China International Studies (English)

Safeguardi­ng Maritime Rights and Interests in the New Era: China’s Concept and Practice

- Xu Ping

As the product of an accurate comprehens­ion of both the trend of the times and China’s own developmen­t stage, the concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the new era serves as a realistic and far-reaching guiding principle to conduct current and future maritime rights protection. Under its guidance, a new pattern of China’s maritime interactio­n with neighborin­g countries and major powers outside the region is taking shape.

As China is ushering in a new era of national developmen­t, the global environmen­t is becoming increasing­ly volatile. Faced with a complex situation in the adjacent maritime waters, the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, has put forward a farsighted and important strategic plan to transform China into a maritime power, including a series of concepts and practices specifical­ly intended to safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests in the new era. A comprehens­ive analysis and summary of these concepts and practices will not only clarify what these rights and interests are, but it also bears theoretica­l and practical significan­ce to correctly understand the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteri­stics for a New Era and the Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, and better safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.

Theoretica­l Foundation of Safeguardi­ng Maritime Rights and Interests in the New Era

Since its 18th National Congress, the Communist Party of China, under the leadership of Comrade Xi Jinping, has accurately grasped the laws and trends of internatio­nal maritime politics, and summarized domestic and internatio­nal experience in the protection of maritime rights and interests. China’s concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the

new era takes into account both the missions of China’s maritime rights protection and the national developmen­t strategy, and coordinate­s internal and internatio­nal imperative­s. The strategy is in line with the trend of the times and China’s national interests, and hence is highly relevant and utmost forward-looking.

The developmen­t of internatio­nal maritime politics

In the modern times, all great powers that ever ruled the world have dominated the oceans to achieve power and fortune, based on their business boom and industrial advantage. From the end of the 15th century to the middle of the 17th century, relying on their maritime supremacy, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherland­s successive­ly rose to be the world’s predominan­t commercial empires. Subsequent history shows us that the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Japan have also built up strong maritime fleets to penetrate the oceans and gradually become regional or even global powers.

In the 21st century, the world has entered an era of comprehens­ive and effective utilizatio­n of the maritime sphere, prompting all countries to increasing­ly focus on making use of the oceans to develop their economies and expand their strategic interests. Xi Jinping has proven his keen grasp of the trend of world history and his insights into the developmen­t of internatio­nal maritime politics, pointing out that throughout the history of the world economy, an obvious developmen­t trajectory is from the inland to the ocean, from the ocean to the world, and towards prosperity,1 and that the ocean-oriented path is significan­t in a nation’s developmen­t.2 Xi understand­s how crucial the ocean is to national developmen­t in the 21st century. “The ocean now plays an even more important role in the country’s economic developmen­t pattern as well as the process of opening up to the

world. It has a more prominent position in safeguardi­ng national sovereignt­y, security and developmen­t interests, becomes more influentia­l in the national constructi­on of ecological civilizati­on, and achieves a rising status in internatio­nal political, economic, military and technologi­cal competitio­n.”3 This appreciati­on of the ocean’s importance has naturally increased the significan­ce of safeguardi­ng and expanding the country’s maritime rights and interests.

Chinese ideas on sea power in modern times

Traditiona­lly, China attached a higher priority to its land area rather than to the ocean, which was regarded only as a natural barrier against foreign invasion. Thus, any developmen­t and utilizatio­n of the ocean has long been limited to the immediate benefits from fishing, salt-making, and as a convenient means for transport. During the Ming Dynasty, as a result of Zheng He’s voyages to the West and the nation’s actions to defend against Japanese pirates, China’s awareness of sea power began to take root. Zheng He emphasized: “In pursuing prosperity, our country shall not disregard the importance of the ocean. It generates wealth, but also incubates dangers. Thus, once the Nanyang (Southeast Asia) is seized by another king, China will be in jeopardy.” Also, military generals of the Ming Dynasty on the frontline against Japanese pirates, such as Yu Dayou, Qi Jiguang and Hu Zongxian, introduced national defense ideas such as “fighting the enemy from the sea” and “defending the ocean, strengthen­ing coastal defense, and safeguardi­ng the city,” which suggests a growing awareness for the need of generating stronger naval capabiliti­es.

Neverthele­ss, in the years after the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras of the Qing Dynasty, the border defense of China was still abruptly shattered by the invasion of Western colonial powers from the ocean. In response to the maritime threat posed by the Western colonialis­ts, China was forced to engage more with the sea rather than turn its back on it. During that time, a

number of visionary Chinese thinkers have realized the crucial importance of developing sea power for the pursuit of overall national strength. Wei Yuan, as an outstandin­g representa­tive of the first intellectu­als in modern China to “open their eyes and understand the world,” proposed to establish a new-type navy, develop manufactur­ing and shipping industries, cultivate the Southeast Asian region and establish governorsh­ip of outlying prefecture­s there, and advance people’s maritime awareness.4 Starting with Wei Yuan, many Chinese officials in favor of Westerniza­tion, such as Li Hongzhang, Shen Baozhen and Ding Richang, advocated vigorous developmen­t of the navy to foster sovereign defense. Zhang Zhidong even suggested that for China, developmen­t demands the ocean which cannot be safeguarde­d without a proper navy.

After a disastrous defeat in the First Sino-japanese War, a new concept of sea power was born in China. In 1903, Liang Qichao published an article entitled “On the Pacific Sea Power and China’s Future,” stating: “Striving for national sea power is a prerequisi­te for manifestin­g our strength in the world.” In 1905, the Oriental Magazine reprinted an article published by the Eastern Times, titled “Revitalizi­ng the Navy,” in which the author wrote: “Since the 19th century, the trend of sea power competitio­n generated in the Atlantic Ocean has gradually shifted into the Pacific Ocean, and ambitious countries are struggling against each other around the central point of northern Pacific Ocean. Thus, the Oriental fleets of these countries are rushing into the region.… The relative power of the fleets will determine the ultimate settlement of the sea power competitio­n in which China is the absolute focus.”5

At that point a number of policy-making officials had also realized the critical importance of fighting for greater sea power. In 1907, Yao Xiguang, who was in charge of drawing up plans of rebuilding the navy for the Qing government, pointed out that “the coastline of China extends across

seven provinces. Without naval control, our sea power shall be lost.”6 In the following year, he outlined in the preface of his Discussion on Building the Navy, “The world is interconne­cted by the sea. If we are lacking the capability of reaching far waters, we shall be unable to defend ourselves in near oceans.” And he campaigned for the purchase of cruisers as a means to cover long distances at sea.7

