NATO in the Us-soviet Competition

The strategic background of the long-term competition between the US and the Soviet Union in Europe not only gave birth to NATO, but also promoted its evolution. At the same time, NATO has also played a role and accumulated experience in setting and adjusting strategic objectives, managing alliances, coordinating the domestic politics and foreign policies of member countries, participating in arms races, and managing competition.

Impact of Us-soviet strategic competition in Europe on NATO

Europe was the primary theater of the Cold War. The Cold War originated from the escalation of disputes between the US and the Soviet Union over Poland and Germany. As the Soviet Union began strategic retrenchment in the late 1980s, it sought to establish mutual trust with the US and NATO’S European members, and no longer attempted to maintain its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, which precipitated drastic changes in the region as a result. There are three main factors that affected NATO’S involvement in the Us-soviet competition, including the arms race and security dilemma in Europe, the European political and social evolution, and the prolonged nature of Us-soviet strategic competition.

The Second World War wreaked great havoc on Europe and seriously hurt the national and military strength of traditional Western European powers, while demonstrating the superior military power of the US and the Soviet Union. Emerging from the war as dominant military forces in the European strategic balance, the US and the Soviet Union turned from wartime allies to rivals, which led to a continuous escalation of the Cold War. Even when the memory of the Second World War was fresh, an “iron curtain” between the two blocs began to fall in central Europe. For the US, the lack of direct influence of its maritime superiority and the limited forward deployment that its ground and tactical air forces could maintain meant that it would have to send reinforcements from its mainland across

the Atlantic Ocean to Europe during wartime. In the face of the Soviet military’s home advantage, the US and Europe found it necessary to form a multilateral military alliance as a counter-balance. Besides, the revolution of nuclear weapons and the development of conventional military technologies brought both sides into a dilemma of escalation, in that it was difficult for either side to achieve any meaningful strategic goals through a full-scale war.

The Us-soviet competition also created a long-term security dilemma in Europe. The East and the West harbored a long-standing distrust toward each other’s motives and fear of each other’s capabilities. In the early stage of the Cold War, the two sides were embroiled in a military confrontation over specific security issues such as the status of Berlin and Germany. In the latter period of the Cold War, despite effective management of specific security issues such as the Berlin issue and the post-war border, distrust and hostility toward each other prompted both sides to prepare for the worst military scenario.

The Second World War ended the international political order based on the balance of power among traditional European powers 300 years after the establishment of the Westphalian system. At the same time, the war also brought unprecedented damage to Europe, which made it necessary for European countries to invest in post-war reconstruction. Western European countries valued cooperation with the US in security and economic realms on the one hand, while on the other hand, they made autonomous choices in domestic development and regional integration to adapt to changes. Europe’s awareness of maintaining autonomy in domestic and foreign affairs was also evident in the differences between the US and Europe and within Western Europe on specific security and strategic issues. First, NATO did not cover all the foreign policy agendas of the US, the UK and France. Disputes frequently arose among these countries as they all hoped that NATO would support their respective major strategic goals and actions outside Europe at different times. Second, there were differences among major members on the direction of NATO and European security issues. For example, France complained that NATO’S decision-making mechanism

did not highlight its status as a major power and called for reform and adjustment of the organization. Third, friction emerged during the European integration process and the NATO-LED security process. For example, France showed dissatisfaction with NATO by keeping the UK outside the European integration process for a long time.

The arms race was a persistent theme throughout the Cold War in Europe, but the overall risk of war declined. Even back in 1948, George F. Kennan, who was then Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the US State Department and known for proposing the containment strategy, believed that the crux to the European problem was socio-economic development, and the US and Europe did not need to establish a military alliance with peacetime obligations.1 NATO member states’ perception of the actual threat of the Soviet Union has also kept changing as time went on; they would accept coexistence with the Soviet and Eastern European bloc, and rebuild normal and stable relations with relevant countries based on traditional European diplomatic concepts. At the same time, in the longterm competition under peaceful conditions, European countries, out of domestic development considerations, also chose to restore and strengthen social and economic ties across the ideological line.

While attaching great importance to domestic development, European countries also expected the Us-soviet competition on the continent to be put under control, competition costs brought down, and risks reduced, while NATO would play a more substantial role in this process. In the middle stage of the Cold War when the US and the Soviet Union experienced a detente, major breakthroughs were made by the two military blocs on core security issues such as the status of Berlin and Germany, and an agreement was reached on the European security framework, which helped stabilize competition in the latter stage of the Cold War. At the same time, the two blocs began to put on the agenda negotiations over the balance of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe.

Essential experience and lessons of NATO’S involvement in the Cold War

NATO was involved in the Us-soviet strategic competition in Europe throughout the Cold War, and the experience and lessons it accumulated in the process had an impact on its organizational culture and behavior preferences.

First, NATO plays the basic function of a military and security alliance in Europe, which was the main battlefield of Us-soviet strategic competition, by clarifying security obligations, organizing collective defense, and providing security guarantees for the domestic development of the US and other member countries. In terms of politics and strategy, NATO has formed a multilateral mechanism of strategic consultation, decision-making, planning and execution that could coordinate and mobilize allies to respond to changes in the security situation. In terms of military, NATO members have achieved a high degree of integration around the strategic needs of Europe. Apart from building a command and control system in the European theater as a whole and in different directions, NATO’S military integration includes the assignment of tasks to the conventional and nuclear forces of member countries in the European theater, including the US military forward deployment and the local forces, according to strategic demands and operational plans.2 In particular, NATO has established a complete strategic early warning, decision-making, command and control system for wartime distribution and use of nuclear weapons.3 In terms of military capability building, NATO sets not only military development goals for member countries, but also shares advanced technologies, integrates weapon and equipment systems, streamlines logistical support, formulates joint operational doctrines, and organizes joint exercises to lay the foundation for joint wartime operations.

