China-Japan Relations after Prime Minister Abe’s Visit to China

2018 marked the 40th anniversary of the signing of China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty and also the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and opening-up. China-Japan relations entered a new stage, a major mark of which was the resumption of exchange of official leadership visits between the two countries that had been interrupted for years. Following Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s successful visit to Japan in May 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made an official visit to China, which forcefully promoted practical cooperation between the two countries as well as set China-Japan relations back on track.

The Results and Limits of Abe’s Visit to China

The visit of Abe was the first Japanese leader’s visit to China in seven years, thus attracted quite a little attention. Before his visit, Abe expressed his desire to move Japan-China relations to a new stage. It was in line with common interest of both countries for China and Japan to resume high-level visits between them and to make joint efforts to promote the development of their strategic mutual beneficial relations. But meanwhile, one should also note the problems that exist in China-Japan relations.

I. Exchange of Leadership Visits between China and Japan Promotes Practical Cooperation

During Abe’s visit to China between October 25 and 27, 2018, both sides affirmed to continue to go byChina-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty in developing friendly cooperative relations between them. In accordance to the treaty, China-Japan Joint Communique of 1972 provided the foundation of peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, and all principles of the communique should be strictly observed.

In political and security fields, leaders of both countries went in depth in comparing notes and made positive progress. During his meeting with Abe, President Xi Jinping remarked that China and Japan should interact more actively in the security area, foster constructive security relations, and pursue the path of peace and development for regional peace and stability. Prime Minister Abe expressed that it was hoped that through this visit, the two sides would usher in a new era with competition transforming into coordination. As close neighbors, Japan and China should push forward bilateral ties on the basis of the principles set in their four political documents and in the spirit of cooperating in a mutual-beneficial way and not posing a threat to each other. He suggested that the two countries should contribute to regional and international peace as well as free trade. Compared with what Abe had made known before in Japan and abroad, the above important positionschanged significantly and put on a positive posture to make concerted efforts with China.

In the area of economic and financial cooperation, the situation has changed from the Japanese side providing the Chinese side with assistance to both sides cooperating to develop thirdparty markets. From 2008 on, Japan had stopped new Yen loans to China, only a small amount of free assistance being retained. Starting from 2018, Japan stopped all official development assistance to China. During Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Japan, the two countries signed the Memorandum on Business Cooperation in Third-Party Markets . During Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China, he attended the first forum on China-Japan third-party market cooperation on October 26, 2018, participated

by 1400 people from both countries. At the forum, 52 cooperation agreements and memoranda were signed between financial institutions, enterprises and business groups from both countries, rendering a new start and new look to China-Japan practical cooperation as China celebrated the 40th anniversary of reform and opening-up.

China-Japan third-party market cooperation features the following, first, extensive areas for cooperation including finance, insurance, infrastructure construction, energy, transport, logistics, information technology and IT industries, energy-conservation and environmental protection, artificial intelligence, medical care and Smart City and so on; secondly, a large number of cooperation agreements being in finance and insurance, 13 agreements pertaining to financial support for enterprises of both countries to cooperate in thirdparty markets; third, China’s coastal provinces and major cities reaching the most of cooperative intent with the Japanese side, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Hainan while landlocked provinces like Xinjiang and Jilin also participating.

In the area of financial cooperation, China and Japan took a new step forward. The People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Japan signed an agreement for a bilateral currency swap, whose size being RMB200 billion (about 3.4 trillion Japanese yen) for a period of three years, aiming to maintain financial stability, reduce currency exchange cost from fluctuation of the US dollar and promote the development of bilateral trade and financial cooperation between the two countries. At the same time as Japan reached the currency swap agreement with China, it also reached a similar agreement with India at an amount of US$75, more than doubling that of China-Japan agreement. It illustrates the fact that in face of the Trump Administration, Japan is enhancing practical precaution against financial risks from the US dollar. However, it does not mean that Japan will break away from the United States on strategic terms.

