New Developments and Implications in US-Europe Alliance under Trump Administration
The transatlantic alliance between the US and Europe within the framework of NATO is the longest and closest alliance relationship in the world today. Since taking office, President Donald Trump has sent “shockwaves” of readjusting US policy toward Europe, intensifying the already serious contradictions accumulated between the two sides. As a result, the transatlantic alliance has found itself in the greatest crisis since the Iraq War. Not only does deterioration of USEurope alliance affect the destiny of the alliance itself, it will also challenge the future development of the EU and even affect the trend of strategic international pattern in the 21st century.
New Changes and Features of US-Europe Alliance
The collective defense and security cooperation within the NATO framework is the cornerstone of US-Europe alliance. Since taking office, President Trump has played hardball and brought great pressure on Europe, leading to escalation of frictions between the US and Europe and giving rise to a series of new changes and new features in the alliance.
1. Disputes over NATO Military Spending Underline Increased Trading Element in US-Europe Alliance
European security is the center of gravity of NATO defense. All of the post-war US presidents had supported clear-cut NATO and US commitment to European security. However, President Trump has openly questioned the value of the NATO and, on the issue of NATO military spending, pressured the European allies to quicken their pace of meeting the 2% of GDP target for military spending. Trump put it frankly that the era of “free-ride” has come to an end. Unless situation changes on the European side, the US will no longer commit itself to European security like what it did during the Cold War years. In Trump’s thinking, the protectorprotected relationship between the US and Europe is a matter of trade rather than duty. The US will not perform its responsibility to protect until the European allies within the NATO pay for the cost. This concept of trade, though clearly different from traditional US concept of alliance duty, fits Trump’s style of government. With a business background, he tends to pursue economic interests and attaches importance to bargaining like a trader.
Europe is discontented and antipathetic to the Trump administration that behaves like a trader with Europe, pursuing its own interest in disregard of amity and friendship. However, depending on the US for security, it has to take actions to assuage US accusations. In the past two years, the European countries have increased their military spending. It is estimated that by 2024, the number of NATO member countries that meet the 2% of GDP target will increase to 15 from 3. Against the backdrop of continued deterioration of US-Russia relations in recent years, the Trump administration seems to have restrained its criticism
of Europe. The US National Security Strategy Report published by the White House at the end of 2017 stressed on the importance of US-Europe Alliance and the NATO and reiterated US commitment to NATO security.
Although the dispute on NATO military spending has been assuaged somehow, its motivation and effects cannot go away easily. In view of the Trump administration insisting on the policy position of “shared responsibility”, it is likely that the contradiction between the US and Europe will break out now and then. In the future, the strategic alliance relationship between the US and Europe may go on but its feature of trading between the two will stand out more and more and even run the risk of falling into some union for trade. This new change and trend reflects the structural imbalance in US-Europe alliance, that is, on security, Europe still harbor strong strategic and psychological dependence on the US whereas the US under Trump could not care less about the traditional role of Europe. Nor is it willing to perform its treaty responsibilities.
2. Separation of Security Interests Leads to Loosened US-Europe Alliance
During the Cold War, Europe was the center of gravity of US-Europe alliance, the US and Europe having shared interests and objectives in defending European security. As the main battlefield of US-Soviet rivalry, Europe is of extremely significant strategic importance to the US. Since the outset of the 21st century, the US has conceived the idea of switching its center of strategic gravity to the Asia-Pacific, which is the main incentive of separating US-Europe security interests. After the Obama administration was in place, it put forward the “pivoting to Asia” strategy, formally commencing the process of shifting US strategic focus to the East. This shift indicated that the presumed threat to US global leadership and geopolitical interests was from neither Europe nor the Middle East. It meant that the geopolitical significance of transatlantic alliance became less important for the US. Europe worried about that the US would move away from its traditional allies in Europe and put its focus of attention only on its friends and enemies in Asia.