Second, NATO constantly adjusted itself to adapt to strategic needs and environmental changes in different stages of the Us-soviet competition. In

the early stage of the Cold War, since the Soviet Union tightened its control over Eastern Europe and escalated tensions with the US and Western Europe due to the Marshall Plan, the US broke its peacetime diplomatic tradition of non-alignment and established NATO with Western European countries, which boosted the confidence of Western Europe in their competition with the Soviet Union. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, NATO established a complete military system and strengthened military deployment in order to cope with the intensifying Cold War. In the mid-1950s, finding it difficult to match the Soviet Union in developing conventional forces, NATO attached importance to the use of nuclear weapons to offset the Soviet advantages, and incorporated West Germany, which had stronger conventional military potential, into the alliance. In the 1960s and 1970s, NATO stepped up political consultations, where it not only withstood the test of France’s withdrawal from the military command, but also actively participated in and influenced the East-west detente process without being marginalized. At the end of the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact engaged in dialogues and reached an agreement on strategic stability and regional military balance, which played a role in the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War. In 1990, NATO announced that it would no longer regard the Warsaw Pact as an enemy; instead, it would transform itself from a military organization to a political organization, welcomed the diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries to NATO, and further reduced its dependence on the nuclear weapon in military strategy, only regarding it as a last resort.4

Third, NATO has internally placed priority on consultation over effectiveness, so as to maintain its inherent vitality and gain the strategic initiative. Despite a multilateral military security alliance, NATO attaches equal importance to political and economic interactions. On the whole, the US respects most NATO allies’ major choices on domestic and foreign affairs, including the European allies’ low investment in military forces, their cultivation of diplomatic and economic ties with the Soviet bloc, and France’s

withdrawal from the integrated military command. Therefore, NATO was unable to gain an overall military advantage over the Soviet Union, and not until the late 1960s did it formally incorporate forward defense and flexible response into its strategic planning. With the detente of East-west relations, NATO no longer exerted strong political, diplomatic and economic pressure on the Soviet Union. However, NATO’S emphasis on consultation and inclusiveness helped the alliance withstand the test of various disputes, allowed its member countries to spare more resources for domestic development, maintained its vitality and took the strategic initiative in competition.

Fourth, NATO attaches importance to handling its relationship with the European integration process. In their strategic planning at the beginning of the Cold War, US decision-makers realized the importance of economic cooperation among European countries for European economic revival. The establishment of NATO clarified the US commitment to European security, dramatically reducing the long-term security distrust among European countries, especially between France and Germany, and created conditions for political and economic integration in Western Europe. In terms of military affairs, the US also made defense cooperation among Western European countries a prerequisite for its participation in NATO. After the Korean War, although the US relied on NATO to strengthen its forward deployment in Europe, it was hesitant to take this as a long-term plan; instead, in the hope that European countries could enhance their military capabilities through military integration, the US once supported the establishment of a European defense bloc. Not until the plan failed did the US push for the inclusion of West Germany into NATO, and relied on NATO to carry out the long-term competition with the Soviet Union in Europe. Therefore, at the strategic level, there was no conflict between NATO and the European integration process as well as the defense cooperation among European countries in the early stage of the Cold War.

Fifth, NATO has multiple weaknesses in military competition. On the one hand, NATO never gained an army edge against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the European theater. It was consistently at a disadvantage in

terms of conventional forces and could not eliminate its dependence on nuclear weapons until the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, compared with the Warsaw Pact joint forces which were predominated by the Soviet military, the US military and the West German defense force, the most potent ground combat forces deployed in Europe, accounted for less than half of all NATO troops. With the ground forces of NATO countries undertaking operational missions in different directions, NATO troops were more likely to confront challenges on their own in times of large-scale conflicts.

Last, the arms race was the driving force behind NATO, but has also become a challenge for alliance management. The arms race triggered a longstanding dispute between the US and Europe over the burden of defense. Besides, the escalation of the Us-soviet arms race, especially the change in their balance of nuclear forces, repeatedly aggravated European allies’ concern about the US security commitment. Despite being under the US nuclear umbrella, the UK and France still decided to develop their own nuclear weapons. In 1973, NATO and the Warsaw Pact launched negotiations on the disarmament of conventional forces in Europe, which was in the interests of NATO’S European allies but gave rise to concerns that the disarmament negotiations would lead to excessive retrenchment of the US. In January 1973, the UK government indicated in its directive to the European disarmament delegation that its goals would include working with NATO allies to achieve the reduction of military forces in Central Europe, while ensuring that the US kept a considerable military deployment and NATO maintained its unity.5

NATO Eastward Expansion and International Strategic Restructuring in the Post-cold War Era

Over the three decades since the end of the Cold War, NATO has responded to various security challenges in the Balkans, the Middle East and North

