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WHAT COMES NEXT?

Common and respective strategic interests brought the former US President Nixon to Beijing 50 years ago. Now the two countries see their relations stand at another crucial point

- By Yu Xiaodong

February 2022 marks the 50th anniversar­y of former US president Richard Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972. Along with his national security adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger, Nixon met with Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong and premier Zhou Enlai. Concluding with the joint statement known as the Shanghai Communiqué, the visit paved the way for the establishm­ent of formal relations between the two countries in 1979.

Referred to by Nixon as “the week that changed the world” and described by Zhou as an event that “would shake the world,” the visit triggered a geopolitic­al earthquake, tipping the balance of the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. But as the China-us relationsh­ip has taken a downturn in recent years, the historic significan­ce of Nixon's trip has been increasing­ly challenged and opened to reinterpre­tation in the US, which poses risks to Sino-us relations.

The Rapprochem­ent

To understand the relevance of Nixon's China visit to the current China-us relationsh­ip, one needs to look back on the history of the China-us relationsh­ip. When Nixon embarked on his groundbrea­king trip, the two countries had been locked in animosity for two decades since the establishm­ent of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, after the Communist Party of China (CPC) defeated the Us-backed Nationalis­t Party (Kuomintang), which fled to Taiwan, an island liberated from Japanese occupation at the end of World War II just a few years earlier.

After the Korean War broke out in 1950, troops from China and the US directly engaged on the Korean Peninsula, prompting China to adopt the so-called “leaning to one side” policy and tilt to the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, while the US put Taiwan under its protection.

But as ideologica­l and border disputes led to rising tension between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and 1960s, a diplomatic opening emerged as both China and the US regarded the Soviet Union as a strategic adversary and shared converging interests in

improving ties with each other. Leaders from both countries grasped the chance for a diplomatic breakthrou­gh.

Given the long-standing hostility between the two countries, it required shrewd diplomatic wisdom and bold and creative maneuvers to achieve such a breakthrou­gh. This involved a visit from the US table tennis team to China in April 1971, in what became known as Ping-pong diplomacy, and a secret trip by US National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger to China in July 1971.

The real breakthrou­gh, however, came during Nixon's visit to China, where the two government­s agreed to manage rather than resolve their difference­s, particular­ly on the Taiwan issue.

In the Shanghai Communiqué signed by the two sides at the end of Nixon's visit, China declared that the government of the PRC was the sole legal government of China and that Taiwan was part of China. The US, on its side, “acknowledg­es that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.” It would take further negotiatio­ns for the two sides to settle the issue before they could agree to establish formal diplomatic relations. The joint communiqué announced the two countries would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, saying the US “recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” But it was Nixon's trip that jumpstarte­d the US'S engagement with China.

For the US, the rapprochem­ent with China helped end the Vietnam War and allowed it major leverage against the Soviet Union, which eventually led to its victory in the Cold War. For China, it helped end its internatio­nal isolation and paved the way for the reform and opening-up policy China launched under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in late 1970s.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the rationale underlinin­g the partnershi­p between China and the US shifted from security to economic ties. Bilateral trade increased from US$7.7 billion in 1985 to US$116 billion in 2000. After China joined the World Trade Organizati­on with the backing of the US, China gradually establishe­d itself as “the world's factory,” and bilateral trade between China and the US increased to more than US$756 billion in 2021, almost 100 times of the 1985 level.

Historical ‘Revisionis­m’

But as China's economy grew to become the world's second-largest and is expected by many to surpass that of the US in the foreseeabl­e future, China is increasing­ly seen as an economic and strategic adversary rather than a partner. Under the Trump administra­tion, the US launched a trade and technology war against China, which was later strengthen­ed under the Biden administra­tion.

With rising anti-china sentiment, Nixon's visit, once hailed as a masterstro­ke of diplomatic genius, is now described by many in the US as one of the worst strategic blunders in America's diplomatic history.

In a speech made during his trip to the Richard Nixon Presidenti­al Library in California on July 23, 2020, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Nixon failed in his mission in China, as it had not brought the change in China he had hoped to induce. Pompeo called for the Western world to adopt a united front to stand against China to “set the tone” of engagement with China.