In the areas of strengthening maritime crisis management, both side reached consensus in setting up mechanism for diplomatic consultation, Chinese Ministry of Transport and Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs having signed an agreement on facilitating cooperation in maritime search and rescue operations. Both sides have reached several consensuses on conducting dialogue and cooperation in maritime and security areas, including defense departments of both countries holding the first meeting of air and maritime contact mechanismsin 2018, exchange and visits between defense departments and maritime law enforcements, holding China-Japan high level consultation on maritime affairs and China-Japan security dialogue at an early date, and setting up maritime contact hot line as soon as possible.

II. Japanese Side is Ambiguous on the Belt and Road Initiative

During Abe’s visit to China, President Xi Jinping pointed out that joint construction of the Belt and Road provided a new platform and test field for both countries to deepen their mutually beneficial cooperation. At present, Japan’s policy-making thinking is yet to be freed from realistic power politics and traditional geopolitical strategy, also constrained by the attitude of the United States. Eyeing on China, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso have put forward socalled “value diplomacy” and proposed “arc of freedom and prosperity” and “alliance of Japan, the US, Australia and India”. Therefore the Belt and Road for them is nothing but counterweight, breakout and challenge to Japan’s strategic vision. In spite of it, as international economic and trade environment has changed dramatically, Japan cannot but seek to conduct third-party market cooperation with China. In this regard, China has adopted a cooperative attitude of seeking common ground while shelving differences, fostering strong points while circumventing weaknesses and giving up nominals for essentials. Between China and Japan, there are huge potentials for bilateral and regional practical cooperation waiting to be tapped.

China-Japan Structural Contradictions Still Deserve Attention

As Japan’s international and domestic situation changes, opportunities and challenges to China-Japan relations may appear alternatively, which is determined by structural contradictions and situational changes between the two countries. At present, between the two countries such contradictions as on the historical issues, the Diaoyu Islands issue, the South China Sea issue and on security and international strategy have not been fundamentally resolved.

A focus of China-Japan structural contradictions is the Japanese leadership’s views on history and war. Shortly before Abe’s recent visit to China, he offered tributes in the name of Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine, thus indirectly worshiping the class “A” war criminals placed there for joint worship together with other souls. It was a tactical readjustment on Abe’s part in view of Japan’s relationship with neighboring countries while insisting on his views on history. On October 23, 2018, Abe made a speech to mark the 150thanniversary of the Meiji Restoration, in which he did not made any rethinking on the fact that on the average once every decade the Meiji Government launched or took part in a war overseas.

In regard to his views on history and war, Abe has inherited the political legacy of his maternal grandfather Kishi Nobusuke, suspect of Japan’s class “A” war criminal and former Prime Minister. During his visit to China, he made a special note that his father Shintaro Abe had been Chief Cabinet Secretary to Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo when the latter concluded Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty. Such duality of Abe is determined by his family background and social existence.

The Abe Cabinet has sought to revise the constitution and produced a new National Defense Program Outline, which consists of another focus of China-Japan structural contradictions. After Abe’s visit to China, he was to try to present a constitutional amendment bill of the Liberal Democratic Party to the National Diet and set to complete the

Diet review process by July 2019 before Japanese elections for House of Councillors. Once this objective is achieved, in order to win popular support for constitutional amendment in a referendum to follow, the Abe Cabinet may likely put forward the theory of so-called China threat and even make troubles in the East China and South China Seas and in the Taiwan Straits. The new edition of Japan’s National Defense Program Outline is even more pinpointed to China.

In the long run, it will involve Japan’s strategic trend in the future whether or not it can amend its constitution and how to do so. Datuk Seri Mahathir, Prime Minister of Malaysia, observed recently that Japan’s pacifist constitution is a model that is worth learning for Malaysia. If the amendment of Japanese constitution is to allow the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to go to war, it will be a historical fall back. As such, once Japan amends its postwar constitution, its Asian neighbors will comprehensively reexamine the country.

The cognitive ownership dispute over the Diaoyu Islands is yet another focus of China-Japan structural contradictions. On the very day when Abe began his visit to China, SDF warships were cruising in waters of the South China Sea and receiving oil filling from US warships, as Japan-US joint military maneuver went on as usual. As an ASEAN diplomat observed in private, everyone knew as a matter of fact that Japan becoming involved in the South China Sea was due to it being in the wrong on the issue of Diaoyu Islands, aiming to rid its disadvantage in the East China Sea.