Africa. On the other hand, it has continued its eastward expansion with an aim to dominate the European security order, with the number of member countries increasing from 16 to 30, covering countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic coast. NATO did not reach agreement with Russia on its eastward expansion, or on the establishment of a regional order that accommodates the core security interests of all parties. As a result, NATO’S eastward expansion has aggravated the security dilemma between NATO and Russia, triggering Russian counter-measures and foreshadowing a new round of great-power competition after 2010.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new round of dramatic changes in the global and European strategic environment. First of all, the US became the lone superpower committed to maintaining global hegemony. Second, while traditional security issues arising from the East-west arms races phased out in Europe, the successive disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia brought about geopolitical changes in Central and Eastern Europe. The European economic and social integration, represented by the European Community which had made progress during the Cold War and the succeeding European Union, demonstrated further momentum of expansion in terms of geographical scope and agenda after the Cold War’s conclusion. Last but not least, regional conflicts, civil wars and counterterrorism became the major international security challenges in the first two decades of the post-cold War era.

In order to adapt to the international landscape in the post-cold War era and prevent being marginalized in the European and global security systems, NATO found it necessary to transform itself. The basis for NATO’S continued existence and transformation included the following factors: US decision-makers would like to maintain leadership and influence over Europe through NATO; traditional Western European allies realized the indispensable role of the US in Europe; former Warsaw Pact members of Central and Eastern Europe and some Soviet republics would like to establish close cooperation with or even join NATO. The new round of security challenges confronting Europe, including the conflicts and civil wars in the

Balkans brought about by the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the conflicts in Europe’s neighborhood and the threat of terrorism, also provided conditions for NATO’S transformation.

During the 1990s and the early 21st century, the US and NATO no longer regarded Russia as their main rival, and made some efforts to stabilize and develop their relations with Moscow. However, their vision and practices of the international security order in the post-cold War era sowed seeds for a new round of great-power competition in Europe. By the end of the Cold War, the US and NATO had claimed themselves to be winners and desired to dominate the future European security architecture, while refusing to build a new and more inclusive structure that would replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the early 1990s, Russia, Eastern Europe and some former Soviet republics became members of NATO’S Partnership for Peace program, which was dedicated to enhancing exchanges and understanding as well as engaging in security cooperation. However, the US and European policymakers regarded Russia as a declining power, and chose to ignore its strategic interests and concerns. In the mid-1990s, NATO began its eastward expansion. According to US decision-makers, the Partnership for Peace program was aimed at creating conditions for former Warsaw Pact members and Soviet republics to join NATO. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense under the Clinton administration, indicated that the US needed to take a longer time to solidify its relations with Russia and should not quickly start NATO’S eastward expansion. In 1996, Richard Holbrooke, then Assistant Secretary of State, persuaded most US policy-makers to formally put on the agenda the accession of some former Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe and the three former Soviet republics in the Baltic Sea to NATO.6 In Russia’s eyes, the US and NATO reneged on their commitment that NATO would not expand eastward after Germany’s unification and accession to NATO. Perry wrote in his memoir that the start of NATO’S eastward expansion made Russia feel the loss of a buffer zone, which was the first step leading to the downward

spiral of Us-russia relations.7 In the 1999 Kosovo War, NATO carried out protracted air strikes against Yugoslavia in spite of opposition from Russia and other countries, which further irritated Moscow. At the beginning of the 21st century, the US withdrew from the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, played a hand in the “color revolution” of Georgia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, and even supported the Russian opposition forces, which seriously undermined the foundation of Us-russia cooperation.

After several rounds of NATO eastward expansion, Russia bounced back. First of all, NATO’S continuous eastward expansion wiped out the geopolitical buffer zone between NATO and Russia which was formed following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Second, since those Eastern European and former Soviet republics that joined NATO have relatively limited comprehensive power and military strength, NATO’S military resources remain concentrated in Western and Central Europe, and did not move eastward despite NATO’S eastward expansion. Third, NATO held openended positions on the Russia’s disputes with Ukraine and Georgia, as well as these countries’ accession to NATO, and its provision of various assistance, including military security assistance, to these countries caused escalation of its confrontation with Russia. Fourth, in the new round of competition, Russia is able to exert significant influence without projecting its military power beyond Eastern Europe. Fifth, as Russia’s military modernization, despite considerable progress, still lagged behind that of NATO in many areas at the beginning of the 21st century, it saw NATO’S expansion and deployment in its neighborhood as a threat and actively opposed this development.

Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strong criticism of NATO’S eastward expansion, NATO still stressed in 2008 that it welcomed Ukraine and Georgia’s aspiration for NATO membership and agreed that these countries would become members of NATO in the future.8 Following the brief conflict between Russia and Georgia that caused dissatisfaction in the

US and Europe, the Obama administration proposed to “reset” Us-russia relations by strengthening NATO’S response to the Russian challenge while cooperating with Russia in areas of common interests such as arms control, counter-terrorism and Middle East affairs.9 However, after the 2013-2014 Ukraine crisis, NATO believed that Russia’s security and military threats were imminent, and it was necessary to respond to Russia’s moves through diplomatic and military means as well as sanctions. The US increased its rotational deployment of troops in Europe, while NATO strengthened its presence in the Baltic Sea and Poland, and called on member countries to increase their military spending. The US and Russian military intervention in the Syrian conflict further intensified the competition between the two sides in the Middle East. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy in 2017 further clarified great-power competition as its strategic objective.