Since taking office, Trump has put forward and implemented the IndoPacific strategy, continuing to shift US strategic focus to the East. The IndoPacific strategy seeks to construct an informal quartet alliance of the US, Japan, Australia and India against China. This new trend makes Europe more worrisome, both about the US neglecting European security and about China policy differences between the US and Europe decreasing its importance further in US global strategy. Besides the Indo-Pacific strategy, the exit of Trump administration from the Iran nuclear deal dealt another heavy blow to US-Europe relations. When the Iran nuclear deal was reached in 2015, it was considered by the EU a diplomatic victory of multilateralism. More significantly, it was considered an important security interest to
underpin stability of the neighboring area. Not only did the Trump administration’s exit from the pact in May 2018 put to the brink of collapse the diplomatic result that had made Europe so proud, it has also endangered stability and security of the Middle East region. The US unilaterally tearing up the Iran nuclear deal triggered off another crisis of the transatlantic relationship.
Separation of extraterritorial regional security interests beyond the NATO between the US and Europe has played a centrifugal and diluting role for the transatlantic alliance, whose original center of gravity used to be European security. As a result, the traditional USEurope alliance may move toward a loosened union, whose degree of closeness and level of cooperation vary by overlapping security interests between both sides in different regions. In Europe, as there is greater convergence of interests between both sides in joint defense against security threat from Russia, the degree of closeness and level of cooperation of the alliance is relatively high whereas in Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific and the Middle East and other extraterritorial regions beyond the NATO, as security interests separate between both sides, the degree of closeness and level of cooperation of the alliance is relatively low.
3. Deepening EU Defense Cooperation Underlines Competition Side of US-Europe Alliance
To establish independent defense and even a European Army is an aspiration long cherished by the EU. Since the Lisbon Treaty introduced the article of permanent structural cooperation (PESCO), the EU has accelerated defense cooperation. In recent years, it has set up European Defense Fund at a value of 5.5 billion Euros for defense R&D and military procurement of its member countries. It has signed PESCO joint defense agreement, allowing its member countries to gradually conduct military cooperation in specific areas. EU measures in deepening defense cooperation strongly imply to cope with changed US-Europe relations. In face of a series of actions taken by the Trump administration at the expense of European security interests, Europe has considered the US a less than reliable ally for security. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel observed, “the days when we entirely rely on others have come to an end to some degree. Europe needs to take its destiny in its own hand and to set up natural partnership with the US”. On several occasions, French President Emmanuel Macron called for rebuilding independent European defense forces, establishing a European Army included. He believes that it is necessary for Europe to strengthen its self-defense capacity rather than rely on the US only.
After the Cold War, the US is ambivalent about the EU developing its defense capabilities. Though agreeing with EU security and defense policy, the US has tried to include it into the security strategy of the NATO and to prevent the EU from setting up its own separate outfit. Trump is extremely unhappy
about Macron’s thinking of building a European Army. He warns the EU that in Europe the US will always remain and what the US asks for is all paying their fair shares for the NATO. The dispute over a European Army reflects the rivalry between the US and Europe for leadership in European security affairs. Though the EU avows not to become a military union in competition with the NATO, it has to take more concrete actions to enhance its own defense capabilities in face of increased uncertainty with US-Europe alliance.
US-Europe contest and competition centering on leadership in European security affairs reflects the structural contradictions in US-Europe relations that have arisen since the Cold War ended. The EU desires to build a more equal partnership with the US whereas the US is not willing to take the EU for an equal partner, even though it accepts the international status and function of the EU and has set up dialogue and consultation mechanism with it and even carried out coordinated and cooperative joint actions in various areas to some extent. To limit the development of EU independent defense capabilities is part of the strategy of the Trump administration toward Europe, whose aim is to preserve US leadership in European security affairs and US control over the EU. In the future, continued deepening of EU defense cooperation will inevitably lead to deepened contradictions between the US and NATO on one hand and EU independent defense on the other.