As reported by Japanese media, according to the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation revised in 2015, the Japanese and the US governments are working on a plan for joint operations of the SDF and the US forces against China, pinpointed to the Diaoyu Islands, to be finished by March 2019. For this purpose, Japan formed its first amphibious rapid deployment brigade, a marine unit of the SDF in March 2018 and has decided for purchasing 17 Osprey warplanes from the US by 2021, planning to deploy 53 Osprey warplanes all over the country. In order to enhance Izumo warship’s air-carrier operational capacity, Japan also plans to buy a number of F35 warplanes from the US.

The complex and changing game between China and Japan is like as if both sides wereplaying the grand chess games at the same time, that is chess on historical, Taiwan and Diaoyu Islands issues; go chess in international security strategy and diplomacy; and hop checkers on issues like third-party market cooperation and currency swap, hopping over ChinaJapan structural contradictions in reaching several practical economic, trade and financial agreements. Sometimes, it is difficult for different chess tactics and rules not to mutually affect one another, but they cannot replace one another. In the three grand chess games, the grand chess game involving structural contradictions between the two countries is decisive, and it is difficult for the hop checkers game to be free from the constraints of the chess game or the go chess game. As such, one should refrain from making sweeping generalization or being impulsive in dealing with ChinaJapan relations, but rather, face contradictions, create conditions and promote it to develop in the direction that favors long-term peaceful cooperation between the two countries.

Looking to the future, the opportunities and challenges in face of improving China Japan relations will appear alternatingly. For steady development of China-Japan relations, it is necessary for people of all walks of life in both countries to make unyielding efforts.

China and Japan Should Keep Promises and Be Practical in Moving forward

Looking to the future, the opportunities and challenges in face of improving China-Japan relations will appear alternatingly. The forces that would not like to see China-Japan relations improve will make troubles and create chaos precisely in the period of opportunity for improving the bilateral relationship. Therefore, for steady development of China-Japan relations, it is necessary for people of all walks of life in both countries to make unyielding efforts.

First, with an eye toward 2022, it is advisable to grasp and use various opportunities to the full and keep spurring China-Japan relations to keep improving. 2019 is “China-Japan Youth Exchange Promotion Year”. Through exchange, young people of both countries can learn history, cherish peace and create future together. 2022 marks the 50th anniversary of normalization of China-Japan relations. In the year, China will host Olympic Winter Games in Beijing and Zhangjiakou and Asian Games in Hangzhou, and thus sports exchange and personal exchange will be even more active. Occasions such as China, Japan and South Korea hosting leadership trilateral meetings on rotation and leadership visits between China and Japan can be used to promote improvement and development of ChinaJapan relations and spur negotiations for China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to make positive advance.

Second, improvement of China-Japan relations can pave the way for that of China-US relations. The conclusion of China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty gave political and legal ground to the bilateral relationship, thus facilitating the establishment of China-US diplomatic relations and, in turn, helping create favorable international environment for China to take economic development as central task and adopt reform and opening-up policy.

Forty years onwards, China and Japan celebrated the 40th anniversary of

the signing of China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty, endeavoring to improve their bilateral relationship which just like before favoring improvement of China-US relations. During his visit to China, Abe expressed his hope for China and the US to further their dialogue and reduce frictions. It was because continued deterioration of ChinaUS relations with intensified economic and trade frictions at the moment was not in line with the interest and diplomatic tempo of Japan.

On December 1, 2018, when he attended the G20 leaders’ summit, President Xi Jinping had dinner and meeting with US President Donald Trump in Argentina capital Buenos Aires at the latter’s invitation. In candid and friendly atmosphere, both of the heads of states had in-depth exchange of views on ChinaUS relations and international issues of common concern and reached important consensus. As January 1, 2019 marks the 40th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US, both countries should seize the opportunity to bring their bilateral relationship back on track, which would be helpful for a benign circle of mutual promotion of China-US-Japan relations.