Implications of 21st-century Great-power Competition on NATO

The great-power competition in the 21st century strikes similarities with the Cold War, such as the shadow of nuclear weapons, geopolitics, ideology, and the influence of third-party factors. At the same time, this round of greatpower competition also demonstrates some new characteristics.

First, at the global strategic level, the US has simultaneously positioned China and Russia as two major competitors, and regarded China as a more significant challenge than Russia but different from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. At the same time, the domestic foundation of the US global strategy has also changed due to the relative decline of its economic and technological power. The US has changed its expectation for NATO and other major allies, in that it not only requires allies to strengthen armaments and deter competitors in the security realm, but also expects allies to adjust their economic, trade and technological policies to participate in the competition.

Second, the US and its European allies’ competition with Russia does not replicate the Cold War model, and the competition between the two sides is expected to be protracted in the political and security realms. During the Cold War, there were distinct boundaries between the two major military blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with both regarding the security of member states as their respective primary goal. Therefore, NATO’S response to the Soviet Union’s use of military forces within the Warsaw Pact was limited. The Warsaw Pact enjoyed a home advantage in Europe and a scale advantage in conventional forces, while NATO relied more on nuclear weapons. In the current strategic competition between NATO and Russia, however, NATO has been consistently expanding eastward while Russia can only passively respond, which leads to constant changes in the European security landscape. In terms of balance of power, NATO also enjoys a clear advantage in conventional weapons. At the same time, there has emerged an undefined middle zone since the 2000s that both sides have been striving for, such as Georgia and Ukraine, with the latter finally escalating into a hot conflict.

Third, there have been multi-level interactions between the great-power competition in Europe and in the Asia-pacific region. The implications of China’s rise have become a global issue. While the US and Europe no longer enjoy an overwhelming advantage in technological innovation, China’s industrial upgrading and high-tech achievements have been internationally recognized. Emerging strategic fields such as cyberspace, outer space and emerging technologies which are issues of relevance in the new round of strategic competition are also global in nature. The US regards both China and Russia as great-power competitors, and thus also needs to adjust its strategic orientation and resource allocation according to changing strategic needs in both directions.

The strategic competition between China and the US has spilled over to Europe and is linked with the competition between the US, Europe and Russia. The close economic and social ties between a rising China and NATO members have been securitized in the new round of great-power competition. Since 2017, China-us strategic competition has expanded

from East Asian geopolitics to economic, scientific and technological, and social realms. The US began to mobilize NATO allies to reduce ties with China in the above areas. At the same time, since 2010, Europe has encountered a series of internal and external challenges and setbacks such as the financial crisis, the Ukraine crisis, Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic, and its attitude toward China’s presence and influence in Europe has changed. In 2019, the EU, which traditionally paid more attention to economic and social agendas, labeled China as a “systematic challenge.” The military cooperation between China and Russia, which has extended to the neighborhood of Europe, has also raised NATO’S vigilance.

NATO is facing two major challenges in the new round of greatpower competition. First, the internal political and economic changes and foreign policy adjustments of its members have affected the foundation of the alliance. During the Cold War, the US and Europe experienced sustained and rapid economic growth, which facilitated the improvement of domestic problems. Since 2010, many European countries and the European integration process have been hit by the successive blows of the financial crisis, debt crisis and refugee crisis. Southern European countries such as Greece confronted severe economic challenges, the UK voted to leave the EU through a referendum, and populism characterized by anti-establishment and xenophobia reared its head in many countries. After the Turkish coup in 2016, the Erdogan administration began adopting a balance-of-power diplomacy and purchased S-400 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia, which hampered NATO’S military integration and drew opposition from the US and other NATO countries. US President Donald Trump’s “America First” concept and his negligence of European allies and the NATO alliance system also raised concerns among European countries toward transatlantic relations. Since 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic has dealt another blow to the region’s political, economic and social development.

Second, NATO’S strategic orientation and preferences formed during the Cold War could not fit in the new round of great-power competition. During the Cold War, NATO focused on Europe in the security realm and

responded to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact with collective defense based on deterrence. Although the new round of great-power competition includes traditional European security issues and the regional arms race, the focus of NATO deployment has not yet completely shifted from Western Europe to Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, areas not covered by NATO’S traditional framework, such as cyberspace and artificial intelligence, have become new areas of great-power competition. In addition, NATO has to handle great-power competition which is outside Europe but with global implications.

In response to great-power competition, NATO is adjusting its strategic orientation. First and foremost is the adjustment made by its members. In recent years, major NATO countries have begun strategic transformation in accordance with changes in international and domestic situations. In March 2021, the Biden administration issued the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance, which continued the direction of the Trump administration’s greatpower competition, but paid more attention to the enhancement of the US itself and its alliances and partnerships. At the same time, the UK government’s report Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy outlined the country’s strategic blueprint after the completion of the Brexit process. As NATO’S strategic decision-making is based on consultation and coordination, consensus will be built based on the new strategic plans of its member countries. In addition, member countries have been using the platform of NATO to conduct consultations and reach an agreement, and NATO itself is expected to launch a new organization-wide strategic concept in 2022.

Meanwhile, NATO is facing specific problems amid the great-power competition: first, its participation in and management of the competition with Russia, especially in the context of the intensifying Ukraine crisis; second, its limited participation in the US strategic competition with China; and third, its coordination with the strategic autonomy expected by Europe. The following three sections will respectively focus on NATO’S response in the three domains.