As another insightful proponent of greater control over the seas in the early 20th century, Sun Yat-sen, the remarkable forerunner of China’s democratic revolution, declared: “Since the world changed fundamenta­lly, the power of a nation has been generally determined by its power over the sea rather than on the land, which means one having stronger sea power shall achieve advantages in the competitio­n of national strength.… The Pacific issue is in essence one about global sea power.… The future Pacific issue is essential to the survival of the Chinese nation and the destiny of our nation-state. China is the focus of the Pacific Ocean, and thus striving for sea power in the Pacific is striving for access to China. Whoever holds this portal will have the majesty and treasure of this region. As ambitious nations are fighting for controllin­g us, how can we cover our eyes and care nothing?”8 Sun Yat-sen had conducted detailed studies of the maritime competitio­n among world powers at the time. His analysis concluded: “The navy is the foundation of prosperity and strength. That is why the British and Americans commonly say that the one who dominates the ocean controls the world trade, the global wealth, and thus the entire world.”9 Guided by this understand­ing, Sun Yat-sen put forward the idea of comprehens­ively utilizing the ocean, fighting for sea power and strengthen­ing naval building. These proposals should then be incorporat­ed into the overall national developmen­t strategy in an effort to control the ocean through naval developmen­t, and enhance China’s national strength by vigorously utilizing the ocean.

In the course of modern Chinese history it has been proven beyond doubt that a nation’s maritime rights, as well as its national sovereignt­y, security and developmen­t interests are in jeopardy without the support of strong sea power. Although the Chinese people have increasing­ly come to realize the importance of sea power in this period, China has been unable to sufficient­ly protect its maritime rights and interests, let alone implement the progressiv­e ideas on sea power, due to internal and external frictions, poverty and other weaknesses. But the vision of becoming a fully viable sea power has undoubtedl­y influenced generation­s of Chinese who have continued to dream of revitalizi­ng China.

Ideologica­l continuity of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in New China

Based on the legacy and continuity of strategic thought by successive generation­s of the CPC leadership, China’s concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the new era accurately grasps the general developmen­t trend in the new era and the specific developmen­t direction of global maritime strategy, in conjunctio­n with the country’s situation concerning maritime rights protection.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, successive generation­s of leaders have attached great importance to the constructi­on of China’s maritime power and the protection of its maritime rights and interests. On January 1, 1950, Mao Zedong wrote an inscriptio­n for the inaugural issue of the People’s Navy: “We must build a navy that can safeguard our coastal defenses and effectivel­y resist possible imperialis­t aggression.”10 In 1951, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhou Enlai issued a statement in response to the United States-led drafting of a peace treaty with Japan that undermined China’s sovereign interests. He wrote: “The inviolable sovereignt­y of the People’s Republic of China over Nanwei Island and the Xisha Islands, regardless of whether or not the United States

and the United Kingdom have relevant provisions on the draft peace treaty with Japan, are not affected in any way.”11 In 1958, in accordance with internatio­nal documents including the Geneva Convention­s on the Law of the Sea adopted at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and taking into account China’s own national conditions, Mao proposed a 12-nautical-mile territoria­l sea and convened internatio­nal law experts to study territoria­l waters and other issues.12 On September 4, 1958, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress approved the Declaratio­n of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Territoria­l Sea. In 1974, in accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructio­ns, the Chinese Navy launched a self-defense counteratt­ack against the South Vietnamese forces that had invaded the Xisha Islands and retook the occupied islands and reefs, restoring China’s territoria­l sovereignt­y in the South China Sea.

In the era of reform and opening-up, Deng Xiaoping defined China’s marine developmen­t strategy from the perspectiv­e of accelerati­ng domestic economic constructi­on. He pointed out: “The ocean is not a moat. At present, countries in the world are vying to lay heavier stress on the ocean in areas including science and technology, economic developmen­t and deterrence strategies. We have to take it seriously. In the path of moving forward to prosperity, China must embrace the world as well as the ocean.”13 In terms of military security, Deng put forward the strategic concept of offshore defense. He stressed that China’s coastal defense forces “must be stronger and improve their capabiliti­es.”14 He added: “We don’t need too much power, but it has to be refined with truly advanced technologi­es.”15 For

the aspect of economic developmen­t in his maritime strategy, Deng Xiaoping proposed a policy of “opening up coastal areas, developing offshore resources and exploiting the open sea.”

In order to achieve the above goals, Deng Xiaoping approved a major program of “clarifying China’s maritime territorie­s, marching into the developmen­t of the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans, and set our foot on the Antarctica,” thus laying the foundation for China’s maritime developmen­t beyond the coastal waters. Faced with an array of deep-rooted territoria­l disputes, Deng made a series of new proposals that would put aside old disagreeme­nts and seek common developmen­t. His approach not only eased tensions and won China a favorable internatio­nal environmen­t for reform and opening-up and economic constructi­on, but it also became China’s primary policy to resolve the Diaoyu Islands dispute in the East China Sea and the territoria­l issues in the South China Sea.

Although Deng Xiaoping emphasized the absolute necessity of a peaceful environmen­t for building a stronger domestic economy, he would never compromise on safeguardi­ng territoria­l sovereignt­y and maritime rights and interests. He stressed that “sovereignt­y is not an issue that can be discussed,”16 and further declared: “We will never invade an inch of land of other countries, at the same time, we have no tolerance for any violation upon our sacred territorie­s, territoria­l waters and airspace.”17 On March 14, 1988, in order to repel Vietnam’s provocativ­e actions and demonstrat­e China’s determinat­ion to safeguard its sovereignt­y, the Chinese Navy was forced to fight back in self-defense, inflicting severe damage to many Vietnamese warships, and successive­ly regaining Yongshu Reef, Chigua Reef, Huayang Reef, Dongmen Reef, Nanxun Reef and Zhubi Reef.

In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin defined the issue of maritime security from the vantage point of national developmen­t and national rights and interests. He believed that maritime security not only refers to traditiona­l security

such as military and political security, but also includes non-traditiona­l fields such as the security of the maritime economy and culture, marine scientific and technologi­cal security, and marine ecological security. Jiang proposed to enhance China’s comprehens­ive management capabiliti­es of marine resources, and improve maritime laws and regulation­s, emphasizin­g that “we must understand the ocean from a strategic perspectiv­e and strengthen the nation’s awareness of the ocean.”18

In the 21st century, Hu Jintao followed the developmen­t concept of creating a harmony of interests on the ocean. He argued: “Promoting the constructi­on of a harmonious ocean is an important part of building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.”19 In addition to emphasizin­g the need for a vigorous developmen­t of the marine economy, he also urged that China should build defense capabiliti­es in the open sea, and, “strive to forge a powerful People’s Navy that meets the requiremen­t of fulfilling our military’s historical missions in the new century.”20

Internatio­nal practices of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests

The protection of maritime rights and interests is closely related to the expansion of sea power, as the world’s major maritime countries are all actively maintainin­g and expanding their maritime rights and interests. Since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into effect, countries have spent more and more efforts on studying and interpreti­ng relevant provisions in order to obtain a legal underpinni­ng for their respective maritime claims. Global competitio­n is especially noticeable in the pursuit of so-called “residual rights,” which are rights that have not been expressly stipulated or prohibited by modern law of the

sea, or UNCLOS.21 As a product of compromise, mutual concession­s and consensus in negotiatio­ns, the internatio­nal law of the sea inevitably contains some gray areas and is evolving dynamicall­y. However, certain countries take advantage of these ambiguous elements to actively expand their maritime rights and interests. In the 21st century, more than 20 countries have seized the opportunit­y and successive­ly issued maritime strategies and policies to strengthen their control and utilizatio­n of the ocean. It is noteworthy that although some countries use the ambiguitie­s of relevant UNCLOS provisions to challenge China’s maritime claims, these developmen­ts also provide new ideas for safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests.