Third, it is advisable to understand the present by reviewing the past, to carry forward the cause pioneered by older generations and forge ahead into the future, and earnestly observe all of the principles in the four political documents between China and Japan, which were written and formulated in document forms with the concerted efforts of leaders of older generation and diplomatic department of both countries. The principles are of very important practical significance and lasting historical effects.

To summarize the content of the four China-Japan political documents, there are fifteen principles that should be followed by both countries as follows, first, the principle for the Japanese side to deeply introspect its history of aggression; second, the principle for the Japanese side to abide by “one China” principle and the Potsdam Proclamation; third, the principle for the Japanese side only to have non-governmental and regional relations with Taiwan; fourth, the principle of peaceful coexistence and mutual non-use of force; fifth, the principle of not seeking hegemony and opposing hegemony; Sixth, the principle of good neighborliness, friendship and enhancement of exchanges; seventh, the principle of equality, mutual benefit and lasting stability; eighth, the principle of peace, friendship and cooperation; ninth, the principle of seeking common ground while shelving differences and friendly consultation; tenth, the principle of building on mutual political trust; eleventh, the principle of building friendly and cooperative partnership for peace and development; twelfth, the principle of developing strategic mutually beneficial relationship in an allround way; thirteenth, the principle of promoting regional peace, stability and development; fourteenth, the principle of opposing nuclear proliferation and fifteenth, the principle of openness, transparency and inclusiveness.

All of the content relating to the above fifteen principles can be found in the four China-Japan political documents. They are correlative, complementary and forming a complete unit. Among them, the principles ranging from the first to the fifth are foundation and premise of China-Japan friendly relations; those ranging from the sixth and the twelfth, objectives and guarantees of the bilateral relationship; and those ranging from the thirteenth to the fifteenth, positions and policy orientation of both countries on regional, multilateral and global cooperation.

Whether or not China-Japan relations can continue to develop on track does not rely on whether the two countries will come up with a fifth political document or put forward new principles but rather whether or not both side can truthfully abide by the above principles of the four political documents. A Chinese saying goes that good faith is basis for all things. As former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama admonished, Japan should not make handshake with one hand while making a fist with another.

Fourth, it is necessary for China and Japan to conduct “knowledge diplomacy”. First of all, it is necessary to truly know the facts relating to important issues of China-Japan relations and their merits and demerits. Former Japanese Prime Ministers Tomiichi Murayama, Toshiki Kaifu, Yukio Hatoyama and Yasuo Fukuda have made respective visits to Nanjing, viewing the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, which is “knowledge diplomacy” in practice. It is out of ignorance that some of the people under the influence of rightist ideology in Japan called ugly for names and assassinated the characters of those former Prime Ministers for visiting Nanjing. It illustrates conversely the necessity of “knowledge diplomacy”.

On the true fact of the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands, even normal Japanese diplomats’ knowledge goes no further than their government’s calibrated statement let alone rank and file Japanese people. Most of the people are ignorant, but of course some people deliberately evade the historical fact and even distort and fabricate the fact. The fact is that the Japanese side dares not to face the fact the Diaoyu Islands have been an inherent territory of China since the Ming and Qing dynasties; that most of the Japanese people do not know that 20 years before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, Japan’s Navy Ministry had identified the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese islands to the northeast of Taiwan; that they are reluctant to acknowledge the fact that the ownership of postwar Japanese territories as decided by the Potsdam Proclamation and the Cairo Declaration has legal validity whereas the San Francisco Treaty of Peace with Japan has no legal validity to China at all; that they do not know the fact the first statement on Japanese ownership of “Senkadu Islands” (that is the Diaoyu Islands) by the Japanese Foreign Ministry was made on March 8, 1972, more than two months after the statement on Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Under such circumstances, it is hardly possible for the Japanese people to fundamentally improve their affinity to China. Therefore, conducting “knowledge diplomacy” through people-topeople exchange and youth exchange between China and Japan is both a longterm task and a pressing matter.