NATO’S Response to the Escalation of the Russia-ukraine Conflict

In response to the deteriorating European security situation since the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014, NATO has paid greater attention to its investment in traditional security. First, due to the Ukraine crisis and the US pressure, NATO member countries’ military expenditure has continued to rise. By 2021, the military expenditure of 10 member states other than the US had reached 2% of their respective GDP. Second, NATO has reinforced forward deployment against Russia, including strengthening air patrols on its east frontier, and deploying four ground combat groups in the three Baltic countries and Poland since 2016, each with about 1000 troops, led respectively by the US, UK, Germany and Canada.10 Third, it has attached importance to the deployment of forces and adjustment of the command system across the Atlantic, and improved the response speed of NATO’S military strategy. In 2021, NATO set up a joint operations command in Norfolk, US, in an effort to accelerate the delivery and integration between its North American and European forces.

However, the conflict between NATO and Russia over Ukraine goes beyond the defense of NATO members. First of all, the Russia-ukraine conflict over Crimea and the Donbas region involves the basic principles of international relations such as territorial sovereignty, which have tremendous implications for the European and global security order. Second, though Russia is considered to have a military edge over Ukraine, and Ukraine is neither a member of nor protected by NATO, NATO is open to the issue of Ukraine’s future accession and regards it as a matter of principle. Lastly, in the Russia-ukraine conflict, NATO, particularly the US, the UK and Eastern European member countries, have made all efforts to support Ukraine and balance against Russia.

The new round of escalation that led to an outbreak of hot conflict

between NATO and Russia from the end of 2021 to the beginning of 2022 has further reflected the dilemma of NATO. With a clear goal in mind, Russia has drawn a red line for NATO’S deployment in Eastern Europe and further eastward expansion by military and diplomatic means. In the second half of 2021, Russia deployed heavy troops on its border with Ukraine. In middecember, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed a draft treaty with the US and NATO, which required that NATO would no longer accept new members from Eastern Europe, and would restore its military deployment to the status before NATO’S eastward expansion in 1997 as the basis for negotiation.11

In response, NATO adopted a dual-track approach of deterrence and negotiation. Since Ukraine is a neighbor of Russia but not a member of NATO, NATO has limited tools for deterrence. Instead, to address the escalation of the “Russia threat,” some member countries stepped up military assistance to Ukraine, coordinated economic sanctions against Russia and reinforced NATO’S response force deployment in Eastern Europe, but these actions would not have a practical deterring effect. During this period, NATO’S response was also constrained by its members’ differing attitudes and policies. Although countries like the US and the UK were reluctant to engage in military conflicts with Russia, they would like to strengthen deterrence against Russia. Poland and the three Baltic countries were more afraid of Russia and expected NATO to increase defensive deployment and prevent conflicts from spilling over into their territories. Countries like France and Germany attached greater importance to communication and dialogue with Russia, and thus were reluctant to provoke Russia. Therefore, the US, the UK and the Baltic countries provided Ukraine with assistance in military equipment and training, while France and Germany refused to participate. Germany even prohibited other NATO members from transferring German-made weapons and equipment to Ukraine. The US and the UK also actively responded to the requests of NATO’S Eastern European members to strengthen their defense.

In late February 2022, Russia announced its recognition of the two “republics” in Donbas and sent troops into Ukraine. The outbreak of the Russia-ukraine conflict marked the strategic failure of NATO’S early attempt to prevent the crisis from escalating. This could be attributed to two factors. First, although NATO regards Ukraine as an important security issue, there is an asymmetry between NATO and Russia in terms of political determination and strategic means. Second, NATO’S economic and military counter-measures against Russia since 2014 and its failure to address Russia’s core security concerns in a timely manner have further weakened its influence on Russia’s strategic decisions.

Within just a month following the outbreak of the Russia-ukraine conflict, NATO made a series of military and political responses. On February 25, it activated the NATO Response Force for the first time.12 A virtual summit, and emergency meetings of the NATO Military Committee, member states’ foreign ministers, defense ministers and heads of state and government were successively held, and leaders of NATO partners such as the European Union and Ukraine were invited to some of the meetings. Through sustained consultation and mobilization, NATO member states reached consensus on responding to the conflict and supporting Ukraine. At the emergency summit on March 24, leaders agreed to deploy battalionlevel battle groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, strengthen cyber defense, and plan for the adjustment of NATO’S long-term military deployment, which would include long-term military presence in Eastern Europe and an increase of military spending.13

In addition to economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation against Russia, NATO members’ military assistance to Ukraine has also had a direct impact on the Russia-ukraine conflict. First, NATO member countries had provided training and assistance to the Ukrainian military long before the

conflict, which improved Ukraine’s combat capability as a whole. Second, the US and the UK have provided Ukraine with portable precision-guided weapons, which has enhanced the Ukrainian infantry’s ability to counter mechanized forces. Under the influence of NATO’S sustained diplomacy and public opinion mobilization around the Russia-ukraine conflict, some NATO member countries have gradually upgraded their material assistance to Ukraine, especially heavy weapons and equipment such as tanks, infantry combat vehicles and ground-to-air missiles. Third, the US has shared strategic and real-time battlefield intelligence with Ukraine to help the country obtain asymmetric advantages in situational awareness.14 Although NATO’S military assistance could not change the balance of military power between Russia and Ukraine, it has enhanced the Ukrainian forces’ combat capability in the long term.