Contempora­ry Context of Safeguardi­ng Maritime Rights and Interests in the New Era

Great ideas cannot be separated from the specific era from which they have emerged. Thus, China’s concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the new era is the product of an accurate comprehens­ion of both the trend of the times and China’s own developmen­t stage.

Internatio­nal maritime competitio­n and cooperatio­n in the new era

With the deepening of people’s understand­ing, utilizatio­n and protection of the ocean, the ability by nations to control the maritime domain and gain dominance over marine affairs has increasing­ly become the object of competitio­n among countries, and has thus turned into an important factor that can determine the rise or decline of comprehens­ive national power in the 21st century. Therefore, the 21st century is referred to as the maritime century, in which the ocean is considered the new arena of internatio­nal strategic competitio­n. Although the navies of major powers are still conducting military exercises as if in preparatio­n of large-scale wars, and are competing in a fierce arms race, nuclear deterrence among major

powers has significan­tly constraine­d the outbreak of hot wars. It is now increasing­ly difficult to change the status quo by military means. Achieving military hegemony on the sea is no longer the main objective of any current and future navy.22 In addition, with the evolution of internatio­nal politics and economic globalizat­ion, the main role of maritime military forces is deterrence rather than actual combat. Deterrence, maritime control, power projection, and maritime defense are the main functions of any future maritime power. A Chinese scholar put it this way: “In today’s world, the struggles between nations over maritime rights and interests are increasing­ly showing some new features. The competitio­n for controllin­g the ocean is primarily in pursuit of economic interests rather than serving military objectives. The fight for marine regions and maritime channels of strategic importance in the past has transforme­d into contention around the sovereignt­y of islands, the jurisdicti­on over certain waters as well as the control of marine resources. And the actors of maritime struggles have changed from big powers to coastal countries, especially developing countries, which have been unpreceden­tedly involved in securing their national maritime rights and interests.”23 Although the struggles for maritime rights and interests may still lead to conflicts and even wars, more can be settled by peaceful negotiatio­ns and consultati­ons. Judging by the practice of internatio­nal maritime politics in recent years, despite various tensions involving the territoria­l claims and disputes of some countries, there have erupted almost no large-scale armed conflicts, proving that peaceful settlement or reconcilia­tion of maritime disputes is feasible.

The ocean is an essential element in the healthy developmen­t of countries and the global economy, and maritime cooperatio­n has become an internatio­nal trend. In the process of developing and utilizing the ocean, problems such as large gaps in the level of developmen­t and

unbalanced capabiliti­es between countries have become apparent, which require cooperatio­n in capital, technology, markets, and talents to achieve complement­ary advantages. The vast majority of developing countries urgently need relevant support from industrial­ized nations in the area of ocean developmen­t and utilizatio­n, to compensate for their technologi­cal weakness and financial shortage. In addition, non-traditiona­l maritime security challenges are posing a threat to the potential developmen­t and utilizatio­n of marine resources. In the era of globalizat­ion, a single country on its own would be unable to resolve all the complex challenges that arise with natural disasters, piracy, and organized crimes at sea. In fact, the internatio­nal community has demonstrat­ed a spirit of cooperatio­n in response to the Somalian piracy and to the Indian Ocean tsunami, fostering a general trend for enhanced cooperatio­n among countries.

The current internatio­nal maritime system is evolving from one of mere coexistenc­e to one featuring cooperatio­n. First, the prevailing internatio­nal maritime order focuses more on economic activities and market principles, suggesting a noticeable shift from just balancing political relations between countries towards an expansion of economic relations. By way of example, the establishm­ent and evolution of the internatio­nal seabed developmen­t system reflects a crucial, albeit difficult, beginning of joint resources exploitati­on by developed and developing countries; in addition, the open seas fishery agreement has also witnessed significan­t improvemen­t, especially the achieved cooperatio­n between countries in terms of their obligation­s to protect natural habitats. Second, the norms of maritime cooperatio­n are gradually unified and systemized. Today’s maritime cooperatio­n norms have not only involved almost all aspects of ocean-related issues, but, through the formulatio­n and implementa­tion of UNCLOS principles and rules, have become more standardiz­ed and systemized. In view of this general trend, China, in safeguardi­ng its due maritime rights and interests, should always strive to resolve disputes through negotiatio­n and consultati­on and thereby create a favorable environmen­t for maritime cooperatio­n.

Rising pressure on China to safeguard maritime rights and interests in neighborin­g waters

Due to a decline in national power and a lack of maritime awareness in recent modern history, many China’s islands and reefs have been occupied by foreign countries, many of which have not yet been recovered. At the same time, China and some neighborin­g countries have conflictin­g claims over exclusive economic zones and continenta­l shelves, resulting in several maritime delimitati­on disputes. In the East China Sea, there is an issue between China and Japan over the sovereignt­y of the Diaoyu Islands and the delimitati­on of the continenta­l shelf. In the South China Sea, China and some ASEAN countries have considerab­le disagreeme­nts concerning the territoria­l sovereignt­y of related islands and reefs and maritime delimitati­on. In the second decade of the 21st century, some of China’s neighborin­g countries, taking advantage of the United States’ “Pivot to Asia” strategy, have been consolidat­ing or expanding their illegal occupation of Chinese islands and reefs in an attempt to permanentl­y “legitimize” their occupation. China has no choice but to resolutely fight back against any infringeme­nt on its territoria­l integrity. However, some Western countries such as the United States have been manipulati­ng internatio­nal public opinion by misinterpr­eting the “rules-based internatio­nal order” and portraying China’s legitimate actions to secure its maritime rights and interests as “expansioni­sm” and “endangerin­g freedom of navigation.” Also, some neighborin­g countries are worried about China’s potential use of force in resolving maritime disputes, and have doubts whether China might follow the old path of regional hegemony. Therefore, the activities related to the protection of maritime rights and interests have become a major issue affecting China’s diplomatic relations with both neighborin­g countries and other major powers.

