asia policy is to drive a wedge between China and ASEAN in order to restrain China’s growing influence. Starting with the dialogue partnership nearly 30 years ago, China and ASEAN have taken a leap forward in their rich and dynamic cooperation in the spirit of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits. China perceives this relationship from a strategic and longterm perspective, respecting ASEAN centrality and its leading role in regional cooperation, and working to upgrade the relationship based on achievements of bilateral cooperation.

The CHINA-ASEAN cooperation has reached an unprecedented high level both in breadth and depth, and shown itself capable of standing up against external factors. In 2019, China became ASEAN’S largest trading partner for the eleventh year in a row. In spite of the COVID-19 pandemic, CHINA-ASEAN trade grew in 2020, bucking the global trend. In the first half of the year, ASEAN overtook the EU in becoming China’s largest trading 23 “Fitch Revises U.S. Outlook to Negative; Affirms AAA Rating,” reuters.com/article/us-united-states-ratings-fitch-iduskcn24w33b.

Reuters, August 1, 2020, https://www.

partner for the first time in history, highlighting strong resilience and the huge potential of bilateral trade. Now, the two sides are working together to take CHINA-ASEAN strategic partnership to a higher level and build a closer CHINA-ASEAN community with a shared future. Under the guidance of the CHINA-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030 and other top-design documents, China and ASEAN are working on their fourth action plan for cooperation over the next five years.

In the spirit of multilateralism and free trade, China and ASEAN advocate open regionalism and promote inclusive development. The two sides maintain good communication and cooperation in collaborative mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN-CHINA-JAPANROK cooperation, and the East Asia Summit. The relations between China and ASEAN have withstood numerous tests and the two sides have supported each other in response to non-traditional security threats such as the international financial crisis, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and the Wenchuan earthquake. In 2020, since the outbreak and spread of the coronavirus, they have offered mutual assistance to overcome the difficulties together. With common development ideas and compassion for each other, the in-depth cooperation between China and ASEAN is advancing on a sound footing. In fact, the CHINA-ASEAN strategic partnership has gone beyond a simple bilateral relationship and has become an important driving force for the development of East Asia and an important pillar for regional stability and prosperity. In contrast, the US has forcibly promoted the Cold War mentality in Southeast Asia and stirred up troubles in CHINA-ASEAN relations in the interest of its geopolitical goals. This will undoubtedly arouse the vigilance of ASEAN countries.

Generally speaking, China and ASEAN have maintained good relations, but it should also be noted that China and some ASEAN countries still have different opinions and there are disputes on a few specific issues. These problems, if badly handled, may be used by the United States to play up the “China threat” and alienate ASEAN from China. In addition, increased US deterrence and alluring proposals may tempt some to

take the risk of seeking their own profits in the China-us competition and become a cat’s paw of the United States.

Conclusion

The US Southeast Asia policy has undergone a major shift amid a stronger promotion of Indo-pacific strategy by the Trump administration. The US has reemphasized the importance of Southeast Asia, on the one hand, in order to seek support from countries in the region for its strategy, and on the other, to make up for the shortage of legitimacy of the QUAD mechanism in representing the entire Indo-pacific region. The inclusion of ASEAN would help the US to close the loop in its Indo-pacific strategy. In view of the fact that the US has turned to a strategy of generating competition among major powers, it will strengthen its access to, and control of, the region, even under the Biden administration.

However, with the policy blatantly targeting China, China is not the only concern in US Southeast Asia policy. US security, diplomatic, and economic and trade interests in the region are closely intertwined. As the region becomes strategically more important, it is sensible to imagine an increased US attention to it. It must be noted that being neighbors, China and the Southeast Asian countries have a history of exchange for some two thousand years with close political, economic, and cultural interactions. The United States must respect the good neighboring relations between China and Southeast Asian countries as it develops its relations with these countries. It would be invidious if the US were to take geopolitical rivalry as its sole purpose and force countries in the region to take sides with the Cold War mentality while ignoring their autonomy in foreign policy. In moving forward with its Southeast Asia policy, the US should focus on creating benign interactions among ASEAN, China and itself, and work together with them for inclusive prosperity and stability in the region as a whole.