The outbreak of the Russia-ukraine conflict and the impasse on the battlefield have brought new opportunities to NATO. First, the conflict has dispelled any doubt among NATO members about the relevance of the organization’s existence. Second, NATO members have united in an unprecedented way on a range of issues, such as sanctions against Russia, support for Ukraine and strengthening NATO’S military power. Germany not only agreed to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons, but also invested 100 billion euros in rearmament. Third, since the escalation of the conflict, a greater number of European countries has indicated the willingness to strengthen cooperation with NATO, or even join NATO, while Russia’s political passivity and military setbacks might also hand over to NATO greater initiative in shaping the future European security order.

However, the protracted conflict between Russia and Ukraine also means that NATO faces a series of challenges. First, the US and its allies on the European continent have different degrees of tolerance toward sanctions against Russia. They failed to be in lockstep on energy sanctions due to

European countries’ heavy dependence on Russian energy. Second, while NATO has taken various measures to support Ukraine to defeat Russia’s military operations, it also has to prevent the conflict from escalating, especially from spreading into NATO countries. In order not to provoke Russia, the US postponed the routine intercontinental missile test, conducted a lowkey test firing of hypersonic missiles, and also ensured that the US European Command maintain a hotline communication with the Russian military. However, as long as the conflict continues, it is difficult for all parties to eliminate the various risks that might cause escalation. Third, in addition to the risk of escalation, NATO’S long-term military assistance to Ukraine is also constrained by objective factors including member countries’ limited inventories of anti-tank missiles and other light weapons, as well as the constraints of their heavy equipment support. Because of NATO’S emphasis on interoperability and standardization, member countries have maintained a limited number of Soviet- or Russian-made main battle equipment in active service and inventory. Coupled with their probably poor maintenance, these weapons could not be provided in large quantities to meet Ukraine’s needs. The equipment made by the US and Europe, though technologically more advanced, requires a longer training process. Without corresponding logistics support and a sound command and control system, combat effectiveness would be unlikely. Fourth, the Nato-ukraine relationship has been put under test. To prevent involving itself in a conflict with the Russian military, NATO rejected Ukraine’s proposal to set up a no-fly zone in its airspace. In the process of crisis control and future rehabilitation, NATO’S relations with Ukraine and other countries might also become a new focus, and NATO’S open-door principle would be subject to further challenge.

NATO’S Limited Involvement in US Strategic Competition with China

Given that the US and NATO’S competition with Russia and the Russiaukraine conflict are put under relative control, NATO has both the capability

and the willingness to further focus on and engage in the US strategic competition with China. First of all, unlike the Us-soviet competition during the Cold War, getting involved in the US strategic competition with China would neither increase the military expenditure of NATO European members nor threaten their homeland security. Thus, from the military point of view, NATO’S investment in competition with China would not be costly or risky. Second, at the macro level, it could also harness the advantages of NATO’S existing framework by engaging in strategic dialogue and consultation over the “China challenge,” and strengthening cooperation in science, technology, intelligence and law enforcement to weaken China’s influence in Europe. Finally, responding to challenges posed by a new great power could in itself strengthen the cohesion of NATO and the transatlantic partnership.

Therefore, since assuming office, the Biden administration has emphasized revitalizing the American alliance system. The US harbored new expectations toward NATO allies in its great-power competition with China. In the Indo-pacific strategy released in February 2022, the Biden administration clearly proposed its expectation of NATO’S participation.15 Encouraged by Biden’s policy adjustment, NATO’S European members have made positive responses. First, they incorporated competition with China in the NATO 2030 Initiative. Second, they promised at the 2021 NATO summit to take China-related issues seriously in the new strategic guidance. In July 2021, NATO joined the US, UK, Canada, Australia, Japan and the European Union for the first time to publicly condemn China’s so-called “malicious cyber activities.”16 NATO also began to exert pressure on China regarding arms control.17 Third, the UK, France and other European military powers cooperated with or even participated in the US Indo-pacific strategy outside the NATO framework as a military show of force in China’s neighborhood,

which would then feed back to the traditional NATO framework and strengthen NATO’S orientation toward the so-called “China challenge.” In 2021, the US sent destroyers and F-35 fighter jets to join the British battle group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Indo-pacific, The Netherlands also sent its frigates into this area. Fourth, the new NATO Strategic Concept is expected to address the perceived China challenge. In April 2022, when most NATO European members were still severely affected by the Russia-ukraine conflict, NATO Secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg stressed the necessity for the organization to strengthen cooperation with its Asia-pacific partners in arms control, cyberspace and technology, and pointed out that the new NATO Strategic Concept to be introduced in June would for the first time address the “China challenge.”18

Meanwhile, there are apparently several constraints to NATO’S involvement in the US competition with China. First of all, NATO’S integrated command-and-control and combat readiness system still focuses on European security challenges and does not target China. Especially after the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, NATO would further concentrate on Europe in its security strategy. Second, compared with the Cold War, NATO’S role in the US competition with China has declined, and the US is more dependent on its major allies in China’s neighborhood in terms of military and security competition. European allies have limited returns from the US through NATO’S involvement in the competition with China. In September 2021, Australia, the UK and the US announced the establishment of their AUKUS trilateral security partnership, under which Australia would receive technological assistance from the US and the UK for nuclear-powered submarines. Without prior consultation with France, Australia canceled the project for conventional submarines that had been carried out with France. Finally, the US does not rely entirely on NATO to counter China’s influence in Europe. The Biden administration has engaged in policy coordination

with the European Union’s foreign service on China. Since the EU has greater influence than NATO on the domestic political, economic and social development of member countries, coordination with the EU is more in line with the US need to suppress China in terms of economic, technological and international influence.