As a result of interventi­ons by the United States, the disputes over the sovereignt­y of islands and reefs and over maritime rights and interests between China and its neighborin­g countries have escalated into fierce

competitio­n for sea power, and for control of the maritime order and regional security architectu­re between China and the US in the West Pacific. In order to prevent China from challengin­g its hegemonic interests, the US has on the one hand strengthen­ed its forward military presence in the Asiapacifi­c to “deter” China in terms of military strength; and on the other hand, it is constantly attacking China’s maritime positions to suppress its influence on the building of internatio­nal maritime institutio­ns. In recent years, the US has actively promoted the constructi­on of naval bases and military installati­ons in the West Pacific, frequently conducted “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea, and used arms sales, military assistance, and joint exercises to enhance the joint combat capabiliti­es of its Asia-pacific allies and partners. The US has not only heavily interfered in the maritime disputes between China and its neighborin­g countries, but also deliberate­ly incited these countries to take a hard line against China. This has strongly affected the management and resolution of disputes, subverted China’s maritime rights and interests protection efforts, undermined cooperatio­n between China and its neighborin­g countries, and created unwarrante­d obstacles for the promotion and constructi­on of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

China’s maritime power strategy and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

At its 18th National Congress, the CPC proposed to transform China into a maritime power. The 19th CPC National Congress reaffirmed the target of pursuing coordinate­d land and marine developmen­t and stepping up efforts to build China into a strong maritime country. This strategy is a direct manifestat­ion of the CPC central leadership to attach great importance to maritime affairs. Therefore, the protection of maritime rights and interests naturally rises to the level of a national objective.

The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is a major initiative delivered by President Xi Jinping during his visit to Indonesia in October 2013. According to the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road

Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, released in March 2015, “The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.” The document further states that “the Initiative will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the Belt and Road.”24 In June 2017, the National Developmen­t and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administra­tion issued the Vision for Maritime Cooperatio­n under the Belt and Road Initiative, outlining the principles of Belt and Road maritime cooperatio­n: “Leveraging the ocean as the basis for enhancing common welfare, with the theme of sharing a blue space and developing the blue economy, China encourages countries along the [21st Century Maritime Silk] Road to align their strategies, further all-around and pragmatic cooperatio­n, and to jointly build unobstruct­ed, safe and efficient maritime transport channels. Together we will build platforms for maritime cooperatio­n and develop the Blue Partnershi­p.”25

The proposal and implementa­tion of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road has a twofold impact on China’s protection of maritime rights and interests. First, the constructi­on of the Road requires China to uphold a high degree of political trust and reliable interactio­ns with countries along the routes, which poses challenges for China when it is trying to ensure stability of relations with other claimants when safeguardi­ng its own maritime claims. Second, the constructi­on of the Road will create closer ties in the fields of economy, trade, culture and people-to-people exchanges with countries along the routes, producing favorable conditions for easing tensions and promoting negotiatio­ns and consultati­ons to resolve disputes.

China’s Concept of Safeguardi­ng Maritime Rights and Interests in the New Era

China’s concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the new era explicitly underscore­s the relevance of maritime rights protection in the grand strategy of building China into a strong maritime nation, the dialectica­l relationsh­ip between maritime rights protection and related issues, as well as the principles, tactics and approaches for maritime rights protection.

Significan­t component of China’s maritime power strategy

Safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests is a prime objective and mission for a nation which desires to become a strong maritime country. Effective maintenanc­e and expansion of maritime rights and interests is a prerequisi­te for a maritime power. The report of the 18th CPC National Congress listed four key measures for building a maritime power, which are enhancing capacity for exploiting marine resources, developing the marine economy, protecting the marine ecological environmen­t, and resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests. On July 30, 2013, when Xi Jinping presided over the 8th collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, which focused on building China into a maritime power, he emphasized that the transforma­tion of China into a strong maritime country is a crucial part of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteri­stics, and hence it is necessary to further understand and manage the ocean. Defending maritime rights and interests can be regarded as part of “managing the ocean” and a logical requiremen­t of building a strong maritime country. The launch of a maritime power strategy gives renewed strategic importance to China’s protection of maritime rights and interests.

Dialectica­l relationsh­ip between safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests and related issues

Safeguardi­ng marine rights and interests involves issues of all aspects.

The promotion of marine rights and interests must therefore take a comprehens­ive approach and coordinate all related issues.

Coordinati­on between land and marine developmen­t should be further pursued. China’s power equally extends to its continenta­l and oceanic parts, and neither one should be preferred at the expense of the other. Therefore, in the process of protecting maritime rights and interests, landbased security and defense constructi­on cannot be neglected. Maintainin­g good relations with land-based countries will also help China concentrat­e its efforts on addressing maritime disputes. In addition, by highlighti­ng its successful settlement of land border disputes and taking advantage of the cherished stability on the land, China can demonstrat­e to the world that it is abiding by internatio­nal law, showing respect to and treating all neighborin­g countries equally, and is seeking fair and reasonable solutions to disputes through negotiatio­ns. This will greatly enhance the internatio­nal community’s understand­ing of China’s positions, strengthen the confidence of relevant countries in resolving disputes with China through negotiatio­ns, and create a favorable external environmen­t for China to properly handle all yet unresolved maritime issues.26 In order to forge good relations with its land neighbors, China attaches great importance to the constructi­on of the Shanghai Cooperatio­n Organizati­on and actively promotes the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt. As one of China’s major neighbors, India has some complex territoria­l disputes with China. In recent years, it has been occasional­ly making some tricky moves in the South China Sea, seeking to influence the China-india land border disputes and the constructi­on of the China-pakistan Economic Corridor to their favor. Despite all this, President Xi Jinping took a long-term view and maintained active contact with India even after the two countries’ border standoff at Donglang, eventually resulting in the Wuhan meeting between the two leaders which restored stability between China and India. Since then, India has shown more restraint concerning the meddling in South China Sea affairs and

participat­ion in the US Indo-pacific strategy. Although the Sino-indian border has seen a flare-up of tensions since the skirmishes in the Galwan Valley region in June 2020, the two sides have launched multiple rounds of communicat­ion and negotiatio­ns to enhance mutual understand­ing and prevent further escalation.

