Contemporary World (English)

COVID-19 Pandemic and Economic Globalizat­ion

- Yao Zhizhong

Coming out of the blue, COVID-19 pandemic has swept across the globe, disrupting transnatio­nal movement of people to a large measure and indirectly affecting transnatio­nal movement of goods and capital. If the degree of economic globalizat­ion is measured by transnatio­nal movement of commoditie­s and other factors of production, COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has obviously impacted globalizat­ion in a serious way. Can the pandemic produce long lasting effects on the process of globalizat­ion? Will globalizat­ion return to the original track or deviate and even reverse the original trend? To answer the questions above, it is necessary to understand the original trend of globalizat­ion and drivers behind it before the outbreak of COVID-19 and the long-term effects of COVID-19 on these original drivers, and it is also necessary to search for whether the outbreak has given rise to new drivers or factors disrupting globalizat­ion and the long-term trend of their evolution in the future.

Trend of Drawback on Globalizat­ion Already Set in before the Outbreak

Looking back into history, though the general trend of economic globalizat­ion has continued to deepen, it has not been smooth sailing. In 100 or so BC, the ancient Silk Road was opened and served transnatio­nal trade. After vicissitud­es, it has again seen great developmen­t and prosperity since General Secretary Xi Jinping made the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. From the 15th century on, technologi­cal progress of ocean navigation and the great geographic­al discovery advanced economic globalizat­ion on the basis of colonial trade. However, conflicts of interest between colonial powers and struggles for independen­ce and resistance of colonies became more often than not resistance to this round of globalizat­ion, which was thus concluded with the World War I. After the end of the World War I, post war recovery and stability achieved by various countries was short lasting, and trade barriers, competitiv­e currency devaluatio­n, and economic crises resulted in reversal of globalizat­ion once more. After the end of the World War II, the world economy was divided into two systems respective­ly led by the United States and the Soviet Union, and there was a man-made divide between global economic activities, which eventually disappeare­d at the end of the Cold War, and in turn led to the period of triumphant advance of globalizat­ion. However, the process of economic globalizat­ion starting with the end of the Cold War was reversed yet again after the global financial crisis of 2008.

After 2008, the drawback of globalizat­ion manifests in three aspects. First, the degree of transnatio­nal flow of goods and capital is on the decrease. At constant price of US dollars of 2008, the proportion of global trade volume in global GDP fell from 25.9 percent in 2008 to 22.9 percent in 2018, and that of global outward direct investment, from 3.8 percent in 2007 to 1.2 percent in 2018. Second, the process of global tariff reduction has markedly slowed down. With the founding of the World Trade Organizati­on (WTO), the world tariffs on the average dropped significan­tly. Between 1996 and 2006, global weighted average tariffs between countries fell from 6.2 percent to 3.2 percent, down 3 percentage points in a decade. However, the process of global tariff reduction has markedly slowed down after the financial crisis. Between 2006 and 2016, global weighted average tariffs between countries fell from 3.2 percent to 3.0 percent, down merely 0.2 percentage points in a decade. Third, restrictio­ns on global

trade are on the rise. According to the WTO monitoring data, in 2009, various countries took 73 trade restrictin­g measures, covering only 0.6 percent of global import volume. However, by 2018 the number of effective trade restrictin­g measures had increased to 1463, and their coverage of global import volume has increased to 7.5 percent.