Implications of European Autonomy on NATO

Against a new round of intensified great-power competition, talk of European strategic autonomy has aroused renewed attention. For a long time, the strategic interests of the US and Europe have been highly overlapping, but are not completely consistent. Great-power competition has also brought costs and risks to third parties, including Europe. Recent US domestic and foreign policy changes in recent years, especially the Trump administration’s contempt for allies and the Biden administration’s failure to consult and coordinate with NATO allies on the military withdrawal from Afghanistan and the AUKUS cooperation on nuclear submarines, have further raised concerns in Europe.

European countries’ appeal for strategic autonomy would affect NATO in two aspects. The first is the coordination among different strategic objectives. Great-power competition highlights the uncertainty of America’s medium-to-long-term strategic intentions, and poses potential challenges to Europe. In calling for strategic autonomy, Europe is not intended to oppose the US and NATO, but to clarify its own interests on major issues and properly handle the differences between Europe and the US as well as other major powers. The NATO consultation mechanism is conducive to dialogue and coordination between the US and the post-brexit UK and their continental allies on the issue of strategic autonomy.

The second aspect involves the enhancement of military capabilities. By guaranteeing US obligations to defend its European allies and promoting long-term transatlantic military cooperation, NATO has also created European dependency on the US militarily. In the Libyan War in 2011, although the UK, France and other countries were able to dispatch naval and air forces and

carry out most of the strike tasks, they could not do without the support of the US military operational system in terms of situation awareness, logistics support and early penetration.19 In high-intensity conflicts, and great-power conflicts in particular, Europe has a greater military dependency on the US. European countries regard the improvement of military capabilities, including the R&D and application of new technologies such as artificial intelligence, as an important part of strategic autonomy. However, European countries could not improve their military capabilities without US support. Even countries with strong R&D and production capabilities in the military field, such as the UK, France, Germany, could not do without cooperation with the US in their defense industries, which is reflected, among other things, in their participation in the R&D and production of the US military’s main combat equipment. In addition, the US has long expected its European allies to improve their military capabilities and further optimize division of labor in the alliance. As a RAND report argues, Europe’s emphasis on strategic autonomy and enhancing military capabilities would be an opportunity for the US to strengthen its alliance system.20

Thus, the European countries’ emphasis on strategic autonomy would have a limited impact on NATO. In particular, against the escalating Russiaukraine conflict, transatlantic cooperation in addressing security challenges would become the primary goal of all parties. In terms of strategic objectives, strategic autonomy would not enable European countries to formulate goals and agendas that conflict with NATO. In the Strategic Compass for Security and Defense for the next 10 years, which was approved by the European Commission in March 2022, it is emphasized that war has returned to Europe in the context of the Russia-ukraine conflict, and the EU needs to become a more capable security provider. The Compass also clearly points out

that a stronger and more capable EU in security and defense will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defense for its members.21 NATO’S consultation and coordination process are also conducive to the stability of USEU relations, and the development of European countries’ armed forces will also strengthen NATO’S military power.

Conclusion

NATO’S full participation in the Us-soviet competition in Europe during the Cold War era has left an imprint on its consultation and decision-making mechanism in political and diplomatic fields, as well as its operational mode in military and security realms. While the long-standing common security challenges and the US leadership were not enough to ensure the cohesion of NATO, member countries constantly coordinated around the organization’s strategic orientation and daily operation based on their respective domestic and foreign policies, thus forming the basis to maintain their participation and adapt NATO to different stages and challenges. By consolidating the transatlantic bloc in the Cold War, NATO made it difficult for the Soviet Union to coerce and divide the US and Western European countries. However, it was not NATO that defeated the Warsaw Pact, rather the Soviet Union’s mistakes in internal development and external strategies were the decisive factors for the end of the Cold War.

In the post-cold War era, NATO set out to explore a new European security order, stepped up exchanges and cooperation with Russia, and participated in addressing new regional and non-traditional security challenges, but its mindset and preferences formed during the Cold War have become a huge impetus for its eastward expansion. Despite the end of the East-west confrontation, NATO continues to measure its external relations

based on values, still emphasizes its dominance in the European security order, and believes that only by extending its security umbrella can the postcold War order be shaped and consolidated. Therefore, NATO equates its own development with the maintenance of the European security order, ignoring the long-term security concerns of Russia and other countries. NATO’S sustained eastward expansion in the post-cold War era has deprived Europe of the opportunity to establish a lasting and inclusive security order, paving the way for the escalation of friction between Us-europe and Russia and a new round of great-power competition.