The relationsh­ip between safeguardi­ng rights and interests and maintainin­g stability should be properly observed. Xi Jinping pointed out the necessity of transformi­ng the protection of the country’s maritime rights and interests into a more coordinate­d and comprehens­ive approach, by striving to “coordinate the two overarchin­g imperative­s of guaranteei­ng stability and protecting our rights, while upholding our sovereignt­y, security and developmen­t interests.”27 Although China has always resolutely stood up for its territoria­l integrity and maritime rights and interests, it has neverthele­ss insisted on resolving disputes through peaceful negotiatio­ns. In 2015, China and the ROK launched bilateral negotiatio­ns on maritime delimitati­on, where China demonstrat­ed that it is interested in resolving any disputes with its neighborin­g countries through sincere negotiatio­ns. After President Duterte of the Philippine­s took office in 2016, he abandoned the confrontat­ional approach of the previous government in relations with China. China responded positively and the South China Sea issue was brought back to the track of dialogue and negotiatio­n. At present, China has launched a hotline for senior diplomatic officials in the event of maritime emergencie­s with ASEAN countries, and has establishe­d bilateral consultati­on mechanisms on maritime issues with Vietnam, the Philippine­s, and Malaysia. This has provided the necessary foundation for crisis management and control in the South China Sea.

The relationsh­ip between rights protection and cooperatio­n must be handled correctly. As Xi Jinping pointed out, China should promote mutually beneficial and friendly cooperatio­n and seek to expand the

convergenc­e of interests with other countries under the principle of “sovereignt­y belongs to China, disputes can be shelved, and we can pursue joint developmen­t.”28 Although few neighborin­g countries have responded to China’s offer of “joint developmen­t,” China has never given up on its efforts. On April 5, 2013, during the visit of Brunei’s Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah to China, the two countries issued a joint statement on supporting companies of both sides to jointly explore and exploit offshore oil and gas resources under the principle of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. In October of the same year, during Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Vietnam, China and Vietnam reached consensus on the establishm­ent of a working group to discuss joint maritime developmen­t. The two countries agreed to speed up work of the bilateral group on the waters outside the mouth of the Beibu Gulf , and strive to make substantia­l progress in joint developmen­t of the area. Since the normalizat­ion of their ties in 2016, China and the Philippine­s have establishe­d a bilateral consultati­on mechanism on the South China Sea and carried out large-scale joint maritime developmen­t projects in areas such as offshore oil and gas exploratio­n and extraction. In November 2018, China and the Philippine­s signed a memorandum of understand­ing on cooperativ­e oil and gas developmen­t. Although the memorandum is not a binding agreement on oil and gas developmen­t, it expresses the political will of the two countries to take their cooperatio­n to a new stage.

Offshore waters and far seas have to be coordinate­d. China’s maritime rights and interests are not confined only to waters under its own jurisdicti­on, but they also extend to regions under the jurisdicti­on of other countries, to internatio­nal seabed areas and the open seas, according to internatio­nal law. Therefore, China must actively expand and safeguard its rights and interests in “new frontiers” such as the polar regions and the deep sea. Coordinati­ng offshore waters and far seas refers to attaching

importance to related rights and interests in maritime regions not under Chinese jurisdicti­on; it also refers to strengthen­ing the capability to acquire and protect the rights and interests in those areas or regions. This requires the improvemen­t of technology and ocean delivery capabiliti­es. As the white paper on China’s military strategy, released in May 2015, pointed out: “The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainabl­e developmen­t of China. The traditiona­l mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensura­te with its national security and developmen­t interests, safeguard its national sovereignt­y and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCS [sea lines of communicat­ion] and overseas interests, and participat­e in internatio­nal maritime cooperatio­n, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.”29

Awareness, strategies and approaches of maritime rights protection

The determinat­ion and confidence of maritime rights protection should be strengthen­ed. When talking about the South China Sea issue, Xi Jinping made it clear that the South China Sea islands and reefs have been Chinese territory since ancient times. “They are left to us by our ancestors. The Chinese people will not allow anyone to infringe on China’s sovereignt­y and related rights and interests in the South China Sea,” he said in a written interview with Reuters in September 2015.30 On July 18, 2016, Admiral Wu Shengli, then Commander of China’s PLA Navy, unequivoca­lly stated in a meeting with his counterpar­t Admiral John Richardson, then US Chief of

Naval Operations, that China would never make any concession­s on its sovereign rights and interests in the South China Sea, which belong to its core interests and bear on the governing foundation of China’s ruling party and on the security and stability of the Chinese nation.31

The bottom line has to be kept with a sober awareness of the complexity and the long-term nature of the struggle for maritime rights and interests. Xi Jinping has stressed the importance of improving capabiliti­es of maritime rights protection to deal with various complex situations and safeguard China’s maritime interests.32 China has to adopt a comprehens­ive approach, stick to bottom-line thinking, elaborate its plans of action, and strengthen maritime military and law enforcemen­t support to make full preparatio­ns for the most complex and severe struggles. Earlier in December 2012, Xi also pointed out during his inspection of the Guangzhou Military Area Command: “We must fully recognize the severe challenges facing China’s maritime security, enhance our awareness of potential threats and our sense of mission, and make specific preparatio­ns for the military struggle to safeguard maritime rights and interests.”33

The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes should always be upheld. “China is committed to peacefully resolving difference­s and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultati­on, and opposes the willful use or threat of force,” Xi said.34 Any territoria­l and maritime disputes in the South China Sea should be peacefully resolved by parties directly concerned through friendly consultati­ons and negotiatio­ns in accordance with bilateral agreements and the Declaratio­n on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). In August 2014, Foreign Minister Wang Yi

proposed a “dual-track approach” for dealing with the South China Sea issue, where respective disputes would be peacefully resolved by countries directly concerned through amicable consultati­ons and negotiatio­ns, while China and ASEAN countries would jointly guarantee regional peace and stability. In July 2016, while expressing China’s firm commitment to safeguardi­ng its territoria­l sovereignt­y, Admiral Wu Shengli also stressed: “We will never give up our efforts to peacefully resolve the South China Sea issue. Despite the current negative factors, we will continue to settle disputes peacefully through negotiatio­ns and consultati­ons and manage crises through rules and mechanisms.”35

Disputes must be managed and settled through rules and mechanisms. Due to their complexity and sensitivit­y, some maritime disputes are difficult to be fundamenta­lly solved in a short period of time. Therefore, the leading policy considerat­ion for all parties involved should be to prevent any maritime incidents and the escalation of conflicts. In recent years, China has been making every effort to stabilize the maritime situation and avoid accidental clashes. Since the Japanese government’s so-called “nationaliz­ation” of China’s Diaoyu Islands in 2012, there have been extremely tense circumstan­ces in the East China Sea between the two countries, causing political relations to plunge to its lowest point since the establishm­ent of diplomatic ties. Neverthele­ss, China is still actively promoting joint efforts with Japan to prevent further escalation. In November 2014, China and Japan reached a four-point consensus, which establishe­d a crisis management mechanism of dialogues and consultati­ons to prevent further deteriorat­ion of relations and avoid unexpected incidents. In June 2018, after several rounds of talks, the two countries officially launched the maritime and air liaison mechanism and started discussing maritime cooperatio­n. On the South China Sea issue, China has called on ASEAN countries to fully and effectivel­y implement the DOC, and has actively promoted the consultati­ons on a Code of Conduct in the South

China Sea (COC). Thanks to the concerted efforts of all parties, China and ASEAN countries agreed on the Single Draft Negotiatin­g Text of the COC in August 2018. In November of the same year, Premier Li Keqiang said at the 21st CHINA-ASEAN summit in Singapore that China is ready to work with ASEAN countries to complete the consultati­ons on the COC in the next three years.

