ASEAN’s Myanmar plan deserves support
Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently said that China supports ASEAN to play an active role in the Myanmar issue in his phone calls with Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi and Brunei's Second Minister of Foreign Affairs Erywan bin Pehin Yusof. Why has China supported an “ASEAN way” to solve the Myanmar conundrum? And what signal is China sending with it?
China's position and attitude toward the situation in Myanmar are clear: China hopes that the current situation in Myanmar will be eased soon. It hopes that all parties involved will start a dialogue quickly to resolve the issue peacefully within legal frameworks.
There is actually a very big similarity between China's and ASEAN's attitude in this regard. The similarity can be found in statements made on the Myanmar issue by ASEAN countries, including Brunei, Singapore and Indonesia. For example, on Thursday, the foreign ministers of Singapore and Indonesia expressed their hope that there will be a peaceful resolution and national reconciliation in Myanmar.
The principle of non- interference is what ASEAN has always upheld. However, ASEAN will also require and expect Myanmar, one of its members, to comply with the ASEAN Charter and many action plans for the realization of the ASEAN Community. For instance, the ASEAN PoliticalSecurity Community blueprint envisages that ASEAN members shall promote political development while adhering to principles of democracy. It is believed that ASEAN will demand that the Myanmar military hold general elections as promised and hand over power to a democratically elected government.
In general, ASEAN'S attitude on the Myanmar issue is similar to and consistent with China's stance. The West now is exerting enormous public opinion pressure on Beijing over this crisis. Slanders and rumors are swirling online that Beijing is supporting and helping the Myanmar military in the aftermath of the political upheaval on February 1. In this context, China has shown support for ASEAN to play a central and more positive role in regional affairs, especially in regards to the Myanmar issue, this, in a sense, could divert pressure from China. The Myanmar upheaval is after all an internal issue of ASEAN members. Thus, ASEAN is in a more suitable position to have a say on the affairs. China and ASEAN's position on the Myanmar issue is very different from that of the West. The two are calling for a peaceful settlement. Meanwhile, the West is imposing sanctions on Myanmar. ASEAN countries have national conditions similar to Myanmar and are facing similar developmental problems. Therefore, ASEAN knows well what Myanmar really needs. Western sanctions cannot help the country out of this quagmire. They are only wedges for Western countries to wield influence on Myanmar.
Western countries actually care nothing but promoting Western democratic values and political systems in Myanmar. The National League for Democracy government under Aung San Suu Kyi didn't tilt toward the West as they had initially expected. The current upheaval in Myanmar in fact has provided a renewed opportunity for the West to intervene in Myanmar's internal issues and vie for influence in the country.
Therefore, we can see why they have unleashed a wave of sanctions. But what real results will these sanctions really bring? As Singaporean Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan said on February 16, sanctions will hurt ordinary people in Myanmar the most.
Promoting internal dialogues is needed to tackle the root cause of Myanmar's puzzles. ASEAN members are proposing to convene an informal meeting of foreign ministers on the current Myanmar crisis. This can be described as routine, as the bloc has taken similar steps with the Rohingya crisis. And while it cannot fundamentally resolve the issue, it is at least promoting relevant agendas.
ASEAN can also take other measures in the future, such as sending special envoys to talk with the Myanmar military and other parties. China has already expressed support for the ASEAN special foreign ministers' meeting. China has close ties with all parties in Myanmar. If China is required to support ASEAN in conducting more mediation work in the future, it is believed China will also be supportive within its capacity.
European political elites who hold the power are likely to potentially complicate the world’s big- power competition.
Last Thursday, European Commission issued a trade policy review. This document might be the first one that systemically explains the strategic visions of current EU executive leadership for handling foreign economic relations. It also holds the potential to establish an overall framework for policy- making of the next five years in trade, technology, industry, investment, and strategic planning. Highlighting the top leadership’s long- term anxieties and concerns, it discloses three inherent dichotomies.
First, it indicates why EU policymakers are “assertive in defending their interests” as they keep up hope to manage globalization by mending the multilateral architecture of global governance – even as it slows down.
In other words, ds, they want both “fair” and “free” trade, and are formulating stronger protectionist measures to fend off imports that may threaten their own manufacturing sectors. At the same time, they are expressing detailed opinions on how to repair the WTO system. However, the “political trilemma” of the world economy, coined by economist Dani Rodrik, is already showing the intrinsic structural discord taking place within trade liberalization.
The parallel moves of assertive trade defense instruments and political efforts to revive the WTO may create disharmony in the EU’s overall blueprint. This may ultimately harm their aim to fulfill objectives. Even within Europe’s domestic politics, business interests that advocate free trade and grassroots voices that call for more protections are in conflict with each other. Second, this dynamic also manifests the EU’s strategic tight- rope balancing act between China and the US. Clearly, the polarization between Beijing and Washington weights heavily on their decision making process. In fact, EU leaders view the ri rise of China as one of the maj major “trends” shaping “global un uncertainty” and “tensions.” Thi This could be int interpreted as one of th the greatest ch challenges th the EU faces. A And they int intend to deal w with China through both “engagement” and “au autonomous” protective policy instruments.
Europe’s competitive moves with both China and US have seen greater intensity, especially as the old continent seeks greater share in third- party markets and more leading edges in technology.
Inevitably, in future, the EU will be even more heavily pressed by and deeply entangled into the destabilizing contentions of these two giants.
Third, EU leaders may have to cautiously deal with possible internal divergences as the continent devises its own “open strategic autonomy.” In this age of disruption and uncertainty, the EU is making endeavors to increase its capacity to be self- determined by its own actions. While the European Commission is moving to centralize more resources for decision- making ( particularly in fields related to industrial strategies), it is also faced with potential tensions between the EU large and member states for a proper division of power and jurisdictions that satisfies both sides.
Although it is undisputed that traditional trade policies and external trade negotiations are well within the EU’s exclusive authority, this document recognizes that trade policy of this new age is widely implicated to strategic planning and geopolitics in a much broader picture.
Therefore, divergences between EU and its member states may unavoidably occur over how to divide or share decision- making power and authority on many specific issues. In this process, the overall effect may weaken its capacity to act as a whole. Indeed, it may exacerbate existing rich- poor and eastern- western divides within different member states themselves. This implies that the EU may or may not follow a straightforward path for developing its external economic relations.
Lastly, the European Commission document claims that EU trade policy shall support its “geopolitical interests” and “ambitions.” In this sense, it is reasonable to anticipate that the EU will attempt to manage its relations with big powers such as China and the US through trade or other economic means, and new tactics or strategies of economic statecraft from its political elites. But this belies the innate contradictions and elusive ambivalence of these dichotomies – particularly as the ever- intensifying big- power strategic rivalry bears down. Simply said, it is likely that global geopolitics will turn out to be ever more unpredictable.
The author is professor and executive director of the Center for European Union Studies, Shanghai International Studies University. opinion@ globaltimes. com. cn