In the face of the great-power competition since 2017, NATO has constantly been transforming itself and still yielding important influence. The security competition between NATO and Russia is different from that between the US and the Soviet Union in terms of geographical scope and competition patterns. In its response to the Russia-ukraine conflict particularly, NATO not only needs to curb the current conflagration but also needs to prevent its escalation. The long-term impact of the conflict on the European security order would be another challenge for the organization to address. At the same time, despite the outbreak of the Russia-ukraine conflict, the US still regards China as a long-term and primary great-power competitor, and has mobilized NATO to participate in its strategic competition with China in many areas. Although the US and Europe have reached some degree of consensus on the strategy toward China, and NATO will also partially get involved in the competition against China, NATO’S military system is unlikely to be fully embroiled in the US competition with China, which has different implications for Europe from the Soviet Union in the Cold War era or the current Russia. In addition, due to the differences in geographical environment and security hotspots between the Asia-pacific and Europe, it is difficult for the US to establish a highly integrated multilateral military system within its Asia-pacific alliance network similar to that of NATO. In the long run, both the US and Europe have to constantly coordinate their competition with Russia and with China according to the overall strategic situation and their respective domestic and external environment.

In response to the US mobilization of its NATO allies to participate in a new round of great-power competition, China first needs to make accurate strategic judgments and set correct goals. Despite long-standing differences between the US and Europe and within NATO, including those on the strategy toward China, it is unwise to expect NATO to split or mobilize European countries to support China. The unrealistic expectation for European countries and attempts to break up the transatlantic alliance through pressure would further push NATO away from China. Through its own development and strategy, however, China is able to keep NATO’S participation in the Us-china competition in military and security areas at a low level. Second, in the face of the impact of the Russia-ukraine conflict on European security and the global order, China needs to carry out its majorcountry diplomacy and multilateral relations in a prudent way. In particular, China-russia relations need to be established on the basis of non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third parties, and guard against interference and provocation by third parties. At the same time, China needs to dispel the misperception of China-russia cooperation as being against NATO, thus preventing NATO from further targeting China. Third, China needs to carry out dialogues and exchanges with NATO and its member states in the fields of cyberspace, outer space and emerging technologies, and build crisis management mechanisms where possible, in an effort to prevent miscalculations and prepare for further cooperation on other nontraditional security issues. Lastly, most NATO members are willing to manage competition and reduce costs, and do not want the strategic competition to hamper their domestic development. Given this, China needs to demonstrate in diplomacy that it not only attaches importance to achieving its own development goals, but also welcomes the development of other countries and promotes mutually beneficial cooperation. China’s rational choices would have an impact on NATO through its member states and decision-making mechanism, and play a role in competition management and shaping a favorable environment for a long time to come.

1 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, New York: Atlantic Press, 1967, pp.407-410.

2 Gregory W. Pedlow, The Evolution of NATO’S Command Structure: 1951-2009, NATO, https://shape. nato.int/resources/21/evolution%20of%20nato%20cmd%20structure%201951-2009.pdf.

3 Shaun R. Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response, London: Macmillan Press, 1996.

4 “Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” NATO, July 5-6, 1990, https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm.

5 “Steering Brief for the British Delegation to the MBFR Exploratory Talks [WDN 27/1],” FCO, January 30, 1973, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Ser.3 Vol.03: Detente in Europe, 1972-76, London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp.18-22.

6 William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015, pp.115129.

7 William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, p.152.

8 “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” NATO, April 3, 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_8443.htm?mode=pressrelease.

9 Michael Mcfaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America, London: Penguin Books, 2019, pp.76-108.

10 “NATO’S Enhanced Forward Presence,” February 2021, NATO, https://shape.nato.int/resources/ site16187/general/factsheets/factsheet_efp_2021.pdf.

11 “Press Release on Russian Draft Documents on Legal Security Guarantees from The United States and NATO,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russia Federation, December 17, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/ en/foreign_policy/news/1790809/.

12 “SACEUR Statement on the Activation of the NATO Response Force,” SHAPE, February 25, 2022, https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2022/saceur-statement-on-the-activation-of-the-nato-response-force. 13 “Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government,” NATO, 24 March 2022, https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm?selectedlocale=en, 2022-04-02.

14 John Grady, “Intel Sharing Between U.S. and Ukraine ‘Revolutionary’ Says DIA Director,” USNI News, March 18, 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/03/18/intel-sharing-between-u-s-and-ukraine-revolutionary-saysdia-director.

15 “Indo-pacific Strategy of The United States,” The White House, February 2022, https://www. whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/u.s.-indo-pacific-strategy.pdf.

16 “Statement by the North Atlantic Council in Solidarity with Those Affected by Recent Malicious Cyber Activities Including the Microsoft Exchange Server Compromise,” NATO, July 19, 2021, https://www.nato. int/cps/en/natohq/news_185863.htm.

17 “NATO Secretary General Sets out Arms Control Priorities,” NATO, September 6, 2021, https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_186313.htm?selectedlocale=en, 2022-04-10.

18 “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 6 and 7 April 2022,” NATO, April 5, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/opinions_194325.htm.

19 Li Chen, “The Employment of the U.S. and European Military Forces in the Lybian Campaign,” The Journal of International Studies, No.1, 2014, pp.104-124.

20 Lucia Retter, Stephanie Pezard, Stephen Flanagan, Gene Germanovich, Sarah Grand Clement, Pauline Paille, European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic Visions and Implications for NATO, US and EU relations, RAND Corporation, November 9, 2021, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ research_reports/rra1300/rra1319-1/rand_rra1319-1.pdf.

21 “A Strategic Compass for a Stronger EU Security and Defence in the Next Decade,” Council of the EU, March 21, 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compassfor-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/.