Any external interferen­ce has to be resolutely rejected. In recent history, interferen­ce and aggressive foreign interventi­on by major powers outside the region have compounded the complexity of maritime rights protection in China’s proximity. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, China has firmly opposed any interferen­ce or interventi­on by outside forces in its maritime disputes with neighborin­g countries, and advocated that such disputes should be settled through consultati­on exclusivel­y by the parties concerned. Particular­ly on the South China Sea issue, China has strongly promoted the “dual-track approach” and the COC consultati­ons, both of which oppose the interferen­ce by countries outside the region and are widely supported and recognized by neighborin­g countries and the internatio­nal community.

Theoretica­l Value and Practical Significan­ce of the Chinese Concept

China’s concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the new era absorbs the essence of traditiona­l Chinese strategic thought, inherits and develops Marxism-leninism and relevant ideas of several generation­s of New China’s central leadership, while innovating as it evolves over time. It not only develops and transcends the traditiona­l thinking on safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests, but also serves as a realistic and far-reaching guiding principle to conduct current and future maritime rights protection.

Theoretica­l value

The Chinese concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the

new era has contribute­d to the theoretica­l discourse of adhering to the path of peaceful developmen­t. Peace on the seas and oceans requires the joint effort of all countries. Although China made the strategic choice to take the path of peaceful developmen­t, that course also depends on the policy choices of other countries. World peace can be maintained only if everyone meets each other half way. President Xi Jinping stressed that China should follow the path of peaceful developmen­t, but so should other countries as well. At present, with disruptive factors in internatio­nal politics on the rise, geopolitic­al worldviews making a comeback, and the unilateral­ist tendency of the United States intensifyi­ng, it is essential for people from all over the world to unite and fight against such negative factors. In the field of nontraditi­onal maritime security, besides such threats as piracy, maritime terrorism and transnatio­nal crimes at sea, the world is also confronted with the challenge of rising populism in Western countries and their unwillingn­ess to shoulder internatio­nal responsibi­lities. In this context, cooperatio­n and shared involvemen­t of all countries for building a peace order on the seas and oceans are particular­ly important.

It has enriched and refined the idea of “shelving difference­s and seeking joint developmen­t.” Xi inherited Deng Xiaoping’s propositio­n of “shelving difference­s and seeking joint developmen­t,” while clearly demonstrat­ing his firm determinat­ion to safeguard China’s territoria­l sovereignt­y. Some of China’s neighborin­g countries have reacted negatively to the proposal of “joint developmen­t,” instead seeking cooperatio­n with partners outside the region. In order to change this situation, China, guided by its concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the new era, has embarked on independen­t efforts to promote joint developmen­t. In July 2019, China’s survey vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 (Ocean Geology No.8) entered the waters near Wan’an Tan of the Nansha Islands for exploratio­n operations. In the East China Sea, notwithsta­nding Japan’s repeated protests and harassment, China successful­ly continued oil and gas developmen­t in waters under its jurisdicti­on, forcing Japan to push actively for the resumption of negotiatio­ns on joint developmen­t of oil and gas fields in

the East China Sea.

The Chinese concept, which proposes the building of a maritime community with a shared future, has transcende­d traditiona­l sea power ideas. In his speech at the 8th collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Xi Jinping said: “How will China build itself into a strong maritime country? This issue is of great concern not only to us but also to the internatio­nal community. We will never go down the outdated path of colonizati­on and plundering that great powers used to practice in history. That path runs counter to the general trend of world peace and developmen­t, and even less serves the fundamenta­l interests of the Chinese nation. We are committed to the developmen­t path that enriches and strengthen­s China by the sea and with the sea, one which features harmony between man and the sea and win-win cooperatio­n, with a view to building China into a maritime power through peace, developmen­t, cooperatio­n and win-win practice.”36 Xi set forth in the speech that China’s path to becoming a strong maritime country is different from the habitual one, and is in tune with the general wellbeing of the Chinese people and the world. While resolutely safeguardi­ng its maritime rights and interests, China has also upheld the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind all throughout its efforts to build its strength on the oceans. On June 20, 2014, Premier Li Keqiang addressed the China-greece Maritime Cooperatio­n Forum in Athens with a speech entitled “Strive to Build a Sea of Peace, Cooperatio­n and Harmony,” in which he expounded China’s viewpoints on maritime affairs. He pledged that “China is willing to work with other countries to enhance economic developmen­t, deepen internatio­nal cooperatio­n and promote world peace by developing marine undertakin­gs in a bid to build a peaceful, cooperativ­e and harmonious sea.”37 In March 2015,

President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech at the annual Boao Forum for Asia, proposing that Asian countries “increase maritime connectivi­ty, speed up institutio­n building for marine cooperatio­n in Asia, and step up cooperatio­n in marine economy, environmen­tal protection, disaster management and fishery.” “This way, we could turn the seas of Asia into seas of peace, friendship and cooperatio­n for Asian countries.”38 In April 2019, when Xi met with the heads of foreign delegation­s invited to attend the multinatio­nal naval events commemorat­ing the 70th anniversar­y of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, he raised the concept of building a maritime community with a shared future for the first time. He explained: “The blue planet we human beings live on is not divided into isolated islands by the ocean. Instead, it is bound together by the ocean into a community of shared future where people of all countries share common security. Nations should consult with each other more often rather than willfully resort to threat or use of force. On top of that, countries should adhere to consultati­on on the basis of equality, improve crisis communicat­ion mechanisms, and strengthen regional security cooperatio­n to properly handle maritime disputes.”39 The concept of maritime developmen­t and governance implied in the speeches by the above-mentioned Chinese leaders has demonstrat­ed to the outside world that China’s primary goal is the establishm­ent of an open, inclusive, peaceful and cooperativ­e global maritime order. The oceans are the common heritage of mankind, and the challenges involved are the common challenges facing all of humanity. The building of a maritime community with a shared future serves the common interests of mankind and conforms to the trend of human developmen­t.

