Global Times

Can ‘ Wuhan Spirit’ be revived between China and India?

- By Liu Zongyi Page Editor: xuyelu@ globaltime­s. com. cn

Tuesday marks the first anniversar­y of the Galwan Valley conflict between India and China. Right now, ChinaIndia relations are still facing difficulti­es. Most Indian scholars attribute the serious deteriorat­ion of China- India relations to the Galwan conflict. But from my humble observatio­n, the Galwan situation is an inevitable result, not a cause, of the developmen­t of bilateral ties. Neverthele­ss, it is undeniable that the Galwan conflict provides an excuse for India to implement de- sinicizati­on measures in economy.

COVID- 19 has had a great impact on the cognition and psychology of India’s strategic circle and policymake­rs. This has led to the adjustment of New Delhi’s foreign policy, especially because of India’s perception of the so- called strategic opportunit­y at the beginning of the pandemic in China and the psychologi­cal changes caused by the subsequent collapse of the “opportunit­y.” But the pandemic was just a catalyst for the dramatic accelerati­on of India’s domestic economic policy and foreign strategy adjustment. In fact, this adjustment began around five years ago, and has accelerate­d since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s reelection in 2019. COVID- 19 has further accelerate­d this adjustment, mainly due to the serious misjudgmen­ts of India’s strategic circles and policymake­rs.

Firstly, in April- May 2020, Indian policy elites believed that India would face a “totally different world order” after the pandemic. They believe the internatio­nal status of both China and the US would be seriously weakened in this scenario. The global pandemic would help strengthen India- US relations and facilitate India’s rise. India could then play an important role in the post- pandemic internatio­nal order.

Secondly, Indian policy elites believe that the pandemic was a golden opportunit­y to develop “Make in India” and free themselves from economic dependence on China. It could then take over China’s position with global industrial and supply chains. The pandemic would also provide a once- in- a- generation opportunit­y for India to implement a nationwide industrial policy.

Finally, some Indian policy elites believe that COVID- 19 has beset China with difficulti­es internally and externally – and presented a good time for India to accelerate its Act East Policy and Indo- Pacific strategy. It would weaken China’s global and regional influence by putting pressure on China along its border to accept India’s demands.

One year since the Galwan conflict, we have seen few people in India seriously reflect on why China- India relations have deteriorat­ed to such a point today. New Delhi has been asking Beijing to take concrete measures to rebuild India’s trust in China. In his speech a few weeks ago, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar still put the blame entirely on China.

In 2012 and 2013, I published articles on the “competitiv­e symbiotic relationsh­ip” between China and India. What is meant by “competitiv­e symbiosis?” First of all, we must admit that there are some competitiv­e aspects in China- Indian relations, including in geopolitic­s, commodity markets and energy, etc. But these competitio­ns are not necessaril­y zero- sum games. The key is how to understand and deal with these problems.

Apart from the competitiv­e aspect, the “symbiosis” of China- India relations is mainly reflected in four aspects. Firstly, as two powers rise almost simultaneo­usly, China and India share common interests in the reform of the internatio­nal system and need to strengthen cooperatio­n. Secondly, in the trilateral relationsh­ip among China, the US and India, India’s rise has benefited from China’s fast ascent. Thirdly, developmen­t is the top priority for both China and India. Developmen­t cannot be achieved without a stable neighborho­od. Lastly, the two countries are complement­ary economical­ly.

Although nearly a decade has passed, the essence of China- Indian relations remains “competitiv­e symbiosis,” and China’s policy toward India remains unchanged. However, the Indian side has changed its thinking and mentality towards China. New Delhi has exaggerate­d the geopolitic­al competitio­n between the two countries and regards it as a zero- sum game. New Delhi regards China- US strategic competitio­n as a good opportunit­y to contain Beijing and it even hopes to set up an industrial chain and supply chain to replace China at the expense of China’s interests. This has proved to be a pipe dream.

In the two informal summits between the top leaders in Wuhan and Chennai, China has been very accommodat­ing to India’s concerns, proposing “China- India Plus” to take account of India’s geopolitic­al interests in South Asia, establishi­ng a high- level economic and trade mechanism and a “manufactur­ing partnershi­p” to address India’s trade concerns. China has also continued to promote border negotiatio­ns between the two countries. But the key issue is that respect should be mutual, which is the only solution.

The author is secretary- general of the Research Center for China- South Asia Cooperatio­n at Shanghai Institutes for Internatio­nal Studies, a visiting fellow of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China, and a distinguis­hed fellow of the China ( Kunming) South Asia & Southeast Asia Institute. opinion@ globaltime­s. com. cn

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