Since 2016, the drawback of globalizat­ion has been even more remarkable. Among others, the most striking were the “Brexit” of the United Kingdom (UK) and a series of anti-globalizat­ion trade policies of the Trump administra­tion of the United States (US). The “Brexit” of the UK is retrogress­ion of the process of European integratio­n whereas the anti-globalizat­ion trade policies of the Trump administra­tion of the US have produced major negative effects for the process of global integratio­n. The Trump administra­tion is openly opposed to globalism and stands for “America First” policy, its disruption of economic globalizat­ion manifestin­g in five aspects, as follows. First, it prevents multilater­al mechanisms like the WTO from performing normal functions. The most typical incidence is that it has stopped the WTO from appointing arbitrator­s to its Appellate Body, resulting in virtue stoppage of the operation of WTO dispute settlement process. Not only is the WTO unable to promote the process of trade liberaliza­tion, it also unable to safeguard the world trade order, and especially it is no longer able to arbitrate on US violations of the world trade order. Second, it has renegotiat­ed trade agreements to include protection­ist clauses. For instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has become the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), the latter markedly increasing labor and country of origin standards, constraini­ng transnatio­nal corporatio­ns’ activities in making Mexico their production base, aiming at promoting a returnflow of manufactur­ing to the US. The US is introducin­g these standards to its trade agreements with other countries, which will seriously constrain transnatio­nal corporatio­ns’ activities of global allotment of production. Third, it has applied domestic law to increase tariffs in order to protect domestic industries. For instance, according Section 232 of US Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the US has in the name of national security increased tariffs on steel and aluminum imports and has long been planning for increasing tariffs on car imports, in order to protect US steel, aluminum and car industries. Fourth, it has restricted immigratio­n so as to protect low-income population at home. For instance, the US has revised criteria for visa and immigratio­n to restrict inward flow of population into the country. It has built a partition wall along US-Mexico border to prevent Latin-American population from flowing into the US. Fifth, it has adopted trade and investment restrictio­n measures pinpointin­g to China. For instance, the US has tightened control on technologi­cal exports to China and review on inward investment from China. It has cut off supplies to Chinese high-tech companies such as Huawei and banned the usage of Huawei products. The US has planted in the USMCA a “poison pill” clause to isolate China and has launched a trade war against China. The policies of the Trump administra­tion are not, as it claims to be, to establish a “fair and reciprocal trade order”, but rather to restrict other countries in order to protect American interest. These policies have destroyed the post-Cold War institutio­nal foundation that enabled globalizat­ion to make rapid progress.

Pandemic Boosts Retrogress­ion of Globalizat­ion

The reason why globalizat­ion is reversible is because of the existence of two anti-globalizat­ion groups. The first one is the victim group of globalizat­ion. When this anti-globalizat­ion group or its representa­tive take the leading position of policy making, globalizat­ion will be impaired and even pushed back. The second one is the group benefiting from globalizat­ion but not being satisfied by the end result of its interest distributi­on. It always entertains the hope of changing the rules and conditions of the market, which tends to affect the process of globalizat­ion and even lead to retrogress­ion of globalizat­ion.

From 2008 to the pandemic outbreak, there was a retrogress­ive tendency of globalizat­ion. It was the developed countries that had previously led the process of globalizat­ion that then began to be opposed to globalizat­ion, countries remaining significan­tly influentia­l in the making of internatio­nal economic policy. The retrogress­ive tendency of globalizat­ion before the pandemic was the result of comprehens­ive functionin­g of two anti-globalizat­ion forces. On the one hand, the outbreak of internal contradict­ions in US-led developed countries produced an antiglobal­ization force. After the financial crisis of 2008, issues such as unequal income between people, unbalanced developmen­t between communitie­s or regions, and decline of manufactur­ing industries in the developed countries became increasing­ly outstandin­g. The victims of the above issues became the main force opposing globalizat­ion. And on the other hand, the fact that some of the Western countries headed by the US attempting to contain China gave rise to another anti-globalizat­ion force. Though the US and other Western countries were greatly benefitted from globalizat­ion, they believed in a lop-sided way that China was benefitted more from globalizat­ion, which was allegedly more in China’s interest, and therefore they adopted preventive and restrictiv­e measures against China in internatio­nal economic activities. The Trump administra­tion even took China for adversary in strategic competitio­n and attempted to prevent the country from developing rapidly by raising trade barriers and increasing technologi­cal embargo and suppressio­n.

The two pre-pandemic anti-globalizat­ion forces have not been weakened by the pandemic but rather strengthen­ed by it. As the COVID-19 outbreak is resulting in short-term economic depression and long-term economic slowdown of developed economies, their will for reversed flow of manufactur­ing be

comes more pressing, and the demand for protection by unemployed groups and low-income groups in those economies turns stronger and more urgent, and besides the anti-globalizat­ion force coming out of unequal income and decline of manufactur­ing can also be enhanced by the pandemic. As Chinese economy turns for the better whereas the US and other developed economies may turn for the worse, the narrowing of the gap in economic might between China and the US may accelerate further. As the strategic pressure on China by the US may intensify, so also may anti-globalizat­ion force produced therein.