Motivation for Changes in US-Europe Alliance
The above new changes in USEurope alliance are results of continued and deepened readjustment of the transatlantic alliance in the wake of the Cold War. At the same time, they carry salient personal feature of Trump. In regard to their motivation, there are several points to make.
First of all, the Trump phenomenon that is tinged with the idea of America First and featured by unilateral egoism is the core crux for deterioration of USEurope alliance this time around. As Trump’s America First foreign policy thinking goes, it should not be constrained by international institutions to preserve US security and prosperity. Rather, American interests should be taken for the sole yardstick of all foreign policy making, end justifying means. It is noteworthy that America First goes hand in hand with unilateral egoism, or in another word, the latter serving as the ways and means for reaching the objective of America First. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has increasingly taken the current multilateral mechanisms for constraint on maximizing its own interests. It cannot wait to “exit” from all of them. On economic and trade, global governance and collective security, the Trump administration’s selfishness, exits and castingoff-burden are its concrete expressions. It illustrates that on Trump’s watch, the idea of America First and unilateralist thinking have gone to the extreme and profoundly impacted US foreign policy. It also reflects that there are increasing differences between the US and Europe in concepts of international order and multilateralism, which are precisely the root cause for “deterioration” of USEurope alliance.
Secondly, readjustment of international strategy by the US and European mismatching security strategic options between them are the direct motivation for alienation of US-Europe alliance. Since the 21st century began, US composite strength has been on decline in relative terms, increasingly ill-fitting its ambition to lead the world, resulting in the fact that US grand strategy becomes increasingly introvert and more selective in participating in international affairs. Since taking office, Trump has contracted his policy focus to domestic affairs, underscoring the strategic introvert tendency. At the same time, the EU has also quickened its pace in readjusting foreign strategy to meet various crises and challenges. As European Union Global Strategy that came out in 2016 pointed out, in the age of uncertainty, it is not sufficient to possess soft power only. It is necessary for the EU to enhance its security and defense capacities to be a trustworthy actor in the international community. The new changes in US-Europe relations since Trump took office make it more urgent for Europe to seek strategic independence. Europe has come to see that it must be selfreliant in preparing for dramatic future changes in the world. Recently, the EU has taken a series of concrete actions to deepen defense cooperation, which reflects the new tendency for it to seek strategic independence. So far as its impacts on US-Europe relations are concerned, it signifies a more noteworthy change.
Finally, the changed international environment after the Cold War and the changed composite strength and interests between the US and Europe have weakened the social and public opinion basis for transatlantic alliance. According to a survey by American Pew Research Center in April 2016, 57% of Americans believed that the US should focus on its domestic problems while other countries should look after their own problems. The fact that Trump, who had called for America First, was elected US president indicates further ascendance of forces for isolationism, conservatism and populism in the US. More and more Americans believe that it cannot and should not be for the US to continue to protect the relatively stable and rich democracies so far away as in Europe. At the same time, popular discontent with the US is on the rise in European societies. Since becoming US president, Trump has been supportive of populism in Europe, indifferent to the EU and hostile to it on trade, which further increases social divisions on both shores of the Atlantic while making Trump himself unpopular in Europe. According to a survey published by Pew Research Center in June 2017, popular confidence of West Europe in US president plummeted. Comparing the figure for Obama, German confidence in Trump dropped from 84% to 11%; that of France, from 84% to 14%; and that of Britain, from 79% to 22%. On both shores of the Atlantic, social and
popular acceptance for US-Europe alliance is on the decrease, which is both a motivation for the US and Europe to readjust their international strategy and an important viable that widens the crack in transatlantic alliance.
Multiple Impacts of Changing US-Europe Alliance
On Trump’s watch, new changes in US-Europe alliance will produce multiple impacts, boiling down in the following areas.