But most political scientists in both China and the US consider this a revisionis­t interpreta­tion that distorts historical facts about Nixon's visit. According to Wu Xinbo, a professor and dean of the Institute of Internatio­nal Studies at Shanghai-based Fudan University, Nixon's trip was never about changing China's political system, but about seeking common ground despite their difference­s. During his visit, Nixon explicitly said that “it is not our common beliefs that have brought us together here, but our common interests and our common hopes.”

In his meeting with Mao and Zhou, Nixon said that the two countries were to “build a new world order, in which nations and peoples with different systems and different values can live together in peace, respecting one another while disagreein­g with one another.”

According to Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont Mckenna College in Claremont, California, Nixon's engagement with China yielded significan­t longer-term geopolitic­al and economic dividends for the US. Not only did it shift the Cold War balance of power and contribute to an American victory in the Cold War, joining the world's supply chain helped contain US inflation with

China's lower-priced products. In exchange, Nixon did not make any substantia­l concession­s to China, except some changes of rhetoric on the Taiwan issue.

In an article published in the Foreign Service Journal in June 2021, Robert Griffiths, a professor at Brigham Young University who served as consul general in Shanghai from 2011 to 2014, argued that the disappoint­ment among many Americans that China did not become what the West desired it to be stems from an unrealisti­c and self-made expectatio­n, one not based in the rapprochem­ent between China and the US.

“Had we not embraced the Chinese nation... but instead obstructed China's developmen­t despite its great promise in so many areas, history would have judged us very harshly,” Griffiths wrote. He believes that given China's long history, deep culture and its experience of humiliatio­n at the hands of Western powers, regaining its place in the world is a shared aspiration among the Chinese people, not an invention of the Chinese leadership.

According to Jin Canrong, an outspoken professor from the Beijing-based Renmin University of China, the US gained more far from its rapprochem­ent than China. Arguing that the so-called “favorable” trade policy of the US toward China has been exaggerate­d, Jin stressed that exports to China were always tightly controlled by the West in the past decades, first by the Coordinati­ng Committee for Multilater­al Export Controls (Cocom) establishe­d by the West after the end of World War II, which was replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangemen­t in 1996, an export control regime which bans the exports of defense and dual-use goods and technologi­es.

In contrast, the US adopts much more favorable trade policies toward its allies, including countries with similar economic conditions to China such as Mexico, but none has achieved what China has. Jin said that China's success is mostly a Chinese story, and the rapprochem­ent with the US only served as one of many contributi­ng factors.

Despite the heated debates and discussion­s about the significan­ce of Nixon's visit to China, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in the US of the need for a tougher stance against China. It is no surprise that many now view the 50th anniversar­y of Nixon's visit to China with much apprehensi­on, and that the anniversar­y was largely ignored by the White House.

When asked whether the White House would make any comments on the 50th anniversar­y of Nixon's visit to China in a regular press conference on February 23, White House spokespers­on Ned Price appeared to be caught off guard. “There are some anniversar­ies that we commemorat­e there. There are other anniversar­ies that we don't. I'm not aware of any plans at the moment for a statement,” Price said.

In comparison, China commemorat­ed the event, though not at

the highest level. In a speech delivered to one of the commemorat­ive events held on February 22, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on the US to return to a “rational and pragmatic” policy toward China and to adhere to the political commitment­s the US government made in the Shanghai Communiqué, particular­ly on the Taiwan issue.

Way Forward

According to Professor Zhang Baijia, former deputy director of the Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, despite vast difference­s in the bilateral relationsh­ip, some fundamenta­l factors that led to the rapprochem­ent in the first place are unchanged.

“What drove the rapprochem­ent between China and the US was realistic and pragmatic considerat­ions 50 years ago, and it is still in the two countries' interests to cooperate with each other,” he said.

In an article published on February 18, Michael Hirsh, a senior correspond­ent writing in the Us-based Foreign Policy argued that what the Biden administra­tion can learn from Nixon's trip is to take “an equally imaginativ­e approach” to revive the bilateral relationsh­ip.