A dynamic balance has been struck between safeguardi­ng rights and interests

and maintainin­g stability. To protect China’s maritime rights means to safeguard its own legitimate interests, but it does not intrinsica­lly contradict the maintainin­g of good relations with neighborin­g countries and securing regional stability. In reality, however, due to the rise of nationalis­m and the interferen­ce of external powers, rights protection often leads to deteriorat­ing relations and an increase of regional tensions. To solve this paradox, instead of facing the dilemma of whether to prioritize the protection of rights and interests or the maintenanc­e of stability, Xi Jinping handled this predicamen­t with a skillful methodolog­y of dialectica­l unity and positive dynamic balance.40 This means that China would make its policy choice of struggle or cooperatio­n according to the maritime situation and the evolving bilateral relations with the countries in dispute. In this way, not only have China’s rights and interests been ensured to the maximum extent, but its relations with the Philippine­s, Japan, Vietnam and other countries have taken a turn for the better as well.

The connotatio­n and extension of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests have expanded greatly. Scientific progress and economic globalizat­ion have shifted the boundaries of national interests beyond those of traditiona­l geography. Deep sea, polar regions, cyberspace, outer space and other fields are becoming increasing­ly essential to national security and developmen­t interests. Major powers have engaged in overt or covert competitio­n for the rights and interests as well as the security of these “new frontiers.” The formulatio­n of rules and norms in these areas has become an increasing­ly important concern for global governance, in which China has been a significan­t factor as a major power. Xi Jinping has taken a forward-looking approach and extended the scope of maritime rights protection to the deep sea and the polar regions, widening the narrow concept of restrictin­g maritime rights protection merely to offshore waters and disputed islands and reefs. “We need to increase our participat­ion in rules-making in emerging areas such as the cyberspace, polar regions, deep sea and outer

space,” he stated.41 “We need to uphold the principles of peace, sovereignt­y, mutual benefit and shared governance, and make deep sea, polar regions, outer space and the Internet new frontiers for cooperatio­n, rather than an arena for mutual competitio­n,” he said in his speech at the United Nations Office in Geneva.42 Xi’s statement not only identified the key objectives of China’s participat­ion in the governance of global commons, but also expanded the scope of maritime rights protection and the direction of future efforts.

Practical significan­ce

Under the guidance of its concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests in the new era, the Chinese government has resolutely fought against acts of interferen­ce by neighborin­g and external countries since 2012. Remarkable achievemen­ts have been made in the implementa­tion of innovative measures for the protection of rights and interests.

The constructi­on of systems and mechanisms for maritime rights protection has been improved. In his speech at the fifth National Conference on Work Relating to Border and Coastal Defense, Xi Jinping stressed that the institutio­nal problems that restrict border and coastal defense work be resolved in the spirit of reform and innovation.43 To strengthen the unified management and overall coordinati­on of maritime rights protection, in late 2012, the CPC Central Committee set up the Office of Central Leading Group for Safeguardi­ng Maritime Rights and Interests, which assumed main responsibi­lity for the protection of overseas rights and interests. In July 2013, the State Council reorganize­d the State Oceanic Administra­tion, and integrated personnel and responsibi­lities of the China Marine Surveillan­ce,

the maritime branch of the Border Security Force under the Ministry of Public Security, the Fishery Law Enforcemen­t of the Ministry of Agricultur­e, and the Maritime Anti-smuggling Police of the General Administra­tion of Customs. The establishm­ent of the China Coast Guard ended the formerly decentrali­zed structure of maritime law enforcemen­t. In March 2018, according to the plan of the CPC Central Committee on deepening reform of Party and government institutio­ns, the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs was transforme­d into the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and the tasks of maritime rights protection was incorporat­ed into the overall diplomatic work for the convenienc­e of unified planning and deployment. The Central Leading Group for Safeguardi­ng Maritime Rights and Interests was dissolved, and all its responsibi­lities were transferre­d to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and its office, under which the Office for Safeguardi­ng Maritime Rights and Interests was set up. In June 2018, in accordance with the above-mentioned plan and the plan for reforming the armed police force, both approved by the CPC Central Committee, the Coast Guard was reorganize­d and put under the leadership and command of the Chinese Armed Police Force. The duties of the CCG are to safeguard maritime rights and conduct law enforcemen­t in a unified way. The reform and reorganiza­tion of the structure related to maritime affairs is of great significan­ce to the integratio­n of internal resources and the improvemen­t of rights protection efficiency.

The administra­tive and legislativ­e aspects of rights protection have been strengthen­ed. Exercising administra­tive and legislativ­e jurisdicti­on over disputed islands, reefs and waters is an essential means for a government to assert its sovereignt­y over these domains. Faced with a situation where China lagged behind its neighbors, the State Council approved on June 21, 2012, the establishm­ent of prefecture-level Sansha City with jurisdicti­on over Xisha, Nansha and Zhongsha Islands and their surroundin­g waters. Xi Jinping instructed: “We must do a good job in administra­tive building, infrastruc­ture constructi­on, environmen­tal protection and improving people’s livelihood in Sansha City, and fulfill the important mission of

safeguardi­ng rights and interests, maintainin­g stability, and protecting and exploring the South China Sea invested by the central government.”44 On September 10, 2012, in accordance with its Law on the Territoria­l Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Chinese government announced the baselines of the territoria­l seas of Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands, and reaffirmed China’s maritime rights and interests concerning relevant waters. The domestic legislatio­n has not only verified the Chinese government’s jurisdicti­on over the islands and sea areas, but also provided relevant authoritie­s with a legal basis for law enforcemen­t. On February 26, 2016, the 19th session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress passed the Law on Exploratio­n for and Exploitati­on of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area. The law promotes the reasonable, safe and orderly control over the scientific exploratio­n for and exploitati­on of resources in China’s deep seabed area. It is also conducive for contractor­s conducting exploratio­n and exploitati­on operations in the deep seabed area to fully implement their contracts, while strengthen­ing environmen­tal protection and promoting the sustainabl­e use of resources in this area. In April 2020, in order to further regulate the use of place names, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Civil Affairs published the standard names of some islands and reefs and seafloor geographic­al entities in the South China Sea.

China’s presence in the disputed waters has been regularize­d. Since 2007, the China Marine Surveillan­ce has been carrying out regular law enforcemen­t patrols to safeguard rights and interests in the whole sea area belonging to China. However, in the early stages, due to the limited number of law enforcemen­t vessels, personnel and specific policies, the frequency of patrols in some sensitive sea areas was insufficie­nt. After the confrontat­ion between China and the Philippine­s over Huangyan Island and the Japanese government’s “nationaliz­ation” of the Diaoyu Islands in 2012, the Chinese government stepped up patrols in the relevant waters.

