India risks Russian ties in drift to the West over China

Danil Bochkov says New Delhi could endanger its autonomy by joining more US-led initiatives

India and Russia recently agreed to launch a “two-plus-two” foreign and defence dialogue, an important milestone in relations.

Russia has joined an exclusive clique of Australia, Japan and the United States in enjoying interactions with India in this two-plus-two format. It speaks volumes of India’s attempts to diversify its foreign policy planning while pursuing strategic autonomy in relations with major powers.

With the rise of the Quad and India’s participation in the grouping, as well as its place in US President Joe Biden’s IndoPacific strategy, New Delhi has shown its inclination towards the US-led Western world. This Cold War cliché re-established its significance with Biden’s initiative to coalesce like-minded states for competition “between the utility of democracies in the 21st century and autocracies”, the latter represented by China and Russia.

India remains economically reliant on China – the source of India’s biggest trade deficit, which stood at nearly US$50 billion last year. Feeling China’s mounting military might in addition to that economic dependence, India has prioritised self-reliance and reduced imports while approaching China as a menacing challenge. The acrimony has grown since the deadly border clash last year, with no signs of rapprochement. China-India relations hit a new low after a Communist Party organ posted an image on social media mocking India’s struggle with the latest wave of Covid-19. An editorial in China’s Global Times, while showing some sympathy for the grave situation in India, stressed that Delhi “has indeed done something wrong towards China … [and] still holds a grudge and remains narrow-minded”.

India showed an adversarial stance towards China last August amid a fierce escalation of tensions, banning 59 Chinese apps from some of the country’s leading hi-tech giants from its local app stores. That number had risen by 118 by September, leading Beijing to lash out at Delhi with thorny remarks and urge it to “rectify its wrongful conduct”.

India is now showing a pattern of behaviour seen elsewhere. It is excluding Huawei and ZTE from taking part in 5G trials by citing national security concerns, which dovetails with US attempts to rally allies against Chinese telecoms providers.

In another sign of strained relations, President Xi Jinping has not spoken directly to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Xi has held phone conversations with leaders of other major countries while maintaining a near-monthly dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Unlike its cool relations with Beijing, Delhi tends to court warmer ties with Moscow to buttress its strategic autonomy. Russia is a more comfortable partner for India than China as their relations lack mutual political claims and have less asymmetric economic interactions.

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s April visit to India aimed to streamline bilateral relations by easing misunderstandings. Delhi tried to soothe Moscow’s concerns over its participation in the US-facilitated Quad and reassure Russia of its inclusive understanding of Indo-Pacific strategy.

Highlighting the deep strategic trust of both states, Lavrov said Russia was “the only country that transfers cutting-edge technologies to India”. Indian imports of Russian military hardware constitute about half its military purchases.

While being far from neutral in relations with China, Delhi seems to be pursuing a more cooperative approach with Russia. This helped Moscow serve as a comfortable venue for China and India to start disengagement talks over Ladakh.

Still, India’s ties with Russia could come under strain as Delhi becomes more involved in US-led initiatives, including attending the G7 ministers’ meeting in London as a guest participant. The summit voiced criticism of “Russia’s irresponsible and destabilising behaviour” as well China’s “human rights violations and abuses” and “coercive economic policies”.

With Russian-Chinese detente growing stronger and the “China factor” becoming more apparent in Moscow-Delhi interactions, with the former blaming the West for attempts to lure Delhi into “antiChina games”, India’s neutrality towards Russia could gradually fade. This could end up costing India its strategic autonomy, over which Lavrov voiced concerns in December. To avoid such a scenario, Delhi might wish to peacefully mitigate its border dispute with China and pursue balanced dialogue with Russia and its Western allies to stop the pendulum swinging to either side.

While being far from neutral in relations with China, Delhi seems to be pursuing a more cooperative approach with Russia