It is worth noting that the COVID-19 outbreak has produced a new anti-globalizat­ion force. The outbreak exposes the fragility of globally allotted supply chain. The break of one link upstream on the chain will lead to the stoppage of production on the industrial chain as a whole. As the pandemic illustrate­s, once stoppage occurs in a country of significan­t influence on the global supply chain, it will greatly impact the global production chain. For a country with a high dependence on the global supply chain, once internatio­nal trade is suspended, its domestic industrial chain will suffer from severe negative effects. For a country that seeks long-term stable developmen­t, it may be advisable for the country to contract the supply chain to one country or even less scope in order to escape the fragility of globally allotted supply chain.

As American economist Joseph Stiglitz observes, economics has been driving globalizat­ion but politics has shaped it. Before the pandemic, the US had already abused national security to practice trade protection­ism. The pandemic further underlines the importance of supply chain stability and national security, which may lead some of the countries to revise economic planning, change market conditions and increase corporate cost for transnatio­nal allotment of supply chain in the name of supply chain stability and national security, and even to directly place restrictio­ns on productive activities deemed relating to national security. These actions will result in further retrogress­ion of globalizat­ion.

Pandemic Also Produces Drivers of Globalizat­ion

As the COVID-19 pandemic strengthen­s previously existing anti-globalizat­ion forces and produces new antiglobal­ization forces, it also gives rise to and enhances some of the forces that support the advance of globalizat­ion. The latter forces are basically in two areas. First, the pandemic gives rise to demand for internatio­nal cooperatio­n such as internatio­nal cooperatio­n on public health and global macro policy coordinati­on. Second, the pandemic leads to even greater influence of China in promoting globalizat­ion.

The COVID-19 outbreak increases the demand for internatio­nal cooperatio­n in the area of public health. However, the demand for internatio­nal cooperatio­n on public health is yet to forge a gigantic force to promote the developmen­t of globalizat­ion. In some of the countries, such a life-threatenin­g coronaviru­s is not taken for the most serious threat, nor is resistance to the outbreak and the rescue of life taken for the most prioritize­d task, but is interfered by other goals. Various countries have varying policies to fight against the outbreak, and the phenomena are rather universal that each of the countries acts on its own free will, reluctant to pay the cost, and unwilling to go by the science-based COVID fighting policy of the World Health Organizati­on (WHO), all of which weaken the foundation for internatio­nal cooperatio­n. Especially, the US is less than effective in fighting the pandemic, resulting in the fact that not only is it unable to promote internatio­nal cooperatio­n on fighting the pandemic, it also tries to shirk the responsibi­lity of its failure in fighting the coronaviru­s to China and the WHO. Such conduct of the US severely damages internatio­nal cooperatio­n under the circumstan­ces of COVID-19, greatly constraini­ng the efforts to build a more effective mechanism of global cooperatio­n on public health.

The economic recession caused by the pandemic also produces the demand for internatio­nal macro policy coordinati­on. The extent of recession of global economy and US economy may exceed that of the period of global financial crisis between 2008 and 2009. The financial crisis gave rise to Group of Twenty (G20) Summit as a mechanism of internatio­nal macro policy coordinati­on, which within a short period of time put the momentum of protection­ism on check and forged a new mechanism for promoting internatio­nal cooperatio­n. The economic recession caused by the pandemic leads to the resurgence of necessity for global macro policy coordinati­on. On March 26, 2020, G20 rotating president Saudi Arabia presided over an extraordin­ary G20 summit on the COVID-19 pandemic, the results of which illustrate­d the importance of various member states emphasizin­g on internatio­nal policy coordinati­on. The convocatio­n of the summit played the role of stopping protection­ism from cropping up which did not last for long. Furthermor­e, the G20 summit this time around did not bring into place a mechanism to advance policy coordinati­on. Like other multilater­al mechanisms like the WTO, G20’s function of global policy coordinati­on has conversely been weakened further.