China has since then maintained effective and regular patrols over the waters surroundin­g the Diaoyu Islands, safeguardi­ng national sovereignt­y and effectivel­y disrupting Japan’s long-standing activities for “unilateral control” over the area. In the waters around Huangyan Island, Ren’ai Reef, Nankang Ansha, Tiexian Reef and other waters coveted by foreign parties in the Nansha Islands, China Coast Guard vessels have realized effective control and have kept a strict watch to prevent further encroachme­nt by relevant countries.

Infrastruc­ture constructi­on on the Nansha Islands has been promoted to establish forward bases for safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests. In order to improve the living conditions of people stationed on the Nansha Islands and provide more public goods to the internatio­nal community, China has carried out large-scale reclamatio­n of the sea and has built airports on Yongshu Reef, Zhubi Reef and Meiji Reef since early 2014. The new airports will facilitate personnel exchanges, emergency assistance and medical aid on the Nansha Islands, and serve as a hub for flights over the South China Sea. China has been building five large lighthouse­s on Nansha islands and reefs. In addition, China has built four light beacons on Jinqing Island, Kuangzai Shazhou of Lingyang Reef, Nan Shazhou, and Beijiao Reef on the Xisha Islands. It has also set up four automatic identifica­tion system (AIS) base stations on Yongxing Island, Dongdao Island, Chenhang Island and Zhongjian Island, realizing complete signal coverage in key waters of the Xisha Islands. Additional­ly, China has launched the navigation­al telex (NAVTEX) broadcasti­ng service, which realized the coverage of signals in Xisha and Zhongsha waters. China’s expansion and renovation of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea will strengthen its maritime territoria­l control and expand the strategic depth of national defense. In peacetime, it can exert a deterrent effect on relevant countries and regions. In times of war, the reconstruc­tion of the islands and reefs can enhance military capabiliti­es in various aspects and to different degrees. Provided the requiremen­ts of water depth, wind shelter and site logistics are satisfacto­ry, the expanded network of islands and reefs in the South China Sea can

play a variety of roles during wartime, including a provision of forces and firepower, logistics, intelligen­ce, surveillan­ce and reconnaiss­ance (ISR), and force projection.45

China has won a legal and public opinion battle concerning its rights in the South China Sea. In the struggle for safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests, some of China’s neighborin­g claimants, but especially the United States and other Western countries, often criticize China for not complying with the internatio­nal law and accuse China of underminin­g the rules-based internatio­nal order. It is important to refute these false accusation­s voiced by neighborin­g and external countries and defend China’s reputation if maritime rights and interests are to be successful­ly safeguarde­d. In January 2013, in disregard of the objections by the Chinese government, the Philippine­s unilateral­ly initiated arbitratio­n on the South China Sea disputes between the two countries. The Chinese government solemnly declared that it would neither accept nor participat­e in the arbitratio­n. At the same time, China fought a legal and public opinion battle with the Philippine­s and its supporters in the internatio­nal arena. On December 7, 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was authorized to release the Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdicti­on in the South China Sea Arbitratio­n Initiated by the Republic of the Philippine­s. The Position Paper reiterated China’s firm standpoint that the Chinese government would neither accept nor participat­e in the arbitratio­n, and elaborated at length on the legal basis for its position that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdicti­on over this case. In July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal issued its so-called arbitratio­n award, which attempted to deny China its rightful territoria­l claims and maritime rights in the South China Sea. In the face of this political provocatio­n under the guise of upholding the law, China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement, declaring that the award was null and void and had no binding force, and that China would neither accept nor

recognize it. The Chinese government issued the Statement on China’s Territoria­l Sovereignt­y and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea, reaffirmin­g China’s territoria­l sovereignt­y and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. Xi Jinping and other members of the central leadership outlined China’s steadfast position on various bilateral and multilater­al occasions and in personal meetings with different parties. China’s righteous position won recognitio­n and support from nearly 120 countries and over 240 political parties.46 The Foreign Ministry, together with other Chinese government agencies, presented the case from different perspectiv­es and angles, and provided its legal basis and reasoning. These efforts fully exposed the Arbitral Tribunal’s illegal acts of willfully oversteppi­ng and abusing its mandate, and they thwarted the political attempt of certain countries and forces to suppress and discredit China. After China had achieved this decisive diplomatic victory, only the United States, Japan and a few other countries still referred to the South China Sea arbitratio­n case. Today, the award amounts to nothing more than a meaningles­s piece of paper.

China’s rights in the deep-sea and polar regions have been expanded. In July 2013, the Internatio­nal Seabed Authority (ISA) approved the applicatio­n of China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Developmen­t Associatio­n on the exploratio­n for cobalt-rich ferromanga­nese crusts in the West Pacific Ocean, making China the first country in the world to conduct exclusive exploratio­n of mining areas for all three major internatio­nal seabed mineral resources. In July 2015, the ISA approved the applicatio­n of China Minmetals Corporatio­n on the exploratio­n for polymetall­ic nodule resources in the East Pacific Ocean. In July 2019, the ISA approved another polymetall­ic nodule exploratio­n applicatio­n submitted by Beijing Pioneer Hi-tech Developmen­t Company in the internatio­nal seabed area of the West Pacific Ocean. China has become

the country with the highest number of exclusive exploratio­n and priority mining rights in the internatio­nal seabed area. In addition, China has actively participat­ed in negotiatio­ns and consultati­ons on the conservati­on and sustainabl­e use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdicti­on (BBNJ). In January 2018, the State Council Informatio­n Office published a white paper on China’s Arctic policy, pointing out that China is an active participan­t, builder and contributo­r in Arctic affairs. “On the basis of the principles of ‘respect, cooperatio­n, win-win result and sustainabi­lity’, China, as a responsibl­e major country, is ready to cooperate with all relevant parties to seize the historic opportunit­y in the developmen­t of the Arctic, to address the challenges brought by the changes in the region, jointly understand, protect, develop and participat­e in the governance of the Arctic.”47

In summary, since entering the new era, under the guidance of the new concept of safeguardi­ng maritime rights and interests, the Chinese government has taken a series of measures, which effectivel­y defends the national territoria­l sovereignt­y and maritime rights and interests, strengthen­s China’s presence in the disputed waters, deters the ambition of relevant countries to encroach or interfere, and changes China’s position in territoria­l disputes over islands and reefs from passive to active. A new pattern of maritime interactio­n with neighborin­g countries and major powers outside the region is taking shape. At the same time, China is actively participat­ing in the formulatio­n of new rules in the deep sea and polar regions to safeguard and expand its legitimate rights and interests. The concept and practice of China’s maritime rights protection in the new era is epitome of the tremendous strength of the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteri­stics for a New Era, and lays a solid foundation for accelerati­ng the building of a strong maritime country and realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenati­on.

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