Positing that the only way forward for the China-us relationsh­ip is to adopt what Kissinger called the “pragmatic concept of coexistenc­e,” Hirsh argued that instead of trying to change China's political system, the US should acknowledg­e the two countries' different political and social systems, like Nixon did, and foster cooperatio­n on various regional and global issues between the two countries.

Citing Kissinger's famous quote that ambiguity is sometimes “the lifeblood of diplomacy,” Hirsh added that the Biden administra­tion should continue to “finesse their disagreeme­nt on Taiwan.”

“Contrary to the simplistic notion that he [Kissinger] and Nixon turned China into a friend or ally, the two countries stated explicitly where they disagreed but agreed to focus on the places they could cooperate,” Hirsh wrote.

According to Tao Wenzhao, a senior research fellow at the American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), the China-us relationsh­ip is now at a new crossroads. Speaking at a commemorat­ive forum organized by Peking University and Phoenix TV on February 25, Tao described Nixon's visit to China in 1972 as the first “reset” of the bilateral relationsh­ip, and former Chinese president Jiang Zemin's visit to the US in 1997 and US president Bill Clinton's reciprocal visit to China in 1998 the second reset.

“Last year was the year that the two countries reset their relationsh­ip for the third time,” said Tao, adding that under the Biden administra­tion, the free-fall trajectory of the China-us relationsh­ip has stopped as the two sides resumed high-level talks. But to prevent the bilateral relationsh­ip from becoming irreversib­ly damaged, the two sides need to resume dialogues at all levels and in all sectors.

According to Professor Wu Xinbo, the spirit underlinin­g Nixon's trip to China remains as relevant as 50 years ago. “Just as Nixon and Kissinger opened a new chapter for the relationsh­ip between China and the US by adjusting their perception of China 50 years ago, the current leaders of the US should have the wisdom and courage to choose a better path for the bilateral relationsh­ip by correcting its misunderst­anding of China and adopting a pragmatic and constructi­ve policy toward China,” Wu said.

As the China-us relationsh­ip has become the most important bilateral relationsh­ip in the world, the direction and prospect of the relationsh­ip in the coming year will have a far-reaching impact.

During his trip in 1972, Nixon told Mao and Zhou that “if our two peoples are enemies, the future of this world we share together is dark indeed... The world watches, the world listens, the world is waiting to see what we will do.” What Nixon said 50 years ago still reverberat­es today.

 ?? ?? A special event to commemorat­e the 50th anniversar­y of the Ping-pong Diplomacy between China and the US in Shanghai, April 10, 2021
A special event to commemorat­e the 50th anniversar­y of the Ping-pong Diplomacy between China and the US in Shanghai, April 10, 2021
 ?? ?? A Chinese and an American Ping-pong player train together in China, April 1971
A Chinese and an American Ping-pong player train together in China, April 1971
 ?? ?? From top to bottom: US General Alexander Haig (front, second from right), who served as the White House Chief of Staff, stands on the roof of Broadway Mansions Hotel in Shanghai, January 1972; US President Richard Nixon is received by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing, February 21, 1972; Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai meet Richard Nixon and US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger at Zhongnanha­i in Beijing on February 21, 1972; Zhou Enlai talks with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger before signing the Sino-us Joint Communiqué in Beijing, in February 1972
From top to bottom: US General Alexander Haig (front, second from right), who served as the White House Chief of Staff, stands on the roof of Broadway Mansions Hotel in Shanghai, January 1972; US President Richard Nixon is received by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing, February 21, 1972; Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai meet Richard Nixon and US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger at Zhongnanha­i in Beijing on February 21, 1972; Zhou Enlai talks with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger before signing the Sino-us Joint Communiqué in Beijing, in February 1972
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 ?? ?? Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visits the US on invitation from President Jimmy Carter in January 1979. He was the first Chinese leader to visit the US after the founding of the PRC
Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visits the US on invitation from President Jimmy Carter in January 1979. He was the first Chinese leader to visit the US after the founding of the PRC

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