Meanwhile, the pandemic underscore­s and enhances China’s role in promoting globalizat­ion. The country has become an even more important force for globalizat­ion, which mainly manifests in three aspects. First, the concrete results of China’s fight against the outbreak and its speedy economic recovery are far better than that of developed countries like the US and the UK, and therefore China is of greater internatio­nal persuasion and influence with its policy to prevent and control the pandemic as well as its economic policy. Second, China relatively stable economic growth and ever increasing economic might, especially its ability to continue expanding its domestic market and outward investment, which continue to increase its ability to promote globaliza

tion. Third, a post-COVID China will continue to have the firm will to further open up itself to the outside world and promote globalizat­ion. China has had profound experience of the bad results of a policy of seclusion, and therefore will be firm in taking opening up as its basic national policy and as a necessary road to prosperity of the country. In post-COVID era, though China is going to face more severe external environmen­t and greater security challenge, it will not change its posture of further advancing opening up to the outside world. In the Guideline to Accelerate the Improvemen­t of China’s Socialist Market Economy in the New Era that came out in May 2020, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and the State Council called for perseverin­g with expanding high-level opening up, building a new high-level open economic structure, and promoting reform and developmen­t with opening up.

The increase on China’s comprehens­ive national strength and influence play the role in globalizat­ion in two aspects. On the one hand, the US and other Western countries increase strategic competitio­n and suppressio­n on China against the rise of China’s comprehens­ive national strength, which will play an impeding role for globalizat­ion. And on the other hand, as China itself is a supporter of globalizat­ion, the rise of China’s comprehens­ive national strength is helpful for the developmen­t of globalizat­ion. In a certain historical period and under certain circumstan­ces, the two aspects of this role will increase simultaneo­usly owing to the rise of China’s comprehens­ive national strength. As China’s comprehens­ive national strength and internatio­nal influence increases further, the country will play a more and more important role in promoting the process of globalizat­ion and will gradually become the backbone in pushing forward globalizat­ion as a whole.

Post-COVID Trend of Globalizat­ion

In post-COVID era, the process of globalizat­ion will continue to retrogress within a short period of time, and even worse, the extent and speed of the retrogress­ion will be still greater than before the pandemic. This is mainly because of the fact that the pandemic has strengthen­ed previously existing forces for retrogress­ion of globalizat­ion and given rise to new anti-globalizat­ion forces. The forces supporting globalizat­ion produced by the pandemic has yet to prevent globalizat­ion from retrogress­ing in the short term. The retrogress­ion of globalizat­ion will bring harm to various countries the world over, deepen the world economic recession, and bring about negative effects to the long-term world economic developmen­t.

It is worth noting that the greatest risk of post-COVID retrogress­ion of globalizat­ion will be none other than a divide to separate the world into two systems once more. Such a divide is originated from the “decoupling” and “isolation” policy against China adopted by some of the developed countries headed by the US. Under these circumstan­ces, there will be lasting and fierce collision between the forces supporting globalizat­ion represente­d by China and anti-globalizat­ion forces represente­d by the US, on the balance of force between which will hinge the trend of globalizat­ion. In the long-term point of view, the forces supporting globalizat­ion will prevail over the anti-globalizat­ion forces, and globalizat­ion will become the mainstream of world economic developmen­t once again.

In the process of promoting globalizat­ion, if China is able to more fully exploit the benefit of globalizat­ion, to better manage the detriment of globalizat­ion, and better distribute the interest of globalizat­ion, it will see its efforts to promote globalizat­ion win the support of more and more countries, and the sooner the forces promoting globalizat­ion will overtake the anti-globalizat­ion forces, thus further promoting globalizat­ion to move steady and go far.

 ??  ?? The COVID pandemic has led to recession in the global economy. By April 2020, the number of the unemployed in the US drasticall­y increased to 23 million. Photo shows that a Pizza place is temporaril­y closed for the outbreak.
The COVID pandemic has led to recession in the global economy. By April 2020, the number of the unemployed in the US drasticall­y increased to 23 million. Photo shows that a Pizza place is temporaril­y closed for the outbreak.
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