First of all, intensification of USEurope contradictions will lead to widening crack in transatlantic alliance and fading away of US-Europe alliance. Though the US proclaims to keep its commitment to European security, its reliability is less than credible to Europe. The trust of Europe in the US as security partner has dipped to a historical low. In the short and mid run, strategic alliance between the US and Europe may go on, but decreasing level of mutual trust and increasing elements of trade will continue to erode and weaken the foundation of common interests between both sides. As a result, US-Europe alliance will become more practical and even run the risks of gradually sliding into a loosened union that is, by nature, trading.
Secondly, the development of EU and US-EU relations will be challenged and constrained. Currently, the process of European integration and the development of the EU are at a historical crossroads. The readjustment on foreign policy by the Trump administration puts great pressure on Europe, rocking what the EU relies on such as multilateralism, transatlantic cooperative mechanisms and globalization. At the same time, the Trump administration’s exit from international treaties and organizations together with its contraction strategy is likely to create new strategic vacuum in regions like Europe and the Middle East and thereby increase geopolitical uncertainty in Europe’s neighborhood, which will not only impact the EU’s environment for subsistence and development but also bring about a more uncertain international environment for the EU in the process of shaping its own interests and seeking partners.
Finally, changes in US-Europe alliance, to some extent, affect the trend of US-Europe-Russia and US-EuropeChina triangle relationships. Though in the short run, it is unlikely for the EU to fundamentally break away from its strategic alliance with the US, it is likely for it to be more open to strategic cooperation with other major countries based on its needs for diplomatic independence and strategic autonomy and, to a degree, its needs for counterweighing US pressure. At present, there is a phenomenon of “political and economic de-linkage” arising from Europe-Russia relations. On the one hand, the EU stresses on security threat from Russia. On the other, it actively seeks to expand economic and energy cooperation with Russia. Since the Crimea Incident happened, the US and Europe have placed Russia under joint economic sanctions. However, the EU is discontent with serious economic damages accruing to it. Out of geopolitical considerations, the EU would not like to make its security relations with Russia unduly tense. Rather, it is the US that, out of its own strategic considerations, would not like to see that Europe-Russia relations get close and intends to place Europe-Russia relations under certain controlled tension by building on antagonism. In the future, presumed security threat from Russia will continue to be adhesive for transatlantic alliance while bilateral interactions between Europe and Russia will also somehow affect US-Europe alliance.
In Asia, as the US shifts its strategic focus to the East and the EU increases its involvement in East Asian affairs, US-Europe-China triangle relationship has become a topic attracting increasing attention. Though the US and Europe have enhanced their strategic interaction and policy coordination against China’s ascendance, differences between them are still outstanding. The EU would not like to be involved in USled containment of China. Based on its misgivings about the prospect of USEurope relations and its considerations of practical interests in China-Europe relations, the EU seeks greater strategic autonomy. Though the US and Europe have similar interests in some of the areas relating to China and conduct corresponding cooperation, on multilateralism, free trade and safeguarding multilateral trade system there are more common ground between China and Europe. Different from the Trump administration that takes China for “strategic competitor”, the EU does not consider the rise of China a geopolitical challenge. It is unlikely for the EU to change its China engagement strategy with economic and trade relations at the core. If in the future the US increases to check and balance China militarily, it will be conversely possible for the EU to enhance its China engagement so as to play a mediating role between China and the US for lowering the possibility of a China-US conflict.
Conclusion
After the Cold War, it is a megatrend for the transatlantic alliance in the framework of the NATO to degenerate. The deterioration of the transatlantic alliance since Trump became US president stands for further development of this megatrend. However, it does not mean the beginning of the end of USEurope alliance. On top of relatively great consistency of security interests (especially in Europe), strong economic and trade ties and still sound shared value base between the US and Europe continue to play a stabilizing role for US-Europe alliance. Furthermore, since the end of the World War II, the US and Europe have, through interaction over the years, accumulated experience and capacity to handle differences and frictions and control crises and risks, which helps them manage differences and ensure that the alliance remains on basically normal track. US-Europe alliance still undergoes readjustment and change. In the short and mid run, it will keep the posture of more cooperation than competition.